

ATTACHMENT 2

To

Letter from C. R. Steinhardt (WPSC) to Document Control Desk (NRC)

Dated

May 9, 1991

PROPOSED TS AMENDMENT NO. 101

Technically Affected TS Pages

<u>Existing TS Page No.</u>	<u>Corresponding TS Page No. In Word Perfect Format</u>
TS 3.1-1	TS 3.1-1
TS 3.1-2a	TS 3.1-3
TS 3.1-2c	TS 3.1-11
TS 3.1-2d	TS 3.1-12
TS 3.1-3	TS 3.1-5
TS 3.1-7	TS 3.1-16

NOTE: TS Section 3.1 has been included in its entirety to reflect the typographical corrections and format changes that have been made concurrent with this TS amendment as a result of conversion to the Word Perfect format.

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3.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION

3.1 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

APPLICABILITY

Applies to the Operating status of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS).

OBJECTIVE

To specify those limiting conditions for operation of the Reactor Coolant System which must be met to ensure safe reactor operation.

SPECIFICATIONS

a. Operational Components

1. Reactor Coolant Pumps

- A. At least one reactor coolant pump or one residual heat removal pump shall be in operation when a reduction is made in the boron concentration of the reactor coolant.
- B. When the reactor is in the OPERATING mode, except for low power tests, both reactor coolant pumps shall be in operation.
- C. A reactor coolant pump shall not be started with one or more of the RCS cold leg temperatures $\leq 372^{\circ}\text{F}$ unless the secondary water temperature of each steam generator is $< 100^{\circ}\text{F}$ above each of the RCS cold leg temperatures.

2. Decay Heat Removal Capability

- A. At least TWO of the following FOUR heat sinks shall be operable whenever the average reactor coolant temperature is $\geq 350^{\circ}\text{F}$ but $> 200^{\circ}\text{F}$.
 - 1. Steam Generator 1A
 - 2. Steam Generator 1B
 - 3. Residual Heat Removal Train A
 - 4. Residual Heat Removal Train B

If less than the above number of required heat sinks are operable, corrective action shall be taken immediately to restore the minimum number to the operable status.

B. TWO residual heat removal trains shall be operable whenever the average reactor coolant temperature is $\leq 200^{\circ}\text{F}$ and irradiated fuel is in the reactor, except when in the REFUELING mode one train may be inoperable for maintenance.

1. Each residual heat removal train shall be comprised of:

- a) ONE operable residual heat removal pump
- b) ONE operable residual heat removal heat exchanger
- c) An operable flow path consisting of all valves and piping associated with the above train of components and required to remove decay heat from the core during normal shutdown situations. This flow path shall be capable of taking suction from the appropriate Reactor Coolant System hot leg and returning to the Reactor Coolant System.

2. If one residual heat removal train is inoperable, corrective action shall be taken immediately to return it to the operable status.

3. Pressurizer Safety Valves

A. At least one pressurizer safety valve shall be operable whenever the reactor head is on the reactor pressure vessel, except for a hydro test of the RCS the pressurizer safety valves may be blanked provided the power operated relief valves and the safety valve on the discharge of the charging pump are set for test pressure plus 35 psi to protect the system.

B. Both pressurizer safety valves shall be operable whenever the reactor is critical.

4. Pressure Isolation Valves

A. All pressure isolation valves listed in Table TS 3.1-2 shall be functional as a pressure isolation device during OPERATING and HOT STANDBY modes, except as specified in 3.1.a.4.B. Valve leakage shall not exceed the amounts indicated.

- B. In the event that integrity of any pressure isolation valve as specified in Table TS 3.1-2 cannot be demonstrated, reactor operation may continue, provided that at least two valves in each high pressure line having a non-functional valve are in, and remain in, the mode corresponding to the isolated condition. ⁽¹⁾
- C. If TS 3.1.a.4.A and TS 3.1.a.4.B cannot be met, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor shall be in the HOT SHUTDOWN condition within the next 4 hours, the INTERMEDIATE SHUTDOWN condition in the next 6 hours and the COLD SHUTDOWN condition within the next 24 hours.
5. Pressurizer Power-Operated Relief Valves (PORV) and PORV Block Valves
- A. Two PORVs and their associated block valves shall be operable during HOT STANDBY and OPERATING modes.
1. With one or both PORVs inoperable because of excessive seat leakage, within 1 hour either restore the PORV(s) to OPERABLE status or close the associated block valve(s) with power maintained to the block valve(s); otherwise, action shall be initiated to:
 - Achieve HOT STANDBY within 6 hours
 - Achieve HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours
 2. With one PORV inoperable due to causes other than excessive seat leakage, within 1 hour either restore the PORV to OPERABLE status or close its associated block valve and remove power from the block valve; restore the PORV to OPERABLE status within the following 72 hours or action shall be initiated to:
 - Achieve HOT STANDBY within 6 hours
 - Achieve HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours
 3. With both PORVs inoperable due to causes other than excessive seat leakage, within 1 hour either restore at least one PORV to OPERABLE status or close its associated block valve and remove power from the block valve and
 - Achieve HOT STANDBY within 6 hours
 - Achieve HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours

