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 RECIPIENT NAME      RECIPIENT AFFILIATION  
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SUBJECT: Forwards proposed corrective actions for individuals not receiving criminal history info from FBI within 180 days. Evaluation will be performed to determine whether unescorted access should be granted.

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March 1, 1991

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
ATTN: Document Control Desk  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

Docket 50-305  
Operating License DPR-43  
Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant  
Additional Access Authorization Criteria

This letter and the attachment hereto provide the basis for the proposed corrective actions that will be taken by WPSC concerning those individuals who have not received the criminal history information from the FBI with 180 days. The KNPP Security Manual (SM) Section 5.3.2 requires, among other things, that an FBI criminal history check be conducted for individuals who require unescorted access to the KNPP. In accordance with the KNPP SM the granting of temporary access to the KNPP or safeguards information is limited to a period not to exceed 180 days.

WPSC has identified that for certain individuals the criminal history information has not been received within the 180 day period. These individuals have a need to be onsite and must have unescorted access authorization in order to perform their work. Attachment 1 to this letter provides a brief background of the requirements surrounding this event. Also provided is the additional criteria WPSC will use to evaluate the trustworthiness, dependability and reliability of individuals who have exceeded the 180 day grace period. From this evaluation a determination will be made on whether to reactivate the badge pending receipt of an adequate


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criminal history check for a period not to exceed 90 days. We request your prompt consideration of this additional criteria. Furthermore, we appreciate the close cooperation and communication the NRC staff has maintained with us throughout this event.

Sincerely,



for K. H. Evers  
Manager - Nuclear Power

DJM/slh

Attach.

cc - US NRC - Region III  
Mr. Patrick Castleman, US NRC

Attachment 1

to

Letter from K. H. Evers (WPSC) to Document Control Desk (NRC)

Dated

March 1, 1991

Alternative Access Authorization Criteria

## **Attachment 1**

This attachment provides a description of the immediate and short-term corrective actions that have been taken to address the KNPP Security Manual requirements for access authorization. WPSC is proposing additional requirements in order to justify unescorted access on a temporary basis for certain individuals who do not meet all KNPP Security Manual access authorization requirements. Individuals who do not meet these additional requirements will not be granted unescorted access.

### **BACKGROUND**

In 1987, the requirements of 10CFR73.57 "Requirements for Criminal History Checks" became effective. This rule added new regulation requiring that an FBI criminal history check be conducted for individuals who were granted unescorted access to nuclear power plants. The criminal history check requirement would be satisfied by submitting fingerprint cards to the FBI prior to issuing the security badge. The KNPP Security Manual section 5.1.4 identifies the requirement to perform a criminal records check on WPSC personnel. The Security Manual Section 5.3 "Interim Reliability Determination", specifically section 5.3.2, provides the details regarding the granting of temporary access to the KNPP or safeguards information for a period not to exceed 180 days if certain provisions are met. One such provision is the requirement to fingerprint individuals and submit the fingerprint cards to the FBI. In January, 1991, WPSC identified that for certain individuals the criminal history information had not been received within the 180 day period. WPSC immediately conducted an investigation to determine the number of badges involved. During the week of February 4, 1991, a special inspection was conducted by Region III personnel. Subsequent to this inspection, and after conversations with Region III personnel, on February 22, 1991, WPSC management conservatively initiated short-term action by inactivating the badges for those individuals who have had temporary unescorted access in excess of 180 days. There was a total of 14 active badges inactivated (6 WPSC employees and 8 contract employees). WPSC has reviewed the situation for each of the individuals involved and has concluded that these individuals do not pose a security concern. In addition to these 14 badges an additional number are currently inactivated. A number of these inactivated badges are expected to be activated in the near future as staffing increases for the upcoming refueling outage.

### **PROPOSED CORRECTIVE ACTIONS**

WPSC is proposing to use the following additional criteria as the required information for making an interim reliability determination pending receipt of the FBI criminal history check. This criteria would only apply to those individuals previously granted unescorted access to

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KNPP whose 180 day grace period has been exceeded. The four requirements of the KNPP Security Manual Section 5.3.2 "Interim Reliability Determination" would still be required to be met. However, in addition, WPSC will conduct an evaluation of the individuals performance evaluation files or Continuous Behavioral Observation file or conduct interviews with WPSC/Contractor supervision. This evaluation will assess the individuals' trustworthiness, dependability and reliability. Some of the criteria which will be considered in the evaluation includes: absenteeism, disciplinary records, any associated psychological or medical records, safety and accident records, any information relative to 10CFR Part 26, any state arrests or convictions, verbal confirmation to determine whether the individual has had unescorted access to another licensed facility, time at KNPP and finally, the general overall performance rating and evaluation. An evaluation by WPSC Security personnel will be made based upon the best available information. This evaluation will determine whether it is acceptable to grant these individuals unescorted access pending receipt of an adequate criminal history check for a period not to exceed 90 days. WPSC believes that the already completed requirements of the KNPP Security Manual along with this added evaluation provides the confidence that these individuals are not a security concern along with sufficient justification to extend temporary access to the individuals involved for an a period not to exceed 90 days from the date the badge is reactivated.