



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III
2443 WARRENVILLE ROAD, SUITE 210
LISLE, IL 60532-4352

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May 26, 2010

Mr. Charles G. Pardee
Senior Vice President, Exelon Generation Company, LLC
President and Chief Nuclear Officer (CNO), Exelon Nuclear
4300 Winfield Road
Warrenville IL 60555

SUBJECT: CLINTON POWER STATION
NRC SECURITY BASELINE INSPECTION REPORT 05000461/2010403(DRS)

Dear Mr. Pardee:

On April 29, 2010, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a security baseline inspection at your Clinton Power Station. The inspection covered one or more of the key attributes of the security cornerstone of the NRC's Reactor Oversight Process. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on April 29, 2010, with Mr. F. A. Kearney and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to security and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspector reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

No findings of significance were identified.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records System (PARS) component of NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> (the Public Electronic Reading Room). However, because of the security-related concerns contained in the enclosure, and in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, a copy of this letter's enclosure will not be available for public inspection.

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A/9

C. Pardee

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Should you have any questions concerning this inspection, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.

Sincerely,

/RA by D. Funk for/

Eric Duncan, Chief
Plant Support Branch
Division of Reactor Safety

Docket Nos. 50-461
License Nos. NPF-62

Nonpublic Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000461/2010403(DRS)
w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

cc w/encl: S. Coker, NSIR/DSO/DDSO/ST
C. Johnson, NSIR
J. Trapp, Region I
M. Ernstes, RII
M. Shannon, RIV
C. Williamson, Clinton Station Security Manager
J. Klinger, State Liaison Officer
Illinois Emergency Management Agency

cc w/o encl: Distribution via ListServ

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Docket No: 05000461

License No: NPF-62

Report No: 05000461/2010403(DRS)

Licensee: Exelon Generation Company, LLC

Facility: Clinton Power Station

Location: Clinton, Illinois

Dates: April 26 through 29, 2010

Inspectors: T. Eck, Physical Security Inspector
D. Funk, Senior Projects Specialist

Approved by: E. Duncan, Chief
Plant Support Branch
Division of Reactor Safety

Enclosure

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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000461/2010403(DRS); 04/26/2010 – 04/29/2010, Clinton Power Station; Routine Security Baseline Inspection.

This report covers a 1 week period of announced routine baseline inspection on security. The inspection was conducted by two Region III physical security inspectors. No findings of significance were identified. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process."

A. Inspector-Identified and Self-Revealed Findings

Cornerstone: Physical Protection

No findings of significance were identified.

B. Licensee-Identified Violations

None.

REPORT DETAILS

3. **SAFEGUARDS**

Cornerstone: Physical Protection (PP)

S05 Protective Strategy Evaluation (71130.05)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated this area by: reviewing procedures and records; conducting interviews with responsible personnel and plant employees; and performing walkdowns of defensive positions, areas of attack, and the Protected Area (PA).

The inspectors verified that the licensee's Protective Strategy Evaluation program: (1) complied with the NRC-approved security plan and other applicable regulatory requirements; and (2) was being effectively implemented and provided high assurance of protecting certain vital equipment and critical personnel assets from the Design Basis Threat (DBT).

The inspectors conducted the following specific inspection activities:

- reviewed and evaluated licensee event reports, safeguards log entries, and corrective action documents between February 2010 and April 2010 (no licensee event reports were documented);
- verified that the licensee's protective strategy: (a) included documentation of the number of armed responders the licensee determined were required to satisfy the design requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(b) and the number of armed security officers the licensee designated to strengthen the onsite response capabilities in security plans; (b) was designed to protect systems and components that were identified as target set equipment against the DBT of radiological sabotage; (c) established response timelines that ensured the response force's ability to interdict and neutralize the threat in accordance with 10 CFR 73.55 and 10 CFR Part 73 Appendix C II and the licensee's Safeguards Contingency Plan; (d) was designed to protect against characteristics, including tactics, of the external attacking force in accordance with the DBT of radiological sabotage; (e) was designed to protect against the weapons described in the DBT of radiological sabotage; (f) was designed to protect against the equipment, tools and incapacitating agents described in the DBT of radiological sabotage; (g) was designed to protect against the land vehicles described in the DBT of radiological sabotage; (h) was designed to protect against the insider threat described in the

