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 RECIP. NAME: VARGA, S.A. RECIPIENT AFFILIATION: Operating Reactors Branch 1

SUBJECT: Forwards response to 831205 request for addl info re
 NUREG-0737 Item II.D.1, "Performance Testing of Relief &
 Safety Valves." Microfiche of RELAPS/ADLPIPE computer
 analyses encl.

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 TITLE: OR Submittal: TMI Action Plan Rgmt NUREG-0737 & NUREG-0660

NOTES: *See "84 Reports"*
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WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATION


P.O. Box 1200, Green Bay, Wisconsin 54305

March 23, 1984

Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
 Attention: Mr. S. A. Varga, Chief
 Operating Reactors Branch No. 1
 Division of Licensing
 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
 Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Mr. Varga:

Docket 50-305
 Operating License DPR-43
 Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant
 NUREG-0737, Item II.D.1 "Performance Testing of Relief
 and Safety Valves" Request for Additional Information

- References: 1) Letter to C. W. Giesler of WPSC from S. A. Varga of the NRC dated December 5, 1983
 2) Letter to S. A. Varga of the NRC from C. W. Giesler of WPSC dated February 16, 1984

On December 5, 1983 (Reference 1), we received a questionnaire concerning our earlier responses to Item II.D.1 of NUREG-0737, "Performance Testing of Relief and Safety Valves," in which we were requested to respond within sixty (60) days. In Reference 2, we informed you that our response would take longer than originally anticipated due to the detailed nature of the questions, the number of submittals requested by the NRC recently, and the limited number of personnel available to respond within the time frame indicated. As such, we committed to a revised submittal schedule which had been discussed with and approved by our Project Manager.

This submittal fulfills our commitment to provide the requested additional information. For your convenience, please find enclosed four (4) copies of the completed questionnaire. These copies include microfiche of the RELAP5/ADLPIPE

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Mr. S. A. Varga
March 23, 1984
Page 2

computer analyses (Appendix A and B). To the best of my knowledge, the information in this submittal is true and accurate.

Very truly yours,



C. W. Giesler
Vice President - Nuclear Power

JGT/js

Enc.

cc - Mr. Robert Nelson, US NRC - w/o attachment

50-305

RESPONSE TO NUREG-0737 ITEM II.D.1

Docket # *50-305*

Control # *8403280048*

Date *3/23/84* of Document:
REGULATORY DOCKET FILE

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
TMI ACTION NUREG-737 (II.D.1)
RELIEF AND SAFETY VALVE TESTING
FOR
KEWAUNEE

Docket No. 50-305

The results of the analyses reported in the submittal indicate several points in the piping are overstressed. Correspondence to the NRC subsequent to the submittal identifies the intended solution is to install rupture discs in the discharge piping. The requirements of Item II.D.1 cannot be considered satisfied until an analysis of the system with the rupture discs installed demonstrates that the system will function properly and that the piping will not be overstressed. Nevertheless the submittal has been evaluated and questions developed based on the information provided to date.

Q-1. The submittal treats steam flow type of valve actuation condition as a worst case transient for both safety and relief valves. It further states that water or steam-water transients are not possible in this plant. The submittal does not contain any discussion, though, on whether single failures after the initiating event were considered that could lead to water flow through the valve. Nor does the submittal address the fact that the pressurizer spray will be on as a result of the original pressure increase, leading to a steam-water flow condition. A discussion should be presented showing how single failures and other mechanisms that could lead to water or steam-water flow conditions were considered in selecting potential transients.

A-1. References:

1. "Valve Inlet Fluid Conditions for Pressurizer Safety and Relief Valves in Westinghouse-Designed Plants," EPRI NP-2296-LD, March 1982.

In Reference 1, transients that would result in steam and/or water discharge flow through the pressurizer power operated relief valves (PORV's) and safety valves were evaluated. The objective of this report was to assist PWR utilities with Westinghouse plants in demonstrating that the fluid conditions under which their valve designs were tested enveloped those fluid conditions expected. The Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant (KNPP) was considered in this report and is covered by it.

This generic report indicated that FSAR events challenged both pressurizer relief and safety valves under steam conditions with the Loss of Load and Locked Rotor Accidents being the pressure enveloping Condition II and Condition IV events, respectively. Liquid discharge was predicted for only one FSAR event, the Feedline Break Accident. Extended high pressure liquid injection events were found to result in no relief or safety valve challenges for two loop plants, such as the KNPP. The shutoff head of the KNPP Safety Injection Pumps is approximately 2200 psia which is well below the opening setpoints for the pressurizer S/RV's.

The Locked Rotor Accident was considered the worst case transient for determining the KNPP S/RV discharge piping loads. No credit was

taken in the accident analysis (KNPP UFSAR* Section 14.1.8) for the pressure-reducing effects of the pressurizer relief valves, pressurizer spray, steam dump, or controlled feedwater flow, although these operations are expected to occur. The worst case analysis for the Loss of Load Accident (KNPP UFSAR* Section 14.1.9) took no credit for a direct or immediate reactor trip, RCCA insertion until reactor trip, pressurizer relief valves, pressurizer spray, or steam dump. These multiple failure assumptions result in enveloping pressurization rates and peak pressures. Since pressurizer spray would condense steam in the pressurizer steam space and reduce system pressure, taking credit for their use during either of the above mentioned accidents would be nonconservative in determining peak pressurization rates and system pressures. If they were assumed functional and did produce a steam-water flow condition, the resultant loading on the discharge piping would be insignificant when compared to the thermal hydraulic forces caused by the solid slugs of loop seal water which move downstream subsequent to safety valve actuation. Both the KNPP pressurizer relief and safety valves were successfully tested for two phase flow.

Multiple failures were also assumed for the analysis of the loss of Normal Feedwater Accident (KNPP UFSAR* Section 14.1.10), which includes pipe breaks. Only one motor-driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump was considered available assuming the active failure of one pump while the other pump was out-of-service for maintenance. In addition, no credit was taken for steam dump or the steam generator PORV's. Steam relief was assumed through the spring loaded steam generator safety valves only.

This analysis concluded that the Loss of Normal Feedwater Accident does not result in water discharge through either the pressurizer relief or safety valves for the KNPP.

*UFSAR implies Updated Final Safety Analysis Report.

The only other failures that could lead to water or steam-water flow through these valves would be if the valves themselves failed to close. The assumption of a pressurizer safety valve failing to close is outside the licensing basis of the KNPP. Only one active failure need be assumed and a safety valve is a passive device. Should a pressurizer relief valve fail to close it would be isolated by its respective block valve. The functional operability of the pressurizer block valves is discussed in response to question ten (10) of this submittal.

In either case, these scenarios have already been analyzed. Studies were performed to analyze an open PORV on top of the pressurizer (KNPP UFSAR* Section 7.2.3, Page 7.2-54), the rupture of a pipe connected to the pressurizer steam space (KNPP Historical FSAR,** Questions and Answers 14.8), and Small Breal LOCA's (KNPP UFSAR,* Section 14.3.1).

Cold overpressurization events will be discussed in response to question three (3) of this submittal.

*UFSAR implies Updated Final Safety Analysis Report.

**Historical FSAR is the original FSAR.

Q-2. A locked rotor accident was evidently selected as the worst case transient for discharge piping analysis. The submittal states that the FSAR specifies the maximum pressure for this transient to be 2737 psia, while 2686 psia was used in the RELAP5 analysis. The pressure ramp rate used in the analysis was not identified in the submittal. A justification for use of 2686 psia should be provided. For the loop seal condition, the valve simmers while the loop seal liquid is passing through the valve. The simmering delays the opening after the set point is reached which was not expected prior to testing. Was the effect of the unexpected longer opening on the overpressure protection analysis and the FSAR events considered?

Based on Kewaunee FSAR evaluations, the locked rotor accident with both power operated relief valves failed provides the worst case transient for safety valve actuation. The locked rotor accident is presented on page 14.1-35 in Section 14.1.8 of the Kewaunee FSAR. The locked rotor primary pressure transient curve is presented on Figure 14.1-34.

A maximum pressurization rate of approximately 280 psi/second is interpreted from Figure 14.1-34 of the Kewaunee FSAR, and a peak pressure of 2737 psia is given on page 14.1-38 of the FSAR. The value of 304 psia/second reported in the Kewaunee Piping Report (see Table 5-1, "Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant Safety and Relief Valves Piping Qualification Report," issued June 28, 1982), was an overly conservative interpretation of the pressurization rate taken from FSAR Figure 14.1-34. The Kewaunee FSAR lock rotor pressurization rate of 280 psi/second and peak pressure of 2737 psia are larger than the maximum pressurization rate and peak pressure (i.e., 240 psi/second and 2682 psia, respectively) given by Westinghouse for their worst case reference two-loop plant [see Table 4-1, "Valve Inlet Fluid Conditions for Pressurizer Safety and Relief Valves in Westinghouse-Designed Plants," EPRI NP-2296-LD (March 1982)]. Therefore, the Kewaunee locked rotor pressure transient is very conservative when compared against Westinghouse worst case locked rotor analyses.

The pressure transient curve used for the Kewaunee Locked rotor accident, presented in Figure 14.1-34 of the FSAR, was modeled in the RELAP5 calculation as a time dependent volume with a linear variation of saturated steam at 2686.0 psia for time equal to 0.0 second and of saturated steam at 2737.0 psia for time equals to .5 seconds. By using this procedure the Kewaunee FSAR calculated lock rotor peak pressure of 2737.0 psia was simulated by the RELAP5 calculation. This is a conservative peak pressure because the Crosby valve flow rates measured in the CE test program were in excess of the rated flow for the safety valves. Since the calculations made for the FSAR transient analyses were based on the rated flow, a more than rated flow will decrease the transient pressure rise below that which was calculated for the FSAR transient.

Due to the conservative simulation of the CE test 908 pressure transient (i.e., a constant ramp rate of 297 psi/second), the measured "pop" pressure for CE test 908 (2686 psi) was used to initiate the RELAP5 transient. Additional items relating to the conservatism included in the Kewaunee analysis are as follows.

The loop seal used in the CE testing contained approximately 1.0 ft³ of water whereas the loop seal piping at the Kewaunee plant only contains .7 ft³ of water. This represents 43 percent more water in the CE test 908 loop seal than contained in the Kewaunee loop seal. With less water in the Kewaunee loop seal, it would follow that the water would clear the Kewaunee valve sooner than the water clearing the CE 908 test valve thereby producing a lower "pop" pressure for the Kewaunee safety valve.

Westinghouse performed (see WCAP-10105) the original FSAR transient analyses with the pressurizer safety valve modeled to open by assuming that the valve starts to open at the design set pressure (2500 psia) and achieves rated flow at the accumulation pressure (2575 psia). To assess the effect on reactor coolant system pressure due to valve opening delay, Westinghouse (see WCAP-10105, Section 4.0), ran a series of overpressure transients with various time delays inserted for the valve opening. These analyses utilized

the limiting overpressure FSAR transient condition. A worst case reference plant was selected for a two-loop plant which maximized the effect of the pressure rise due to an overpressure transient condition. These simulations revealed that even with the delays of up to 1.0 second, the pressure transient peaks and turns around in a very short period of time. The Westinghouse calculations reveal that the CE testing apparatus simulated the effects of the loop seal delay in the pressure transient fairly well. Using the limiting transient reference plant, the calculations indicated that the .8 to .9 second opening delay produced a peak popping pressure which was typical of what was seen in the Crosby safety valve loop seal testing.

Other calculations done by Westinghouse proved that the locked rotor pressure rise is only slightly dependent on safety valve actuation and that the reactor coolant system pressurization is dictated mainly by heat removal (steam generators) and core feedback models. As a result, the pressurization rate decreases with time until the transient pressure begins to subside even with no safety valve opening.

In summary, the following items were used in determining the Kewaunee popping pressure and peak pressure which were simulated using RELAP5.

1. The Kewaunee locked rotor transient was simulated on RELAP5 using the Kewaunee FSAR transient. The Kewaunee FSAR transient was shown to be very conservative when compared to the Westinghouse Two-loop worst case locked rotor transients.
2. The Kewaunee loop seal has less water than the CE test 908 loop. Therefore, when using a similar valve and pressurization rates, the CE test results are conservative relative to what would be expected at Kewaunee.
3. The CE test 908 popping pressure is typical of popping pressures calculated by Westinghouse when simulating a loop seal delay.

Based on this information, it was judged that the popping pressure of 2686 psia and the peak pressure of 2737 psia which were used to simulate the Kewaunee safety valve acuations are representative and conservative pressures.

Q-3. The submittal states that the safety/relief valve system is not challenged by cold overpressurization events because of the existence of an overpressurization mitigation system. This system is composed of a pressure relief valve aligned to the reactor coolant system from the RHR system. A failure of this one relief valve, however, would seemingly result in an overpressurization condition requiring relief from the safety/relief valve system. Has the potential for such a failure been considered in neglecting cold overpressurization events?

A-1. Reference:

1. Letter to S. R. Barge of the NRC from C. W. Giesler of Wisconsin Public Service Corporation, dated December 16, 1983.

The assumption that the pressurizer safety and relief valves are not challenged by cold overpressurization events is correct. The KNPP has an Overpressurization Protection System which consists of two spring loaded relief valves (2-inch and 4-inch) that are aligned to the Reactor Coolant System via the Residual Heat Removal System. An assumed failure of these safety valves is outside the design basis of the KNPP. Only one active failure need be assumed, while the safety valves are passive devices. This system is currently under review by the NRC staff as part of the Low Temperature Overpressurization Protection (LTOP) issue and is in the final stages of negotiation. (See Reference 1.)

Q. 4. In the RELAP5 analysis part of the water in the loop seal was apparently assumed to move downstream during valve simmering. The Tables 7.1 through 7.4 of the submittal indicate which sections of the model contain water; however, no explanation is given as how the water distribution was obtained. The submittal should provide justification for the water distribution and water temperatures used at the time of the valve popping open.

A. 4. The water was located directly downstream of the valve as a solid slug of water (i.e., no voids). The energy profile, predicted by TAC2D (See Section 7.1.1 of the Kewaunee piping report), was conserved by moving the water into the downstream piping with the same energy distribution as was calculated for upstream loop seal water.

To determine the downstream energy or temperature profile, the loop seal water was expanded through the valve while holding the enthalpy constant. The first two control volumes downstream of the valve contain the water above 212 F and below the saturated steam condition at 2250 psia (i.e., 653 F). These two volumes contain two-phase water, which represents the flashing of all water in the upstream loop seal between 212 F and 653 F into the downstream piping at a pressure of 14.7 psia. All other water below 212 F was distributed in the remaining downstream volumes. The primary criteria for calculating accurate downstream loading is to keep the water slug solid (no voids) in the piping system at the time of safety valve "pop."

This same technique of the downstream water distribution was used to determine the loads generated by the CE 908 safety valve test. These results were presented in Figure 6-16 of the "Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant Safety and Relief Valves Piping Qualification Report" issued on June 28, 1982. Figure 6-16 presents the calculated versus measured load data of the piping leg which experiences the largest thermal/hydraulic load tested. As seen in the comparison, the RELAP5 calculated results are in good agreement with the measured results. Also, the studies done by ITI for EPRI (see "Application of RELAP5/MOD1 for Calculation of Safety and Relief Valve Discharge

Piping Hydrodynamic Loads," Interim Report prepared by Intermountain Technologies, Inc., for participating PWR Utilities and Electric Power Research Institute, March 1982) apparently used a similar method for distributing the downstream water. They also had good calculated results when compared to the test data.

Based on these comparisons, it was judged that the method for downstream water distribution used in the RELAP5 simulation was good in determining downstream loads on the Kewaunee S/RV piping system.

Q-5. An 8.3 percent blowdown occurred during EPRI test 908, which was the loop seal test evidently most representative of Kewaunee conditions. This exceeds the design value of 5 percent given in the valve specifications. Other EPRI loop seal-steam test blowdowns were as high as 9.4 percent. These increased blowdowns would cause a rise in pressurizer level such that the level may reach the discharge piping and result in a steam-water flow situation. Also, the pressure might be sufficiently decreased so that adequate cooling might not be achieved for decay heat removal. Since the specific combinations of ring settings and backpressures to be used at the Kewaunee plant were not tested, the maximum blowdown should be estimated by extrapolating the test data. A discussion should be provided demonstrating, that with the estimated blowdown, the water level will not reach the discharge piping and that adequate core cooling can be maintained.

Also, the effect of the difference in orifice sizes between the tested valve and the Kewaunee valve should be included in the extrapolation or justification provided that the effect is not significant.

A-5. References:

1. EPRI/C-E PWR Safety Valve Test Report, Volumes 5 and 6, EPRI NP-2770-LD (March 1983).
2. "Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant Safety and Relief Valves Qualification Report," (June 25, 1983).
3. "Safety Valve Contingency Analysis in Support of the EPRI S/RV Test Program--Volume3: Westinghouse Systems," EPRI NP-2047-LD, (October 1981).

Results from the loop seal tests for the Crosby 6M6 Safety Valve (see Reference 1) are given in Table A5-1.

The ring settings for the three safety valves used at Kewaunee are as follows.

<u>Valve</u>	<u>Ring Settings</u>
PR-3A	Guide Ring - 250 notches Nozzle Ring - 18 notches
PR-3B	Guide Ring - 260 notches Nozzle Ring - 6 notches
Spare	Guide Ring - 250 notches Nozzle Ring - 18 notches

As explained in Reference 2 (page 9-8), the guide ring reference point for the above settings refers to the measurements relative to the upper limit of ring travel. The guide ring settings referred to in the C-E testing program referenced the measurements relative to the bottom of the disc ring. Therefore, the ring settings for the

TABLE A5-1. CROSBY 6M6 TEST RESULTS

<u>Test</u>	<u>Valve Settings</u>		<u>Pressure Rate</u> psi/sec	<u>Per Cent Rated Flow Rate At 3 Per Cent Accumulation</u>	<u>Peak Back Pressure</u> psia	<u>Per Cent of Blowdown</u>
	<u>Ring Guide</u>	<u>Nozzle</u>				
908	-136	-68	297	105	649	8.3
910	-136	-68	375	107	227	7.8
913	-44	-66	375	107	242	7.4
917	-136	-68	291	(1)	245	9.0
923	-186	-68	283	105	667	7.7
929	-71	-18	319	112	710	5.1
1406	-77	-18	325	109	250	9.4
1415	-77	-18	360	111	255	6.2

(1) The instrumentation malfunctioned; no reliable measurement was available.

Kewaunee safety valves relative to the bottom of the disc ring are as given below.

<u>Valve</u>	<u>Ring Settings</u>
PR-3A	Guide Ring -136 Nozzle Ring -18
PR-3B	Guide Ring -146 Nozzle Ring -6
Spare	Guide Ring -136 Nozzle Ring -18

The guide ring setting and the nozzle ring setting are not independent of each other, but to estimate the blowdown for the Kewaunee safety valves, only the guide ring setting will be considered. This is a good approximation since the guide ring setting mainly influences the blowdown reset pressure and the nozzle ring setting influences the accumulation opening pressure. Raising the guide ring setting decreases the blowdown and conversely lowering the ring setting increases the blowdown. This is shown to be true by examining the data presented in Table A5-1. The lower guide ring settings (see Tests 908, 910, 917, and 923) produce increased blowdown and the higher guide ring settings (see Tests 913, 929, and 1415) produce decreased blowdown. An exception to this rule was Test 1406 which produced the largest per cent blowdown using a relatively high guide ring setting.

Based on this test information it appears the the per cent blowdown for the Crosby 6M6 safety valve is between 5.1 and 9.4. Taking the average of the low ring setting test results, the average per cent blowdown is 8.2. Since the guide ring settings for the Kewaunee safety valves vary between -146 and -136 and the test guide ring settings for similar settings vary between -186 and -136, the average per cent blowdown of 8.2 is therefore a good estimate for the Kewaunee 6M₁6 Crosby 6M6 safety valves.

When considering the Crosby 3K6 safety valve testing, the average blowdown for the loop seal tested Crosby safety valves was found to be 18.8 per cent blowdown. The orifice flow area for the Crosby

3K6, 6M₁6, and 6M6 safety valves are 1.85 in², 3.00 in², and 3.64 in², respectively. Although the 6M₁6 orifice size is much closer to the 6M6 orifice size than the 3K6 orifice size, there is some appreciable difference between 6M6 and 6M₁6 orifice sizes. To account for this difference the Crosby 6M6 and 3K6 test results given in Table A5-1 and Table A5-2, respectively, were interpolated based on the average blowdown for the Crosby 6M6 and 3K6 safety valves and relative orifice areas with respect to the Crosby 6M₁6 safety valve orifice area. Using the following interpolation, the average area weighted blowdown was found to be 12.1 per cent.

<u>Valve</u>	<u>Orifice Area (in²)</u>	<u>Average Blowdown</u>
3K6	1.85	18.8
6M ₁ 6	3.00	12.1 (interpolated)
6M6	3.64	8.2

A conservatively high 12.1 per cent blowdown was chosen to be evaluated for the Kewaunee locked rotor accident. From Figure 14.1-34 of the Kewaunee FSAR a 12.1 per cent blowdown equates to a reset pressure of 2197 psia, which is approximately 8.2 seconds into the locked rotor transient. This is the time when the safety valves are closed assuming a 12.1 per cent blowdown. A 5 per cent blowdown (2375 psia) occurs approximately 6.2 seconds into the transient. This represents a difference of 2.0 seconds in the transient between a 5 per cent blowdown and a 12.1 per cent blowdown.

If one assumes rated flow out of both safety valves (i.e., 345,000 lb/h) for 2.0 seconds, the mass loss out the open safety valves for the extended blowdown period is 383 pounds. This is not a significant loss of liquid inventory when compared to total liquid in the nuclear steam supply system. This very limited amount of inventory loss due to the extended blowdown is not expected to raise the pressurizer water level enough so that subcooled water would flow through the valves.

A worst case possibility of extended blowdown was analyzed by Westinghouse using WFLASH (see Reference 3). In this evaluation both safety valves were assumed to stick open which can be evaluated

TABLE A5-2. CROSBY 3K6 TEST RESULTS

<u>Test</u>	<u>Valve Ring Settings</u>		<u>Pressure Rate</u> psia/sec	<u>Per Cent of</u> <u>Blowdown</u>
	<u>Guide</u>	<u>Nozzle</u>		
525	-115	-14	3.4	18.8
526	-115	-14	220.0	18.9
529	-115	-14	13.0	17.7
536	-115	-14	44.0	19.9

as a small break at the top of the pressurizer with an equivalent break area equal to the flow area of the two safety valves. The following is a description of the subsequent transient.

Initially the primary system becomes saturated, as the pressure drops to a value slightly above the secondary side pressure. The system remains at this approximately constant pressure for several hundred seconds; during this time, steam formation in the upper head and upper plenum is retarded by the lack of a route for steam flow to be released from the reactor vessel. At this time, essentially any steam flowing out the stuck-open safety valves is from flashing in the pressurizer, rather than from the core. The fluid flow out the break is two phase, of low to moderate quality, during this plateau period.

As more water is removed through the stuck-open safety valves, void fraction occurs in the upper head. This eventually leads to the upper plenum level dropping to the hot leg elevation. Steam can now flow from the reactor vessel. Pressure relief occurs through steam flowing out the break and through heat transfer to the steam generator tubes. The cold secondary water condenses the steam, which shrinks, and pulls more steam to the tubes, etc., leading to the rapid system despressurization. The RCS pressure is now following the secondary side transient behavior.

The core remains covered through the entire transient and the peak core temperature is approximately 610 F, which is equal to the initial RCS fluid operating temperature.

The methodology and assumptions used in the Westinghouse analyses are consistent with 10 CFR 50 Appendix K criteria and with those employed in Section 3.3 of WCAP-9600, entitled, "Report on Small Break Accidents for Westinghouse NSSS System," which considered the opening of pressurizer power-operated relief valves. As noted in Section 3.2 of WCAP-9600, pressurizer vapor space breaks behave similarly to small hot leg break LOCAs and, therefore, no core uncover would be expected. This behavior is a general characteristic

of all Westinghouse plant designs. This conclusion has been previously verified by numerous break spectra performed for Westinghouse two, three, and four loop plants to support the ECCS Evaluation Model, as well as in WCAP-9600.

Based on the above discussion, only flashing two-phase water is predicted to pass through the safety valves during a long extended blowdown and no core uncover is expected.

Q-6. The submittal indicates that there is some difference between ring settings used in the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Crosby safety valve tests and those used at the plant and, for the same flow rate, the plant backpressure is greater than was tested. An evaluation should be presented that shows that the plant valves will pass rated flow capacity with the ring settings used at the plant together with expected backpressures.

A-6. References:

1. "Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant Safety and Relief Valves Qualification Report," issued June 25, 1982.
2. E. M. Burns, et al., "Review of Pressurizer Safety Valve Performance as Observed in the EPRI Safety and Relief Valve Test Program," WCAP-10105, June 1982.

The backpressures presented in Reference 1 are the peak backpressures. The C-E tested flow rates for the Crosby safety valves were measured at steady state backpressures. The peak and steady state backpressures calculated for the Kewaunee S/RV discharge piping at the exits of safety valves, PR-3A and PR-3B are shown in Figures A6-1 and A6-2, respectively. These are calculated for the double rupture disc configuration as shown on Figure A23-1. As seen in Figure A6-1 and A6-2, the peak backpressure was calculated for safety valve PR-3A at 716 psia and the steady state backpressure was calculated to be approximately 245 psia. This steady backpressure is greater than the steady state backpressures measured for the C-E Crosby safety valve testing for high backpressure.

In Reference 2 it was shown that measured flow rates for the Crosby valves exhibited a linear flow above the closing "knee" and all the measured steam flow rates for the Crosby loop seal valves tested were above 100 per cent. Also, the valve flow rate was not dependent on backpressure.

Based on the measured flow rates for both Crosby 3K6 and the Crosby 6M6 safety valves with loop seals, it can be seen that the flow rates are insensitive to the ring settings for the Crosby valves.

