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RECIP.NAME	RECIPIENT AFFILIATION	
HINTZ, D.C.	Wisconsin Public Service Corp.	

SUBJECT: Forwards request for addl info re review of revised responses to LE Bulletin 85-003, "Motor-Operated Valve Common Mode Failures During Plant Transients due to Improper Switch Settings,"

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# APR 3 1987

Docket No. 50-305

Wisconsin Public Service Corporation ATTN: Mr. D. C. Hintz Vice President Nuclear Power Post Office Box 19002 Green Bay, WI 54307-9002

Gentlemen:

The preliminary review of your revised responses to IE Bulletin 85-03 "Motor-Operated Valve Common Mode Failures During Plant Transients Due To Improper Switch Settings" indicates the need for additional information before the program to assure valve operability can be approved. The specific information necessary for the completion of our review is enclosed. Additional information is requested within one month of receipt of this letter.

The written reports shall be submitted to the Regional Administrator, Region III, under oath or affirmation under provisions of Section 182a, Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. Also, the original copy of the cover letters and a copy of the reports shall be transmitted to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555 for reproduction and distribution.

Questions addressing this issue may be forwarded to Richard J. Kiessel, IE (301) 492-8119.

Sincerely,

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY C. E. NORELIUS

Charles E. Norelius, Director Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure: Request for Additional Information

PDR

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See Attached Distribution





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Wisconsin Public Service

## Distribution

cc w/enclosure: C. R. Steinhardt, Plant Manager DCS/RSB (RIDS) Licensing Fee Management Branch Resident Inspector, RIII Virgil Kanable, Chief Boiler Section Mary Lou Munts, Chairperson Wisconsin Public Service Commission Collette Blum-Meister (SLO), WI Div. of Emergency Government Richard J. Kiessel, IE

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#### REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION (RAI) RE:

Review of Responses to Action Item 3 of IE Bulletin 85-03

Licensee:	Unit(s): Kewaunee		
Wisconsin Public Service Corp. 600 North Adams P.O. Box 19002	Date of Response: 05/14/86 09/08/86		
Green Bay, WI 54307-9002	Respondent: D. C. Hintz Vice President,		

The information provided in your responses to Action Item 3 of IE Bulletin 85-03 was found to be deficient in some areas. Please provide the additional information necessary to resolve the following comments and questions:

Nuclear Power

 The following MOVs are not included in the list of values of the safety injection system to be examined for maximum differential pressure. That is, they are not identified in Table 1 of the response of May 14, 1986. However, they are identified as "locked open" in the flow diagram of that response.

If these MOVs actually are locked open, revise drawings X-K100-26-V and X-K100-29-L, on which they are shown normally open.

If these MOVs are locked open and power is removed from the motor please state this in your response. Otherwise, address the effect of assuming inadvertent equipment operations as requested by Action Item a of the bulletin, and revise Table 1 of the response to include these valves.

- (a) <u>MOV SI-3</u> is shown normally open (per the P&ID) in the boric acid supply line downstream of two normally closed MOVs in parallel. How would suction of the boric acid tank be ensured if MOV SI-3 were to be left closed inadvertently?
- (b) <u>MOVs SI-9A, SI-11A and SI-11B</u> are shown normally open (per the P&ID) in the discharge lines to the reactor vessel cold legs. The latter two are in parallel and are downstream of MOV SI-9A. How would discharge be ensured if these valves were to be left closed inadvertently?
- 2. <u>MOV SI-9B</u> is shown normally open in the discharge lines of Safety Injection Pump 1B, on drawings X-K100-28-V and X-K100-29-L, as well as on the flow diagram of Attachment 1 of the response of September 8, 1986. It is upstream of two parallel, normally closed valves used for reactor vessel injection. This MOV is not included in Table 1 of the response of May 14, 1986.

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Note that reactor vessel injection would be suppressed if this valve were to be left closed inadvertently. Revise Table 1 of the response to include MOV X1-9B.

- 3. Unlisted MOVS SI-20A and SI-20B in discharge lines of the accumulator safety injection system are shown normally open on Drawing X-K100-28-V. The possible problem that the system would be inoperable if the MOVs were left closed inadvertently should be addressed. Based on the assumption of inadvertent equipment operations as required by Action Item a of the bulletin, revise Table 1 of the response of May 14, 1986 to include these valves.
- 4. Has water hammer due to valve closure been considered in the determination of pressure differentials? If not, please explain.
- 5. Please state the planned date of completion of Action Item f of the bulletin. Note that the due date specified by the bulletin is January 15, 1988.