⁽¹⁾ Manual valves shall be locked in the closed position; motor operated valves shall be placed in the closed position with their power breakers locked out.

4. With one or both block valves inoperable, within 1 hour restore the block valve(s) to OPERABLE status or place its associated PORV(s) in manual control. Restore at least one block valve to OPERABLE status within the next hour if both block valves are inoperable; restore any remaining inoperable block valve to OPERABLE status within 72 hours; otherwise action shall be initiated to:

- Achieve HOT STANDBY within 6 hours

- Achieve HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours

6. Pressurizer Heaters

A. At least one group of pressurizer heaters shall have an emergency power supply available when the average RCS temperature is $\geq 350^{\circ}\text{F}$.

7. Reactor Coolant Vent System

A. A reactor coolant vent path from both the reactor vessel head and pressurizer steam space shall be operable and closed prior to the average RCS temperature being heated $\geq 200^{\circ}\text{F}$ except as specified in TS 3.1.a.7.B and TS 3.1.a.7.C below.

B. When the average RCS temperature is $\geq 200^{\circ}\text{F}$, any one of the following conditions of inoperability may exist:

1. Both of the parallel vent valves in the reactor vessel vent path are inoperable.
2. Both of the parallel vent valves in the pressurizer vent path are inoperable.

If operability is not restored within 30 days, then within one hour action shall be initiated to:

- Achieve HOT STANDBY within 6 hours

- Achieve HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours

- Achieve COLD SHUTDOWN within an additional 36 hours

C. If no Reactor Coolant System vent paths are operable, restore at least one vent path to operable status within 72 hours. If operability is not restored within 72 hours, then within 1 hour action shall be initiated to:

- Achieve HOT STANDBY within 6 hours

- Achieve HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours

- Achieve COLD SHUTDOWN within an additional 36 hours

b. Heatup and Cooldown Limit Curves for Normal Operation

1. The reactor coolant temperature and pressure and system heatup and cooldown rates (with the exception of the pressurizer) shall be limited in accordance with Figures TS 3.1-1 and TS 3.1-2 for the service period up to 15 equivalent full-power years.
 - A. Allowable combinations of pressure and temperature for specific temperature change rates are below and to the right of the limit lines shown. Limit lines for cooldown rates between those presented may be obtained by interpolation.
 - B. Figures TS 3.1-1 and TS 3.1-2 define limits to assure prevention of non-ductile failure only. For normal operation other inherent plant characteristics, e.g., pump heat addition and pressurizer heater capacity may limit the heatup and cooldown rates that can be achieved over certain pressure-temperature ranges.
2. The secondary side of the steam generator must not be pressurized > 200 psig if the temperature of the steam generator is $\leq 70^\circ\text{F}$.
3. The pressurizer cooldown and heatup rates shall not exceed 200°F/hr and 100°F/hr , respectively. The spray shall not be used if the temperature difference between the pressurizer and the spray fluid is $> 320^\circ\text{F}$.
4. The Overpressure Protection System for low temperature operation shall be operable whenever the RCS average temperature is $\leq 372^\circ\text{F}$, and the reactor vessel head is installed. The system shall be considered operable when at least one of the following conditions is satisfied:
 - A. The overpressure relief valve on the Residual Heat Removal System (RHR 33-1) shall have a lift setting of ≤ 505 psig and shall be aligned to the RCS by maintaining valves RHR 1A, 1B, 2A and 2B open. If any of these valves are closed, the valves in the other parallel flow path shall be opened, and the associated motor breakers for the valves in the open flow path shall be locked in the off position.
 - B. A vent pathway shall be provided with an effective flow cross section ≥ 6.4 in².
 1. When low temperature overpressure protection (LTOP) is provided via a vent pathway, the vent pathway shall be verified at least once per 31 days when the pathway is provided by a valve(s) that is locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the open position. If the vent path is provided by any other means, verify the vent pathway every 12 hours.

