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BOSTON EDISON

Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station
 Rocky Hill Road
 Plymouth, Massachusetts 02360

Ralph G. Bird
 Senior Vice President — Nuclear

BECO 88-126
 August 18, 1988

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
 Document Control Desk
 Washington, DC 20555

License DPR-35
 Docket 50-293

REVISED INFORMATION REGARDING PILGRIM STATION
SAFETY ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM

Dear Sir:

Enclosed is a description of a revised design for the Direct Torus Vent System (DTVS) that was described in the "Report on Pilgrim Station Safety Enhancements" dated July 1, 1987 and transmitted to the NRC with Mr. Bird's letter (BECO 87-111) to Mr. Varga dated July 8, 1987. This revision supersedes in its entirety the Section 3.2 included in the July 1, 1987 report.

On March 7, 1988 Boston Edison Company (BECO) personnel met with Dr. Murley, Mr. Russell, and Dr. Thadani and provided a tour of SEP modifications and an informal presentation of the quantification of competing risks associated with venting the containment and conclusions drawn from these results. This presentation provided BECO the opportunity to respond to questions posed under Item 1 Section 3.2 - "Installation of A Direct Torus Vent System (DTVS)" in Mr. Varga's letter to Mr. Bird of August 21, 1987 "Initial Assessment of Pilgrim Safety Enhancement Program". The material presented was made available to the resident inspector and was included as Attachment II in NRC Inspection Report #88-12, dated May 31, 1988.

As you are aware from plant inspections we have installed the DTVS piping and portions of related control wiring. Currently, the DTVS is isolated from the Standby Gas Treatment System (SBGTS) by blind flanges installed in place of Valve AO-5025 and the DTVS rupture disk. This configuration was inspected by NRR in the performance of a technical review which focused on System, Mechanical Design and Structural Design issues. The review took place on March 2-3, 1988 as documented in NRC Inspection Report #88-07, dated May 6, 1988 and determined the installation configuration to be acceptable. We now plan to remove these blind flanges and proceed with installation of Valve AO-5025 and the DTVS rupture disk. We conclude the valve and rupture disk provide equivalent physical isolation of the DTVS piping from the SBGTS and appropriately ensure the operational integrity of the SBGTS under design basis accident conditions. Following completion of this work, we will perform a local leak rate test to verify that Valve AO-5025 is acceptably leak tight using the same method previously utilized in testing the blind flange. We also plan to complete all remaining electrical work on the DTVS in accordance with the revised design.

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On the basis of the revised Section 3.2, we conclude that the DTVS design as described in the enclosure does not require any change to the Technical Specifications and that we can proceed with installation without prior NRC approval.

Please feel free to contact me or Mr. J. E. Howard, of my staff at (617) 849-8900 if you have any questions pertaining to the design details of the DTVS.


R. G. Bird

Attachment: Section 3.2 Revision 1 "Installation Of A Direct Torus Vent System (DTVS)"

JEH/amm/2282


cc: Mr. D. McDonald, Project Manager
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Senior NRC Resident Inspector
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station

DIRECT TORUS VENT SYSTEM

FIGURE 3.2-1



— EXISTING
 // NEW PIPE