MEMO ROUTE SLIP
Form AEC-93 (Rev. May 14, 1947) AECM 0240

☐ See me about this.	☐ For concurrence.	☐ For action.
☐ Note and return.	☐ For signature.	☐ For information.

TO (Name and unit)	INITIALS	REMARKS
IE Chief, FS&EB IE:HQ(4) Licensing(4) DR Central Files J. Rizzo, IE:HQ	DATE	Wisconsin Public Service Corporation Kewaunee 50-305
TO (Name and unit)	INITIALS	REMARKS
A/D for Info. Processing Region I Region II PDR Local PDR	DATE	
TO (Name and unit)	INITIALS	REMARKS
NSIC TIC OGC, Beth, P-506A R. Renfrow, GC	DATE	
FROM (Name and unit)		REMARKS
G. Fiorelli IE:III		Attached is a copy of licensee's reply dated April 9, 1975, to IE Bulletin 75-03.
PHONE NO.	DATE	
	4-11-75	

USE OTHER SIDE FOR ADDITIONAL REMARKS

GPO : 1971 O - 445-469

abnormal occurrence
2

WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATION

P.O. Box 1200, Green Bay, Wisconsin 54305

April 9, 1975

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Directorate of Regulatory Operations
Region III
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

Attention: Mr. James G. Keppler
Regional Director

Dear Mr. Keppler:

Reference: Docket 50-305
Operating License DPR-43
Letter from Mr. J. G. Keppler to
E. W. James dated March 17, 1975

The reference letter transmitted IE Bulletin No. 75-03 requesting action to correct a deficiency in ASCO solenoid valves series 8300C and 8302C.

Our review indicates there are approximately 70 of the suspect valves installed on safety related equipment at the Kewaunee Nuclear Plant.

Four of the suspect solenoid valves have been replaced with valves known to be free of defects. These four valves have been sent to ASCO for analysis. Upon completion of their analysis ASCO will supply either repair parts, or replacements for all Kewaunee valves.

All of the ASCO valves in question are installed in a service which functions to mitigate the consequences of an accident but not to prevent an accident. Thus, failure of any of these valves would not increase the probability of an accident occurring. Also, due to the redundant system design and the surveillance testing program, an isolated solenoid valve failure would not present a hazard to the plant personnel or the public.

We have established a replacement priority grouping of the solenoid valves based on their function. The first priority is assigned to those valves which function in conjunction with containment isolation to control valves in piping or ducts larger than one inch. The second priority is assigned to containment isolation valves smaller than one inch. These are sample and vent line valves. Third priority is assigned to the remaining safety related equipment solenoid valves.

We plan to modify or replace the installed valves as parts become available on an individual basis beginning with those which can be removed from service during plant operation. A few cannot be replaced during operation due either to their physical location or service function. Should an extended shutdown occur after receipt of replacement parts, we will upgrade as many valves as time, material and manpower allow without extending the shutdown. All suspect valves will be upgraded by the end of the first refueling shutdown expected to occur early in 1976.

Very truly yours,

E. W. James
Senior Vice President
Power Generation & Engineering

EWJ:sna

cc - Mr. Dwane Boyd