This is shown in Table A5-1. Taking the average per cent rated flow rate at 3 per cent accumulation for the measured Crosby 6M6 test results from Table A5-1, the average per cent of rated flow rate at 3 per cent accumulation was found to be 108 per cent which is 8 per cent in excess of rated flow. Based on this evaluation, the Kewaunee safety valves will pass rated flow or greater at 3 per cent accumulation.

KEWAUNEE 2 PSV -- 2 RUPTURE DISC -- DIF--MOD2
RELAP5 MOD1 CYCLE14




FIGURE A6-1

KEWAUNEE 2 PSV -- 2 RUPTURE DISC -- DIF--MOD2
RELAP5 MOD1 CYCLE14




FIGURE A6-2

Q. 7. During loop-seal tests the Crosby safety valves fluttered and chattered while in a partial lift position and also chattered on closure. Does this behavior have an adverse effect on the operability or reliability of the valves, so as to require an inspection after each such lift to assure the qualification of the valves has not been compromised?

A. 7. The operating procedures at the Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant will be changed to indicate that the plant will be shutdown subsequent to a safety valve actuation to inspect the safety valves and to replace the rupture discs which are part of the Kewaunee S/RV discharge piping modification.

This would not include valve leakage during normal operation unless the leakage rate exceeds the KNPP technical specification limits.

Q-8. After the two tests on the Crosby valve, which were terminated by manually opening the valve to stop chattering, damaged internal parts were found which required refurbishment or replacement. After the loop seal tests the following parts were refurbished: bellows assembly landings, educator I.D., bonnet adapter I.D., upper and lower spring washer bearing surface, and adjusting bolt bearing surface. The following were replaced: spindle, nozzle, disc insert, piston, and piston slip ring. Should similar repairs or modifications be required if the safety valves lift to insure reliable operation of the plant valves?

A-8. As stated in A-7, the operating procedures at the Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant will be changed to indicate that the plant will be shut down subsequent to a safety valve actuation to inspect the safety valves and to replace the rupture discs which are part of the Kewaunee S/RV discharge piping modification. (See Answer A-23 for a description of rupture disc assembly.)

This would not include valve leakage during normal operation unless the leakage rate exceeds the KNPP technical specification limits.

Q-9. Section 5.1.2 of the submittal identifies bending moment induced in the valve body as a parameter that could affect safety valve operability. Thermal expansion of the pressurizer causing displacement of the piping nozzle and the thermal expansion of the piping from the nozzle to the load can contribute to this moment. Section 9.1 of the submittal, however, does not discuss the moment applied to the plant safety valves. A discussion should be included comparing the measured moments on the tested valves with the calculated moments on the plant valves and verifying that the moments would not have an adverse effect on the operability of the plant valves.

A-9. The loadings measured on the test facility valves and the loadings predicted by analysis on the Kewaunee S/RV's were compared. The Kewaunee safety valve, which is a Crosby 6M₁6 safety valve, is similar to the Crosby 6M6 safety valve used at the CF Test Facility. Minor differences between the 6M6 and 6M₁6 valves such as disc holder material and the orifice size have been documented in the Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant Safety and Relief Valves Qualification report. The valve bodies and overall assembly are similar, thus, providing justification for comparing predicted loading on the Kewaunee safety valve to the measured loading on the CE Test Facility valve. The Masoneilan relief valve tested at the Marshall Test Facility used for comparison to the Kewaunee relief valve is the same valve type as the Kewaunee Masoneilan valve. This provides justification for using loads from the test facility for an upper bound analysis to predict loads for the Kewaunee relief valves.

The maximum bending moment induced on the safety valve by the test facility was 298,750-inch pounds. The largest ADLPIPE analysis predicted bending moment induced on either safety valve was less than 298,750-inch pounds. The analysis predicted bending moment includes plant faulted condition loads due to dead weight, thermal expansion, design basis earthquake and a simultaneous two-safety valve actuation.

The maximum bending moment induced on the power operated relief valve by the test facility was 35,600-inch pounds. The largest bending moment predicted by analysis simulating the plant upset condition was less than 35,600-inch pounds. This bending moment included analyzed loading due to dead weight, thermal expansion, operating basis

earthquake, and the simultaneous actuation of two power operated relief valves.

Therefore, it was concluded, based on test information, that the Kewaunee safety and/or power operated relief valves operability would not be adversely affected by a worst case actuating transient.

Q-10. The Kewaunee safety/relief valve piping system contains block valves in-line with the relief valves. NUREG 0737, paragraph II.D.1, requires qualification of the block valves to ensure that a stuck-open relief valve can be isolated. The submittal, however, makes no attempt to qualify the block valves.

A-10. References:

1. Letter from C. W. Giesler, Wisconsin Public Service Corporation to D. G. Eisenhut, Nuclear Regulatory Commission dated November 23, 1982.
2. Letter from R. C. Youndahl, Chairman Electric Power Research Institute Research Advisory Committee (Consumers Power Company) to H. R. Denton, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, dated June 1, 1982.
3. "EPRI-Marshall Electric Motor-Operated Valve (Block Valve) Interim Test Data Report," EPRI NP-2514-LD, July 1982.

Wisconsin Public Service Corporation's position on pressurizer block valve testing is stated in Reference 1. Reference 1 refers to Reference 2 in qualifying the KNPP block valves. Reference 2 transmitted to the NRC information which documented the utilization and performance of PORV block valves in PWR plant service. It was provided to support utilities in their responses to NUREG 0737, Item II.D.1 "Block Valve Testing" and satisfied this requirement.

Reference 3, which was part of this information package, documents the results of block valve tests conducted at the Marshall Steam Station in Terrell, North Carolina. Section 3.1 of this report documents the successful testing of an identical valve and actuator to those installed at the KNPP. This valve was successfully tested over a range of torque switch settings (1.7-1.0) which envelope the settings used at KNPP (1.5).

Q-11. The backpressure measured during the tests should be representative of the plant backpressure since the valve performance is affected by the backpressure. The thermal hydraulic analysis on the loop seal-steam flow actuation condition yielded peak backpressure of 792 psi while the backpressure of 649 psi was measured during the corresponding test 908. While the submittal states that the tested and plant specific backpressure are very close, some justification should be provided that these pressure values are indeed sufficiently close that actual conditions were truly represented in the tests.

A-11. With the modification of the Kewaunee S/RV discharge piping, to include the rupture disc and baffle plate assemblies, the peak backpressures were reduced significantly. As stated on A-6 of these responses and shown in Figures A6-1 and A6-2, the peak backpressures were calculated by RELAP5 to be 716 psia and 600 psia for Kewaunee safety valves, PR-3A and PR-3B, respectively. The peak backpressure measured for the Crosby 6M6 safety valve testing was 725 for CE Test 931 which exceeds the peak backpressure calculated for the Kewaunee valves. Therefore, the Kewaunee safety valves were bounded by the test program.

Q-12. Although Tables 7.1 through 7.4 of the submittal provide much of the RELAP5 input data they do not contain some basic information needed to evaluate the thermal hydraulic analysis. What time step was used in the RELAP5 calculations and how was this determined to be acceptable? How were the safety/relief valve flow areas sized for the hydraulic analysis and how were junction loss coefficients established? What value was used for valve popping time and how was this justified? A RELAP5 computer printout of input and output for the Locked Rotor accident case for the safety-valves lifting should be provided.

A-12. The time step parameters used for the RELAP5 calculations were a maximum time step of .001 seconds and a minimum time of 1.0 E-07 seconds. The RELAP5 computer code has an automatic time step control scheme which sets the calculational time step being used between the maximum time step specified (.001 seconds) and the minimum time step specified (1.0E-07 seconds). Checks are made on the mass truncating error, the Courant limit, negative or zero densities, density differences and water properties in determining if the time advancement is successful. If unsuccessful, the time step is reduced and the advancement is repeated until all acceptance criteria are met.

The use of these maximum and minimum time steps were confirmed by comparing RELAP5 calculations using these time steps with measured data from the Edwards' and Hanson's experimental measurements. These experiments were done using subcooled water, so the applicability to the loop seal simulation is good. The RELAP5 calculated results were in good agreement with the measured data. Based on these comparisons it was judged that the time steps used for the Kewaunee analyses were sufficient to provide accurate results.

The safety valve flow area was found by using the Kewaunee S/RV piping RELAP5 model and setting the upstream pressure at 2575 psia (safety valve set point plus 3 per cent accumulation) with the safety valve completely open. The valve area was adjusted leaving the upstream pressure at 2575 psia, until the calculated flow through the valve was found to be 115 per cent (or 396,700 lb/h) of rated flow. Therefore, using an area of 0.017 ft² for the safety valve will produce 115 per cent of rated flow at 3 per cent accumulation. This

is a conservative assumption for calculating thermal/hydraulic piping loads since all of the tested Crosby 6M6 safety valves produced less than 115 per cent rated flow at 3 per cent accumulation.

The loss coefficients were calculated for all geometry changes in the discharge piping (i.e., elbows, contraction-expansions, reducers). The loss coefficients were calculated using the handbook written by Idel'chik [I. E. Idel'chik, "Handbook of Hydraulic Resistance," AEC-tr-6630, (1966)].

A .015 second popping time was extracted from test data and was used for the Kewaunee simulation. The popping times for the Crosby 6M6 safety valve testing for loop seals ranged from .009 seconds to .019 seconds, therefore the popping time used for the Kewaunee safety valves is typical for that type of valve.

A microfiche of the RELAP5 two-safety valve actuation run for the rupture disc analysis is presented in Appendix A of this submittal.

Q-13. The submittal does not mention whether loading from a sequential opening of the safety and/or relief valve were considered for multiple actuation conditions. EG&G Idaho's experience indicates that maximum forces would be expected when a sequence of opening is such that the initial pressure waves from the safety valves opening reach the common header simultaneously. Was a sequential opening of the valves considered in establishing a maximum loading on the piping?

A-13. A sequential opening of the safety valves were not considered for this evaluation. For the initial evaluation based on a worst case locked rotor accident occurring with the as-built Kewaunee S/RV piping system, the sequential actuation was not considered because of its very low probability of occurring. A sequential actuation with a perfect timing to allow the pressure waves to reach the common header simultaneously along with both power operated relief valves failing, no spray actuation, and the locked rotor would be an incredibly low probability event. The assumptions associated with the locked rotor with simultaneous safety valve actuation are very unlikely to occur (i.e., faulted condition). Any other condition such as valve sequencing would further reduce the probability of the event beyond that of a faulted condition.

For the current evaluation, using the concept of the dual rupture discs at the valve discharges the possible larger forces caused by valve sequence are mitigated. Basically, if one valve opened before the other, that disc would rupture sooner, thus, relieving the pressure caused by the open valve. Therefore, it was judged that the sequential opening of the safety valves should not be considered in establishing design basis thermal/hydraulic loads.

- Q-14. The adequacy of using the RELAP5 and REPIPE in combination to calculate fluid forces was based on one steam discharge problem. The REPIPE momentum equations, however, contain an acceleration term which, when used with RELAP5 results, commonly introduces spurious spikes into the calculated fluid forces for water discharge problems. These spikes can be avoided by using a large time step in the REPIPE calculations, but this may result in losing the peak force values. Thus, for water transients or for loop seal-steam flow transients where some water does occur, a thorough assessment of the use of REPIPE in conjunction with RELAP5 should be provided.
- A-14. For the original analyses (i.e., the Kewaunee as-built S/RV piping configuration), the RELAP5/REPIPE was used to calculate two variations of the loop seal discharge (see Section 6.0 of Kewaunee Piping Report, June 28, 1982). As presented in Subsection 6.3 a RELAP5/REPIPE model was developed to simulate CE Test 908 which was the test that closely approximated the Kewaunee plant specific faulted conditions. Two situations were run using REPIPE as the RELAP5 post-processor.

As identified in Subsection 6.4 of the Kewaunee piping report, comparisons were made between test data and RELAP5/REPIPE CALCULATIONS. The two cases run were assuming water upstream of the safety valve and assuming water downstream of the safety valve. The results, as presented in Subsection 6.4 of the Kewaunee report, produced good agreement with test information. The REPIPE time steps used for the Kewaunee plant specific evaluation were chosen based on experience in calculations of these two cases. Based on these calculations using REPIPE, the REPIPE time steps used were judged to be adequate for Kewaunee plant specific evaluations.

In the subsequent analyses of the Kewaunee rupture disc configuration (see A-23 for description), the FORCE post-processor was used in place of REPIPE to determine thermal/hydraulic loads based on the output from RELAP5. FORCE was developed by Dr. Joe Chang for Boeing Computer Services.

Many benchmark comparisons were used to establish the accuracy of the RELAP5/FORCE calculations. The comparisons included running an analyses using RELAP5/REPIPE and running the same simulation

using RELAP5/FORCE. The forces generated by each method were almost identical.

Other analyses were made using the RELAP5/FORCE combination which included simulating CE Test 908, CE Test 1411, Edwards' Pipe Problem, and Hanson's Problem. Each of the calculations were in good agreement with the test data. Therefore the time steps used for FORCE calculations were also found to be acceptable for use in determining Kewaunee plant specific thermal/hydraulic loads.

Q. 15. In performing a thermal hydraulic analysis the valve flow area is typically allowed to vary in some manner over the valve opening time. In the case of a loop seal transient, the valve simmers for a period of time after the set pressure is reached, and then pops open. Was the simmering time included in the valve opening time over which the flow area was assumed to vary, or was the transient assumed to begin after the simmering period? In what manner was the flow area assumed to vary during the opening time?

A. 15. For all safety valve simulations, all subcooled water upstream was assumed to simmer through the valve prior to the safety valve popping. When the safety began to "pop," the RELAP5 transient started. Therefore the simmering time was not included in the RELAP5 calculation.

The safety valve was simulated to ramp open from 0.0 seconds, with $A_{\text{safety valve}} = 0.0 \text{ ft}^2$ to .015 seconds, with $A_{\text{safety valve}} = .017 \text{ ft}^2$. After .015 seconds throughout the remainder of the RELAP5 transient, the safety valve(s) remain fully open ($A_{\text{safety valve}} = .017 \text{ ft}^2$).

Q-16. The submittal does not provide some of the details needed to make an assessment of the structural analysis. How were the pipe supports modeled and how did calculated loads in the supports compare with allowable values? What damping values were assumed in the piping analysis? What time steps were used in the time history integration model superposition analysis and in the fluid forcing functions applied to the model? A computer printout of input and output for the Locked Rotor accident problem for the safety valves lifting should be provided.

A-16. The dynamic piping supports were modeled as springs to ground each having a calculated spring constant for the overall support assembly based on a series spring combination of all the components in the restraint assembly. The dynamic supports for the Kewaunee piping consist of three hanger types which are structural components such as I-beam frame assemblies, ITT Grinnell Figure 211 rigid sway struts, and ITT Grinnell Figure 201 hydraulic shock and sway suppressors. The spring constant for the structural items were calculated with a structural computer code by modeling each structural assembly with the applicable beam properties included. The sway strut spring constant was based on a series spring combination of the calculated stiffness of the restraint components which included the clevis, pins, and center components. The snubber spring constants reflect test data values published by ITT Grinnell. The ITT Grinnell values are the average snubber spring rates based on test data.

The computer predicted loads on all supports have been compared to the allowable values. The largest value based on the normal, upset or faulted load combination has been used as a design basis to ensure that allowables have not been exceeded. The stresses in structural components such as beams and plates are within AISC allowable stress levels. The loads on ITT Grinnell hanger components have been compared to the published allowable loads in Catalog PH79 which corresponds to plant "normal" conditions.

The restraint loads based on Kewaunee normal, upset, and faulted load combinations are below the rated loads in Catalog PH79 with the

exception of struts RC-H8, RC-H9, and snubber RC-H40. These loads, which exceed the ITT Grinnell "normal" allowables, were sent to ITT Grinnell for review. ITT Grinnell has qualified replacement restraints to the new loads.

The damping value used for the ADLPIPE time history analysis was 2 per cent. This value is consistent with suggested values for SSE earthquake analysis found in U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Guide 1.61.

The time steps used for the ADLPIPE modal superposition time history analysis was 0.001 seconds. This value is based on the following suggested formula from the Control Data Corporation REPIPE Application Manual.

$$\Delta t \leq \frac{0.1}{f_i} \quad \text{Where: } \Delta t - \text{suggested time step.}$$

$f_i = \text{highest significant frequency.}$

An additional computer analysis was run for the two safety valve actuation with a time step of 0.0004 seconds to confirm the acceptability of the 0.001 time step value. The maximum predicted piping stress increased less than 1.0 per cent with the time step value of 0.0004 seconds. The increase of less than 1 per cent is considered insignificant. The time step used in the forcing functions applied to the model was based on the RELAP5 calculation. The REPIPE post-processor was used in the original evaluation and the FORCE post-processor was used in the final evaluations (see A-14.0). The time steps varied depending on the transient conditions. For the locked rotor, double safety valve, double rupture disc FORCE calculations, the FORCE time steps varied between 1.25 msec and .625 msec. The FORCE post-processor also checks for peak forces in the data from RELAP5. If a peak force is discovered, it also includes this force in the forcing function table to be used in ADLPIPE calculations.

A packet which contains a microfiche copy of the two safety valve actuation time history analysis has been attached to this submittal and is contained in Appendix B.

Q-17. The submittal presents loading combinations for FSAR Class 1 and Class 2 piping and components. In this presentation the fluid transient load for the emergency condition for Class 1 items includes only a single safety valve actuation. Since the safety valves are set at the same pressure multiple actuation is probable. Multiple actuation should be included for the emergency load combination with appropriate consideration of sequential lift (see Question 13).

The loading combination presented for Class II items does not include any fluid transient loads from safety or relief valve actuation. Loading from valve actuation should be included in an appropriate load combination for Class II items.

A-17. The Kewaunee piping system has been analyzed for four separate valve actuation possibilities. These events are the double PORV actuation, the single actuation of safety valve PR-3A, the single actuation of safety valve PR-3B, and the simultaneous actuation of both safety valves. The Kewaunee Final Safety Analysis Report load combinations for components does not contain a loading combination for the plant emergency condition as indicated by Tables B.7-1 and B.7-5 found within Appendix B of the FSAR. Therefore, since the emergency loading combination was not used in the original design basis for the plant, the emergency loading combination was not used for this evaluation. It should be noted that the load combinations presented in Tables 8-4 and 8-5 of the original Kewaunee piping report (see "Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant Safety and Relief Valves Piping Qualification Report," issued June 28, 1982) were based on EPRI recommendations. Subsequent to issuing this report, it was found that some of the information in the tables was not relevant to the Kewaunee design basis, therefore, the tables will be changed for the final issue of the report.

The FSAR considers the locked rotor accident as a plant faulted condition. This condition was considered the design basis for the Kewaunee evaluation. The sequence of safety valve actuation has been discussed under Question 13.

The piping downstream of the power operated relief valves and the safety valves is Class II piping per the FSAR. All piping upstream of the valves is Class I per the FSAR. The load combinations

attached in Tables 1 and 2 are consistent with the Kewaunee FSAR load combinations in Table B.7-1 found in the FSAR. It is recognized that the downstream or Class II piping will affect the upstream or Class I piping during the plant normal, upset, and faulted condition loadings. To ensure the integrity of the upstream piping, all downstream or Class II piping has been subjected to Class I loading conditions for the plant normal, upset, and faulted condition. All piping, including upstream and downstream, has been evaluated to the load combinations for Class I piping and components. The resultant stresses are within the allowables for the FSAR Class I normal, upset, and faulted conditions.

TABLE 1. LOAD COMBINATIONS FOR FSAR CLASS I PIPING AND COMPONENTS

<u>Condition</u>	<u>Load Combination*</u>	<u>B31.1 Equation</u>	<u>Stress Allowable</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
Normal	DL + PI	11	S_h	Primary and normal loads
Upset	$DL + PI \pm [SO^2 + SA^2 + ST_1^2]^{1/2}$	12	$1.2S_h$	Primary and occasional loads
	TE + TA	13	S_a	Secondary loads
	TE + TA + DL + PI	14	$S_a + S_h$	Secondary and primary loads to be evaluated only if Equation 13 is exceeded
Faulted	$DL + PI \pm [SS^2 + SA^2 + ST_n]^{1/2}$	12	$2.4S_h$	Primary loads

*See Table 3 for definitions of symbols.

TABLE 2. LOAD COMBINATIONS FOR FSAR CLASS II PIPING AND COMPONENTS

<u>Condition</u>	<u>Load Combinations*</u>	<u>B31.1 Equation</u>	<u>Stress Allowable</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
Normal	DL + PI	11	S_h	Primary and normal loads
Upset	$DL + PI + [SO^2 + SA^2]^{1/2}$	12	$1.2S_h$	Primary and occasional loads
	TE + TA	13	S_a	Secondary loads
	DL + PI + TE + TA	14	$S_a + S_h$	Secondary and primary loads to be evaluated only if Equation 13 is exceeded

*See Table 3 for definition of symbols.

TABLE 3. DEFINITIONS AND LOAD ABBREVIATIONS

DL	Dead Load
PI	Pressure
TE	Thermal Expansion
TA	Thermal Anchor Motions
SO	Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE)
SS	Design Basis Earthquake (DBE)
SA	Seismic Anchor Motions (OBE or DBE)
ST1	System Transient (2 relief valves)
ST2	System Transient (1 safety valve, PR-3B)
ST3	System Transient (2 safety valves)
ST4	System Transient (1 safety valve, PR-3A)
S_h	Hot allowable stress
S_a	Allowable stress range based on hot and cold stress allowables
S_n	Largest Loading Due to ST ₂ , ST ₃ , or ST ₄

Q-18. The pressurizer and relief tank connections were modeled as anchors in the analysis. Was it verified that the tanks or connections possess no flexibility that could affect structural response of the piping system?

A-18. In order to verify the acceptability of modeling the pressurizer and the pressurizer relief tank as rigid anchors, a computer analysis for the two-safety valve actuation was run with the anchors modeled simulating the approximate stiffness of the pressurizer and pressurizer relief tank. The results of the analysis with approximate anchor stiffness was compared to the results of the analysis with anchors modeled rigid. The maximum stresses in the piping system yield negligible differences in value (about 1 per cent) thus, justifying the use of rigid anchor modeling.

Q-19. The program ADLPIPE is limited to the use of the modal superposition technique to generate the time history dynamic response of the piping system. Since the modal superposition will limit the solution to the set natural frequencies included in the solution, further information is required to evaluate accuracy of results obtained in using this method.

- a. The hydrodynamic forces created by overpressure transients typically contain high frequencies. What was the cutoff frequency used in the analysis and how was it established?
- b. The natural modes of the structure having frequencies above a properly established cutoff frequency will respond rigidly to the applied loading. This rigid response of the high frequency modes will not be included in a normal modal superposition solution, but is often a significant part of the total response in fluid transient time history problems. Was this high frequency rigid body response accounted for in the calculated total response of the system?

A-19. The forcing functions being used in the ADLPIPE two-safety valve time history analysis were examined for frequency content by extracting the fourier series coefficients and plotting the sine and cosine coefficients vs. frequency. Examination of the cosine coefficients indicate the majority of frequencies with large coefficients at or below 100 to 120 hertz. One forcing function in the upper portion of the piping system had significant cosine coefficients near the 200 hertz range. The cutoff frequency used for the analysis was 300 hertz. Review of the modal participation factors on pages 54 and 55 of the two safety-valve time history ADLPIPE analysis microfiche copy contained in Appendix B indicates the majority of the significant modal participation factors occur below 100 hertz with some vertical participation factors of about 0.4 near 130 and 230 hertz. The 300 hertz cutoff frequency and the relatively low modal participation factors of higher frequencies indicate that the major thermal/hydraulic loads due to the two-safety valve transient have been included in the ADLPIPE analysis.

Q-20. Some of the spacing between lumped masses (particularly in the lower region of the discharge piping) is too large to permit dynamic response to the high frequencies commonly contained in fluid forcing functions. What is the rationale for using the large spacing?

A-20. The lumped mass spacing used in the analysis was established for each pipe diameter and the corresponding pipe cross section based on the first mode (fundamental) frequency of a simply supported beam. The spacing span is based on the following equation.

$$L = \left[\frac{9.87}{2\pi} \right]^{1/2} \left[\frac{gEI}{f^2W} \right]^{1/4}$$

Where L = Lumped mass spacing; in feet

E = Modulus of Elasticity; in psi

I = Moment of Inertia; in in⁴

W = Distributed weight of the pipe; in lbs/in

f = Frequency, in hertz

g = Acceleration of gravity (in/sec²)

Table 4 attached, is a summary of the lumped mass spacing for the Kewaunee S/RV piping. As indicated under Question 19, one forcing function, which is applied in the upper portion of the piping system, had a significant fourier coefficient at about 200 hertz. In order to confirm the adequacy of lumped mass spacing based on 100 hertz, the 10-inch piping in the lower section was lumped at a 6-foot spacing and the two safety-valve analysis was rerun. The analysis showed no significant changes in the piping stresses or loads on restraints. It is also noted that the lump mass spacing in the upper portion of the piping system is adequate for 200 Hertz as mass points are used at elbows, tees, valves, etc., which resulted in a set of closely spaced lumped mass points because of piping geometry.

TABLE 4.

<u>Pipe</u>	<u>Schedule</u>	<u>E</u> (psi x 10 ⁻⁶)	<u>I</u> (in ⁴)	<u>W</u> (lbs/in)	<u>f</u> (HZ)	<u>L</u> (ft)
3	160	28.3	5.0	1.2	100	5
4	40	28.3	7.2	0.9	100	6
6	160	28.3	59.0	3.8	100	7
10	40	28.3	160.8	3.4	100	9
10	40	28.3	160.8	3.4	200	6

Q-21. The program REPIPE calculates a wave force for each bounded segment of piping, which was evidently applied to the structural model. Application of only a wave force on a pipe segment, however, ignores the axial extension that is caused by opposing "blowdown" forces at the ends of the pipe segment. This axial extension induces bending moments on pipe segments adjacent to the bounded segment in question. How was this axial extension accounted for in the analysis?