c. Maximum Coolant Activity

The total specific activity of the reactor coolant due to nuclides with half-lives of more than 30 minutes, excluding tritium, shall not exceed

$$A = \frac{91}{\bar{E}} \quad \frac{\mu Ci}{CC}$$

whenever the reactor is critical or the average temperature is $\geq 500^{\circ}F$ (\bar{E} is the average sum of the beta and gamma energies in Mev per disintegration).

d. Leakage of Reactor Coolant

1. Any Reactor Coolant System leakage indication in excess of 1 gpm shall be the subject of an investigation and evaluation initiated within 4 hours of the indication. Any indicated leak shall be considered to be a real leak until it is determined that no unsafe condition exists. If the Reactor Coolant System leakage exceeds 1 gpm and the source of leakage is not identified within 12 hours, the reactor shall be placed in the HOT SHUTDOWN condition utilizing normal operating procedures. If the source of leakage exceeds 1 gpm and is not identified within 48 hours, the reactor shall be placed in the COLD SHUTDOWN condition utilizing normal operating procedures.
2. Reactor coolant-to-secondary leakage through the steam generator tubes shall be limited to 500 gallons per day through any one steam generator. With tube leakage greater than the above limit, reduce the leakage rate within 4 hours or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 36 hours.
3. If the sources of leakage other than that in 3.1.d.2 have been identified and it is evaluated that continued operation is safe, operation of the reactor with a total Reactor Coolant System leakage rate not exceeding 10 gpm shall be permitted. If leakage exceeds 10 gpm, the reactor shall be placed in the HOT SHUTDOWN condition within 12 hours utilizing normal operating procedures. If the leakage exceeds 10 gpm for 24 hours, the reactor shall be placed in the COLD SHUTDOWN condition utilizing normal operating procedures.
4. If any reactor coolant leakage exists through a non-isolable fault in a Reactor Coolant System component (exterior wall of the reactor vessel, piping, valve body, relief valve leaks, pressurizer, steam generator head, or pump seal leakoff), the reactor shall be shut down; and cooldown to the COLD SHUTDOWN condition shall be initiated within 24 hours of detection.
5. When the reactor is critical and above 2% power, two reactor coolant leak detection systems of different operating principles shall be in operation with one of the two systems sensitive to radioactivity. Either system may be out of operation for up to 12 hours provided at least one system is operable.

e. Maximum Reactor Coolant Oxygen, Chloride and Fluoride Concentration

1. Concentrations of contaminants in the reactor coolant shall not exceed the following limits when the reactor coolant temperature is $\geq 250^{\circ}\text{F}$.

CONTAMINANT	NORMAL STEADY-STATE OPERATION (ppm)	TRANSIENT LIMITS (ppm)
A. Oxygen	0.10	1.00
B. Chloride	0.15	1.50
C. Fluoride	0.15	1.50

2. If any of the normal steady-state operating limits as specified in TS 3.1.e.1 above are exceeded, or if it is anticipated that they may be exceeded, corrective action shall be taken immediately.
3. If the concentrations of any of the contaminants cannot be controlled within the transient limits of TS 3.1.e.1 above or returned to the normal steady-state limit within 24 hours, the reactor shall be brought to the COLD SHUTDOWN condition, utilizing normal operating procedures, and the cause shall be ascertained and corrected. The reactor may be restarted and operation resumed if the maximum concentration of any of the contaminants did not exceed the permitted transient values; otherwise a safety review by the Plant Operations Review Committee shall be made before starting.
4. Concentrations of contaminants in the reactor coolant shall not exceed the following maximum limits when the reactor coolant temperature is $\leq 250^{\circ}\text{F}$.

CONTAMINANT	NORMAL CONCENTRATION (ppm)	TRANSIENT LIMITS (ppm)
A. Oxygen	Saturated	Saturated
B. Chloride	0.15	1.50
C. Fluoride	0.15	1.50

5. If the transient limits of TS 3.1.e.4 are exceeded or the concentrations cannot be returned to normal values within 48 hours, the reactor shall be brought to the COLD SHUTDOWN condition and the cause shall be ascertained and corrected.

6. To meet TS 3.1.e.1 and TS 3.1.e.4 above, reactor coolant pump operation shall be permitted for short periods, in accordance with TS 3.1.a.1.c, and provided the coolant temperature does not exceed 250°F.

f. Minimum Conditions for Criticality

1. Except during low-power physics tests, the reactor shall not be made critical unless the moderator temperature coefficient is negative.
2. The reactor shall not be brought to a critical condition until the pressure-temperature state is to the right of the criticality limit line shown in Figure TS 3.1-1.
3. Except during low-power physics tests, when the reactor coolant temperature is in a range where the moderator temperature coefficient is positive, the reactor shall be subcritical by an amount equal to or greater than the potential reactivity insertion due to depressurization.
4. The reactor shall be maintained subcritical by at least 1% $\Delta k/k$ until normal water level is established in the pressurizer.

