

From: Polickoski, James [James.Polickoski@nrc.gov]
Sent: Wednesday, May 25, 2011 5:21 PM
To: 'Rochelle'
Cc: Wang, Alan; Markley, Michael
Subject: RE: replacement of the Eagle 21 portion of the Diablo Canyon Power Plant process protection system.
Signed By: james.polickoski@nrc.gov

Rochelle,

Thanks for your note and questions.

For reference and as you are aware, PG&E has stated an intention to submit a license amendment request to perform a digital upgrade of the Eagle 21 portion of the Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP) Process Protection System (PPS). This PPS is the system that electronically monitors plant operating parameters and will generate an automatic reactor shutdown and other plant protective signals to place the plant in a safe condition. The NRC staff and the licensee have conducted three phase 0, pre-licensing public meetings to date, with a fourth planned for June 7, 2011. The meeting summary from the last meeting (February 3, 2011), which provides a comprehensive status of the project, can be found at ADAMS Accession No. ML110610589, and the meeting announcement for the upcoming meeting can be found at ML111300230.

In regards to your first question, the digital upgrade of the DCPP Eagle 21 PPS has no relationship to the enhanced security measures following 9/11. The Eagle 21 system upgrade, which is a replacement of the Westinghouse 7100 PPS, was approved by the NRC in October 1993 (ML022350074) and has been in service at other facilities since approximately 1994.

In regards to cyber security measures, the NRC addresses licensee cyber security for plant digital systems, to include the DCPP Eagle 21 PPS system upgrade, via the regulations found in 10 CFR 73.54. This regulation (10 CFR 73.54) requires all licensees to assess all of their digital systems (regardless of when they were installed) to determine susceptibility to a cyber attack, the relationship to safety, security, and emergency preparedness functions, and implement security controls to mitigate possible threat vectors (inside or external).

In regards to your "extreme measures" review question, the NRC staff recently executed the Temporary Instruction (TI) 2525/183, "Followup to the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station Fuel Damage Event." This inspection reviewed a different set of plant

protection systems than the PPS discussed above. Although the word "protection" is used in both discussions, the systems, equipment, and procedures involved are for very different aspects of reactor protection such as security threats and events related to Japan. For reference, the TI 2515/183 report for DCPD can be found at ML11133A310.

Thank you again for your interest.

Jim

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-----Original Message-----

From: Rochelle [mailto:beckers@thegrid.net]
Sent: Monday, May 16, 2011 4:59 PM
To: Polickoski, James; WVM3@pge.com; Wang, Alan
Subject: replacement of the Eagle 21 portion of the Diablo Canyon Power Plant
process protection system.

Dear PGE,NRC

The Alliance for Nuclear Responsibility would like to ask if the "protection system" being replaced was one of the system required or which the NRC agreed provided enhanced security measures post 9/11? If so, was this one of the systems that might have delayed response time in your recent "extreme measures" review?

We have also addressed this to Mr. Manheim at PG&E as he is a numbers guy and may be able to share what this system cost and when ratepayers paid for it.

Thank you

In Peace
Rochelle

In Peace

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