A-21. The ADLPIPE analysis for the two safety valve actuation event was performed by utilizing forcing functions generated by the computer code FORCE. A single (net) forcing function was applied at the downstream end of each run of discharge piping. The two safety valve actuation analysis was also run with a set of forcing functions applied at both ends of each run to investigate the effect of axial pipe extensions on the bending stresses induced into the piping. The analysis with forces applied at both ends of each run includes bending stresses due to net forces and bending stresses induced on adjacent piping by the axial extension of pipe segments. The points of highest stress in the piping system had a negligible difference in stress values when comparing stresses produced by the analysis with net forces to the stresses produced by the analysis with forces applied at each end of pipe segments. These minor fluctuations in piping stress values were about 1 to 3 per cent.

Q-22. The submittal does not discuss how the safety valve bonnet assemblies and the relief valve actuators were modeled. They should be modeled as masses displaced from the pipe centerline and if the natural frequency of the bonnets or actuators could potentially be excited by piping or support motion then elements connecting the masses to the pipe should represent the flexibility of these structures. A discussion of the modeling of these items should be included.

A-22. The safety valves and power operated relief valves were modeled to represent the approximate valve stiffness with the weight of the valve lumped at the modeled center of gravity. The valve body and upper housing for both valves have been modeled with pipe diameters equal to the adjacent piping. The wall of the valve has been modeled as two times that of the connecting piping for both the valve body and upper housing. The entire weight of the valve has been located as a lumped mass in the valve upper housing model at the location corresponding to the center of gravity of the actual valve assembly.

Q-23. The submittal states that several overstressed points in the upstream and downstream piping were identified in the analysis. The overstresses were caused by the large thermal-hydraulic forces which are created when expanding steam forces the cold water slug through the downstream piping. A letter written subsequent to the submittal indicates that this problem will be resolved by installing rupture discs in the discharge piping. The rupture discs are intended to relieve the water slug from the loop seals into the pressurizer vault, thereby eliminating the hydrodynamic forces that result in the overstressed condition. Further details of the rupture disc design should be presented showing the viability of this concept. Also, an analysis should be provided that shows that no overstresses in the piping system will occur under any transient condition with the revised piping configuration

A-23. Two rupture disc/baffle plate assemblies will be used in the Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant discharge piping to reduce the thermal/hydraulic loads caused by the actuation of one or both safety valves. A double or single safety valve actuation will create a pressure buildup in the discharge piping which will cause the rupture discs to burst, allowing the subcooled water from the safety valve loop seals to escape from the discharge piping. The loss of the fluid out the rupture disc openings will also reduce the pressure rise in the discharge piping, thereby reducing the downstream driving force which contributes to large thermal/hydraulic loads in the discharge piping.

A plan view of the upper portion of the S/RV piping showing the added rupture disc assemblies has been included on Figure A23-1. Figures A23-2a and A23-2b present a plan view comparison between the as-built Kewaunee S/RV discharge piping and the planned Kewaunee modification using the rupture discs, respectively.

Major features of the rupture disc design are given below.

- (1) An eccentric orifice plate with a maximum open area of 1.37 ft^2 (approximately 25 per cent of full open area) will be located at the first 10-inch 90 degree elbow downstream of both safety valves. The orifice plate will be designed to allow drainage from leaking safety valves to pass into the downstream piping. This orifice plate serves two purposes. The first is to cause the upstream pressure to exceed the rated pressure set point

of the rupture disc during a single safety valve actuation. The disc was required to rupture during a single safety actuation to ensure discharge piping loads are minimized. The second is to minimize the downstream flow of subcooled water from the loop seals and to minimize the downstream pressure wave. This will minimize the downstream forces.

- (2) The rupture disc will have a set point of 270 psid. This set point will provide a sufficient margin to ensure that the disc does not rupture during a worst case power operated relief valve (PORV) actuation. The worst case PORV actuation produced a pressure of 162 psig at the rupture disc/baffle plate assembly. The rupture disc will be constructed out of inconel material which is resistant to boric acid degradation.
- (3) A 10-inch piping segment is required to replace the 6-inch piping run between the first 90-degree elbow at the safety valve PR-3A discharge and the 10-inch by 6-inch reducer. This additional 10-inch piping was necessary to decrease the water hammer pressure spikes caused by the double safety valve actuation.
- (4) An additional snubber rated at 27 kips will be installed at elevation 626 feet on the 10-inch vertical discharge piping run.

As previously indicated a microfilm copy, found on page 12-3, contains the two safety actuation RELAP5 analysis.

The stresses due to the two-safety actuation is the major contributor to the overall piping stresses for the plant faulted loading conditions. Table A23-1, which indicates the largest stress values per the load combinations included in the answer to Question 17, has also been included. Specific analytical results will be presented in Revision 1 of the "Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant Safety and Relief Valves Piping Qualification Report," to be issued at a later date.

With the rupture disc configuration and associated modification implemented, it was concluded that the piping stresses and restraint loading would be within acceptable values during worst case safety valve(s) or PORV(s) actuation.




FIGURE A23-1. PLAN VIEW OF KEWAUNEE RUPTURE DISC CONFIGURATION




FIGURE A23-2a. KEWAUNEE AS-BUILT--PLAN VIEW




FIGURE A23-2b. KEWAUNEE RUPTURE DISC MODIFICATION--PLAN VIEW

TABLE A23-1. MAXIMUM STRESS IN THE S/RV PIPING

<u>ADLPIPE Node</u>	<u>Stress psi</u>	<u>Allowable Stress psi</u>	<u>Plant Condition</u>	<u>B31.1 Equation</u>	<u>Location in Piping System</u>
80	8,004	14,300	Normal	11	3" PORV Inlet Piping
94	13,272	17,160	Upset	12	3" PORV Inlet Piping
17	15,734*	27,013		13	6" Safety Inlet Piping
807	34,663**	43,440	Faulted	12	10" Discharge Piping

*Stress range of all thermal modes.

**Includes loading due to two-safety actuation.

B & V

MICROFILM CENTER

SUBJECT: WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATION
KEWAUNEE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
RELAPS COMPUTER CALCULATION
9653.51.1006

START

FILMED: MAR 6 1984

COMPUTER GENERATED CALCULATIONS

Owner WPSC Computed By [Signature]
 Plant Kewanee Unit _____ Date 12/20 1983
 Project No. 9653 File No. 9653, 51.1006 Rev 1
 Title Kewanee S/RV Analysis

PROGRAM NUMBER N 28 VERSION RELAPS/MOD 1
 RUN DATE 11/28/83 RUN TIME 22:52:21
 CASE TWO SAFETIES AP S ASFE NO. OF PAGES _____

STATUS* _____
 By _____ Date _____ 19____

REVIEW AND APPROVAL

1. Input Data Printout

Checked By M. Wood Date 12/20 1983

2. Output Data Printout

Checked By M. Wood Date 12/20 1983

3. Approved _____ Date _____ 19____

*No special indication of status is required for calculations other than those that are superseded or declared void.

PP	PP	RR	RR	TT	1111	4444	00	00	33	33
PP	PP	RR	RR	TT	11	44 44	00	00		33
PP	PP	RR	RR	TT	11	44 44	00	00		33
PPPPPPPPPPPP	RRRRRRRRRRRR			TT	11	44 44	00	00		3333
PPPPPPPPPPPP	RRRRRRRRRRRR			TT	11	44 44	00	00		3333
PP	RR	RR		TT	11	444444444444	00	00		33
PP	RR	RR		TT	11	444444444444	00	00		33
PP	RR	RR		TT	11	44	00	00	33	33
PP	RR	RR		TT	1111111111	44	0000000000		333333333333	
PP	RR	RR		TT	1111111111	44	00000000		3333333333	

R51GA

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. RELAP5 CERTIFICATION STATUS .
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•81/12/11• VERSION 1.00 UPDATE SUMMARY

1. WORD SIZE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CDC AND CRAY CHANGES THE FORMAT FOR HYDRODYNAMIC COMPONENTS, THE COMPONENT NAME SHOULD BE LIMITED TO 8 LETTERS.

2. CRAY VERSION HAS UNIQUE WAY OF HANDLING ITS PLOTTING TO MINIMIZE THE I/O AND DISK STORAGE CHARGES.

3. SOME SPECIAL MINOR EDIT SPECIFICATIONS ARE NOT ALLOWED ON CRAY. CONSULT THE CONSULTANTS IF YOU RUN INTO ONE.

•82/05/25• VERSION 2.00 UPDATE SUMMARY

1. PLOTTING AND FORCING-FUNCTION DATA FILE OUTPUT FREQUENCY IS CONTROLLED BY THE FIRST DATA ITEM IN A 199 CARD, WHICH IS AN INTEGER REPRESENTING THE NUMBER OF ACTUAL TIME STEPS PER OUTPUTTING OF DATA. (DEFAULT IS 1) A "0" ENTRY DIRECT THE CODE TO SKIP GENERATION OF PLOTTING FILE.

2. AIR MASS ERROR TOLERANCE CONTROL BY A 199 INPUT CARD. THE SECOND DATA ITEM IN 199 CARD IS A REAL NUMBER REPRESENTING THE AIR MASS ERROR TOLERANCE TO BE USED. (DEFAULT IS 0.01)

•83/05/06• VERSION 3.00 UPDATE SUMMARY

1. RELAP5-FORCE VOLUME/JUNCTION CORRELATIONS ARE PROVIDED AFTER INPUT PREPARATION.

2. DIMENSION OF PROBLEM SIZE JACKED UP TO 500. DUE TO THE DYNAMIC DIMENSIONING NATURE OF RELAP5, THE ACTUAL SIZE OF THE PROBLEM THAT CAN BE RUN CAN NOT BE DETERMINED. EXTENSIVE TESTING FOR PROBLEMS LESS THAN 300 JUNCTION/VOLUME HAVE BEEN PERFORMED. ANY THING ABOUT 300 MOST LIKELY WILL RUN BUT NOT GUARANTEED. CONTACT THE NUCLIB CONSULTANT IF YOU BOMBED OUT ON *OPERAND RANGE ERROR*.

3. BUG IN SUBROUTINE RMPDC WAS REPORTED BY INEL (RJM) AND CORRECTED IN CRAY VERSION.

2 PSV
Rev 1

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. CERTIFICATION STATUS (CONTINUED) .
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•83/09/13• VERSION 4.00 UPDATE SUMMARY

•83/08/07• BY J.T.CHING AND K.TAKAZAWA

PRESSURE, FLOW AND FORCE OSCILLATIONS ARE SMOOTHED OUT BY

(1) TWO UPDATE CARDS FROM INEL TO SKIP CHOKING IN CERTAIN UNWARRANTED SITUATION.

(2) LINEARIZATION OF THE UNDER-RELAXATION OF THE PHASE

TRANSITION REGION FOR VOID FRACTION BETWEEN

0.0 AND 0.1 CENTERED AROUND 0.05

CONSULTANT IF YOU BOMB OUT ON *OPERAND RANGE ERROR*.

3. BUG IN SUBROUTINE RMPDC WAS REPORTED BY INEL (RJM) AND CORRECTED IN CRAY VERSION.

2 PSV
Rev 1

.....
: CERTIFICATION STATUS (CONTINUED) :
:.....

83/09/13 VERSION 4.00 UPDATE SUMMARY

83/08/07 BY J.T.CHING AND K.TAKAZAWA
PRESSURE, FLOW AND FORCE OSCILLATIONS ARE SMOOTHED OUT BY
(1) TWO UPDATE CARDS FROM INEL TO SKIP CHOKING IN
CERTAIN UNWARRANTED SITUATION.
(2) LINEARIZATION OF THE UNDER-RELAXATION OF THE PHASE
TRANSITION REGION FOR VOID FRACTION BETWEEN
0.0 AND 0.1 CENTERED AROUND 0.05.

83/08/10 BY J.T.CHING
INCORPORATION OF A LIQUID-FLOW SEPARATOR JUNCTION IN SUBR.
JPROP FOR STEAM GENERATOR SECONDARY, DOWNCOMER MODELLING
VIA INPUT BY THE 199 CARD, THIRD INTEGER VARIABLE.

83/08/20 BY K.TAKAZAWA
INCORPORATION OF CYCLE 15 TO CYCLE 18 FROM INEL.
AN OCCASIONAL HEAT STRUCTURE CALCULATION BUG CORRECTED.

83/09/04 BY J.T.CHING
SEVERE TRANSIENT ENCOUNTERED IN MULTIPLE JUNCTION SUBCOOL
BLOWDOWN CAUSED *RAISING (0.8) TO A NEGATIVE POWER* IN
SUBROUTINE JCHOK. CORRECTED BY SET NEGATIVE NUMBER TO
ZERO IN THE ITERATION. RESULTS APPEAR SATISFACTORY.

83/09/13 EXECUTION PROCEDURE FILE CHANGE
PROCEDURE MODIFIED TO ACCESS VERSION 4.00

83/09/13 VERSION 4.01 ERROR CORRECTION
LIQUID-FLOW SEPARATOR JUNCTION MOVED FROM FIFTH
VALUE TO THIRD VALUE ON 199 CARD. VARIABLES TWOMUL
AND THICKN DELETED FROM PROGRAM.

83/09/16 PROCEDURE INSTALLATION
PROCEDURE TO ACCESS EXPERIMENTAL VERSION OF
RELAP5 (R51EXX) INSTALLED ON SYSTEM.

83/09/16 PROCEDURE INSTALLATION
PROCEDURE TO ACCESS BCS 0.A. VERSION OF
RELAP5 (R51FXG) INSTALLED ON SYSTEM.

83/09/16 VERSION 4.00 VERSION RELEASE
SOME MODIFICATIONS DID NOT GET TRANSFERRED INTO

THE VERSION 4.00 UPDATE. VERSION 4.00 WAS RE-COMPILED
WITH CORRECTIONS IN PLACE. ALL PREVIOUS VERSION
4.00 RUNS AFTER SEPT. 13 ARE INVALID.

83/09/18 VERSION 4.00 VERSION RELEASE
CYCLE 18 MODS PULLED FROM VERSION 4. MODS WERE
CAUSING FAILURE OF STANDARD BCS TEST CASE 1.

83/09/18 LIQUID-FORCE JUNCTION MODEL
THIS INPUT TEST THE LIQUID-FORCED JUNCTION MODEL FOR ANY JUNCTION,
BESIDES A SEPARATOR MODEL JUNCTION. THE FLOW EVENTUALLY BECOMES

PROCEDURE TO ACCESS EXPERIMENTAL VERSION OF
RELAP5 (R51EXX) INSTALLED ON SYSTEM.

83/09/16 PROCEDURE INSTALLATION
PROCEDURE TO ACCESS BCS O.A. VERSION OF
RELAP5 (R51EXQ) INSTALLED ON SYSTEM.

83/09/16 VERSION 4.00 VERSION RELEASE
SOME MODIFICATIONS DID NOT GET TRANSFERED INTO

THE VERSION 4.00 UPDATE. VERSION 4.00 WAS RE-COMPILED
WITH CORRECTIONS IN PLACE. ALL PREVIOUS VERSION
4.00 RUNS AFTER SEPT. 13 ARE INVALID.

83/09/18 VERSION 4.00 VERSION RELEASE
CYCLE 18 MODS PULLED FROM VERSION 4. MODS WERE
CAUSING FAILURE OF STANDARD BCS TEST CASE 1.

83/09/18 LIQUID-FORCE JUNCTION MODEL
THIS INPUT TEST THE LIQUID-FORCED JUNCTION MODEL FOR ANY JUNCTION,
RESIDES A SEPARATOR MODEL JUNCTION. THE FLOW EVENTUALLY BECOME
ALL LIQUID (VOIDGJ=0.0, AND VOIDFJ=1.0 IN *200000*.)

83/09/18 FLOATING-ERROR ELIMINATOR IN SUBR. JCHOKE
A CHECK IS MADE IN SUBROUTINE JCHOKE TO PREVENT RAISING (0.8) TO
A NEGATIVE POWER IN ITERATION.

83/09/18 LIQUID-FORCED JUNCTION MODEL
THE THIRD ENTRY IN CARD 199 CAN BE ENTERED AS A JUNCTION THRU
WHICH LIQUID ARE FORCED TO FLOW UNTIL EITHER IT BECOME ALL LIQUID
OR THERE IS NO LIQUID LEFT IN THE FROM VOLUME. THIS INPUT TEST
SUCH A MODEL FOR A SEPARATOR COMPONENT.

83/09/18 OSCILLATION SMOOTHING MODEL
A LINEAR MODEL IS USED TO REPLACE THE CONSTANT MODEL IN PHASE
CROSSING UNDER-RELAXATION MODEL IN SUBR. JCHOKE .
A INEL UPDATE CARD IS INTRODUCED TO ELIMINATE CHOKING TREATMENT
IN CERTAIN CRITICAL STATES.

83/09/18 TEST CASE INSTALLATION
R51IQ14 RE-INSTALLED WITH UNIQUE RECORD NAME

83/09/18 TEST CASE INSTALLATION
R51IQ13 RE-INSTALLED WITH UNIQUE RECORD NAME

83/09/18 TEST CASE INSTALLATION
R51IQ12 RE-INSTALLED WITH UNIQUE RECORD NAME

83/09/18 TEST CASE INTSALLATION
TEST CASE RE-INSTALLED WITH UNIQUE RECORD NAME

83/09/20 TEST CASE INSTALLATION
TEST CASE 10 SIMPLE VALVE TEST

83/09/20 TEST CASE INSTALLATION
TEST CASE 9 CE STEAM TEST NO. 1411

83/09/20 TEST CASE INSTALLATION
TEST CASE 7 CE TEST 1411 (BCS MODEL)

•83/09/18• TEST CASE INSTALLATION
R511G13 RE-INSTALLED WITH UNIQUE RECORD NAME

•83/09/18• TEST CASE INSTALLATION
R511G12 RE-INSTALLED WITH UNIQUE RECORD NAME

•83/09/18• TEST CASE INTSALLATION
TEST CASE RE-INSTALLED WITH UNIQUE RECORD NAME

•83/09/20• TEST CASE INSTALLATION
TEST CASE 10 SIMPLE VALVE TEST

•83/09/20• TEST CASE INSTALLATION
TEST CASE 9 CE STEAM TEST NO. 1411

•83/09/20• TEST CASE INSTALLATION
TEST CASE 7 CE TEST 1411 (RCS MODEL)

•83/09/20• TEST CASE INSTALLATION
TEST CASE 6 LOFT L9-1 POSTTEST ANALYSIS INITIALIZATION DECK

•83/09/20• TEST CASE INSTALLATION
TEST CASE 5 LIQUID OVER VAPOR VERTICAL PIPE

•83/09/20• TEST CASE INSTALLATION
TEST CASE 4 SUPERHEATED VAPOR PIPE (HIGH PRESSURE)

•83/09/20• TEST CASE INSTALLATION
TEST CASE 3 EDWARDS PIPE 9 VOL, 1VOL, 10 VOL CASE -- SCRAMBLED

•83/09/20• TEST CASE INSTALLATION
TEST CASE 2 TWO PHASE PIPE FILLED WITH SAME WATER

•83/09/20• TEST CASE INSTALLATION
TEST CASE 1 SUPERHEATED VAPOR PIPE (LOW PRESSURE)

•10/23/83• CONFIRMATORY TEST PERFORMED FOR LIQUID JUNCTION MODEL
AT REQUEST OF TWO CLIENTS (J.CHING)

PROBLEM R511G14 IS RERUN WITH R51EXG WITH AND WITHOUT
THE SPECIFICATION OF FORCED-LIQUID JUNCTION (THIRD ENTRY
IN 199 CARD=1/0 RESPECTIVELY). THE MINOR EDIT AT 10 SEC
GIVES:

CASE	TIME	VOIDGJ(VAPOR)	VOIDFJ(LIQUID)
LIQ JUN	10.0SEC	1.66E-5	0.99998
NO LIQ J	10.0SEC	0.98923	1.07E-2

•10/23/83• LIQUID-JUNCTION MODEL, RESTART AND REVERSE FLOW.

BY J.CHING

IT WAS DEMONSTRATED THAT:

- (1) THE LIQ-JUN MODEL CAN BE TURN ON IN A RESTART
- (2) IT DOES NOT, HOWEVER, WORK FOR A REVERSE FLOW
(WHICH IS PHYSICALLY REASONABLE).

•83/11/07• VERSION 4.01 ERROR CORRECTION
VERSION 4.01 RE-BUILT FROM VERSION 4.00,
INCLUDES CYCLE 18 MODIFICATIONS AFTER A SMALL
BUG FIX WAS INCORPORATED TO GET G.A. PROBLEM 1
TO WORK, ALSO THE OSCILLATION SMOOTHING MODEL
WAS CORRECTED.

•10/23/83• CONFIRMATORY TEST PERFORMED FOR LIQUID JUNCTION MODEL
AT REQUEST OF TWO CLIENTS (J.CHING)

PROBLEM R511Q14 IS RERUN WITH R51EXQ WITH AND WITHOUT
THE SPECIFICATION OF FORCED-LIQUID JUNCTION (THIRD ENTRY
IN 199 CARD=1/0 RESPECTIVELY). THE MINOR EDIT AT 10 SEC
GIVES:

CASE	TIME	VOIDGJ(VAPOR)	VOIDFJ(LIQUID)
LIQ JUN	10.0SEC	1.66E-5	0.99998
NO LIQ J	10.0SEC	0.98923	1.07E-2

•10/23/83• LIQUID-JUNCTION MODEL, RESTART AND REVERSE FLOW.

BY J.CHING

IT WAS DEMONSTRATED THAT:

- (1) THE LIQ-JUN MODEL CAN BE TURN ON IN A RESTART
- (2) IT DOES NOT, HOWEVER, WORK FOR A REVERSE FLOW
(WHICH IS PHYSICALLY REASONABLE).

•83/11/07• VERSION 4.01 ERROR CORRECTION
VERSION 4.01 RE-BUILT FROM VERSION 4.00,
INCLUDES CYCLE 18 MODIFICATIONS AFTER A SMALL
BUG FIX WAS INCORPORATED TO GET Q.A. PROBLEM 1
TO WORK, ALSO THE OSCILLATION SMOOTHING MODEL
WAS CORRECTED IN SUBROUTINE JCHOKE. *

•83/11/07• INPUT PREPARATION PROGRAM CHANGE
EXTEND CAPABILITY IN HEAT STRUCTURE INPUT.

•83/11/07• TEST CASE INSTALLATION
R51Q15 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE TEST

•83/11/18• PRE-CERTIFIED PROCEDURE
PROCEDURE TO ACCESS BCS PRE-CERTIFIED VERSION
ADDED TO NUCLIB INTERACTIVE.

*** D I S C L A I M E R ***

R51AB3 IS BEING ACCESSED FROM THE NUCLIB VENDOR
ACCOUNT ON AN EXPERIMENTAL BASIS ONLY. BCS ASSUMES
NO RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE VALIDITY OF RESULTS
OBTAINED BY THE USE OF THIS PROGRAM OR DATA SET.
THE VENDOR IS MAINTAINING CONFIGURATION CONTROL
RECORDS FOR THIS FILE. Q.A. RESPONSIBILITY
RESIDES SOLELY WITH YOUR ORGANIZATION FOR THE
CERTIFICATION AND VALIDATION OF THESE RESULTS.
PLEASE CONTACT JON JERVERT (BCS Q.A. MANAGER)
AT (206) 763-5024 FOR FURTHER DETAILS.

*** D I S C L A I M E R ***

R51AB3 IS BEING ACCESSED FROM THE NUCLIB VENDOR
ACCOUNT ON AN EXPERIMENTAL BASIS ONLY. BCS ASSUMES
NO RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE VALIDITY OF RESULTS
OBTAINED BY THE USE OF THIS PROGRAM OR DATA SET.
THE VENDOR IS MAINTAINING CONFIGURATION CONTROL
RECORDS FOR THIS FILE. Q.A. RESPONSIBILITY
RESIDES SOLELY WITH YOUR ORGANIZATION FOR THE
CERTIFICATION AND VALIDATION OF THESE RESULTS.
PLEASE CONTACT JON JERVERT (BCS Q.A. MANAGER)
AT (206) 763-5024 FOR FURTHER DETAILS.

*** D I S C L A I M E R ***

ST5DAT IS BEING ACCESSED FROM THE NUCLIB VENDOR
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NO RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE VALIDITY OF RESULTS
OBTAINED BY THE USE OF THIS PROGRAM OR DATA SET.
THE VENDOR IS MAINTAINING CONFIGURATION CONTROL
RECORDS FOR THIS FILE. Q.A. RESPONSIBILITY
RESIDES SOLELY WITH YOUR ORGANIZATION FOR THE
CERTIFICATION AND VALIDATION OF THESE RESULTS.
PLEASE CONTACT JON JERVERT (BCS Q.A. MANAGER)
AT (206) 763-5024 FOR FURTHER DETAILS.

*** D I S C L A I M E R ***

STSDAT IS BEING ACCESSED FROM THE NUCLIR VENDOR ACCOUNT ON AN EXPERIMENTAL BASIS ONLY. BCS ASSUMES NO RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE VALIDITY OF RESULTS OBTAINED BY THE USE OF THIS PROGRAM OR DATA SET. THE VENDOR IS MAINTAINING CONFIGURATION CONTROL RECORDS FOR THIS FILE. Q.A. RESPONSIBILITY RESIDES SOLELY WITH YOUR ORGANIZATION FOR THE CERTIFICATION AND VALIDATION OF THESE RESULTS. PLEASE CONTACT JON JERVERT (BCS Q.A. MANAGER) AT (206) 763-5024 FOR FURTHER DETAILS.

• C R A Y - 1 5 •

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XXXXX  XXXX  XX  XXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
X XX  XX  XX  XX  XXXXXXXXX
X XX  XX  XX  XX  X  X
Y XX  XX  XX  XX  X  Y
Y XX  XX  XX  XX  Y  X
X XX  XX  XX  XX  X  X
X XX  XX  XX  XX  X  Y
Y XX  XX  XX  XX  Y  Y
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.....
• C R A Y - 1 S •
.....