BASES - Operational Components (TS 3.1.a)

Reactor Coolant Pumps (TS 3.1.a.1)

When the boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System is to be reduced, the process must be uniform to prevent sudden reactivity changes in the reactor. Mixing of the reactor coolant will be sufficient to maintain a uniform boron concentration if at least one reactor coolant pump or one residual heat removal pump is running while the change is taking place. The residual heat removal pump will circulate the equivalent of the primary system volume in approximately one-half hour.

Part 1 of the specification requires that both reactor coolant pumps be operating when the reactor is in power operation to provide core cooling. Planned power operation with one loop out of service is not allowed in the present design because the system does not meet the single failure (locked rotor) criteria requirement for this mode of operation. The flow provided in each case in Part 1 will keep DNBR well above 1.30. Therefore, cladding damage and release of fission products to the reactor coolant will not occur. One pump operation is not permitted except for tests. Upon loss of one pump below 10% full power, the core power shall be reduced to a level below the maximum power determined for zero power testing. Natural circulation can remove decay heat up to 10% power. Above 10% power, an automatic reactor trip will occur if flow from either pump is lost.⁽²⁾

The restriction on starting a reactor coolant pump (RXCP) when one or more RCS cold leg temperatures is $\leq 372^{\circ}\text{F}$ is provided to prevent a RCS pressure transient, caused by an energy addition from the secondary system, which could exceed the design basis of the low temperature overpressure protection (LTOP) system. The RCS will be protected against exceeding the design basis of the LTOP system by restricting the starting of a RXCP to when the secondary water temperature of each SG is $< 100^{\circ}\text{F}$ above each RCS cold leg temperature.

Decay Heat Removal Capabilities (TS 3.1.a.2)

When the average reactor coolant temperature is $\leq 350^{\circ}\text{F}$ a combination of the available heat sinks is sufficient to remove the decay heat and provide the necessary redundancy to meet the single failure criterion.

When the average reactor coolant temperature is $\leq 200^{\circ}\text{F}$, the plant is in a **COLD SHUTDOWN** condition and there is a negligible amount of sensible heat energy stored in the Reactor Coolant System. Should one residual heat removal train become inoperable under these conditions, the remaining train is capable of removing all of the decay heat being generated.

⁽²⁾ USAR Section 7.2.2

Pressurizer Safety Valves (TS 3.1.a.3)

Each of the pressurizer safety valves is designed to relieve 325,000 lbs. per hour of saturated steam at its setpoint. Below 350°F and 350 psig, the Residual Heat Removal System can remove decay heat and thereby control system temperature and pressure. If no residual heat were removed by any of the means available, the amount of steam which could be generated at safety valve relief pressure would be less than half the valves' capacity. One valve therefore provides adequate protection against overpressurization.

Pressure Isolation Valves (TS 3.1.a.4)

The Basis for the Pressure Isolation Valves is discussed in the Reactor Safety Study (RSS), WASH-1400, and identifies an intersystem loss-of-coolant accident in a PWR which is a significant contributor to risk from core melt accidents (EVENT V). The design examined in the RSS contained two in-series check valves isolating the high pressure Primary Coolant System from the Low Pressure Injection System (LPIS) piping. The scenario which leads to the EVENT V accident is initiated by the failure of these check valves to function as a pressure isolation barrier. This causes an overpressurization and rupture of the LPIS low pressure piping which results in a LOCA that bypasses containment.⁽³⁾

PORVs and PORV Block Valves (TS 3.1.a.5)

The pressurizer power-operated relief valves (PORVs) operate as part of the pressurizer pressure control system. They are intended to relieve RCS pressure below the setting of the code safety valves. These relief valves have remotely operated block valves to provide a positive shutoff capability should a PORV become inoperable. The pressurizer PORVs and associated block valves must be operable to provide an alternate means of mitigating a design basis steam generator tube rupture. Thus, an inoperable PORV (for reasons other than seat leakage) or block valve is not permitted in the HOT STANDBY and OPERATING modes for periods of more than 72 hours.

