

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
DIRECTORATE OF REGULATORY OPERATIONS
REGION III
799 ROOSEVELT ROAD
GLEN ELLYN, ILLINOIS 60137

January 27, 1975

Wisconsin Public Service Corporation
ATTN: Mr. E. W. James, Senior Vice President
Power Generation and Engineering
P.O. Box 1200
Green Bay, Wisconsin 54305

Docket No. 50-305

Gentlemen:

Enclosed is IE Bulletin No. 74-10B which is forwarded to you for information.

Should you have questions regarding this Bulletin, please contact this office.

Sincerely yours,

James G. Keppler
Regional Director

Enclosure:
IE Bulletin No. 74-10B

bcc: DR Central Files
RO Files
PDR
Local PDR
OGC, Beth, P-506A



80 R.
(2)

January 27, 1975
IE Bulletin No. 74-10B

FAILURES IN 4-INCH BYPASS PIPING AT DRESDEN-2
(REFERENCE: RO BULLETINS NO. 74-10, DATED SEPTEMBER 19, 1974
AND NO. 74-10A, DATED DECEMBER 17, 1974)

DESCRIPTION OF CIRCUMSTANCES (AMENDED):

Cracks similar to those described in RO Bulletins 74-10 and 74-10A have been revealed during reexamination of the 4-inch bypass piping at five boiling water reactor facilities (including Dresden-2) since mid-December 1974. All the facilities are of jet-pump design. In each instance where cracks have been revealed, the same welds had been examined previously (during September-November 1974) and no cracks were revealed at that time.

A special study group, comprised of key technical members of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff, is currently studying the causes of the cracks which have been experienced. Consultants from other government agencies are also participating in the study.

In the interim, pending recommendations of the Commission's special study group, additional actions are necessary by licensees to insure continued close surveillance of reactor coolant leakage.

ACTIONS REQUESTED OF LICENSEES (AMENDED):

For all boiling water reactor facilities of jet-pump design with operating license:

1. Upon completion of those actions described in RO Bulletin 74-10A, implement the following reactor coolant leakage detection program:

If (within the sensitivity specified in paragraph C.5. of Regulatory Guide 1.45) any reactor coolant leakage detection system indicates, within a period of 4 hours or less, either an increase in unidentified leakage to twice the determined normal rate of unidentified leakage or an increase in the rate of unidentified leakage by two (2.0) gpm or more:

- a. Initiate plant shutdown immediately, and
- b. Determine the source of increased leakage prior to resuming operation.

January 27, 1975

- c. If there is evidence of leakage from the 4-inch bypass piping, reexamine (by ultrasonic or other suitable volumetric inspection technique), all accessible welds in the bypass piping lines.

(In no case, however, shall the rate of leakage exceed that specified in the technical specifications without those actions required by the technical specifications being taken.)

2. Notify this office, in writing within 10 days of your receipt of this Bulletin, of your intent to implement the actions described in 1., above.

MEMO ROUTE SLIP Form AEC-93 (Rev. May 14, 1947) AECM 0240		See me about this. Note and return.	For concurrence. For signature.	For action. For information.
TO (Name and unit) RO Chief, FS&EB RO:HQ (4) Licensing (4) <u>DR Central Files</u> <u>Region I</u>	INITIALS DATE	REMARKS Wisconsin Public Service Corporation Kewaunee 50-305		
TO (Name and unit) Region II PDR Local PDR NSIC TIC	INITIALS DATE	REMARKS		
TO (Name and unit) OGC, Beth, P-506A R. Renfrow, GC J. Rizzo, RO:HQ A/D for Info. Processing, OOE	INITIALS DATE	REMARKS		
FROM (Name and unit) G. Fiorelli RO:III	REMARKS Attached is licensee's reply dated January 6, 1975, to RO Bulletin 74-15.			
PHONE NO.	DATE 1-8-75			

USE OTHER SIDE FOR ADDITIONAL REMARKS

GPO : 1971 O - 445-469

Handwritten initials: RR

WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATION



P.O. Box 1200, Green Bay, Wisconsin 54305

January 6, 1975

U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Directorate of Regulatory Operations,
Region III
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

Attention: Mr. James Keppler
Regional Director

Dear Mr. Keppler:

Reference: Docket 50-305
Operating License DPR-43
Letter from Mr. J. G. Keppler to Mr. E. W. James
dated December 6, 1974

The referenced letter transmitted Directorate of Regulatory Operations Bulletin 74-15 "Misapplication of Cutler-Hammer Three Position Maintained Switch Model No. 10250T," which addresses our Abnormal Occurrence Report 50-305/74-5 and requests notification of subsequent inspection and corrective action taken to prevent malfunction.

The Kewaunee Plant has eight Cutler-Hammer Model No. 10250T switches in safety related equipment. All of the switches in question are located on the two local control panels for the two emergency diesel generators, four on each panel. Two of the switches per diesel are employed in manual control functions which do not affect safety, since normal system alignment for automatic actuation and control disables the manual controls. The remaining two switches per diesel did present potential safety problems and required corrective action which has been completed.

The switch whose malfunction caused the incident reported by our Abnormal Occurrence Report 50-305/74-5 is associated with the diesel engine auto-manual control selection. To conform to safeguard system operability requirements, this switch must be in the "Auto" position. Positive assurance that the switch is located in the "Auto" position was provided by a design change which installed an alarm for the "not in Auto" condition. The alarm installation was implemented by utilization of an


U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Page 2
January 6, 1975

additional relay. The alarm annunciates at the local control panel, as a diesel not in auto alarm, and as a diesel abnormal alarm in the control room. This corrective modification was performed on both diesels.

The other set of switches, one per diesel, whose misalignment would result in diesel inoperability are associated with the excitation and voltage control mode selection. To assure proper alignment of these switches auxiliary contacts were utilized to provide a "not in Auto" alarm. These alarms, as above, annunciate locally as a diesel not in auto alarm and as a diesel abnormal alarm in the control room.

We believe that the above noted modifications adequately assure proper alignment of these switches.

Sincerely,



E. W. James
Senior Vice President
Power Generation & Engineering

EWJ:sna

cc - Dr. D. F. Knuth
Mr. Dwane Boyd