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Y  X  U  X  XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX  F  X
XXX  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X
XXX  X  X  C  X  I  X  X
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XXXX  L  X  X  XXXXX
XXXXX  Y  XXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

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NUCLEAR PROGRAM LIBRARY
 BOEING COMPUTER SERVICES
 ENERGY ENGINEERING COMPUTER CODE LABORATORY

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RRRRRRRRRRR  EEEEEEEEEEEEE  LL  AAAAAAAAA  PPPPPPPPPP  5555555555555
RRRRRRRRRRR  EEEEEEEEEEEEE  LL  AAAAAAAAA  PPPPPPPPPP  5555555555555
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RR      RR  EE  LL  AA      AA  PP      PP  55
RR      RR  EE  LL  AA      AA  PP      PP  55
RRRRRRRRRRR  EEEEEEEEE  LL  AAAAAAAAAAAAAA  PPPPPPPPPP  555555555555
RRRRRRRRRRR  EEEEEEEEE  LL  AAAAAAAAAAAAAA  PPPPPPPPPP  555555555555
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RR      RR  EE  LL  AA      AA  PP      PP  55
RR      RR  EEEEEEEEEEEE  LLLLLLLLLLLLLL  AA      AA  PP      PP  555555555555
RR      RR  EEEEEEEEEEEE  LLLLLLLLLLLLLL  AA      AA  PP      PP  555555555555

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RRRRRRRRRR	EEEEEEEEEEEE	LL	AAAAAAAAAA	PPPPPPPPPP	5555555555
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RR RR	EE	LL	AA AA	PP PP	55
RR RR	EE	LL	AA AA	PP PP	55
RR RR	EE	LL	AA AA	PP PP	55
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RRRRRRRRRR	EEEEEEEE	LL	AAAAAAAAAA	PPPPPPPPPP	5555555555
RR RR	EE	LL	AA AA	PP	55
RR RR	EE	LL	AA AA	PP	55
RR RR	EE	LL	AA AA	PP	55
RR RR	EEEEEEEEEEEE	LLLLLLLLLLLL	AA AA	PP	55 55
RR RR	EEEEEEEEEEEE	LLLLLLLLLLLL	AA AA	PP	5555555555
RR RR	EEEEEEEEEEEE	LLLLLLLLLLLL	AA AA	PP	5555555555

MM	MM	0000000000	DDDDDDDDDD	11	CCCCCCCCCC	11	44
MMM	MMM	0000000000	DDDDDDDDDD	111	CCCCCCCCCC	111	444
MMMM	MMM	00 00	DD DD	1111	CC CC	1111	4444
MM MM	MM MM	00 00	DD DD	11	CC	11	44 44
MM MM MM	MM	00 00	DD DD	11	CC	11	44 44
MM MM	MM	00 00	DD DD	11	CC	11	44 44
MM M	MM	00 00	DD DD	11	CC	11	44 44
MM	MM	00 00	DD DD	11	CC	11	44 44
MM	MM	00 00	DD DD	11	CC	11	44 44
MM	MM	00 00	DD DD	11	CC	11	44 44
MM	MM	0000000000	DDDDDDDDDD	11111111	CCCCCCCCCC	11111111	44
MM	MM	0000000000	DDDDDDDDDD	11111111	CCCCCCCCCC	11111111	44

VV	VV	EEEEEEEEEEEE	RRRRRRRRRR	3333333333	00000000	00000000
VV	VV	EEEEEEEEEEEE	RRRRRRRRRR	3333333333	00000000	00000000
VV	VV	EE	RR RR	33	00	00
VV	VV	EE	RR RR	33	00	00
VV	VV	EE	RR RR	33	00	00
VV	VV	EEEEEEEE	RRRRRRRRRR	333	00	00
VV	VV	EEEEEEEE	RRRRRRRRRR	333	00	00
VV	VV	EE	RR RR	33	00	00
VV	VV	EE	RR RR	33	00	00
VV	VV	EE	RR RR	33	00	00
VV	VV	EE	RR RR	33	00	00
VV	VV	EE	RR RR	33	00	00
VV	VV	EEEEEEEEEEEE	RR RR	3333333333	00000000	00000000
V	V	EEEEEEEEEEEE	RR RR	3333333333	00000000	00000000

AAAAAAAAAA	PPPPPPPPPP	5555555555	AAAAAAAAAA	SSSSSSSSSS	FFFFFFFFFF	EEEEEEEEEEEE
AAAAAAAAAA	PPPPPPPPPP	5555555555	AAAAAAAAAA	SSSSSSSSSS	FFFFFFFFFF	EEEEEEEEEEEE
AA AA	PP PP	55	AA AA	SS SS	FF	EE
AA AA	PP PP	55	AA AA	SS	FF	EE
AA AA	PP PP	55	AA AA	SS	FF	EE
AAAAAAAAAA	PPPPPPPPPP	5555555555	AAAAAAAAAA	SSSSSSSSSS	FFFFFFFF	EEEEEEEE
AAAAAAAAAA	PPPPPPPPPP	5555555555	AAAAAAAAAA	SSSSSSSSSS	FFFFFFFF	EEEEEEEE
AA AA	PP	55	AA AA	SS	FF	EE
AA AA	PP	55	AA AA	SS	FF	EE
AA AA	PP	55	AA AA	SS	FF	EE
AA AA	PP	55	AA AA	SS	FF	EE
AA AA	PP	5555555555	AA AA	SSSSSSSSSS	FF	EEEEEEEEEEEE
AA AA	PP	5555555555	AA AA	SSSSSSSSSS	FF	EEEEEEEEEEEE

VV	VV	EE	RR	RR	33	00	00	00	00
VV	VV	EE	RR	RR	33	00	00	00	00
VV	VV	EE	RR	RR	33	00	00	00	00
VVV		EEEEEEEEEEEE	RR	RR	333333333333	000000000	000000000	000000000	000000000
V		EEEEEEEEEEEE	RR	RR	333333333333	0000000	0000000	0000000	0000000

AAAAAAAAA	PPPPPPPPPP	555555555555	AAAAAAAAA	SSSSSSSSSS	FFFFFFFFFFFF	EEEEEEEEEEEE
AAAAAAAAA	PPPPPPPPPP	555555555555	AAAAAAAAA	SSSSSSSSSS	FFFFFFFFFFFF	EEEEEEEEEEEE
AA AA	PP PP	55	AA AA	SS SS	FF FF	EE EE
AA AA	PP PP	55	AA AA	SS SS	FF FF	EE EE
AA AA	PP PP	55	AA AA	SS SS	FF FF	EE EE
AAAAAAAAA	PPPPPPPPPP	555555555555	AAAAAAAAA	SSSSSSSSSS	FFFFFFFFFFFF	EEEEEEEEEEEE
AAAAAAAAA	PPPPPPPPPP	555555555555	AAAAAAAAA	SSSSSSSSSS	FFFFFFFFFFFF	EEEEEEEEEEEE
AA AA	PP	55	AA AA	SS	FF	EE
AA AA	PP	55	AA AA	SS	FF	EE
AA AA	PP	55	AA AA	SS	FF	EE
AA AA	PP	555555555555	AA AA	SSSSSSSSSSSS	FF	EEEEEEEEEEEE
AA AA	PP	555555555555	AA AA	SSSSSSSSSS	FF	EEEEEEEEEEEE

11	11	//	2222222222	8888888888	//	8888888888	3333333333
111	111	//	222222222222	888888888888	//	888888888888	333333333333
1111	1111	//	22 22	88 88	//	88 88	33 33
11	11	//	22 22	88 88	//	88 88	33 33
11	11	//	22 22	88 88	//	88 88	33 33
11	11	//	22 22	8888888888	//	8888888888	333
11	11	//	22 22	8888888888	//	8888888888	333
11	11	//	22 22	88 88	//	88 88	33 33
11	11	//	22 22	88 88	//	88 88	33 33
11	11	//	22 22	88 88	//	88 88	33 33
11111111	11111111	//	222222222222	888888888888	//	888888888888	333333333333
11111111	11111111	//	222222222222	888888888888	//	888888888888	333333333333

2222222222	2222222222	555555555555	2222222222	2222222222	11
222222222222	222222222222	555555555555	222222222222	222222222222	111
22 22	22 22	55 55	22 22	22 22	1111
22 22	22 22	55 55	22 22	22 22	11
22 22	22 22	55 55	22 22	22 22	11
22 22	22 22	555555555555	22 22	22 22	11
22 22	22 22	555555555555	22 22	22 22	11
22 22	22 22	55 55	22 22	22 22	11
22 22	22 22	55 55	22 22	22 22	11
222222222222	222222222222	555555555555	222222222222	222222222222	11111111
222222222222	222222222222	555555555555	222222222222	222222222222	11111111

= KEWAUNEE 2 PSV -- 2 RUPTURE DISC -- DIF--MOD2
 1 100 NEW TRANSNT
 2 102 BRITISH BRITISH
 3 199 5
 * TIME STEP CONTROL
 4 201 5.1000E-1 1.0000E-07 1.0000E-03 1 1 50 100
 *202 0.60E-01 1.00E-07 1.00E-03 1 1 50 100
 5 302 P 38010000
 6 303 TEMP 97010000
 7 304 P 97010000
 8 305 TEMP 36010000

```

22      22      : : :      55      22      : : :      11
22      22      : : :      55      22      : : :      11
22      22      : : :      55      22      : : :      11
222222222222  222222222222  555555555555  222222222222  222222222222  11111111
222222222222  222222222222  555555555555  222222222222  222222222222  11111111

```

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LISTING OF INPUT DATA FOR CASE 1
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```

= KCWAUNEE 2 PSV -- 2 RUPTURE DISC -- DIF--MOD2
1 100 NEW TRANSNT
2 102 BRITISH BRITISH
3 199 5
  * TIME STEP CONTROL
4 201 5.1000E-1 1.0000E-07 1.0000E-03 1 1 50 100
  *202 0.60E-01 1.00E-07 1.00E-03 1 1 50 100
5 302 P 38010000
6 303 TEMP 97010000
7 304 P 97010000
8 305 TEMP 36010000
9 306 P 36010000
10 307 TEMP 96010000
11 308 P 96010000
12 309 TEMP 38010000
13 310 P 38010000
14 311 TEMP 42010000
15 312 P 42010000
16 313 TEMP 76010000
17 314 P 76010000
18 315 TEMP 44010000
19 316 P 44010000
20 317 TEMP 114030000
21 318 P 114030000
22 319 P 48010000
23 320 P 114020000
24 321 RHO 114020000
25 322 TEMP 48010000
26 323 TEMP 48080000
27 324 P 48080000
28 325 TEMP 52010000
29 326 P 52010000
30 327 TEMP 52010000
31 328 P 52010000
32 329 TEMP 54500000
33 330 P 54500000
34 331 TEMP 60010000
35 332 P 60010000
36 333 P 97010000
37 334 P 95010000
38 335 RHO 97010000
39 336 TEMP 95010000
40 337 RHO 95010000
41 338 MFLOWJ 114020000
42 339 MFLOWJ 94000000
43 340 TEMP 114030000
44 341 P 114030000
45 342 P 114020000
46 343 P 48010000
47 344 P 195020000
48 345 TEMP 195020000
49 346 MFLOWJ 194000000
  * TRIP CONTROL
50 505 TIME 0 GT NULL 0 11.0000E-01 L
51 506 P,95010000 GE NULL,0 285.0 L

```

347 RHO 114030000
348 MFLOWJ 123000000

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LISTING OF INPUT DATA FOR CASE 1
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```

52 507 P,95010000 LT NULL,0 .05 L
53 508 P,195020000 GE NULL,0 285.0 L
54 509 P,195020000 LT NULL,0 .05 L
55 600 505
  *
  * HYDRODYNAMIC COMPONENTS
  *
  * PRESSURIZER
56 0010000 C-001 TMDPVOL
57 0010101 3.8480E+01 2.5980E+01 0.

```

40 337 RHO 95010000
 41 338 MFLOWJ 114020000
 42 339 MFLOWJ 940000000
 43 340 TEMP 114030000
 44 341 P 114030000
 45 342 P 114020000
 46 343 P 48010000
 47 344 P 195020000
 48 345 TEMP 195020000
 49 346 MFLOWJ 194000000 ✓
 * TRIP CONTROL
 50 505 TIME 0 GT NULL 0 11.0000E-01 L
 51 506 P,95010000 GE NULL,0 285.0 L

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 LISTING OF INPUT DATA FOR CASE 1
 NUCLIB VERSION 3.00 CRAY 05/06/83

52 507 P,95010000 LT NULL,0 .05 L
 53 508 P,195020000 GE NULL,0 285.0 L
 54 509 P,195020000 LT NULL,0 .05 L
 55 600 505

* HYDRODYNAMIC COMPONENTS

* PRESSURIZER

56 0010000 C-001 TMDPVOL
 57 0010101 7.8480E+01 2.5980E+01 0. 0. 9.0000E+01
 58 0010102 2.5980E+01 1.5000E-04 0. 10
 59 0010200 2

* TIME PRESSURE QUALITY --- KEWAUNEE LOCKED ROTOR

60 0010201 0.0 2686.0 1.0
 61 0010202 .5 2737.0 1.0
 62 0010203 1.0 2712.0 1.0
 * HORIZONTAL PIPING SEGMENT DOWNSTREAM FROM PSV
 63 0360000 C-36 PIPE
 64 0360001 3
 65 0360101 2.0100E-01 3
 66 0360301 7.0000E-01 3
 67 0360601 0. 3
 68 0360801 1.5000E-04 0. 3
 69 0361001 10 3
 70 0361101 1000 2
 71 0361201 2 14.7 .01 0. 0. 2
 72 0361202 3 14.7 204.2 0.0 0. 3
 73 0361301 0. 0. 0. 2

* SECOND 45 DEGREE ELBOW DOWNSTREAM FROM PSV PR-3A

74 0370000 C-96-040 SNGLJUN
 75 0370101 096010000 040000000
 76 0370102 .201 .15 .15 0000
 77 0370201 0 0. 0. 0.
 * HORIZONTAL PIPING 10 INCH FROM 45 ELBOW TO REDUCER
 78 0380000 C-38 PIPE
 79 0380001 7
 80 380101 .548 7
 81 380301 .64 7
 82 380601 0.0 7
 83 0380801 1.5000E-04 0.0 7
 84 0381001 00 7
 85 0381101 1000 6
 86 0381201 4 14.7 120. .948 0. 7
 87 0381301 0. 0. 0. 6

* JUNCTION AT 6 INCH END OF REDUCER

88 0390000 C-40-38 SNGLJUN
 89 0390101 040010000 038000000
 90 0390102 .375 .94 .348 1000 0. 0.
 91 0390201 0 0. 0. 0.
 * 6 INCH BY 10 INCH REDUCER
 92 0400000 C-40 SNGLVOL
 93 0400101 3.7500E-01 5.8300E-01 0. 0. 0.
 94 0400102 0. 1.5000E-04 0. 00
 95 0400200 4 14.7 120. .948 0.
 * JUNCTION AT 10 INCH END OF REDUCER

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 LISTING OF INPUT DATA FOR CASE 1
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96 0410000 C-38-42 SNGLJUN
 97 0410101 038010000 042000000
 98 0410102 .548 0.0 0. 1000 0. 0.
 99 0410201 0 0. 0. 0.
 * HORIZONTAL SEGMENT DOWNSTREAM OF REDUCER
 * CONNECTS DOWNSTREAM PIPING ADJACENT TO SECOND PSV DISCHARGE
 100 0420000 C-42 SNGLVOL
 101 0420101 .548 .60 0. 0. 0. 0. .00015 0. 00
 102 0420200 4 14.7 120. .948 0.0
 *
 103 0430000 C-42-44 SNGLJUN

87	0381301	0.	0.	0.	6			
*JUNCTION AT 6 INCH END OF REDUCER								
88	0390000	C-40-38	SNGLJUN					
89	0390101	040010000	038000000					
90	0390102	.375	.94	.348	1000	0.	0.	
91	0390201	0	0.	0.	0.			
*6 INCH BY 10 INCH REDUCER								
92	0400000	C-40	SNGLVOL					
93	0400101	3.7500E-01	5.8300E-01	0.	0.	0.		
94	0400102	0.	1.5000E-04	0.	00			
95	0400200	4	14.7	120.	.948	0.		
*JUNCTION AT 10 INCH END OF REDUCER								

BOEING COMPUTER SERVICES / NUCLIB

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96	0410000	C-38-42	SNGLJUN					
97	0410101	038010000	042000000					
98	0410102	.548	0.0	0.	1000	0.	0.	
99	0410201	0	0.	0.	0.			
*HORIZONTAL SEGMENT DOWNSTREAM OF REDUCER								
*CONNECTS DOWNSTREAM PIPING ADJACENT TO SECOND PSV DISCHARGE								
100	0420000	C-42	SNGLVOL					
101	0420101	.548	.60	0.	0.	0.	.00015	0.
102	0420200	4	14.7	120.	.948	0.0		
*								
103	0430000	C-42-44	SNGLJUN					
104	0430101	042010000	044000000					
105	0430102	.201	0.0	0.0	0100	0.	0.	
106	0430201	0	0.	0.	0.			
*DISCHARGE FROM SECOND PSV INTO MAIN PIPING RUN								
107	0440000	C-44	BRANCH					
108	0440001	0						
109	0440101	2.0100E-01	8.3000E-01	0.	0.	0.		
110	0440102	0.	1.5000E-04	0.	00			
111	0440200	3	14.7	120.	0.0	0.0		
*								

112	1140000	C-114	PIPE					
113	1140001	3						
114	1140101	.548	3					
115	1140301	.574	3					
116	1140601	0.	3					
117	1140801	.00015	0.	3				
118	1141001	00	3					
119	1141101	1000	2					
120	1141201	4	14.7	120.	.948	0.	3	
121	1141301	0.	0.	0.	2			
*CONNECTS DOWNSTREAM PIPING FROM TWO SAFETY VALVES								

122	0450000	C-44-46	SNGLJUN					
123	0450101	044010000	046000000					
124	0450102	.201	0.0	0.0	0100	0.	0.	
125	0450201	0	0.	0.	0.			
*HORIZONTAL SEGMENT UPSTREAM OF SECOND DISCHARGE ELBOW								
126	0460000	C-46	PIPE					
127	0460001	3						
128	0460101	5.4800E-01	3					
129	0460301	.38	1					
130	0460302	.65	3					
131	0460601	0.	3					
132	0460801	1.5000E-04	0.	3				
133	0461001	00	3					
134	0461101	1000	2					
135	0461201	3	14.7	120.	0.0	0.0	1	
136	0461202	4	14.7	120.	.948	0.	3	
137	0461301	0.	0.	0.	2			
*SECOND ELBOW IN PSV DOWNSTREAM PIPING								
138	0470000	C-46-48	SNGLJUN					
139	0470101	046010000	114000000					
140	0470102	.548	.171	.171	1000	0.	0.	
141	0470201	0	0.	0.	0.			

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*HORIZONTAL PIPE BETWEEN SECOND AND THIRD PSV DISCHARGE ELBOWS								
142	0480000	C-48	PIPE					
143	0480001	9						
144	0480101	5.4800E-01	9					
145	0480301	5.1000E-01	9					
146	0480601	0.	9					
147	0480801	1.5000E-04	0.	9				
148	0481001	00	9					
149	0481101	1000	8					
150	0481201	4	14.7	120.	.948	0.	9	
151	0481301	0.	0.	0.	9			

130	0460302	.65	3						
131	0460601	0.		3					
132	0460801	1.5000E-04	0.			3			
133	0461001	00	3						
134	0461101	1000	2						
135	0461201	3	14.7	120.	0.0	0.0	1		
136	0461202	4	14.7	120.	.948			0.	
137	0461301	0.		0.		0.		2	3
	*SECOND ELBOW IN PSV DOWNSTREAM PIPING								
138	0470000	C-46-48	SNGLJUN						
139	0470101	046010000	114000000						
140	0470102	.548	.171	.171	1000	0.	0.		
141	0470201	0	0.		0.			0.	

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RELAP5 MOD1 C14
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*HORIZONTAL PIPE BETWEEN SECOND AND THIRD PSV DISCHARGE ELBOWS

142	0480000	C-48	PIPE						
143	0480001	9							
144	0480101	5.4800E-01	9						
145	0480301	5.1000E-01	9						
146	0480601	0.	9						
147	0480801	1.5000E-04	0.			9			
148	0481001	00	9						
149	0481101	1000	8						
150	0481201	4	14.7	120.	.948		0.		9
151	0481301	0.		0.		0.		8	

*THIRD ELBOW IN PSV DOWNSTREAM PIPING

152	0490000	C-48-50	SNGLJUN						
153	0490101	048010000	050000000						
154	0490102	5.4800E-01	1.7200E-01	1.7200E-01	1000	0.		0.	
155	0490201	0	0.		0.			0.	

*FIRST VERTICAL SEGMENT IN PSV DOWNSTREAM PIPING

156	0500000	C-50	PIPE						
157	0500001	5							
158	0500101	5.4800E-01	5						
159	0500301	5.2600E-01	5						
160	0500601	-9.0000E+01	5						
161	0500801	1.5000E-04	0.			5			
162	0501001	00	5						
163	0501101	1000	4						
164	0501201	4	14.7	120.	.948		0.		5
165	0501301	0.		0.		0.		4	

*CONNECTS VERTICAL SEGMENTS

166	0510000	C-50-52	SNGLJUN						
167	0510101	050010000	052000000						
168	0510102	.548	0.		0.	1000	0.		0.
169	0510201	0	0.		0.			0.	

*PIPING TEE WHERE PORV FLOW ENTERS PSV 10 INCH VERTICAL DISCHARGE PIPING RUN

170	0520000	C-52	SNGLVOL						
171	0520101	.548	.5	0.	-90.	0.			
172	0520102	0.		1.5000E-04	0.			00	
173	0520200	4	14.7	120.	.948		0.		

*CONNECTS PORV-PSV TEE TO VERTICAL DISCHARGE PIPING

174	0530000	C-52-54	SNGLJUN						
175	0530101	052010000	054000000						
176	0530102	.548	.55	.55	1000	0.		0.	
177	0530201	0	0.		0.			0.	

*PSV 10 INCH VERTICAL DISCHARGE SEGMENT TO FOURTH DISCHARGE ELBOW

178	0540000	C-54	PIPE						
179	0540001	95							
180	0540101	5.4800E-01	95						
181	0540301	5.5800E-01	95						
182	0540601	-9.0000E+01	95						
183	0540801	1.5000E-04	0.			95			
184	0541001	00	95						
185	0541101	1000	94						
186	0541201	4	14.7	120.	.948		0.		95
187	0541301	0.		0.		0.		94	

*FOURTH ELBOW IN PSV DOWNSTREAM PIPING

188	0550000	C-54-56	SNGLJUN						
-----	---------	---------	---------	--	--	--	--	--	--

BOEING COMPUTER SERVICES / NUCLIB

RELAP5 MOD1 C14
LISTING OF INPUT DATA FOR CASE 1
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189	0550101	054010000	056000000						
190	0550102	.548		1.7200E-01	1.7200E-01	1000	0.		0.
191	0550201	0	0.		0.			0.	
	*HORIZONTAL SEGMENT								
192	0560000	C-56	PIPE						
193	0560001	35							
194	0560101	5.4800E-01	35						
195	0560301	8.9700E-01	35						
196	0560601	0.	35						
197	0560801	1.5000E-04	0.			35			

*PSV 10 INCH VERTICAL DISCHARGE SEGMENT TO FOURTH DISCHARGE ELBOW
 178 0540000 C-54 PIPE
 179 0540001 95
 180 0540101 5.4800E-01 95
 181 0540301 5.5800E-01 95
 182 0540601 -9.0000E+01 95
 183 0540801 1.5000E-04 0. 95
 184 0541001 00 95
 185 0541101 1000 94
 186 0541201 4 14.7 120. .948 0. 95
 187 0541301 0. 0. 0. 94
 *FOURTH ELBOW IN PSV DOWNSTREAM PIPING
 188 0550000 C-54-56 SNGLJUN

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189 0550101 054010000 056000000
 190 0550102 .548 1.7200E-01 1.7200E-01 1000 0. 0.
 191 0550201 0 0. 0. 0.
 *HORIZONTAL SEGMENT
 192 0560000 C-56 PIPE
 193 0560001 35
 194 0560101 5.4800E-01 35
 195 0560301 8.9700E-01 35
 196 0560601 0. 35
 197 0560801 1.5000E-04 0. 35
 198 0561001 00 35
 199 0561101 1000 34
 200 0561201 4 14.7 120. .948 0. 35
 201 0561301 0. 0. 0. 34
 *16.6 DEGREE BEND IN DOWNSTREAM PIPING
 202 0570000 C-56-58 SNGLJUN
 203 0570101 056010000 058000000
 204 0570102 .548 6.0000E-02 6.0000E-02 1000 0. 0.
 205 0570201 0 0. 0. 0.
 *HORIZONTAL SEGMENT
 206 0580000 C-58 PIPE
 207 0580001 7
 208 0580101 5.4800E-01 7
 209 0580301 9.9700E-01 7
 210 0580601 0. 7
 211 0580801 1.5000E-04 0. 7
 212 0581001 00 7
 213 0581101 1000 6
 214 0581201 4 14.7 120. .948 0. 7
 215 0581301 0. 0. 0. 6
 *FIFTH ELBOW IN DOWNSTREAM PIPING
 216 0590000 C-58-60 SNGLJUN
 217 0590101 058010000 060000000
 218 0590102 .548 1.7200E-01 1.7200E-01 1000 0. 0.
 219 0590201 0 0. 0. 0.
 *VOLUME FROM RELIEF TANK ORIFICE TO AIR/WATER INTERFACE WITHIN TANK
 220 0600000 C-60 PIPE
 221 0600001 3
 222 0600101 5.4800E-01 3
 223 0600301 1.1100E+00 3
 224 0600601 -4.5000E+01 3
 225 0600801 1.5000E-04 0. 3
 226 0601001 00 3
 227 0601101 1000 2
 228 0601201 4 14.7 120. .948 0. 3
 229 0601301 0. 0. 0. 2
 *AIR/WATER INTERFACE WITHIN PRESSURE RELIEF TANK
 230 0610000 C-60-62 SNGLJUN
 231 0610101 060010000 062000000
 232 0610102 .548 0. 0. 1000 0. 0.
 233 0610201 0 0. 0. 0.
 *VOLUME DIRECTLY BELOW WATER SURFACE IN RELIEF TANK
 234 0620000 C-62 PIPE
 235 0620001 2
 236 0620101 5.4800E-01 2

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237 0620301 1.0000E+00 2
 238 0620601 -4.5000E+01 2
 239 0620801 1.5000E-04 0. 2
 240 0621001 00 2
 241 0621101 1000 1
 242 0621201 4 14.7 120. .948 0. 2
 243 0621301 0. 0. 0. 1
 *45 DEGREE BEND IN RELIEF TANK
 244 0630000 C-62-64 SNGLJUN
 245 0630101 062010000 064000000
 246 0630102 .548 1.0300E-01 1.0300E-01 1000 0. 0.