Pressurizer Heaters (TS 3.1.a.6)

Pressurizer heaters are vital elements in the operation of the pressurizer which is necessary to maintain system pressure. Loss of energy to the heaters would result in the inability to maintain system pressure via heat addition to the pressurizer. Hot functional tests⁽⁴⁾ have indicated that one group of heaters is required to overcome ambient heat losses. Placing heaters necessary to overcome ambient heat losses on emergency power will assure the ability to maintain pressurizer pressure. Annual surveillance tests are performed to ensure heater operability.

⁽³⁾ Order for Modification of License dated 4/20/81

⁽⁴⁾ Hot functional test (PT-RC-31)

Reactor Coolant Vent System (TS 3.1.a.7)

The function of the high point vent system is to vent noncondensable gases from the high points of the RCS to assure that core cooling during natural circulation will not be inhibited. The operability of at least one vent path from both the reactor vessel head and pressurizer steam space ensures the capability exists to perform this function.

The vent path from the reactor vessel head and the vent path from the pressurizer each contain two independently emergency powered, energize to open, valves in parallel and connect to a common header that discharges either to the containment atmosphere or to the pressurizer relief tank. The lines to the containment atmosphere and pressurizer relief tank each contain an independently emergency powered, energize to open, isolation valve. This redundancy provides protection from the failure of a single vent path valve rendering an entire vent path inoperable.

A flow restriction orifice in each vent path limits the flow from an inadvertent actuation of the vent system to less than the flow capacity of one charging pump. (5)

Heatup and Cooldown Limit Curves for Normal Operation (TS 3.1.b)

Fracture Toughness Properties - (TS 3.1.b.1)

The fracture toughness properties of the ferritic material in the reactor coolant pressure boundary are determined in accordance with the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (6), and the calculation methods of Footnote (7). The postirradiation fracture toughness properties of the reactor vessel belt line material were obtained directly from the Kewaunee Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Program.

(5) Letter from E. R. Mathews to S. A. Varga dated 5/21/82

(6) ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, "Nuclear Power Plant Components" Section III, Summer 1984 Addenda, Non-Mandatory Appendix G - "Protection Against Non-ductile Failure."

(7) Standard Method for Measuring Thermal Neutron Flux by Radioactivation Techniques, ASTM designation E262-70, 1975 Book of ASTM Standards, Part 45, pp. 756-763.

Allowable pressure-temperature relationships for various heatup and cooldown rates are calculated using methods derived from Nonmandatory Appendix G in Section III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, and are discussed in detail in Footnote⁽⁸⁾.

The method specifies that the allowable total stress intensity factor (K_I) at any time during heatup or cooldown cannot be greater than that shown on the K_{IR} curve for the metal temperature at that time. Furthermore, the approach applies an explicit safety factor of 2.0 on the stress intensity factor induced by the pressure gradient. Thus, the governing equation for the heatup-cooldown analysis is:

$$2 K_{Im} + K_{It} \leq K_{IR} \quad (3.1b-1)$$

where

K_{Im} is the stress intensity factor caused by membrane (pressure) stress

K_{It} is the stress intensity factor caused by the thermal gradients

K_{IR} is provided by the Code as a function of temperature relative to the RT_{NOT} of the material.

From equation (3.1b-1) the variables that affect the heatup and cooldown analysis can be readily identified. K_{Im} is the stress intensity factor due to membrane (pressure) stress. K_{It} is the thermal (bending) stress intensity factor and accounts for the linearly varying stress in the vessel wall due to thermal gradients. During heatup K_{It} is negative on the inside and positive on the outer surface of the vessel wall. The signs are reversed for cooldown and, therefore, an ID or an OD one quarter thickness surface flaw is postulated in whichever location is more limiting. K_{IR} is dependent on irradiation and temperature and, therefore, the fluence profile through the reactor vessel wall and the rates of heatup and cooldown are important. Details of the procedure used to account for these variables is explained in the following text.

⁽⁸⁾p. K. Nair and E. B. Norris, "Pressure/Temperature Operating Curves and Assessment of RT_{PTS} Concerns for Kewaunee Nuclear Plant," SWRI Project 06-8919, April, 1986.

Following the generation of pressure-temperature curves for both the steady-state (zero rate of change of temperature) and finite heatup rate situations, the final limit curves are produced in the following fashion. First, a composite curve is constructed based on a point-by-point comparison of the steady-state and finite heatup rate data. At any given temperature, the allowable pressure is taken to be the lesser of the two values taken from the curves under consideration. The composite curve is then adjusted to allow for possible errors in the pressure and temperature sensing instruments.

The use of the composite curve is mandatory in setting heatup limitations because it is possible for conditions to exist such that over the course of the heatup ramp the controlling analysis switches from the OD to the ID location. The pressure limit must, at all times, be based on the most conservative case.