*PSV 10 INCH VERTICAL DISCHARGE SEGMENT TO FOURTH DISCHARGE TLEOW
 17 0540000 C-54 PIPE
 175 0540001 95
 180 0540101 5.4800E-01 95
 181 0540301 5.5800E-01 95
 182 0540601 -9.0000E-01 95
 183 0540801 1.5000E-04 0. 95
 184 0541001 00 95
 185 0541101 1000 94
 186 0541201 4 14.7 120. .948 0. 95
 187 0541301 0. 0. 0. 94
 *FOURTH ELBOW IN PSV DOWNSTREAM PIPING
 188 0550000 C-54-56 SINGLJUN

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 LISTING OF INPUT DATA FOR CASE 1
 NUCLIB VERSION 3.00 CRAY 05/06/83

189 0550101 054010700 056000000
 190 0550102 .548 1.7200E-01 1.7200E-01 1000 0. 0.
 191 0550201 0 0. 0. 0.
 *HORIZONTAL SEGMENT
 192 0560000 C-56 PIPE
 193 0560001 35
 194 0560101 5.4800E-01 35
 195 0560301 8.9700E-01 35
 196 0560601 0. 35
 197 0560801 1.5000E-04 0. 35
 198 0561001 00 35
 199 0561101 1000 34
 200 0561201 4 14.7 120. .948 0. 35
 201 0561301 0. 0. 0. 34
 *16.6 DEGREE BEND IN DOWNSTREAM PIPING
 202 0570000 C-56-58 SINGLJUN
 203 0570101 056010000 058000000
 204 0570102 .548 6.0000E-02 6.0000E-02 1000 0. 0.
 205 0570201 0 0. 0. 0.
 *HORIZONTAL SEGMENT
 206 0580000 C-58 PIPE
 207 0580001 7
 208 0580101 5.4800E-01 7
 209 0580301 8.9700E-01 7
 210 0580601 0. 7
 211 0580801 1.5000E-04 0. 7
 212 0581001 00 7
 213 0581101 1000 6
 214 0581201 4 14.7 120. .948 0. 7
 215 0581301 0. 0. 0. 6
 *FIFTH ELBOW IN DOWNSTREAM PIPING
 216 0590000 C-58-60 SINGLJUN
 217 0590101 056010000 060000000
 218 0590102 .548 1.7200E-01 1.7200E-01 1000 0. 0.
 219 0590201 0 0. 0. 0.
 *VOLUME FROM RELIEF TANK ORIFICE TO AIR/WATER INTERFACE WITHIN TANK
 220 0600000 C-60 PIPE
 221 0600001 3
 222 0600101 5.4800E-01 3
 223 0600301 1.1100E+00 3
 224 0600601 -4.5000E+01 3
 225 0600801 1.5000E-04 0. 3
 226 0601001 00 3
 227 0601101 1000 2
 228 0601201 4 14.7 120. .948 0. 3
 229 0601301 0. 0. 0. 2
 *AIR/WATER INTERFACE WITHIN PRESSURE RELIEF TANK
 230 0610000 C-60-62 SINGLJUN
 231 0610101 060010000 062000000
 232 0610102 .548 0. 0. 1000 0. 0.
 233 0610201 0 0. 0. 0.
 *VOLUME DIRECTLY BELOW WATER SURFACE IN RELIEF TANK
 234 0620000 C-62 PIPE
 235 0620001 2
 236 0620101 5.4800E-01 2

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237 0620301 1.0000E+00 2
 238 0620601 -4.5000E+01 2
 239 0620801 1.5000E-04 0. 2
 240 0621001 00 2
 241 0621101 1000 1
 242 0621201 4 14.7 120. .948 0. 2
 243 0621301 0. 0. 0. 1
 *45 DEGREE BEND IN RELIEF TANK
 244 0630000 C-62-64 SINGLJUN
 245 0630101 062010000 064000000
 246 0630102 .548 1.7200E-01 1.7200E-01 1000 0. 0.

226 0601001 00 3
 227 0601101 1000 2
 228 0601201 4 14.7 120. .948 0. 3
 229 0601301 0. 0. 0. 2
 *AIR/WATER INTERFACE WITHIN PRESSURE RELIEF TANK
 230 0610000 C-60-62 SNGLJUN
 231 0610101 060010000 062000000
 232 0610102 .548 0. 0. 1000 0.
 233 0610201 0 0. 0. 0.
 *VOLUME DIRECTLY BELOW WATER SURFACE IN RELIEF TANK
 234 0620000 C-62 PIPE
 235 0620001 2
 236 0620101 5.4800E-01 2

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237 0620301 1.0000E+00 2
 238 0620601 -4.5000E+01 2
 239 0620801 1.5000E-04 0. 2
 240 0621001 00 2
 241 0621101 1000 1
 242 0621201 4 14.7 120. .948 0. 2
 243 0621301 0. 0. 0. 1
 *45 DEGREE BEND IN RELIEF TANK
 244 0630000 C-62-64 SNGLJUN
 245 0630101 062010000 064000000
 246 0630102 .548 1.0300E-01 1.0300E-01 1000 0. 0.
 247 0630201 0 0. 0. 0.
 *VOLUME OF DISCHARGE PIPING BELOW WATER IN PRESSURE RELIEF TANK
 248 0640000 C-64 SNGLVOL
 249 0640101 .548 1.65 0. -90. 0.
 250 0640102 0. 1.5000E-04 0. 10
 251 0640200 3 14.7 1.2000E+02 0. 0.
 *CONNECTS C-64 TO C-66
 252 0650000 C-64-66 SNGLJUN
 253 0650101 064010000 066000000
 254 0650102 .548 0. 0. 1000 0. 0.
 255 0650201 0 0. 0. 0.
 *90 DEGREE BEND IN RELIEF TANK
 256 0660000 C-66 SNGLVOL
 257 0660101 .548 1.5 0. -90. 0.
 258 0660102 0. 1.5000E-04 0. 10
 259 0660200 3 14.7 1.2000E+02 0. 0.
 *90 DEGREE BEND IN RELIEF TANK WATER
 260 0670000 C-66-68 SNGLJUN
 261 0670101 066010000 068000000
 262 0670102 .548 1.7200E-01 1.7200E-01 1000 0. 0.
 263 0670201 0 0. 0. 0.
 *BEND VOLUME
 264 0680000 C-68 SNGLVOL
 265 0680101 5.4800E-01 1.5000E+00 0. 0. 0.
 266 0680102 0. 1.5000E-04 0. 10
 267 0680200 3 14.7 1.2000E+02 0. 0.
 *HORIZONTAL DISCHARGE SPARGER WITHIN RELIEF TANK
 268 0690000 C-69 BRANCH
 269 0690001 3
 270 0690101 5.4800E-01 4.0800E+00 0. 0. 0.
 271 0690102 0. 1.5000E-04 0. 10
 272 0690200 3 14.7 1.2000E+02 0. 0.
 273 0691101 068010000 069000000 5.4800E-01 0. 0. 1000
 274 0692101 069010000 073000000 2.7300E-01 1.89 1.71 0000
 275 0693101 069010000 070000000 .548 0.0 0.0 1000
 276 0692201 0. 0. 0.
 277 0693201 0. 0. 0.
 278 0691201 0.0 0.0 0.0
 *HORIZONTAL DISCHARGE SPARGER WITHIN RELIEF TANK
 279 0700000 C-70 BRANCH
 280 0700001 2
 281 0700101 5.4800E-01 4.0800E+00 0. 0. 0.
 282 0700102 0. 1.5000E-04 0. 10
 283 0700200 3 14.7 1.2000E+02 0. 0.

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284 0701101 070010000 073000000 2.7300E-01 1.89 1.71 0000
 285 0701201 0. 0. 0.
 286 0702101 070010000 071000000 5.4800E-01 0. 0. 1000
 287 0702201 0. 0. 0.
 *HORIZONTAL DISCHARGE SPARGER WITHIN RELIEF TANK
 288 0710000 C-71 SNGLVOL
 289 0710101 5.4800E-01 4.0800E+00 0. 0. 0.
 290 0710102 0. 1.5000E-04 0. 10
 291 0710200 3 14.7 1.2000E+02 0. 0.
 *CONNECTS COMPONENT SPARGER 71 TO WATER IN RELIEF TANK

272	0690200	14.7	1.2000E+02	0.	0.	0.	1000
273	0691101	068010000	069000000	5.4800E-01	0.	0.	
274	0692101	069010000	073000000	2.7300E-01	1.89	1.71	0000
275	0693101	069010000	070000000	.548	0.0	0.0	1000
276	0692201	0.	0.	0.			
277	0693201	0.	0.	0.			
278	0691201	0.0	0.0	0.0			
*HORIZONTAL DISCHARGE SPARGER WITHIN RELIEF TANK							
279	0700000	C-70	BRANCH				
280	0700001	2					
281	0700101	5.4800E-01	4.0800E+00	0.	0.	0.	
282	0700102	0.	1.5000E-04	0.	10		
283	0700200	3	14.7	1.2000E+02	0.	0.	

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284	0701101	070010000	073000000	2.7300E-01	1.89	1.71	0000
285	0701201	0.	0.	0.			
286	0702101	070010000	071000000	5.4800E-01	0.	0.	1000
287	0702201	0.	0.	0.			
*HORIZONTAL DISCHARGE SPARGER WITHIN RELIEF TANK							
288	0710000	C-71	SINGLVOL				
289	0710101	5.4800E-01	4.0800E+00	0.	0.	0.	
290	0710102	0.	1.5000E-04	0.	10		
291	0710200	3	14.7	1.2000E+02	0.	0.	
*CONNECTS COMPONENT SPARGER 71 TO WATER IN RELIEF TANK							
292	0720000	C-71-73	SINGLJUN				
293	0720101	071010000	073000000				
294	0720102	2.8500E-01	1.89	1.71	0000	1.0000E+00	1.0000E+00
295	0720201	0	0.	0.	0.		
*WATER IN RELIEF TANK (REPRESENTS 75 % OF FREE VOLUME OF RELIEF TANK)							
296	0730000	C-73	BRANCH				
297	0730001	0					
298	0730101	1.0665E+02	5.6290E+00	0.	0.	9.0000E+01	
299	0730102	5.6290E+00	1.5000E-04	0.	00		
300	0730200	3	14.7	1.2000E+02	0.	0.	
*AIR/WATER INTERFACE WITHIN RELIEF TANK							
301	0740000	C-73-75	SINGLJUN				
302	0740101	073010000	075000000				
303	0740102	1.0660E+02	0.	0.	1000	1.0000E+00	1.0000E+00
304	0740201	0	0.	0.	0.		
*VOLUME OF AIR IN RELIEF TANK							
305	0750000	C-75	SINGLVOL				
306	0750101	1.0660E+02	1.8760E+00	0.	0.	9.0000E+01	
307	0750102	1.8760E+00	1.5000E-04	0.	00		
308	0750200	4	14.7	1.2000E+02	9.4800E-01	0.	
*HORIZONTAL SEGMENT DOWNSTREAM FROM SECOND PSV							
309	0760000	C-76	PIPE				
310	0760001	4					
311	0760101	2.0100E-01	4				
312	0760301	5.0000E-01	4				
313	0760601	0.	4				
314	0760801	1.5000E-04	0.	4			
315	0761001	10	3				
316	0761002	00	4				
317	0761101	1000	3				
318	0761201	2	14.7	.01	0.	0.	2
319	0761202	3	14.7	204.2	0.	0.	4
320	0761301	0.	0.	0.	3		
*JUNCTION TO BRANCH COMPONENT 44							
321	0770000	C-76-044	SINGLJUN				
322	0770101	076010000	044000000				
323	0770102	.201	0.0	0.0	0100	1.0000E+00	1.0000E+00
324	0770201	0	0.	0.	0.		
* INLET TO VALVE NOZZLE PSV PR-3A							
325	1980000	V-CASE	SINGLVOL				
326	1980101	.017	.92	0.	0.	0.	.00005 0. 11
327	1980200	2	2686.	1.0			

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328	2980000	V-INLET	SINGLJUN				
329	2980101	99010000	198000000	.017	0.	0.	0100
330	2980201	1	0.	0.	0.		
*							
331	1780000	V-CASE	SINGLVOL				
332	1780101	.017	.92	0.	0.	0.	.00005 0. 11
333	1780200	2	2686.	1.0			
*							
334	2780000	V-INLET	SINGLJUN				

320 0761301 0. 0. 0. 3
 *JUNCTION TO BRANCH COMPONENT 44
 321 0770000 C-76-044 SNGLJUN
 322 0770101 076010000 044000000
 323 0770102 .201 0.0 0.0 0100 1.0000E+00 1.0000E+00
 324 0770201 0 0. 0. 0.

* INLET TO VALVE NOZZLE PSV PR-3A

325 1980000 V-CASE SNGLVOL
 326 1980101 .017 .92 0. 0. 0. 0. .00005 0. 11
 327 1980200 2 2686. 1.0

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328 2980000 V-INLET SNGLJUN
 329 2980101 99010000 198000000 .017 0. 0. 0100
 330 2980201 1 0. 0. 0.

331 1780000 V-CASE SNGLVOL
 332 1780101 .017 .92 0. 0. 0. 0. .00005 0. 11
 333 1780200 2 2686. 1.0

334 2780000 V-INLET SNGLJUN
 335 2780101 79010000 178000000 .017 .0 0. 0100
 336 2780201 1 0. 0. 0.

* VALVE TABLE

337 20221000 REAC-T 0
 338 20221001 0. 0.
 339 20221002 .015 1.0000E+00
 340 20221003 9.0 1.0
 * CONTROL SYSTEM INPUT
 341 20500100 PSV FUNCTION 1.0 0.0 0
 342 20500101 TIME 0 210

* SAFETY VALVE

343 0780000 C178-76 VALVE
 344 0780101 178010000 076000000
 345 0780102 1.7000E-02 0. 0. 0100 1.0000E+00 1.0000E+00
 346 0780201 0 0. 0. 0.
 347 0780300 SRVVLV
 348 0780301 1

* VERTICAL LOOP SEAL SEGMENT UPSTREAM FROM PSV
 *CONNECTS LOWER PART OF LOOP SEAL

349 0790000 C-79 SNGLVOL
 350 0790101 .147 .8 0. 0.0 0. .00015 0. 00
 351 0790200 2 2686. 1.0

352 0800000 C-81-79 SNGLJUN
 353 0800101 081010000 079000000
 354 0800102 1.4700E-01 0. 0. 1000 1.0000E+00 1.0000E+00
 355 0800201 0 0. 0. 0.

* LOWER PART OF LOOP SEAL

356 0810000 C-81 SNGLVOL
 357 0810101 1.4700E-01 5.8900E-01 0. 0. 0.
 358 0810102 0. 1.5000E-04 0. 00
 359 0810200 2 2686. 1.0 0. 0.

*CONNECTS LOWER LOOP SEAL TO VERTICAL PART OF LOOP SEAL

360 0820000 C-83-81 SNGLJUN
 361 0820101 083010000 081000000
 362 0820102 1.4700E-01 0. 0. 1000 1.0000E+00 1.0000E+00
 363 0820201 0 0. 0. 0.

* VERTICAL PART OF LOOP SEAL

364 0830000 C-83 PIPE
 365 0830001 2
 366 0830101 1.4700E-01 2

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367 0830301 5.4000E-01 1
 368 0830302 6.3800E-01 2
 369 0830601 9.0000E+01 2
 370 0830801 1.5000E-04 0. 2
 371 0831001 00 2
 372 0831101 1000 1
 373 0831201 2 2686. 1.0 0. 0. 1
 374 0831202 2 2.686000E+03 1.0 0. 0. 2
 375 0831301 0. 0. 0. 1
 *TOP 90 DEGREE BEND INTO PRESSURIZER

376 0840000 C-85-83 SNGLJUN

357	0810101	1.4700E-01	5.8900E-01	0.	0.				
358	0810102	0.	1.5000E-04	0.	00				
359	0810200	2 2686.	1.0 0.	0.					
*CONNECTS LOWER LOOP SEAL TO VERTICAL PART OF LOOP SEAL									
360	0820000	C-83-81	SNGLJUN						
361	0820101	083010000	081000000						
362	0820102	1.4700E-01	0.	0.	1000	1.0000E+00	1.0000E+00		
363	0820201	0 0.	0.	0.					
*VERTICAL PART OF LOOP SEAL									
364	0830000	C-83	PIPE						
365	0830001	2							
366	0830101	1.4700E-01	2						

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367	0830301	5.4000E-01	1						
368	0830302	6.3800E-01	2						
369	0830601	9.0000E+01	2						
370	0830801	1.5000E-04	0.	2					
371	0831001	00 2							
372	0831101	1000 1							
373	0831201	2 2686.	1.0 0.	0.	1				
374	0831202	2 2.686000E+03	1.0 0.	0.		2			
375	0831301	0.	0.	0.	1				
*TOP 90 DEGREE BEND INTO PRESSURIZER									
376	0840000	C-85-83	SNGLJUN						
377	0840101	083010000	085000000						
378	0840102	1.4700E-01	1.6000E-01	1.6000E-01	1000	1.0000E+00	1.0000E+00		
379	0840201	0 0.	0.	0.					
*VERTICAL PART OF PIPE FROM LOOP SEAL WATER									
380	0850000	C-85	PIPE						
381	0850001	2							
382	0850101	1.4700E-01	2						
383	0850201	1.4700E-01	1						
384	0850301	7.0300E-01	2						
385	0850601	-9.0000E+01	2						
386	0850801	1.5000E-04	0.	2					
387	0851001	00 2							
388	0851101	1000 1							
389	0851201	2 2.686000E+03	1.000000E+00	0.	0.		2		
390	0851301	0.	0.	0.	1				
*SECOND ELBOW VOLUME									
391	0860000	C-87-85	SNGLJUN						
392	0860101	087010000	085000000						
393	0860102	1.4700E-01	0.	0.	1000	1.0000E+00	1.0000E+00		
394	0860201	0 0.	0.	0.					
*HORIZONTAL SEGMENT									
395	0870000	C-87	PIPE						
396	0870001	1							
397	0870101	1.4700E-01	1						
398	0870301	5.8400E-01	1						
399	0870601	0.	1						
400	0870801	1.5000E-04	0.	1					
401	0871001	00 1							
402	0871201	2 2.686000E+03	1.000000E+00	0.	0.		1		
*CONNECTS HORIZONTAL SEGMENTS									
403	0880000	C-89-87	SNGLJUN						
404	0880101	089010000	087000000						
405	0880102	1.4700E-01	1.9500E-01	1.9500E-01	1000	1.0000E+00	1.0000E+00		
406	0880201	0 0.	0.	0.					
*HORIZONTAL SEGMENT									
407	0890000	C-89	SNGLVOL						
408	0890101	1.4700E-01	7.8500E-01	0.	0.		0.		
409	0890102	0.	1.5000E-04	0.	00				
410	0890200	2 2.6860E+03	1.0000E+00	0.	0.				
*CONNECTS HORIZONTAL SEGMENT									
411	0900000	C-91-89	SNGLJUN						
412	0900101	091010000	089000000						
413	0900102	1.4700E-01	0.	0.	1000	1.0000E+00	1.0000E+00		
414	0900201	0 0.	0.	0.					

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*VERTICAL PIPE FROM PRESSURIZER TO FIRST LOOP SEAL ELBOW VOLUME									
415	0910000	C-91	PIPE						
416	0910001	3							
417	0910101	1.4700E-01	3						
418	0910201	1.4700E-01	2						
419	0910301	1.0740E+00	3						
420	0910601	9.0000E+01	3						
421	0910801	1.5000E-04	0.	3					
422	0911001	00 3							
423	0911101	1000 2							
424	0911201	2 2.686000E+03	1.000000E+00	0.	0.				


```

404 0880101 08901000 08700000
405 0880102 1.4700E-01 1.9500E-01 1.9500E-01 1000 1.0000E+00 1.0000E+00
406 0880201 0 0. 0. 0.
*HORIZONTAL SEGMENT
407 0890000 C-89 SNGLVOL
408 0890101 1.4700E-01 7.8500E-01 0. 0. 0.
409 0890102 0. 1.5000E-04 0. 00
410 0890200 2 2.6860E+03 1.0000E+00 0. 0.
*CONNECTS HORIZONTAL SEGMENT
411 0900000 C-91-89 SNGLJUN
412 0900101 09101000 089000000
413 0900102 1.4700E-01 0. 0. 1000 1.0000E+00 1.0000E+00
414 0900201 0 0. 0. 0.

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*VERTICAL PIPE FROM PRESSURIZER TO FIRST LOOP SEAL ELBOW VOLUME
415 0910000 C-91 PIPE
416 0910001 3
417 0910101 1.4700E-01 3
418 0910201 1.4700E-01 2
419 0910301 1.0740E+00 3
420 0910601 9.0000E+01 3
421 0910801 1.5000E-04 0. 3
422 0911001 00 3
423 0911101 1000 2
424 0911201 2 2.686000E+03 1.000000E+00 0. 0. 3
425 0911301 0. 0. 0. 2
*CONNECTS LOOP SEAL PIPING TO PRESSURIZER
426 0920000 C-01-91 SNGLJUN
427 0920101 001000000 091000000
428 0920102 1.4700E-01 5.9400E-01 9.9200E-01 0000 1.0000E+00 1.0000E+00
429 0920201 0 0. 0. 0.

```

* PRESSURIZER VAULT

```

430 0930000 C-93 SNGLVOL
431 0930101 90. 100. 0. 0. 0.0 0. .00015 0. 00
432 0930200 4 14.7 120. .948

```

* RUPTURE DISC

```

433 0940000 RD VALVE
434 0940101 09501000 093000000 .163 0. 0. 0100
435 0940201 0 0. 0. 0.
436 0940300 MTRVLV
** CONTROL VARIABLE NUMBER
437 0940301 506 507 100. 0.0 2

```

* RUPTURE DISC TABLE

```

438 20200200 NORMAREA
439 20200201 0. 0.
440 20200202 1.0 1.0
* RUPTURE DISC BAFFLE CAVITY

```

```

441 0950000 C-95 SNGLVOL
442 0950101 .201 .51 0. 0. 0. 0. .00015 0. 00
443 0950200 3 14.7 120. 0.0 0.0

```

* PRESSURIZER VAULT

```

444 1930000 C-193 SNGLVOL
445 1930101 90. 100. 0. 0. 0. 0. .00015 0. 00
446 1930200 4 14.7 120. .948

```

* RUPURE DISC AT PR-3B

```

447 1940000 RD VALVE
448 1940101 19501000 193000000 .163 0. 0. 0100
449 1940201 0 0. 0. 0.

```

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450 1940300 MTRVLV
** CONTROL VARIABLE
451 1940301 508 509 100. 0.0 2
*
452 1950000 C-195 PIPE
453 1950001 2
454 1950101 .201 1
455 1950102 .188 2
456 1950301 .62 1
457 1950302 .62 2

```

* PRESSURIZER VAULT

444 1930000 C-193 SNGLVOL
 445 1930101 90. 100. 0. 0. 0. 0. .00015 0. 00
 446 1930200 4 14.7 120. .948

* RUPURE DISC AT PR-3B

447 1940000 RD VALVE
 448 1940101 195010000 193000000 .163 0. 0. 0100
 449 1940201 0 0. 0. 0.

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450 1940300 MTRVLV
 ** CONTROL VARIABLE
 451 1940301 508 509 100. 0.0 2
 *
 452 1950000 C-195 PIPE
 453 1950001 2
 454 1950101 .201 1
 455 1950102 .188 2
 456 1950301 .62 1
 457 1950302 .62 2
 458 1950601 0. 2
 459 1950801 .00015 0. 2
 460 1950901 .15 .15 1
 461 1951001 00 2
 462 1951101 0000 1
 463 1951201 3 14.7 120. 0.0 0.0 1
 464 1951202 4 14.7 120. .948 0.0 2
 465 1951301 0. 0. 0. 1

*
 466 1960000 C-44-195 SNGLJUN
 467 1960101 044010000 195000000
 468 1960102 .201 0.0 0.0 0100
 469 1960201 0 0. 0. 0.

* INLET TO DISCHARGE PIPING

470 0960000 C-96 SNGLVOL
 471 0960101 .201 .843 0. 0. 0. 0. .00015 0. 00
 472 0960200 3 14.7 120. 0.0 0.0

* OUTLET FROM INACTIVE SAFETY VALVE

473 0970000 C-97 BRANCH
 474 0970001 0
 475 0970101 .201 .604 0. 0. 0. 0. .00015 0. 00
 476 0970200 3 14.7 120. 0.0 0.0

* VALVE PR-2A

477 0980000 PR-2A VALVE
 478 0980101 198010000 036000000
 479 0980102 1.7000E-02 0.0 0.0 0100 1.0000E+00 1.0000E+00
 480 0980201 0 0. 0. 0.
 481 0980300 SRVVLV
 482 0980301 1

* VERTICAL LOOP SEAL SEGMENT UPSTREAM FROM PSV

483 0990000 C-99 SNGLVOL
 484 0990101 .147 .8 0. 0. 0.0
 485 0990102 0. .00015 0. 00
 486 0990200 2 2686. 1.0 0. 0.

* ELBOW JUNCTION TO BOTTOM OF LOOP SEAL

487 1000000 C-100 SNGLJUN
 488 1000101 101010000 099000000
 489 1000102 .147 0. 0. 1000 1.0000E+00 1.0000E+00
 490 1000201 0 0. 0. 0.

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* ELBOW JUNCTION TO BOTTOM OF LOOP SEAL
 491 1010000 C-101 SNGLVOL
 492 1010101 1.4700E-01 5.8900E-01 0. 0. 0.
 493 1010102 0. 1.5000E-04 0. 00
 494 1010200 2 2686. 1.0 0. 0.
 * JUNCTION TO CONNECT BOTTOM OF LOOP SEAL
 495 1020000 C1-103 SNGLJUN
 496 1020101 103010000 101000000
 497 1020102 .147 1.6000E-01 1.6000E-01 1000 1.0000E+00 1.0000E+00
 498 1020201 0 0. 0. 0.
 * HORIZONTAL LOOP SEAL PIPE

480 0980201 0 0. 0. 0.
 481 0980300 SRVVLV
 482 0980301 1
 *VERTICAL LOOP SEAL SEGMENT UPSTREAM FROM PSV
 483 0990000 C-99 SNGLVOL
 484 0990101 .147 .8 0. 0. 0.0
 485 0990102 0. .00015 0. 00
 486 0990200 2 2686. 1.0 0. 0.
 *ELBOW JUNCTION TO BOTTOM OF LOOP SEAL
 487 1000000 C-100 SNCLJUN
 488 1000101 101010000 099000000
 489 1000102 .147 0. 0. 0. 1000 1.0000E+00 1.0000E+00
 490 1000201 0 0. 0. 0.

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 LISTING OF INPUT DATA FOR CASE 1
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*ELBOW JUNCTION TO BOTTOM OF LOOP SEAL
 491 1010000 C-101 SNGLVOL
 492 1010101 1.4700E-01 5.8900E-01 0. 0. 0.
 493 1010102 0. 1.5000E-04 0. 00
 494 1010200 2 2686. 1.0 0. 0.
 *JUNCTION TO CONNECT BOTTOM OF LOOP SEAL
 495 1020000 C1-103 SNCLJUN
 496 1020101 103010000 101000000
 497 1020102 .147 1.6000E-01 1.6000E-01 1000 1.0000E+00 1.0000E+00
 498 1020201 0 0. 0. 0.
 *HORIZONTAL LOOP SEAL PIPE
 499 1030000 C-103 PIPE
 500 1030001 2
 501 1030101 1.4700E-01 2
 502 1030301 6.8400E-01 1
 503 1030302 6.3800E-01 2
 504 1030601 0. 2
 505 1030801 1.5000E-04 0. 2
 506 1031001 00 2
 507 1031101 1000 1
 508 1031201 2 2686. 1.0 0. 0. 1
 509 1031202 2 2686. 1.0 0. 0. 2
 510 1031301 0. 0. 0. 1
 *ELBOW TO CONNECT BOTTOM OF LOOP TO VERTICAL SEGMENT
 511 1040000 C5-103 SNCLJUN
 512 1040101 105010000 103000000
 513 1040102 .147 1.6000E-01 1.6000E-01 1000 1.0000E+00 1.0000E+00
 514 1040201 0 0. 0. 0.
 *SECOND LOOP SEAL ELBOW AND VERTICAL SEGMENT
 515 1050000 C-105 PIPE
 516 1050001 2
 517 1050101 1.4700E-01 2
 518 1050301 1.0310E+00 2
 519 1050601 0. 2
 520 1050801 1.5000E-04 0. 2
 521 1051001 00 2
 522 1051101 1000 1
 523 1051201 2 2.686000E+03 1.000000E+00 0. 0. 2
 524 1051301 0. 0. 0. 1
 *CONNECTS TOP OF LOOP SEAL PIPING
 525 1060000 C7-105 SNCLJUN
 526 1060101 107010000 105000000
 527 1060102 .147 0. 0. 1000 1.0000E+00 1.0000E+00
 528 1060201 0 0. 0. 0.
 *HORIZONTAL SEGMENT AT TOP OF PIPING
 529 1070000 C-107 SNGLVOL
 530 1070101 1.4700E-01 5.8400E-01 0. 0. 0.
 531 1070102 0. 1.5000E-04 0. 00
 532 1070200 2 2.6860E+03 1.0000E+00 0. 0.
 *FIRST ELBOW JUNCTION
 533 1080000 C9-107 SNCLJUN
 534 1080101 109010000 107000000
 535 1080102 .147 1.9500E-01 1.9500E-01 1000 1.0000E+00 1.0000E+00
 536 1080201 0 0. 0. 0.
 *TOP OF LOOP SEAL

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537 1090000 C-109 SNGLVOL
 538 1090101 1.4700E-01 7.8500E-01 0. 0. 0.
 539 1090102 0. 1.5000E-04 0. 00
 540 1090200 2 2.6860E+03 1.0000E+00 0. 0.
 *CONNECTS TOP OF PIPING DOWNSTREAM OF PRESSURIZER
 541 1100000 C11-109 SNCLJUN
 542 1100101 111010000 109000000
 543 1100102 .147 0. 0. 1000 1.0000E+00 1.0000E+00
 544 1100201 0 0. 0. 0.
 *VERTICAL PIPE FROM PRESSURIZER TO FIRST LOOP SEAL ELBOW VOLUME

527 1060102 .147 0. 0. 0. 1000 1.0000E+00 1.0000E+00
528 1060201 0 0. 0. 0. 0.
*HORIZONTAL SEGMENT AT TOP OF PIPING
529 1070000 C-107 SNGLVOL
530 1070101 1.4700E-01 5.8400E-01 0. 0. 0.
531 1070102 0. 1.5000E-04 0. 00
532 1070200 2 2.6860E+03 1.0000E+00 0. 0.
*FIRST ELBOW JUNCTION
533 1080000 C9-107 SNGLJUN
534 1080101 10901000 107000000
535 1080102 .147 1.9500E-01 1.9500E-01 1000 1.0000E+00 1.0000E+00
536 1080201 0 0. 0. 0.
*TOP OF LOOP SEAL

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LISTING OF INPUT DATA FOR CASE 1
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537 1090000 C-109 SNGLVOL
538 1090101 1.4700E-01 7.8500E-01 0. 0. 0.
539 1090102 0. 1.5000E-04 0. 00
540 1090200 2 2.6860E+03 1.0000E+00 0. 0.
*CONNECTS TOP OF LOOP TO PIPING DOWNSTREAM OF PRESSURIZER
541 1100000 C11-109 SNGLJUN
542 1100101 11101000 109000000
543 1100102 .147 0. 0. 1000 1.0000E+00 1.0000E+00
544 1100201 0 0. 0. 0.
*VERTICAL PIPE FROM PRESSURIZER TO FIRST LOOP SEAL ELBOW VOLUME
545 1110000 C-111 PIPE
546 1110001 3
547 1110101 1.4700E-01 3
548 1110301 1.0740E+00 3
549 1110601 9.0000E+01 3
550 1110801 1.5000E-04 0. 3
551 1111001 00 3
552 1111101 1000 2
553 1111201 2 2.686000E+03 1.000000E+00 0. 0. 3
554 1111301 0. 0. 0. 2
*CONNECTS TO PRESSURIZER
555 1120000 C13-111 SNGLJUN
556 1120101 113000000 111000000
557 1120102 .147 5.9400E-01 5.9400E-01 0000 1.0000E+00 1.0000E+00
558 1120201 0 0. 0. 0.
*PRESSURIZER
559 1130000 C-113 TMDPVOL
560 1130101 38.48 2.5980E+01 0. 0. 9.0000E+01
561 1130102 2.5980E+01 1.5000E-04 0. 00
562 1130200 2
563 1130201 0. 2.6860E+03 1.0000E+00
564 1130202 .5 2737.0 1.0000E+00
565 1130203 1.0 2712.0 1.0000E+00
*
566 1190000 C-119 SNGLJUN
567 1190101 36010000 136000000
568 1190102 .201 .15 .15 1000
569 1190201 0 0. 0. 0.
*
570 1200000 C-120 SNGLJUN
571 1200101 136010000 97000000
572 1200102 .201 0.0 0.0 0100
573 1200201 0 0. 0. 0.
*
574 1210000 C-121 SNGLJUN
575 1210101 97010000 96000000
576 1210102 .201 0.0 0.0 0100
577 1210201 0 0. 0. 0.
*
578 1220000 C-122 SNGLJUN
579 1220101 97010000 95000000
580 1220102 .185 0.0 0.0 0100
581 1220201 0 0. 0. 0.
*
582 1230000 C-123 SNGLJUN

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583 1230101 114010000 48000000
584 1230102 .137 0.0 0.0 0100
585 1230201 0 0. 0. 0.
*
586 1360000 C-136 SNGLVOL
587 1360101 .201 .854 0. 0. 0.
588 1360102 0. .00015 0. 00
589 1360200 3 14.7 120. 0. 0.
*END OF CASE

```

573 1200201 0 0. 0. 0.
*
574 1210000 C-121 SNGLJUN
575 1210101 97010000 96003000
576 1210102 .201 0.0 0.0 0100
577 1210201 0 0. 0. 0.
*
578 1220000 C-122 SNGLJUN
579 1220101 97010000 95000000
580 1220102 .185 0.0 0.0 0100
581 1220201 0 0. 0. 0.
*
582 1230000 C-123 SNGLJUN

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GOING COMPUTER SERVICES / NUCLIB