The cooldown analysis proceeds in the same fashion as that for heatup with the exception that the controlling location is always at the ID. The thermal gradients induced during cooldown tend to produce tensile stresses at the ID location and compressive stresses at the OD position. Thus, the ID flaw is clearly the worst case.

As in the case of heatup, allowable pressure-temperature relations are generated for both steady-state and finite cooldown rate situations. Composite limit curves are then constructed for each cooldown rate of interest. Again adjustments are made to account for pressure and temperature instrumentation error.

The use of the composite curve in the cooldown analysis is necessary because system control is based on a measurement of reactor coolant temperature, whereas the limiting pressure is calculated using the material temperature at the tip of the assumed reference flaw. During cooldown, the 1/4T vessel location is at a higher temperature than the fluid adjacent to the vessel ID. This condition, of course, is not true for the steady-state situation. It follows that the ΔT induced during cooldown results in a calculated higher K_{IR} for finite cooldown rates than for steady-state under certain conditions.

Limit curves for normal heatup and cooldown of the primary Reactor Coolant System have been calculated using the methods discussed above. The derivation of the limit curves is consistent with NRC Regulatory Standard Review Plan Directorate of Licensing, Section 5.3.2, "Pressure-Temperature Limits" 1974 and Footnote⁽⁹⁾.

⁽⁹⁾ ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, "Nuclear Power Plant Components" Section III, Summer 1984 Addenda, Non-Mandatory Appendix G - "Protection Against Non-ductile Failure."

Transition temperature shifts occurring in the pressure vessel materials due to radiation exposure have been obtained directly from the reactor pressure vessel surveillance program. As presented in WCAP 9878⁽¹⁰⁾, weld metal Charpy test specimens from Capsule R indicate that the core region weld metal exhibits the largest shift in RT_{NDT} (235°F).

The results of Irradiation Capsules V and R analyses are presented in WCAP 8908⁽¹¹⁾ and WCAP 9878, respectively. Heatup and cooldown limit curves for normal operation of the reactor vessel are presented in Figures TS 3.1-1 and TS 3.1-2⁽¹²⁾ and represent an operational time period of 15 effective full-power years.

Pressurizer Limits - (TS 3.1.b.3)

Although the pressurizer operates at temperature ranges above those for which there is reason for concern about brittle fracture, operating limits are provided to assure compatibility of operation with the fatigue analysis performed in accordance with Code requirements. In-plant testing and calculations have shown that a pressurizer heatup rate of 100°F/hr cannot be achieved with the installed equipment.

Low Temperature Overpressure Protection - (TS 3.1.b.4)

At RCS bulk temperatures $\leq 372^\circ\text{F}$, the pressurizer safety valves are not able to prevent an overpressure event from exceeding the limits of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix G, Reactor Coolant System Temperature and Pressure Curves. Therefore, the LTOP system must be operable when the head is on the reactor vessel and the RCS bulk temperature is $\leq 372^\circ\text{F}$ (low temperature).⁽¹³⁾ The LTOP system is considered operable when all 4 valves on the RHR suction piping (valves RHR-1A, 1B, 2A, 2B) are open and valve RHR-33-1, the LTOP valve, is able to relieve RCS overpressure events without violating the 10 CFR 50, Appendix G, 0°F/hr cooldown curve. If one train of RHR suction is isolated, the system can still be considered operable if the valves and valve breakers in the other train are open and tagged open. If both trains

⁽¹⁰⁾ S. E. Yanichko, et al, "Analysis of Capsule R from the Wisconsin Public Service Corporation Kewaunee Nuclear Plant Reactor Vessel Radiation Surveillance Program," WCAP 9878, March, 1981.

⁽¹¹⁾ S. E. Yanichko, S. L. Anderson, and K. V. Scott, "Analysis of Capsule V from the Wisconsin Public Service Corporation Kewaunee Nuclear Plant Reactor Vessel Radiation Surveillance Program," WCAP 8908, January 1977.

⁽¹²⁾ Letter from P. S. VanTesslaer (Westinghouse) to C. W. Giesler (WPSC) dated April 30, 1981, transmitting KNPP heatup and cooldown curves based on Capsule R results.

⁽¹³⁾ USAR Section 9.3.3

of RHR suction are isolated or valve RHR-33-1 is inoperable, the system can still be considered operable if an alternate vent path is provided which has the same or greater effective flow cross section as the LTOP safety valve (≥ 6.4 sq. inches).