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 LISTING OF INPUT DATA FOR CASE 1
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583 1230101 114010000 48000000
584 1230102 .137 0.0 0.0 0100
585 1230201 0 0. 0. 0.
*
586 1360000 C-136 SNGLVOL
587 1360101 .201 .254 0. 0. 0.
588 1360102 0. .00015 0. 00
589 1360200 3 14.7 120. 0. 0.

```

.END OF CASE

IFPSKP= 5 AIRRR= 9.10E-01 TWOMUL= 0.00E+00 THICKN= 0.00E+00

IMP-CHEK, RUN OPTION IS RUN.

NO ACTION ON RESTART-PLOT FILE IS TO BE TAKEN AT END OF PROBLEM.

INPUT UNITS ARE ASSUMED BRITISH OUTPUT UNITS ARE BRITISH

REMAINING CPU TIME VALUES ARE 1.0 AND 2.0 SEC.

TIME STEP CONTROL DATA						
END TIME (SEC)	MIN.TIME STEP (SEC)	MAX.TIME STEP (SEC)	OPTION	MINOR EDIT FREQUENCY	MAJOR EDIT FREQUENCY	RESTART FREQUENCY
5.100000E-01	1.000000E-07	1.000000E-03	1	1	50	100

MINOR EDIT REQUESTS

REG.NUM.	VARIABLE CODE	PARAMETER
302	P	38010000
303	TEMP	97010000
304	P	97010000
305	TEMP	36010000
306	P	36010000
307	TEMP	96010000
308	P	96010000
309	TEMP	38010000
310	P	38010000
311	TEMP	42010000
312	P	42010000
313	TEMP	76010000
314	P	76010000
315	TEMP	44010000
316	P	44010000
317	TEMP	114030000
318	P	114030000
319	P	48010000
320	P	114020000
321	RHO	114020000
322	TEMP	48010000
323	TEMP	48080000
324	P	48080000
325	TEMP	52010000
326	P	52010000
327	TEMP	52010000
328	P	52010000
329	TEMP	54500000
330	P	54500000
331	TEMP	60010000
332	P	60010000
333	P	97010000
334	P	95010000
335	RHO	97010000
336	TEMP	95010000
337	RHO	95010000
338	MFLOWJ	114020000
339	MFLOWJ	94000000
340	TEMP	114030000
341	P	114030000
342	P	114020000
343	P	48010000
344	P	195020000

317	TEMP	114030000
318	P	114030000
319	P	48010000
320	P	114020000
321	RHO	114020000
322	TEMP	48010000
323	TEMP	48080000
324	P	48080000
325	TEMP	52010000
326	P	52010000
327	TEMP	52010000
328	P	52010000
329	TEMP	54500000
330	P	54500000

331	TEMP	60010000
332	P	60010000
333	P	97010000
334	P	95010000
335	RHO	97010000
336	TEMP	95010000
337	RHO	95010000
338	MFLOWJ	114020000
339	MFLOWJ	94000000
340	TEMP	114030000
341	P	114030000
342	P	114020000
343	P	48010000
344	P	195020000
345	TEMP	195020000
346	MFLOWJ	194000000

EDIT OF COMPONENT INPUT DATA
(QUANTITIES PRINTED ARE INPUT VALUES, SET BY DEFAULT, OR SET BY ERROR RECOVERY)

INPUT DATA FOR COMPONENT 1, C-001 TMDPVOL , HAVING 1 VOLUMES AND 0 JUNCTIONS

VOL NO.	FLOW AREA (FT2)	FLOW LENGTH (FT)	VOLUME (FT3)	HORIZ. ANGLE (DEG)	VERT. ANGLE (DEG)	ELEV. CHNG. (FT)
1010000	3.848000E+01	2.598000E+01	9.997103E+02	0.000000E+00	9.000000E+01	2.598000E+01
VOL.NO.	ROUGHNESS (FT)	HYDRAULIC DIAM. (FT)	EQUIL. FLAG			
1010000	1.500000E-04	6.999590E+00	0			

TABULAR DATA

TIME (SEC)	PRESSURE (LBF/IN2)	QUALITY
0.000000E+00	2.686000E+03	1.000000E+00
5.000000E-01	2.737000E+03	1.000000E+00
1.000000E+00	2.712000E+03	1.000000E+00

INPUT DATA FOR COMPONENT 36, C-36 PIPE , HAVING 3 VOLUMES AND 2 JUNCTIONS

VOL NO.	FLOW AREA (FT2)	FLOW LENGTH (FT)	VOLUME (FT3)	HORIZ. ANGLE (DEG)	VERT. ANGLE (DEG)	ELEV. CHNG. (FT)		
36010000	2.010000E-01	7.000000E-01	1.407000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00		
36020000	2.010000E-01	7.000000E-01	1.407000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00		
36030000	2.010000E-01	7.000000E-01	1.407000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00		
VOL NO.	ROUGHNESS (FT)	HYDRAULIC DIAM. (FT)	VOLUME INIT. COND. FLAGS	INIT. COND. FLAG	I.C.VALUE 1	I.C.VALUE 2	I.C.VALUE 3	I.C.VALUE 4
36010000	1.500000E-04	5.058865E-01	10	2	1.470000E+01	1.000000E-02	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
36020000	1.500000E-04	5.058865E-01	10	2	1.470000E+01	1.000000E-02	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
36030000	1.500000E-04	5.058865E-01	10	3	1.470000E+01	2.042000E+02	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
JUN.NO.	JUNCTION AREA (FT2)	FORWARD LOSS COEFFICIENT	REVERSE LOSS COEFFICIENT	JUNCTION FLAGS	INIT. LIQ. VEL. (FT/SEC)	INIT. VAP. VEL. (FT/SEC)	INTERFACE VEL. (FT/SEC)	
36010000	2.010000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	1000	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	
36020000	2.010000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	1000	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	

INPUT DATA FOR COMPONENT 37, C-96-040 SNGLJUN , HAVING 0 VOLUMES AND 1 JUNCTIONS

JUN.NO.	FROM VOL.	TO VOL.	JUNCTION AREA (FT2)	FORWARD LOSS COEFFICIENT	REVERSE LOSS COEFFICIENT	JUNCTION FLAGS	SUBCOOLED DISCHARGE COEF.	TWO-PHASE DISCHARGE COEF.
37000000	96010000	40000000	2.010000E-01	1.500000E-01	1.500000E-01	0	1.000000E+00	1.000000E+00
JUN.NO.			INIT. LIQ. VEL. (FT/SEC)	INIT. VAP. VEL. (FT/SEC)	INTERFACE VEL. (FT/SEC)			
37000000			0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00			

INPUT DATA FOR COMPONENT 38, C-38 PIPE , HAVING 7 VOLUMES AND 6 JUNCTIONS

VOL NO.	FLOW AREA (FT2)	FLOW LENGTH (FT)	VOLUME (FT3)	HORIZ. ANGLE (DEG)	VERT. ANGLE (DEG)	ELEV. CHNG. (FT)
38010000	5.480000E-01	6.400000E-01	3.507200E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
38020000	5.480000E-01	6.400000E-01	3.507200E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
38030000	5.480000E-01	6.400000E-01	3.507200E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00

VOL NO.	ROUGHNESS (FT)	HYDRAULIC DIAM. (FT)	VOLUME FLAGS	INIT. COND. FLAG	I.C.VALUE 1	I.C.VALUE 2	I.C.VALUE 3	I.C.VALUE 4
36010000	1.500000E-04	5.058865E-01	10	2	1.470000E+01	1.000000E-02	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
36020000	1.500000E-04	5.058865E-01	10	2	1.470000E+01	1.000000E-02	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
36030000	1.500000E-04	5.058865E-01	10	3	1.470000E+01	2.042000E+02	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00

JUN.NO.	JUNCTION AREA (FT2)	FORWARD LOSS COEFFICIENT	REVERSE LOSS COEFFICIENT	JUNCTION FLAGS	INIT. LIQ. VEL. (FT/SEC)	INIT. VAP. VEL. (FT/SEC)	INTERFACE VEL. (FT/SEC)
36010000	2.010000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	1000	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
36020000	2.010000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	1000	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00

INPUT DATA FOR COMPONENT 37, C-96-040 SNGLJUN , HAVING 0 VOLUMES AND 1 JUNCTIONS

JUN.NO. FROM VOL.	TO VOL.	JUNCTION AREA (FT2)	FORWARD LOSS COEFFICIENT	REVERSE LOSS COEFFICIENT	JUNCTION FLAGS	SUBCOOLED DISCHARGE COEF.	TWO-PHASE DISCHARGE COEF.	
37000000	96010000	40000000	2.010000E-01	1.500000E-01	1.500000E-01	0	1.000000E+00	1.000000E+00

JUN.NO.	INIT. LIQ. VEL. (FT/SEC)	INIT. VAP. VEL. (FT/SEC)	INTERFACE VEL. (FT/SEC)
37000000	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00

INPUT DATA FOR COMPONENT 38, C-38 PIPE , HAVING 7 VOLUMES AND 6 JUNCTIONS

VOL NO.	FLOW AREA (FT2)	FLOW LENGTH (FT)	VOLUME (FT3)	HORIZ. ANGLE (DEG)	VERT. ANGLE (DEG)	ELEV. CHNG. (FT)
38010000	5.480000E-01	6.400000E-01	3.507200E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
38020000	5.480000E-01	6.400000E-01	3.507200E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
38030000	5.480000E-01	6.400000E-01	3.507200E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
38040000	5.480000E-01	6.400000E-01	3.507200E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
38050000	5.480000E-01	6.400000E-01	3.507200E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
38060000	5.480000E-01	6.400000E-01	3.507200E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
38070000	5.480000E-01	6.400000E-01	3.507200E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00

VOL NO.	ROUGHNESS (FT)	HYDRAULIC DIAM. (FT)	VOLUME FLAGS	INIT. COND. FLAG	I.C.VALUE 1	I.C.VALUE 2	I.C.VALUE 3	I.C.VALUE 4
38010000	1.500000E-04	8.353055E-01	0	4	1.470000E+01	1.200000E+02	9.480000E-01	0.000000E+00
38020000	1.500000E-04	8.353055E-01	0	4	1.470000E+01	1.200000E+02	9.480000E-01	0.000000E+00
38030000	1.500000E-04	8.353055E-01	0	4	1.470000E+01	1.200000E+02	9.480000E-01	0.000000E+00
38040000	1.500000E-04	8.353055E-01	0	4	1.470000E+01	1.200000E+02	9.480000E-01	0.000000E+00
38050000	1.500000E-04	8.353055E-01	0	4	1.470000E+01	1.200000E+02	9.480000E-01	0.000000E+00
38060000	1.500000E-04	8.353055E-01	0	4	1.470000E+01	1.200000E+02	9.480000E-01	0.000000E+00
38070000	1.500000E-04	8.353055E-01	0	4	1.470000E+01	1.200000E+02	9.480000E-01	0.000000E+00

JUN.NO.	JUNCTION AREA (FT2)	FORWARD LOSS COEFFICIENT	REVERSE LOSS COEFFICIENT	JUNCTION FLAGS	INIT. LIQ. VEL. (FT/SEC)	INIT. VAP. VEL. (FT/SEC)	INTERFACE VEL. (FT/SEC)
38010000	5.480000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	1000	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
38020000	5.480000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	1000	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
38030000	5.480000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	1000	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
38040000	5.480000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	1000	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
38050000	5.480000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	1000	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
38060000	5.480000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	1000	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00

INPUT DATA FOR COMPONENT 39, C-40-38 SNGLJUN , HAVING 0 VOLUMES AND 1 JUNCTIONS

JUN.NO. FROM VOL.	TO VOL.	JUNCTION AREA (FT2)	FORWARD LOSS COEFFICIENT	REVERSE LOSS COEFFICIENT	JUNCTION FLAGS	SUBCOOLED DISCHARGE COEF.	TWO-PHASE DISCHARGE COEF.	
39000000	40010000	38000000	3.750000E-01	9.400000E-01	3.480000E-01	1000	1.000000E+00	1.000000E+00

JUN.NO.	INIT. LIQ. VEL. (FT/SEC)	INIT. VAP. VEL. (FT/SEC)	INTERFACE VEL. (FT/SEC)
39000000	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00

INPUT DATA FOR COMPONENT 40, C-40 SNGLVOL , HAVING 1 VOLUMES AND 0 JUNCTIONS

VOL NO.	FLOW AREA (FT2)	FLOW LENGTH (FT)	VOLUME (FT3)	HORIZ. ANGLE (DEG)	VERT. ANGLE (DEG)	ELEV. CHNG. (FT)
40010000	3.750000E-01	5.830000E-01	2.186250E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00

VOL NO.	ROUGHNESS (FT)	HYDRAULIC DIAM. (FT)	VOLUME FLAGS	INIT. COND. FLAG	I.C.VALUE 1	I.C.VALUE 2	I.C.VALUE 3	I.C.VALUE 4
40010000	4.572000E-05	2.106132E-01	0	4	1.470000E+01	1.200000E+02	9.480000E-01	0.000000E+00

INPUT DATA FOR COMPONENT 41, C-38-42 SNGLJUN , HAVING 0 VOLUMES AND 1 JUNCTIONS

JUN.NO. FROM VOL.	TO VOL.	JUNCTION AREA (FT2)	FORWARD LOSS COEFFICIENT	REVERSE LOSS COEFFICIENT	JUNCTION FLAGS	SUBCOOLED DISCHARGE COEF.	TWO-PHASE DISCHARGE COEF.	
41000000	38010000	42000000	5.480000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	1000	1.000000E+00	1.000000E+00

JUN.NO.	INIT. LIQ. VEL. (FT/SEC)	INIT. VAP. VEL. (FT/SEC)	INTERFACE VEL. (FT/SEC)
41000000	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00

INPUT DATA FOR COMPONENT 42, C-42 SNGLVOL , HAVING 1 VOLUMES AND 0 JUNCTIONS

VOL NO.	FLOW AREA (FT2)	FLOW LENGTH (FT)	VOLUME (FT3)	HORIZ. ANGLE (DEG)	VERT. ANGLE (DEG)	ELEV. CHNG. (FT)
42010000	5.480000E-01	6.000000E-01	3.288000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00

VOL NO. ROUGHNESS HYDRAULIC DIAM. VOLUME

39000000 0.000000E+00 0.000000E+00 0.000000E+00

INPUT DATA FOR COMPONENT 40, C-40 SNGLVOL , HAVING 1 VOLUMES AND 0 JUNCTIONS

VOL NO.	FLOW AREA (FT2)	FLOW LENGTH (FT)	VOLUME (FT3)	HORIZ. ANGLE (DEG)	VERT. ANGLE (DEG)	ELEV. CHNG. (FT)
40010000	3.750000E-01	5.830000E-01	2.186250E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00

VOL NO.	ROUGHNESS (FT)	HYDRAULIC DIAM. (FT)	VOLUME INIT. COND. FLAGS	I.C.VALUE 1 FLAG	I.C.VALUE 2	I.C.VALUE 3	I.C.VALUE 4
40010000	4.572000E-05	2.106132E-01	0	4	1.470000E+01	1.200000E+02	9.480000E-01

INPUT DATA FOR COMPONENT 41, C-38-42 SNGLJUN , HAVING 0 VOLUMES AND 1 JUNCTIONS

JUN.NO. FROM VOL.	TO VOL.	JUNCTION AREA (FT2)	FORWARD LOSS COEFFICIENT	REVERSE LOSS COEFFICIENT	JUNCTION FLAGS	SUBCOOLED DISCHARGE COEF.	TWO-PHASE DISCHARGE COEF.
41000000 38010000	42000000	5.480000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	1000	1.000000E+00	1.000000E+00

JUN.NO.	INIT. LIQ. VEL. (FT/SEC)	INIT. VAP. VEL. (FT/SEC)	INTERFACE VEL. (FT/SEC)
41000000	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00

INPUT DATA FOR COMPONENT 42, C-42 SNGLVOL , HAVING 1 VOLUMES AND 0 JUNCTIONS

VOL NO.	FLOW AREA (FT2)	FLOW LENGTH (FT)	VOLUME (FT3)	HORIZ. ANGLE (DEG)	VERT. ANGLE (DEG)	ELEV. CHNG. (FT)
42010000	5.480000E-01	6.000000E-01	3.288000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00

VOL NO.	ROUGHNESS (FT)	HYDRAULIC DIAM. (FT)	VOLUME INIT. COND. FLAGS	I.C.VALUE 1 FLAG	I.C.VALUE 2	I.C.VALUE 3	I.C.VALUE 4
42010000	4.572000E-05	2.546011E-01	0	4	1.470000E+01	1.200000E+02	9.480000E-01

INPUT DATA FOR COMPONENT 43, C-42-44 SNGLJUN , HAVING 0 VOLUMES AND 1 JUNCTIONS

JUN.NO. FROM VOL.	TO VOL.	JUNCTION AREA (FT2)	FORWARD LOSS COEFFICIENT	REVERSE LOSS COEFFICIENT	JUNCTION FLAGS	SUBCOOLED DISCHARGE COEF.	TWO-PHASE DISCHARGE COEF.
43000000 42010000	44000000	2.010000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	100	1.000000E+00	1.000000E+00

JUN.NO.	INIT. LIQ. VEL. (FT/SEC)	INIT. VAP. VEL. (FT/SEC)	INTERFACE VEL. (FT/SEC)
43000000	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00

INPUT DATA FOR COMPONENT 44, C-44 BRANCH , HAVING 1 VOLUMES AND 0 JUNCTIONS

VOL NO.	FLOW AREA (FT2)	FLOW LENGTH (FT)	VOLUME (FT3)	HORIZ. ANGLE (DEG)	VERT. ANGLE (DEG)	ELEV. CHNG. (FT)
44010000	2.010000E-01	8.300000E-01	1.668300E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00

VOL NO.	ROUGHNESS (FT)	HYDRAULIC DIAM. (FT)	VOLUME INIT. COND. FLAGS	I.C. VALUE 1 FLAG	I.C. VALUE 2	I.C. VALUE 3	I.C. VALUE 4
44010000	1.500000E-04	5.058865E-01	0	3	1.470000E+01	1.200000E+02	0.000000E+00

INPUT DATA FOR COMPONENT 45, C-44-46 SNGLJUN , HAVING 0 VOLUMES AND 1 JUNCTIONS

JUN.NO. FROM VOL.	TO VOL.	JUNCTION AREA (FT2)	FORWARD LOSS COEFFICIENT	REVERSE LOSS COEFFICIENT	JUNCTION FLAGS	SUBCOOLED DISCHARGE COEF.	TWO-PHASE DISCHARGE COEF.
45000000 44010000	46000000	2.010000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	100	1.000000E+00	1.000000E+00

JUN.NO.	INIT. LIQ. VEL. (FT/SEC)	INIT. VAP. VEL. (FT/SEC)	INTERFACE VEL. (FT/SEC)
45000000	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00

INPUT DATA FOR COMPONENT 46, C-46 PIPE , HAVING 3 VOLUMES AND 2 JUNCTIONS

VOL NO.	FLOW AREA (FT2)	FLOW LENGTH (FT)	VOLUME (FT3)	HORIZ. ANGLE (DEG)	VERT. ANGLE (DEG)	ELEV. CHNG. (FT)
46010000	5.480000E-01	3.800000E-01	2.082400E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
46020000	5.480000E-01	6.500000E-01	3.562000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
46030000	5.480000E-01	6.500000E-01	3.562000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00

VOL NO.	ROUGHNESS (FT)	HYDRAULIC DIAM. (FT)	VOLUME INIT. COND. FLAGS	I.C.VALUE 1 FLAG	I.C.VALUE 2	I.C.VALUE 3	I.C.VALUE 4
46010000	1.500000E-04	8.353055E-01	0	3	1.470000E+01	1.200000E+02	0.000000E+00
46020000	1.500000E-04	8.353055E-01	0	4	1.470000E+01	1.200000E+02	9.480000E-01

VOL NO.	ROUGHNESS (FT)	HYDRAULIC DIAM. (FT)	VOLUME INIT. COND. FLAGS	I.C.VALUE 1 FLAG	I.C.VALUE 2	I.C.VALUE 3	I.C.VALUE 4
46030000	1.500000E-04	8.353055E-01	0	4	1.470000E+01	1.200000E+02	9.480000E-01

JUN.NO.	JUNCTION AREA (FT2)	FORWARD LOSS COEFFICIENT	REVERSE LOSS COEFFICIENT	JUNCTION FLAGS	INIT. LIQ. VEL. (FT/SEC)	INIT. VAP. VEL. (FT/SEC)	INTERFACE VEL. (FT/SEC)
46010000	5.480000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	1000	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
46020000	5.480000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	1000	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00

INPUT DATA FOR COMPONENT 47, C-46-48 SNGLJUN , HAVING 0 VOLUMES AND 1 JUNCTIONS

JUN.NO. FROM VOL.	TO VOL.	JUNCTION AREA (FT2)	FORWARD LOSS COEFFICIENT	REVERSE LOSS COEFFICIENT	JUNCTION FLAGS	SUBCOOLED DISCHARGE COEF.	TWO-PHASE DISCHARGE COEF.
47000000 46010000	114000000	5.480000E-01	1.710000E-01	1.710000E-01	1000	1.000000E+00	1.000000E+00

JUN.NO.	INIT. LIQ. VEL. (FT/SEC)	INIT. VAP. VEL. (FT/SEC)	INTERFACE VEL. (FT/SEC)
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45000000

0.000000E+00

0.000000E+00

0.000000E+00

INPUT DATA FOR COMPONENT 46, C-46 PIPE, HAVING 3 VOLUMES AND 2 JUNCTIONS

VOL NO.	FLOW AREA (FT2)	FLOW LENGTH (FT)	VOLUME (FT3)	HORIZ. ANGLE (DEG)	VERT. ANGLE (DEG)	ELEV. CHNG. (FT)
46010000	5.480000E-01	3.800000E-01	2.082400E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
46020000	5.480000E-01	6.500000E-01	3.562000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
46030000	5.480000E-01	6.500000E-01	3.562000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00

VOL NO.	ROUGHNESS (FT)	HYDRAULIC DIAM. (FT)	VOLUME FLAGS	INIT. COND. FLAG	I.C.VALUE 1	I.C.VALUE 2	I.C.VALUE 3	I.C.VALUE 4
46010000	1.500000E-04	8.353055E-01	0	3	1.470000E+01	1.200000E+02	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
46020000	1.500000E-04	8.353055E-01	0	4	1.470000E+01	1.200000E+02	9.480000E-01	0.000000E+00

46030000	1.500000E-04	8.353055E-01	0	4	1.470000E+01	1.200000E+02	9.480000E-01	0.000000E+00
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JUN.NO.	JUNCTION AREA (FT2)	FORWARD LOSS COEFFICIENT	REVERSE LOSS COEFFICIENT	JUNCTION FLAGS	INIT. LIQ. VEL. (FT/SEC)	INIT. VAP. VEL. (FT/SEC)	INTERFACE VEL. (FT/SEC)
46010000	5.480000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	1000	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
46020000	5.480000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	1000	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00

INPUT DATA FOR COMPONENT 47, C-46-48 SNGLJUN, HAVING 0 VOLUMES AND 1 JUNCTIONS

JUN.NO.	FROM VOL.	TO VOL.	JUNCTION AREA (FT2)	FORWARD LOSS COEFFICIENT	REVERSE LOSS COEFFICIENT	JUNCTION FLAGS	SUBCOOLED DISCHARGE COEF.	TWO-PHASE DISCHARGE COEF.
47000000	46010000	114000000	5.480000E-01	1.710000E-01	1.710000E-01	1000	1.000000E+00	1.000000E+00

JUN.NO.	INIT. LIQ. VEL. (FT/SEC)	INIT. VAP. VEL. (FT/SEC)	INTERFACE VEL. (FT/SEC)
47000000	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00

INPUT DATA FOR COMPONENT 48, C-48 PIPE, HAVING 9 VOLUMES AND 8 JUNCTIONS

VOL NO.	FLOW AREA (FT2)	FLOW LENGTH (FT)	VOLUME (FT3)	HORIZ. ANGLE (DEG)	VERT. ANGLE (DEG)	ELEV. CHNG. (FT)
48010000	5.480000E-01	5.100000E-01	2.794800E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
48020000	5.480000E-01	5.100000E-01	2.794800E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
48030000	5.480000E-01	5.100000E-01	2.794800E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
48040000	5.480000E-01	5.100000E-01	2.794800E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
48050000	5.480000E-01	5.100000E-01	2.794800E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
48060000	5.480000E-01	5.100000E-01	2.794800E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
48070000	5.480000E-01	5.100000E-01	2.794800E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
48080000	5.480000E-01	5.100000E-01	2.794800E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
48090000	5.480000E-01	5.100000E-01	2.794800E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00

VOL NO.	ROUGHNESS (FT)	HYDRAULIC DIAM. (FT)	VOLUME FLAGS	INIT. COND. FLAG	I.C.VALUE 1	I.C.VALUE 2	I.C.VALUE 3	I.C.VALUE 4
48010000	1.500000E-04	8.353055E-01	0	4	1.470000E+01	1.200000E+02	9.480000E-01	0.000000E+00
48020000	1.500000E-04	8.353055E-01	0	4	1.470000E+01	1.200000E+02	9.480000E-01	0.000000E+00
48030000	1.500000E-04	8.353055E-01	0	4	1.470000E+01	1.200000E+02	9.480000E-01	0.000000E+00
48040000	1.500000E-04	8.353055E-01	0	4	1.470000E+01	1.200000E+02	9.480000E-01	0.000000E+00
48050000	1.500000E-04	8.353055E-01	0	4	1.470000E+01	1.200000E+02	9.480000E-01	0.000000E+00
48060000	1.500000E-04	8.353055E-01	0	4	1.470000E+01	1.200000E+02	9.480000E-01	0.000000E+00
48070000	1.500000E-04	8.353055E-01	0	4	1.470000E+01	1.200000E+02	9.480000E-01	0.000000E+00
48080000	1.500000E-04	8.353055E-01	0	4	1.470000E+01	1.200000E+02	9.480000E-01	0.000000E+00
48090000	1.500000E-04	8.353055E-01	0	4	1.470000E+01	1.200000E+02	9.480000E-01	0.000000E+00

JUN.NO.	JUNCTION AREA (FT2)	FORWARD LOSS COEFFICIENT	REVERSE LOSS COEFFICIENT	JUNCTION FLAGS	INIT. LIQ. VEL. (FT/SEC)	INIT. VAP. VEL. (FT/SEC)	INTERFACE VEL. (FT/SEC)
48010000	5.480000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	1000	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
48020000	5.480000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	1000	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
48030000	5.480000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	1000	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
48040000	5.480000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	1000	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
48050000	5.480000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	1000	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
48060000	5.480000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	1000	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
48070000	5.480000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	1000	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
48080000	5.480000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	1000	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00

INPUT DATA FOR COMPONENT 49, C-48-50 SNGLJUN, HAVING 0 VOLUMES AND 1 JUNCTIONS

JUN.NO.	FROM VOL.	TO VOL.	JUNCTION AREA (FT2)	FORWARD LOSS COEFFICIENT	REVERSE LOSS COEFFICIENT	JUNCTION FLAGS	SUBCOOLED DISCHARGE COEF.	TWO-PHASE DISCHARGE COEF.
49000000	48010000	50000000	5.480000E-01	1.720000E-01	1.720000E-01	1000	1.000000E+00	1.000000E+00

JUN.NO.	INIT. LIQ. VEL. (FT/SEC)	INIT. VAP. VEL. (FT/SEC)	INTERFACE VEL. (FT/SEC)
49000000	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00

INPUT DATA FOR COMPONENT 50, C-50 PIPE, HAVING 5 VOLUMES AND 4 JUNCTIONS

VOL NO.	FLOW AREA (FT2)	FLOW LENGTH (FT)	VOLUME (FT3)	HORIZ. ANGLE (DEG)	VERT. ANGLE (DEG)	ELEV. CHNG. (FT)
50010000	5.480000E-01	5.260000E-01	2.882480E-01	0.000000E+00	-9.000000E+01	-5.260000E-01
50020000	5.480000E-01	5.260000E-01	2.882480E-01	0.000000E+00	-9.000000E+01	-5.260000E-01
50030000	5.480000E-01	5.260000E-01	2.882480E-01	0.000000E+00	-9.000000E+01	-5.260000E-01
50040000	5.480000E-01	5.260000E-01	2.882480E-01	0.000000E+00	-9.000000E+01	-5.260000E-01
50050000	5.480000E-01	5.260000E-01	2.882480E-01	0.000000E+00	-9.000000E+01	-5.260000E-01

VOL NO.	ROUGHNESS (FT)	HYDRAULIC DIAM. (FT)	VOLUME FLAGS	INIT. COND. FLAG	I.C.VALUE 1	I.C.VALUE 2	I.C.VALUE 3	I.C.VALUE 4
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48020000	5.480000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	1000	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
48030000	5.480000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	1000	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
48040000	5.480000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	1000	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
48050000	5.480000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	1000	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
48060000	5.480000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	1000	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
48070000	5.480000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	1000	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
48080000	5.480000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	1000	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00

INPUT DATA FOR COMPONENT 49, C-48-50 SNGLJUN , HAVING 0 VOLUMES AND 1 JUNCTIONS

JUN.NO.	FROM VOL.	TO VOL.	JUNCTION AREA (FT ²)	FORWARD LOSS COEFFICIENT	REVERSE LOSS COEFFICIENT	JUNCTION FLAGS	SURCOOLED DISCHARGE COEF.	TWO-PHASE DISCHARGE COEF.
49000000	48010000	50000000	5.480000E-01	1.720000E-01	1.720000E-01	1000	1.000000E+00	1.000000E+00

JUN.NO.	INIT. LIQ. VEL. (FT/SEC)	INIT. VAP. VEL. (FT/SEC)	INTERFACE VEL. (FT/SEC)
49000000	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00

INPUT DATA FOR COMPONENT 50, C-50 PIPE , HAVING 5 VOLUMES AND 4 JUNCTIONS

VOL NO.	FLOW AREA (FT ²)	FLOW LENGTH (FT)	VOLUME (FT ³)	HORIZ. ANGLE (DEG)	VERT. ANGLE (DEG)	ELEV. CHNG. (FT)
50010000	5.480000E-01	5.260000E-01	2.882480E-01	0.000000E+00	-9.000000E+01	-5.260000E-01
50020000	5.480000E-01	5.260000E-01	2.882480E-01	0.000000E+00	-9.000000E+01	-5.260000E-01
50030000	5.480000E-01	5.260000E-01	2.882480E-01	0.000000E+00	-9.000000E+01	-5.260000E-01
50040000	5.480000E-01	5.260000E-01	2.882480E-01	0.000000E+00	-9.000000E+01	-5.260000E-01
50050000	5.480000E-01	5.260000E-01	2.882480E-01	0.000000E+00	-9.000000E+01	-5.260000E-01

VOL NO.	ROUGHNESS (FT)	HYDRAULIC DIAM. (FT)	VOLUME FLAGS	INIT. COND. FLAG	I.C.VALUE 1	I.C.VALUE 2	I.C.VALUE 3	I.C.VALUE 4
50010000	1.500000E-04	8.353055E-01	0	4	1.470000E+01	1.200000E+02	9.480000E-01	0.000000E+00
50020000	1.500000E-04	8.353055E-01	0	4	1.470000E+01	1.200000E+02	9.480000E-01	0.000000E+00
50030000	1.500000E-04	8.353055E-01	0	4	1.470000E+01	1.200000E+02	9.480000E-01	0.000000E+00
50040000	1.500000E-04	8.353055E-01	0	4	1.470000E+01	1.200000E+02	9.480000E-01	0.000000E+00
50050000	1.500000E-04	8.353055E-01	0	4	1.470000E+01	1.200000E+02	9.480000E-01	0.000000E+00

JUN.NO.	JUNCTION AREA (FT ²)	FORWARD LOSS COEFFICIENT	REVERSE LOSS COEFFICIENT	JUNCTION FLAG	INIT. LIQ. VEL. (FT/SEC)	INIT. VAP. VEL. (FT/SEC)	INTERFACE VEL. (FT/SEC)
50010000	5.480000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	1000	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
50020000	5.480000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	1000	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
50030000	5.480000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	1000	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
50040000	5.480000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	1000	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00

INPUT DATA FOR COMPONENT 51, C-50-52 SNGLJUN , HAVING 0 VOLUMES AND 1 JUNCTIONS

JUN.NO.	FROM VOL.	TO VOL.	JUNCTION AREA (FT ²)	FORWARD LOSS COEFFICIENT	REVERSE LOSS COEFFICIENT	JUNCTION FLAGS	SURCOOLED DISCHARGE COEF.	TWO-PHASE DISCHARGE COEF.
51000000	50010000	52000000	5.480000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	1000	1.000000E+00	1.000000E+00

JUN.NO.	INIT. LIQ. VEL. (FT/SEC)	INIT. VAP. VEL. (FT/SEC)	INTERFACE VEL. (FT/SEC)