Maximum Coolant Activity (TS 3.1.c)

This specification is based on the evaluation of the consequences of a postulated rupture of a steam generator tube when the maximum activity in the reactor coolant is at the allowable limit. The potential release of activity to the atmosphere has been evaluated to insure that the public is protected.

Rupture of a steam generator tube would allow reactor coolant activity to enter the secondary system. The major portion of this activity is noble gases⁽¹⁴⁾ which would be released to the atmosphere from the air ejector or a relief valve. Activity could continue to be released until the operator could reduce the Reactor Coolant System pressure below the setpoint of the secondary relief valves and could isolate the faulty steam generator. The worst credible set of circumstances is considered to be a double-ended break of a single tube, followed by isolation of the faulty steam generator by the operator within one-half hour after the event. During this period, 120,000 lbs. of reactor coolant are discharged into the steam generator.⁽¹³⁾

The limiting off-site dose is the whole-body dose resulting from immersion in the cloud containing the released activity. Radiation would include both gamma and beta radiation. The gamma dose is dependent on the finite size and configuration of the cloud. However, for purposes of analysis, the simple model of a semi-infinite cloud, which gives an upper limit to the potential gamma dose, has been used. The semi-infinite cloud model is applicable to the beta dose because of the short range of beta radiation in air. The effectiveness of clothing as shielding against beta radiation is neglected and therefore the analysis model also gives an upper limit to the potential beta dose.

⁽¹⁴⁾USAR Section 14.2.4

The combined gamma and beta dose from a semi-infinite cloud is given by:

$$\text{Dose, rem} = 1/2 [\bar{E} \cdot A \cdot V \cdot \frac{X}{Q} \cdot (3.7 \times 10^{10}) (1.33 \times 10^{-11})]$$

Where: \bar{E} = average energy of betas and gammas per disintegration (Mev/dis)

A = primary coolant activity (Ci/m³)

$\bar{E}A$ = 91 Mev Ci/dis m³ (the maximum per this specification)

$\frac{X}{Q}$ = 2.9×10^{-4} sec/m³, the 0-2 hr dispersion coefficient at the site boundary prescribed by the Commission

V = 77 m³, which corresponds to a reactor coolant liquid mass of 120,000 lbs.

The resultant dose is < 0.5 rem at the site boundary.

Leakage of Reactor Coolant (TS 3.1.d)⁽¹⁵⁾

Leakage from the Reactor Coolant System is collected in the containment or by the other closed systems. These closed systems are: the Steam and Feedwater System, the Waste Disposal System and the Component Cooling System. Assuming the existence of the maximum allowable activity in the reactor coolant, the rate of 1 gpm unidentified leakage would not exceed the limits of 10 CFR Part 20. This is shown as follows:

If the reactor coolant activity is $91\bar{E} \mu$ Ci/cc (\bar{E} = average beta plus gamma energy per disintegration in Mev) and 1 gpm of leakage is assumed to be discharged through the air ejector, or through the Component Cooling System vent line, the yearly whole body dose resulting from this activity at the site boundary, using an annual average $X/Q = 2.0 \times 10^{-6}$ sec/m³, is 0.09 rem/yr, compared with the 10 CFR Part 20 limits of 0.5 rem/yr.

⁽¹⁵⁾ USAR Sections 6.5, 11.2.3, 14.2.4

With the limiting reactor coolant activity and assuming initiation of a 1 gpm leak from the Reactor Coolant System to the Component Cooling System, the radiation monitor in the component cooling pump inlet header would annunciate in the control room and initiate closure of the vent line from the surge tank in the Component Cooling System, within less than one minute. In the case of failure of the closure of the vent line and resulting continuous discharge to the atmosphere via the component cooling surge tank vent, the resultant dose rate at the site boundary would be 0.09 rem/yr as given above.

Leakage directly into the containment indicates the possibility of a breach in the coolant envelope. The limitation of 1 gpm for an unidentified source of leakage is sufficiently above the minimum detectable leak rate to provide a reliable indication of leakage, and is well below the capacity of one charging pump (60 gpm).

Twelve hours of operation before placing the reactor in the **HOT SHUTDOWN** condition are required to provide adequate time for determining whether the leak is into the containment or into one of the closed systems and to identify the leakage source.

When the source of leakage has been identified, the situation can be evaluated to determine if operation can safely continue. This evaluation will be performed by the plant operating staff and will be documented in writing and approved by either the Plant Manager or his designated alternate. Under these conditions, an allowable Reactor Coolant System leak rate of 10 gpm has been established. This explained leak rate of 10 gpm is within the capacity of one charging pump as well as being equal to the capacity of the Steam Generator Blowdown Treatment System.