51000000	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00

INPUT DATA FOR COMPONENT 52, C-52 SNGLVOL , HAVING 1 VOLUMES AND 0 JUNCTIONS

VOL NO.	FLOW AREA (FT ²)	FLOW LENGTH (FT)	VOLUME (FT ³)	HORIZ. ANGLE (DEG)	VERT. ANGLE (DEG)	ELEV. CHNG. (FT)
52010000	5.480000E-01	5.000000E-01	2.740000E-01	-9.000000E+01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00

VOL NO.	ROUGHNESS (FT)	HYDRAULIC DIAM. (FT)	VOLUME FLAGS	INIT. COND. FLAG	I.C.VALUE 1	I.C.VALUE 2	I.C.VALUE 3	I.C.VALUE 4
52010000	4.572000E-05	2.546011E-01	0	4	1.470000E+01	1.200000E+02	9.480000E-01	0.000000E+00

INPUT DATA FOR COMPONENT 53, C-52-54 SNGLJUN , HAVING 0 VOLUMES AND 1 JUNCTIONS

JUN.NO.	FROM VOL.	TO VOL.	JUNCTION AREA (FT ²)	FORWARD LOSS COEFFICIENT	REVERSE LOSS COEFFICIENT	JUNCTION FLAGS	SURCOOLED DISCHARGE COEF.	TWO-PHASE DISCHARGE COEF.
53000000	52010000	54000000	5.480000E-01	5.500000E-01	5.500000E-01	1000	1.000000E+00	1.000000E+00

JUN.NO.	INIT. LIQ. VEL. (FT/SEC)	INIT. VAP. VEL. (FT/SEC)	INTERFACE VEL. (FT/SEC)
53000000	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00

INPUT DATA FOR COMPONENT 54, C-54 PIPE , HAVING 95 VOLUMES AND 94 JUNCTIONS

VOL NO.	FLOW AREA (FT ²)	FLOW LENGTH (FT)	VOLUME (FT ³)	HORIZ. ANGLE (DEG)	VERT. ANGLE (DEG)	ELEV. CHNG. (FT)
54010000	5.480000E-01	5.580000E-01	3.057840E-01	0.000000E+00	-9.000000E+01	-5.580000E-01
54020000	5.480000E-01	5.580000E-01	3.057840E-01	0.000000E+00	-9.000000E+01	-5.580000E-01
54030000	5.480000E-01	5.580000E-01	3.057840E-01	0.000000E+00	-9.000000E+01	-5.580000E-01
54040000	5.480000E-01	5.580000E-01	3.057840E-01	0.000000E+00	-9.000000E+01	-5.580000E-01
54050000	5.480000E-01	5.580000E-01	3.057840E-01	0.000000E+00	-9.000000E+01	-5.580000E-01
54060000	5.480000E-01	5.580000E-01	3.057840E-01	0.000000E+00	-9.000000E+01	-5.580000E-01
54070000	5.480000E-01	5.580000E-01	3.057840E-01	0.000000E+00	-9.000000E+01	-5.580000E-01
54080000	5.480000E-01	5.580000E-01	3.057840E-01	0.000000E+00	-9.000000E+01	-5.580000E-01
54090000	5.480000E-01	5.580000E-01	3.057840E-01	0.000000E+00	-9.000000E+01	-5.580000E-01
54100000	5.480000E-01	5.580000E-01	3.057840E-01	0.000000E+00	-9.000000E+01	-5.580000E-01
54110000	5.480000E-01	5.580000E-01	3.057840E-01	0.000000E+00	-9.000000E+01	-5.580000E-01
54120000	5.480000E-01	5.580000E-01	3.057840E-01	0.000000E+00	-9.000000E+01	-5.580000E-01
54130000	5.480000E-01	5.580000E-01	3.057840E-01	0.000000E+00	-9.000000E+01	-5.580000E-01

56250000	5.480000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	1000	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
56260000	5.480000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	1000	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
56270000	5.480000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	1000	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
56280000	5.480000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	1000	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
56290000	5.480000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	1000	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
56300000	5.480000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	1000	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
56310000	5.480000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	1000	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
56320000	5.480000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	1000	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
56330000	5.480000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	1000	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
56340000	5.480000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	1000	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00

INPUT DATA FOR COMPONENT 57, C-56-58 SNGLJUN, HAVING 0 VOLUMES AND 1 JUNCTIONS

JUN.NO.	FROM VOL.	TO VOL.	JUNCTION AREA (FT ²)	FORWARD LOSS COEFFICIENT	REVERSE LOSS COEFFICIENT	JUNCTION FLAGS	SUBCOOLED DISCHARGE COEF.	TWO-PHASE DISCHARGE COEF.
57000000	56010000	58000000	5.480000E-01	6.000000E-02	6.000000E-02	1000	1.000000E+00	1.000000E+00

JUN.NO.	INIT. LIQ. VEL. (FT/SEC)	INIT. VAP. VEL. (FT/SEC)	INTERFACE VEL. (FT/SEC)
57000000	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00

INPUT DATA FOR COMPONENT 58, C-58 PIPE, HAVING 7 VOLUMES AND 6 JUNCTIONS

VOL NO.	FLOW AREA (FT ²)	FLOW LENGTH (FT)	VOLUME (FT ³)	HORIZ. ANGLE (DEG)	VERT. ANGLE (DEG)	ELEV. CHNG. (FT)
58010000	5.480000E-01	9.970000E-01	5.463559E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
58020000	5.480000E-01	9.970000E-01	5.463559E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
58030000	5.480000E-01	9.970000E-01	5.463559E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
58040000	5.480000E-01	9.970000E-01	5.463559E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
58050000	5.480000E-01	9.970000E-01	5.463559E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
58060000	5.480000E-01	9.970000E-01	5.463559E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
58070000	5.480000E-01	9.970000E-01	5.463559E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00

VOL NO.	ROUGHNESS (FT)	HYDRAULIC DIAM. (FT)	VOLUME FLAGS	INIT. COND. FLAG	I.C.VALUE 1	I.C.VALUE 2	I.C.VALUE 3	I.C.VALUE 4
58010000	1.500000E-04	8.353055E-01	0	4	1.470000E+01	1.200000E+02	9.480000E-01	0.000000E+00
58020000	1.500000E-04	8.353055E-01	0	4	1.470000E+01	1.200000E+02	9.480000E-01	0.000000E+00
58030000	1.500000E-04	8.353055E-01	0	4	1.470000E+01	1.200000E+02	9.480000E-01	0.000000E+00
58040000	1.500000E-04	8.353055E-01	0	4	1.470000E+01	1.200000E+02	9.480000E-01	0.000000E+00
58050000	1.500000E-04	8.353055E-01	0	4	1.470000E+01	1.200000E+02	9.480000E-01	0.000000E+00
58060000	1.500000E-04	8.353055E-01	0	4	1.470000E+01	1.200000E+02	9.480000E-01	0.000000E+00
58070000	1.500000E-04	8.353055E-01	0	4	1.470000E+01	1.200000E+02	9.480000E-01	0.000000E+00

JUN.NO.	JUNCTION AREA (FT ²)	FORWARD LOSS COEFFICIENT	REVERSE LOSS COEFFICIENT	JUNCTION FLAGS	INIT. LIQ. VEL. (FT/SEC)	INIT. VAP. VEL. (FT/SEC)	INTERFACE VEL. (FT/SEC)
58010000	5.480000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	1000	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
58020000	5.480000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	1000	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
58030000	5.480000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	1000	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
58040000	5.480000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	1000	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
58050000	5.480000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	1000	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
58060000	5.480000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	1000	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00

INPUT DATA FOR COMPONENT 59, C-58-60 SNGLJUN, HAVING 0 VOLUMES AND 1 JUNCTIONS

JUN.NO.	FROM VOL.	TO VOL.	JUNCTION AREA (FT ²)	FORWARD LOSS COEFFICIENT	REVERSE LOSS COEFFICIENT	JUNCTION FLAGS	SUBCOOLED DISCHARGE COEF.	TWO-PHASE DISCHARGE COEF.
59000000	58010000	60000000	5.480000E-01	1.720000E-01	1.720000E-01	1000	1.000000E+00	1.000000E+00

JUN.NO.	INIT. LIQ. VEL. (FT/SEC)	INIT. VAP. VEL. (FT/SEC)	INTERFACE VEL. (FT/SEC)
59000000	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00

INPUT DATA FOR COMPONENT 60, C-60 PIPE, HAVING 3 VOLUMES AND 2 JUNCTIONS

VOL NO.	FLOW AREA (FT ²)	FLOW LENGTH (FT)	VOLUME (FT ³)	HORIZ. ANGLE (DEG)	VERT. ANGLE (DEG)	ELEV. CHNG. (FT)
60010000	5.480000E-01	1.110000E+00	6.082799E-01	0.000000E+00	-4.500000E+01	-7.848885E-01
60020000	5.480000E-01	1.110000E+00	6.082799E-01	0.000000E+00	-4.500000E+01	-7.848885E-01
60030000	5.480000E-01	1.110000E+00	6.082799E-01	0.000000E+00	-4.500000E+01	-7.848885E-01

VOL NO.	ROUGHNESS (FT)	HYDRAULIC DIAM. (FT)	VOLUME FLAGS	INIT. COND. FLAG	I.C.VALUE 1	I.C.VALUE 2	I.C.VALUE 3	I.C.VALUE 4
60010000	1.500000E-04	8.353055E-01	0	4	1.470000E+01	1.200000E+02	9.480000E-01	0.000000E+00

60020000	1.500000E-04	8.353055E-01	0	4	1.470000E+01	1.200000E+02	9.480000E-01	0.000000E+00
60030000	1.500000E-04	8.353055E-01	0	4	1.470000E+01	1.200000E+02	9.480000E-01	0.000000E+00

JUN.NO.	JUNCTION AREA (FT ²)	FORWARD LOSS COEFFICIENT	REVERSE LOSS COEFFICIENT	JUNCTION FLAGS	INIT. LIQ. VEL. (FT/SEC)	INIT. VAP. VEL. (FT/SEC)	INTERFACE VEL. (FT/SEC)
60010000	5.480000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	1000	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
60020000	5.480000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	1000	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00

INPUT DATA FOR COMPONENT 61, C-60-62 SNGLJUN, HAVING 0 VOLUMES AND 1 JUNCTIONS

JUN.NO.	FROM VOL.	TO VOL.	JUNCTION AREA (FT ²)	FORWARD LOSS COEFFICIENT	REVERSE LOSS COEFFICIENT	JUNCTION FLAGS	SUBCOOLED DISCHARGE COEF.	TWO-PHASE DISCHARGE COEF.
61000000	60010000	62000000	5.480000E-01	0.500000E+00	0.500000E+00	1000	1.000000E+00	1.000000E+00

59000000 0.000000E+00 0.000000E+00 0.000000E+00

INPUT DATA FOR COMPONENT 60, C-60 PIPE , HAVING 3 VOLUMES AND 2 JUNCTIONS

Table with 7 columns: VOL NO., FLOW AREA (FT2), FLOW LENGTH (FT), VOLUME (FT3), HORIZ. ANGLE (DEG), VERT. ANGLE (DEG), ELEV. CHNG. (FT). Rows 60010000, 60020000, 60030000.

Table with 9 columns: VOL NO., ROUGHNESS (FT), HYDRAULIC DIAM. (FT), VOLUME INIT. COND. FLAGS, I.C.VALUE 1, I.C.VALUE 2, I.C.VALUE 3, I.C.VALUE 4. Rows 60010000, 60020000, 60030000.

Table with 9 columns: JUN.NO., JUNCTION AREA (FT2), FORWARD LOSS COEFFICIENT, REVERSE LOSS COEFFICIENT, JUNCTION FLAGS, INIT. LIQ. VEL. (FT/SEC), INIT. VAP. VEL. (FT/SEC), INTERFACE VEL. (FT/SEC). Rows 60010000, 60020000.

INPUT DATA FOR COMPONENT 61, C-60-62 SNLJUN , HAVING 0 VOLUMES AND 1 JUNCTIONS

Table with 9 columns: JUN.NO., FROM VOL., TO VOL., JUNCTION AREA (FT2), FORWARD LOSS COEFFICIENT, REVERSE LOSS COEFFICIENT, JUNCTION FLAGS, SUBCOOLED DISCHARGE COEF., TWO-PHASE DISCHARGE COEF. Rows 61000000.

Table with 4 columns: JUN.NO., INIT. LIQ. VEL. (FT/SEC), INIT. VAP. VEL. (FT/SEC), INTERFACE VEL. (FT/SEC). Row 61000000.

INPUT DATA FOR COMPONENT 62, C-62 PIPE , HAVING 2 VOLUMES AND 1 JUNCTIONS

Table with 7 columns: VOL NO., FLOW AREA (FT2), FLOW LENGTH (FT), VOLUME (FT3), HORIZ. ANGLE (DEG), VERT. ANGLE (DEG), ELEV. CHNG. (FT). Rows 62010000, 62020000.

Table with 9 columns: VOL NO., ROUGHNESS (FT), HYDRAULIC DIAM. (FT), VOLUME INIT. COND. FLAGS, I.C.VALUE 1, I.C.VALUE 2, I.C.VALUE 3, I.C.VALUE 4. Rows 62010000, 62020000.

Table with 8 columns: JUN.NO., JUNCTION AREA (FT2), FORWARD LOSS COEFFICIENT, REVERSE LOSS COEFFICIENT, JUNCTION FLAGS, INIT. LIQ. VEL. (FT/SEC), INIT. VAP. VEL. (FT/SEC), INTERFACE VEL. (FT/SEC). Row 62010000.

INPUT DATA FOR COMPONENT 63, C-62-64 SNLJUN , HAVING 0 VOLUMES AND 1 JUNCTIONS

Table with 9 columns: JUN.NO., FROM VOL., TO VOL., JUNCTION AREA (FT2), FORWARD LOSS COEFFICIENT, REVERSE LOSS COEFFICIENT, JUNCTION FLAGS, SUBCOOLED DISCHARGE COEF., TWO-PHASE DISCHARGE COEF. Row 63000000.

Table with 4 columns: JUN.NO., INIT. LIQ. VEL. (FT/SEC), INIT. VAP. VEL. (FT/SEC), INTERFACE VEL. (FT/SEC). Row 63000000.

INPUT DATA FOR COMPONENT 64, C-64 SNGLVOL , HAVING 1 VOLUMES AND 0 JUNCTIONS

Table with 7 columns: VOL NO., FLOW AREA (FT2), FLOW LENGTH (FT), VOLUME (FT3), HORIZ. ANGLE (DEG), VERT. ANGLE (DEG), ELEV. CHNG. (FT). Row 64010000.

Table with 9 columns: VOL NO., ROUGHNESS (FT), HYDRAULIC DIAM. (FT), VOLUME INIT. COND. FLAGS, I.C.VALUE 1, I.C.VALUE 2, I.C.VALUE 3, I.C.VALUE 4. Row 64010000.

INPUT DATA FOR COMPONENT 65, C-64-66 SNLJUN , HAVING 0 VOLUMES AND 1 JUNCTIONS

Table with 9 columns: JUN.NO., FROM VOL., TO VOL., JUNCTION AREA (FT2), FORWARD LOSS COEFFICIENT, REVERSE LOSS COEFFICIENT, JUNCTION FLAGS, SUBCOOLED DISCHARGE COEF., TWO-PHASE DISCHARGE COEF. Row 65000000.

Table with 4 columns: JUN.NO., INIT. LIQ. VEL. (FT/SEC), INIT. VAP. VEL. (FT/SEC), INTERFACE VEL. (FT/SEC). Row 65000000.

INPUT DATA FOR COMPONENT 66, C-66 SNGLVOL , HAVING 1 VOLUMES AND 0 JUNCTIONS

Table with 7 columns: VOL NO., FLOW AREA (FT2), FLOW LENGTH (FT), VOLUME (FT3), HORIZ. ANGLE (DEG), VERT. ANGLE (DEG), ELEV. CHNG. (FT). Row 66010000.

Table with 9 columns: VOL NO., ROUGHNESS (FT), HYDRAULIC DIAM. (FT), VOLUME INIT. COND. FLAGS, I.C.VALUE 1, I.C.VALUE 2, I.C.VALUE 3, I.C.VALUE 4. Row 66010000.

VOL NO.	FLOW AREA (FT2)	FLOW LENGTH (FT)	VOLUME (FT3)	HORIZ. ANGLE (DEG)	VERT. ANGLE (DEG)	ELEV. CHNG. (FT)
64010000	5.480000E-01	1.650000E+00	9.041999E-01	-9.000000E+01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00

VOL NO.	ROUGHNESS (FT)	HYDRAULIC DIAM. (FT)	VOLUME INIT. FLAGS	COND. FLAG	I.C. VALUE 1	I.C. VALUE 2	I.C. VALUE 3	I.C. VALUE 4
64010000	1.500000E-04	8.353055E-01	10	3	1.470000E+01	1.200000E+02	0.000000E+00	

INPUT DATA FOR COMPONENT 65, C-64-66 SNGLJUN , HAVING 0 VOLUMES AND 1 JUNCTIONS

JUN. NO.	FROM VOL.	TO VOL.	JUNCTION AREA (FT2)	FORWARD LOSS COEFFICIENT	REVERSE LOSS COEFFICIENT	JUNCTION FLAGS	SUBCOOLED DISCHARGE COEF.	TWO-PHASE DISCHARGE COEF.
65000000	64010000	66000000	5.480000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	1000	1.000000E+00	1.000000E+00

JUN. NO.	INIT. LIQ. VEL. (FT/SEC)	INIT. VAP. VEL. (FT/SEC)	INTERFACE VEL. (FT/SEC)
65000000	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00

INPUT DATA FOR COMPONENT 66, C-66 SNGLVOL , HAVING 1 VOLUMES AND 0 JUNCTIONS

VOL NO.	FLOW AREA (FT2)	FLOW LENGTH (FT)	VOLUME (FT3)	HORIZ. ANGLE (DEG)	VERT. ANGLE (DEG)	ELEV. CHNG. (FT)
66010000	5.480000E-01	1.500000E+00	8.219999E-01	-9.000000E+01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00

VOL NO.	ROUGHNESS (FT)	HYDRAULIC DIAM. (FT)	VOLUME INIT. FLAGS	COND. FLAG	I.C. VALUE 1	I.C. VALUE 2	I.C. VALUE 3	I.C. VALUE 4
66010000	1.500000E-04	8.353055E-01	10	3	1.470000E+01	1.200000E+02	0.000000E+00	

INPUT DATA FOR COMPONENT 67, C-66-68 SNGLJUN , HAVING 0 VOLUMES AND 1 JUNCTIONS

JUN. NO.	FROM VOL.	TO VOL.	JUNCTION AREA (FT2)	FORWARD LOSS COEFFICIENT	REVERSE LOSS COEFFICIENT	JUNCTION FLAGS	SUBCOOLED DISCHARGE COEF.	TWO-PHASE DISCHARGE COEF.
67000000	66010000	68000000	5.480000E-01	1.720000E-01	1.720000E-01	1000	1.000000E+00	1.000000E+00

JUN. NO.	INIT. LIQ. VEL. (FT/SEC)	INIT. VAP. VEL. (FT/SEC)	INTERFACE VEL. (FT/SEC)
67000000	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00

INPUT DATA FOR COMPONENT 68, C-68 SNGLVOL , HAVING 1 VOLUMES AND 0 JUNCTIONS

VOL NO.	FLOW AREA (FT2)	FLOW LENGTH (FT)	VOLUME (FT3)	HORIZ. ANGLE (DEG)	VERT. ANGLE (DEG)	ELEV. CHNG. (FT)
68010000	5.480000E-01	1.500000E+00	8.219999E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00

VOL NO.	ROUGHNESS (FT)	HYDRAULIC DIAM. (FT)	VOLUME INIT. FLAGS	COND. FLAG	I.C. VALUE 1	I.C. VALUE 2	I.C. VALUE 3	I.C. VALUE 4
68010000	1.500000E-04	8.353055E-01	10	3	1.470000E+01	1.200000E+02	0.000000E+00	

INPUT DATA FOR COMPONENT 69, C-69 BRANCH , HAVING 1 VOLUMES AND 3 JUNCTIONS

VOL NO.	FLOW AREA (FT2)	FLOW LENGTH (FT)	VOLUME (FT3)	HORIZ. ANGLE (DEG)	VERT. ANGLE (DEG)	ELEV. CHNG. (FT)
69010000	5.480000E-01	4.080000E+00	2.235840E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00

VOL NO.	ROUGHNESS (FT)	HYDRAULIC DIAM. (FT)	VOLUME INIT. FLAGS	COND. FLAG	I.C. VALUE 1	I.C. VALUE 2	I.C. VALUE 3	I.C. VALUE 4
69010000	1.500000E-04	8.353055E-01	10	3	1.470000E+01	1.200000E+02	0.000000E+00	1.500000E-

JUN. NO.	FROM VOL.	TO VOL.	JUNCTION AREA (FT2)	FORWARD LOSS COEFFICIENT	REVERSE LOSS COEFFICIENT	JUNCTION FLAGS
69010000	68010000	69000000	5.480000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	1000
69020000	69010000	73000000	2.730000E-01	1.690000E+00	1.710000E+00	0
69030000	69010000	70000000	5.480000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	1000

JUN. NO.	INIT. LIQ. VEL. (FT/SEC)	INIT. VAP. VEL. (FT/SEC)	INTERFACE VEL. (FT/SEC)
69010000	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
69020000	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
69030000	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00

INPUT DATA FOR COMPONENT 70, C-70 BRANCH , HAVING 1 VOLUMES AND 2 JUNCTIONS

VOL NO.	FLOW AREA (FT2)	FLOW LENGTH (FT)	VOLUME (FT3)	HORIZ. ANGLE (DEG)	VERT. ANGLE (DEG)	ELEV. CHNG. (FT)
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70010000	5.480000E-01	4.080000E+00	2.235840E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
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VOL NO.	ROUGHNESS (FT)	HYDRAULIC DIAM. (FT)	VOLUME INIT. FLAGS	COND. FLAG	I.C. VALUE 1	I.C. VALUE 2	I.C. VALUE 3	I.C. VALUE 4
70010000	1.500000E-04	8.353055E-01	10	3	1.470000E+01	1.200000E+02	0.000000E+00	1.500000E-

JUN. NO.	FROM VOL.	TO VOL.	JUNCTION AREA (FT2)	FORWARD LOSS COEFFICIENT	REVERSE LOSS COEFFICIENT	JUNCTION FLAGS
70010000	70010000	73000000	2.730000E-01	1.690000E+00	1.710000E+00	0
70020000	70010000	71000000	5.480000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	1000

JUN. NO.	INIT. LIQ. VEL. (FT/SEC)	INIT. VAP. VEL. (FT/SEC)	INTERFACE VEL. (FT/SEC)
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69020000 69010000 73000000 2.730000E-01 1.890000E+00 1.710000E+00 0
 69030000 69010000 70000000 5.480000E-01 0.000000E+00 0.000000E+00 1000

JUN.NO. INIT. LIQ. VEL. (FT/SEC) INIT. VAP. VEL. (FT/SEC) INTERFACE VEL. (FT/SEC)
 69010000 0.000000E+00 0.000000E+00 0.000000E+00
 69020000 0.000000E+00 0.000000E+00 0.000000E+00
 69030000 0.000000E+00 0.000000E+00 0.000000E+00

INPUT DATA FOR COMPONENT 70, C-70 BRANCH , HAVING 1 VOLUMES AND 2 JUNCTIONS

VOL. NO. FLOW AREA (FT2) FLOW LENGTH (FT) VOLUME (FT3) HORIZ. ANGLE (DEG) VERT. ANGLE (DEG) ELEV. CHNG. (FT)

70010000 5.480000E-01 4.080000E+00 2.235840E+00 0.000000E+00 0.000000E+00 0.000000E+00

VOL NO. ROUGHNESS (FT) HYDRAULIC DIAM. (FT) VOLUME FLAGS INIT. COND. FLAG I.C. VALUE 1 I.C. VALUE 2 I.C. VALUE 3 I.C. VALUE 4
 70010000 1.500000E-04 8.353055E-01 10 3 1.470000E+01 1.200000E+02 0.000000E+00 1.500000E-

JUN.NO. FROM VOL. TO VOL. JUNCTION AREA (FT2) FORWARD LOSS COEFFICIENT REVERSE LOSS COEFFICIENT JUNCTION FLAGS
 70010000 70010000 73000000 2.730000E-01 1.890000E+00 1.710000E+00 0
 70020000 70010000 71000000 5.480000E-01 0.000000E+00 0.000000E+00 1000

JUN.NO. INIT. LIQ. VEL. (FT/SEC) INIT. VAP. VEL. (FT/SEC) INTERFACE VEL. (FT/SEC)
 70010000 0.000000E+00 0.000000E+00 0.000000E+00
 70020000 0.000000E+00 0.000000E+00 0.000000E+00

INPUT DATA FOR COMPONENT 71, C-71 SNGLVOL , HAVING 1 VOLUMES AND 0 JUNCTIONS

VOL NO. FLOW AREA (FT2) FLOW LENGTH (FT) VOLUME (FT3) HORIZ. ANGLE (DEG) VERT. ANGLE (DEG) ELEV. CHNG. (FT)
 71010000 5.480000E-01 4.080000E+00 2.235840E+00 0.000000E+00 0.000000E+00 0.000000E+00

VOL NO. ROUGHNESS (FT) HYDRAULIC DIAM. (FT) VOLUME FLAGS INIT. COND. FLAG I.C. VALUE 1 I.C. VALUE 2 I.C. VALUE 3 I.C. VALUE 4
 71010000 1.500000E-04 8.353055E-01 10 3 1.470000E+01 1.200000E+02 0.000000E+00

INPUT DATA FOR COMPONENT 72, C-71-73 SNGLJUN , HAVING 0 VOLUMES AND 1 JUNCTIONS

JUN.NO. FROM VOL. TO VOL. JUNCTION AREA (FT2) FORWARD LOSS COEFFICIENT REVERSE LOSS COEFFICIENT JUNCTION FLAGS SUBCOOLED DISCHARGE COEF. TWO-PHASE DISCHARGE COEF.
 72000000 71010000 73000000 2.850000E-01 1.890000E+00 1.710000E+00 0 1.000000E+00 1.000000E+00

JUN.NO. INIT. LIQ. VEL. (FT/SEC) INIT. VAP. VEL. (FT/SEC) INTERFACE VEL. (FT/SEC)
 72000000 0.000000E+00 0.000000E+00 0.000000E+00

INPUT DATA FOR COMPONENT 73, C-73 BRANCH , HAVING 1 VOLUMES AND 0 JUNCTIONS

VOL NO. FLOW AREA (FT2) FLOW LENGTH (FT) VOLUME (FT3) HORIZ. ANGLE (DEG) VERT. ANGLE (DEG) ELEV. CHNG. (FT)
 73010000 1.066500E+02 5.629000E+00 6.003328E+02 0.000000E+00 9.000000E+01 5.629000E+00

VOL NO. ROUGHNESS (FT) HYDRAULIC DIAM. (FT) VOLUME FLAGS INIT. COND. FLAG I.C. VALUE 1 I.C. VALUE 2 I.C. VALUE 3 I.C. VALUE 4
 73010000 1.500000E-04 1.165294E+01 0 3 1.470000E+01 1.200000E+02 0.000000E+00 1.500000E-

INPUT DATA FOR COMPONENT 74, C-73-75 SNGLJUN , HAVING 0 VOLUMES AND 1 JUNCTIONS

JUN.NO. FROM VOL. TO VOL. JUNCTION AREA (FT2) FORWARD LOSS COEFFICIENT REVERSE LOSS COEFFICIENT JUNCTION FLAGS SUBCOOLED DISCHARGE COEF. TWO-PHASE DISCHARGE COEF.
 74000000 73010000 75000000 1.066000E+02 0.000000E+00 0.000000E+00 1000 1.000000E+00 1.000000E+00

JUN.NO. INIT. LIQ. VEL. (FT/SEC) INIT. VAP. VEL. (FT/SEC) INTERFACE VEL. (FT/SEC)
 74000000 0.000000E+00 0.000000E+00 0.000000E+00

INPUT DATA FOR COMPONENT 75, C-75 SNGLVOL , HAVING 1 VOLUMES AND 0 JUNCTIONS

VOL NO. FLOW AREA (FT2) FLOW LENGTH (FT) VOLUME (FT3) HORIZ. ANGLE (DEG) VERT. ANGLE (DEG) ELEV. CHNG. (FT)
 75010000 1.066000E+02 1.876000E+00 1.999816E+02 0.000000E+00 9.000000E+01 1.876000E+00

VOL NO. ROUGHNESS (FT) HYDRAULIC DIAM. (FT) VOLUME FLAGS INIT. COND. FLAG I.C. VALUE 1 I.C. VALUE 2 I.C. VALUE 3 I.C. VALUE 4
 75010000 4.572000E-05 3.550983E+00 0 4 1.470000E+01 1.200000E+02 9.480000E-01 0.000000E+0

INPUT DATA FOR COMPONENT 76, C-76 PIPE , HAVING 4 VOLUMES AND 3 JUNCTIONS

VOL NO. FLOW AREA (FT2) FLOW LENGTH (FT) VOLUME (FT3) HORIZ. ANGLE (DEG) VERT. ANGLE (DEG) ELEV. CHNG. (FT)
 76010000 2.010000E-01 5.000000E-01 1.005000E-01 0.000000E+00 0.000000E+00 0.000000E+00
 76020000 2.010000E-01 5.000000E-01 1.005000E-01 0.000000E+00 0.000000E+00 0.000000E+00
 76030000 2.010000E-01 5.000000E-01 1.005000E-01 0.000000E+00 0.000000E+00 0.000000E+00
 76040000 2.010000E-01 5.000000E-01 1.005000E-01 0.000000E+00 0.000000E+00 0.000000E+00

INPUT DATA FOR COMPONENT 74, C-74-75 SNGLVOL , HAVING 0 VOLUMES AND 1 JUNCTIONS

JUN.NO.	FROM VOL.	TO VOL.	JUNCTION AREA (FT2)	FORWARD LOSS COEFFICIENT	REVERSE LOSS COEFFICIENT	JUNCTION FLAGS	SUBCOOLED DISCHARGE COEF.	TWO-PHASE DISCHARGE COEF.
74000000	73010000	75000000	1.066000E+02	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	1000	1.000000E+00	1.000000E+00

JUN.NO.	INIT. LIQ. VEL. (FT/SEC)	INIT. VAP. VEL. (FT/SEC)	INTERFACE VEL. (FT/SEC)
74000000	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00

INPUT DATA FOR COMPONENT 75, C-75 SNGLVOL , HAVING 1 VOLUMES AND 0 JUNCTIONS

VOL NO.	FLOW AREA (FT2)	FLOW LENGTH (FT)	VOLUME (FT3)	HORIZ. ANGLE (DEG)	VERT. ANGLE (DEG)	ELEV. CHNG. (FT)
75010000	1.066000E+02	1.876000E+00	1.999816E+02	0.000000E+00	9.000000E+01	1.876000E+00

VOL NO.	ROUGHNESS (FT)	HYDRAULIC DIAM. (FT)	VOLUME FLAGS	INIT. COND. FLAG	I.C.VALUE 1	I.C.VALUE 2	I.C.VALUE 3	I.C.VALUE 4
75010000	4.572000E-05	3.550983E+00	0	4	1.470000E+01	1.200000E+02	9.480000E-01	0.000000E+00

INPUT DATA FOR COMPONENT 76, C-76 PIPE , HAVING 4 VOLUMES AND 3 JUNCTIONS

VOL NO.	FLOW AREA (FT2)	FLOW LENGTH (FT)	VOLUME (FT3)	HORIZ. ANGLE (DEG)	VERT. ANGLE (DEG)	ELEV. CHNG. (FT)
76010000	2.010000E-01	5.000000E-01	1.005000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
76020000	2.010000E-01	5.000000E-01	1.005000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
76030000	2.010000E-01	5.000000E-01	1.005000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
76040000	2.010000E-01	5.000000E-01	1.005000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00

VOL NO.	ROUGHNESS (FT)	HYDRAULIC DIAM. (FT)	VOLUME FLAGS	INIT. COND. FLAG	I.C.VALUE 1	I.C.VALUE 2	I.C.VALUE 3	I.C.VALUE 4
76010000	1.500000E-04	5.058865E-01	10	2	1.470000E+01	1.000000E-02	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
76020000	1.500000E-04	5.058865E-01	10	2	1.470000E+01	1.000000E-02	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
76030000	1.500000E-04	5.058865E-01	10	3	1.470000E+01	2.042000E+02	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
76040000	1.500000E-04	5.058865E-01	0	3	1.470000E+01	2.042000E+02	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00

JUN.NO.	JUNCTION AREA (FT2)	FORWARD LOSS COEFFICIENT	REVERSE LOSS COEFFICIENT	JUNCTION FLAGS	INIT. LIQ. VEL. (FT/SEC)	INIT. VAP. VEL. (FT/SEC)	INTERFACE VEL. (FT/SEC)
76010000	2.010000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	1000	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
76020000	2.010000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	1000	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00
76030000	2.010000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	1000	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00

INPUT DATA FOR COMPONENT 77, C-76-044 SNGLJUN , HAVING 0 VOLUMES AND 1 JUNCTIONS

JUN.NO.	FROM VOL.	TO VOL.	JUNCTION AREA (FT2)	FORWARD LOSS COEFFICIENT	REVERSE LOSS COEFFICIENT	JUNCTION FLAGS	SUBCOOLED DISCHARGE COEF.	TWO-PHASE DISCHARGE COEF.
77000000	76010000	44000000	2.010000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	100	1.000000E+00	1.000000E+00

JUN.NO.	INIT. LIQ. VEL. (FT/SEC)	INIT. VAP. VEL. (FT/SEC)	INTERFACE VEL. (FT/SEC)
77000000	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00

INPUT DATA FOR COMPONENT 78, C178-76 VALVE , HAVING 0 VOLUMES AND 1 JUNCTIONS

JUN.NO.	FROM VOL.	TO VOL.	JUNCTION AREA (FT2)	FORWARD LOSS COEFFICIENT	REVERSE LOSS COEFFICIENT	JUNCTION FLAGS	SUBCOOLED DISCHARGE COEF.	TWO-PHASE DISCHARGE COEF.
78000000	178010000	76000000	1.700000E-02	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	100	1.000000E+00	1.000000E+00

JUN.NO.	INIT. LIQ. VEL. (FT/SEC)	INIT. VAP. VEL. (FT/SEC)	INTERFACE VEL. (FT/SEC)
78000000	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00

JUN.NO.	CONTROL NUMBER	TABLE NUMBER
78000000	1	0

INPUT DATA FOR COMPONENT 79, C-79 SNGLVOL , HAVING 1 VOLUMES AND 0 JUNCTIONS

VOL NO.	FLOW AREA (FT2)	FLOW LENGTH (FT)	VOLUME (FT3)	HORIZ. ANGLE (DEG)	VERT. ANGLE (DEG)	ELEV. CHNG. (FT)
79010000	1.470000E-01	8.000000E-01	1.176000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00

VOL NO.	ROUGHNESS (FT)	HYDRAULIC DIAM. (FT)	VOLUME FLAGS	INIT. COND. FLAG	I.C.VALUE 1	I.C.VALUE 2	I.C.VALUE 3	I.C.VALUE 4
79010000	1.500000E-04	4.326271E-01	0	2	2.686000E+03	1.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	

INPUT DATA FOR COMPONENT 80, C-81-79 SNGLJUN , HAVING 0 VOLUMES AND 1 JUNCTIONS

JUN.NO.	FROM VOL.	TO VOL.	JUNCTION AREA (FT2)	FORWARD LOSS COEFFICIENT	REVERSE LOSS COEFFICIENT	JUNCTION FLAGS	SUBCOOLED DISCHARGE COEF.	TWO-PHASE DISCHARGE COEF.
80000000	81010000	79000000	1.470000E-01	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	1000	1.000000E+00	1.000000E+00

JUN.NO.	INIT. LIQ. VEL. (FT/SEC)	INIT. VAP. VEL. (FT/SEC)	INTERFACE VEL. (FT/SEC)
80000000	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00	0.000000E+00

INPUT DATA FOR COMPONENT 81, C-81 SNGLVOL , HAVING 1 VOLUMES AND 0 JUNCTIONS