The provision pertaining to a non-isolable fault in a Reactor Coolant System component is not intended to cover steam generator tube leaks, valve bonnets, packings, instrument fittings, or similar primary system boundaries not indicative of major component exterior wall leakage.

If leakage is to the containment, it may be identified by one or more of the following methods:

- A. The containment air particulate monitor is sensitive to low leak rates. The rates of reactor coolant leakage to which the instrument is sensitive is dependent upon the presence of corrosion product activity.
- B. The containment radiogas monitor is less sensitive and is used as a backup to the air particulate monitor. The sensitivity range of the instrument is approximately 2 gpm to 10 gpm.
- C. Humidity detection provides a backup to A. and B. The sensitivity range of the instrumentation is from approximately 2 gpm to 10 gpm.

D. A leakage detection system is provided which determines leakage losses from all water and steam systems within the containment. This system collects and measures moisture condensed from the containment atmosphere by fancoils of the Containment Air Cooling System and thus provides a dependable and accurate means of measuring integrated total leakage, including leaks from the cooling coils themselves which are part of the containment boundary. The fancoil units drain to the containment sump, and all leakage collected by the containment sump will be pumped to the waste holdup tank. Pump running time will be monitored in the control room to indicate the quantity of leakage accumulated.

If leakage is to another closed system, it will be detected by the area and process radiation monitors and/or inventory control.

Maximum Reactor Coolant Oxygen, Chloride and Fluoride Concentration (TS 3.1.e)

By maintaining the oxygen, chloride and fluoride concentrations in the reactor coolant below the limits as specified in TS 3.1.e.1 and TS 3.1.e.4, the integrity of the Reactor Coolant System is assured under all operating conditions.⁽¹⁶⁾

If these limits are exceeded, measures can be taken to correct the condition, e.g., replacement of ion exchange resin or adjustment of the hydrogen concentration in the volume control tank⁽¹⁷⁾. Because of the time-dependent nature of any adverse effects arising from oxygen, chloride, and fluoride concentration in excess of the limits, it is unnecessary to shut down immediately since the condition can be corrected. Thus, the time periods for corrective action to restore concentrations within the limits have been established. If the corrective action has not been effective at the end of the time period, reactor cooldown will be initiated and corrective action will continue.

The effects of contaminants in the reactor coolant are temperature dependent. The reactor may be restarted and operation resumed if the maximum concentration of any of the contaminants did not exceed the permitted transient values; otherwise a safety review by the Plant Operations Review Committee is required before startup.

Minimum Conditions for Criticality (TS 3.1.f)

During the early part of the initial fuel cycle, the moderator temperature coefficient is calculated to be slightly positive at coolant temperatures below the power operating range. The moderator coefficient at low

⁽¹⁶⁾ USAR Section 4.2

⁽¹⁷⁾ USAR Section 9.2

temperatures will be most positive at the beginning of life of the fuel cycle, when the boron concentration in the coolant is greatest. Later in the fuel cycle, the boron concentrations in the coolant will be lower and the moderator coefficients either will be less positive or will be negative. At all times, the moderator coefficient is negative in the power operating range. (18)(19)

Suitable physics measurements of moderator coefficients of reactivity will be made as part of the startup testing program to verify analytical predictions.

The requirement that the reactor is not to be made critical when the moderator coefficient is positive has been imposed to prevent any unexpected power excursion during normal operation, as a result of either an increase in moderator temperature or a decrease in coolant pressure. This requirement is waived during low power physics tests to permit measurement of reactor moderator coefficient and other physics design parameters of interest. During physics tests, special operating precautions will be taken. In addition, the strong negative Doppler coefficient (20) and the small integrated $\Delta k/k$ would limit the magnitude of a power excursion resulting from a reduction in moderator density.

The requirement that the reactor is not to be made critical except as specified in TS 3.1.f.2 provides increased assurance that the proper relationship between reactor coolant pressure and temperature will be maintained during system heatup and pressurization whenever the reactor vessel is in the nil-ductility temperature range. Heatup to this temperature will be accomplished by operating the reactor coolant pumps and by the pressurizer heaters.

The shutdown margin specified in TS 3.10 precludes the possibility of accidental criticality as a result of an increase in moderator temperature or a decrease in coolant pressure. (21)

The requirement that the pressurizer is partly voided when the reactor is \leq 1% subcritical assures that the Reactor Coolant System will not be solid when criticality is achieved.

[REDACTED]

(18) USAR Table 3.2-1

(19) USAR Figure 3.2-8

(20) USAR Figure 3.2-9

(21) USAR Table 3.2-1