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DBT of radiological sabotage; (i) was designed to protect personnel, equipment, and systems necessary to prevent significant core damage and spent fuel sabotage against the effects of a vehicle bomb assault in accordance with the DBT of radiological sabotage; (j) was designed to protect against a waterborne vehicle bomb assault in accordance with the DBT of radiological sabotage; (k) included all security equipment (i.e., access control devices, physical barriers, intrusion detection systems (IDS), surveillance systems, locking devices, weapon systems, etc.) that was identified by the licensee as a component that supported its protective strategy in the maintenance, testing and calibration program and subjected this equipment to periodic checks for integrity and functionality; (l) included notification to law enforcement agencies (local, State, Federal, etc.) in accordance with site procedures; (m) ensured that there was at least one member of the security organization, onsite and available at all times, who had the authority to direct the activities of the security organization and who was assigned no other duties that interfered with this individual's ability to perform these duties in accordance with the physical security plan, safeguards contingency plan and the licensee's protective strategy; (n) was designed to ensure that each alarm station is continuously staffed with at least one trained and qualified alarm station operator who is not assigned other duties and responsibilities that would interfere with the ability to execute the functions described in 10 CFR 73.55(i)(4)(i); (o) ensured both the licensee's plant operations staff and security organization participated in assessing and managing changes to plant configurations, facility conditions, or security before implementing changes such as physical modifications, procedural changes, changes to operator actions or security assignments, maintenance activities, system reconfigurations, access modifications or restrictions and changes to the security plan and its implementation; and (p) established, maintained, and implemented measures for the response to alarms to determine the existence and level of a threat in accordance with pre-established assessment methodologies and procedures;

• verified for components of the protective strategy that the licensee:
(a) implemented continuous surveillance, observation and monitoring activities in the Owner-Controlled Area to detect and deter intruders and ensure the integrity of physical barriers or other components and functions of the onsite physical protection program; (b) implemented measures to restrict waterborne vehicle access to areas as identified by their site specific analysis; (c) implemented periodic surveillance and observation measures (in accordance with its site specific analysis) of waterway approaches and adjacent areas; (d) employed vehicle barrier systems to protect personnel, equipment and systems necessary to prevent significant core damage and spent fuel sabotage against the effects of the DBT of radiological sabotage land vehicle bomb assault; (e) implemented protective measures (i.e., train derailer, removal of a section of track, or restrict access to railroad sidings), for areas where there is rail access to the PA and provided periodic surveillance of these protective measures; (f) ensured that unattended openings that intersect a security boundary (such as underground pathways) were protected by a physical barrier and were monitored

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by intrusion detection equipment or observed by security personnel at a frequency that prevented exploitation; (g) employed physical barriers which provided deterrence, delay or supported access control and supported the effective implementation of the protective strategy; (h) secured and monitored openings in any physical barrier or barrier system to prevent exploitation of the opening; (i) provided periodic surveillance and observation of vehicle barriers and barrier systems adequate to detect indications of tampering and degradation; (j) ensured that the PA perimeter barrier was designed and constructed to limit access into the PA to only those personnel, vehicles and materials required to perform official duties and supported the effective implementation of the protective strategy; (k) had armed security patrols perform periodic checks of all exterior areas within the PA to include physical barriers and Vital Area (VA) portals in accordance with the security plan and implementing procedures; (l) had armed security patrols perform periodic inspections of VAs to include the physical barriers used at all VA portals in accordance with the security plan and implementing procedures; (m) performed random patrols of all accessible areas containing target set equipment in accordance with the security plan and implementing procedures; (n) ensured that a single act, in accordance with the design basis threat of radiological sabotage, could not remove the capabilities of both alarm stations to detect and assess alarms, initiate and coordinate an adequate response to alarms, summon offsite assistance, and provide command and control; (o) maintained the appropriate number of armed responders available at all times inside the PA within the specified predetermined timelines per the licensee's security plan and safeguards contingency plan; (p) ensured that armed responders were not assigned other duties or responsibilities that could interfere with their assigned response duties; (q) ensured appropriate timelines for armed responders; (r) maintained the appropriate number of armed security officers that were designated in the licensee's security plan and safeguards contingency plan to strengthen its onsite response, onsite and available at all times to carry out their assigned response duties as designated in the licensee's security plan, safeguards contingency plan and protective strategy; (s) provided the firearms, ammunition, and equipment necessary to implement the protective strategy to armed responders and armed security officers designated to strengthen the onsite response capabilities and ensured that this equipment was of sufficient supply, was in working condition and was readily available; (t) provided and maintained measures that limit the exposure of security personnel to possible attack, including the incorporation of bullet-resisting protected positions that provide protection against the firearms identified in the DBT of radiological sabotage; (u) provided protection of systems and components that were identified as target set equipment against the DBT of radiological sabotage; and (v) maintained a documented copy of liaison agreements that the licensee established with local law enforcement agencies;

- verified through a protective strategy table top evaluation that the licensee's protective strategy provided a basis of information that demonstrated that the protective strategy was designed to effectively interdict and neutralize the threats up to and including the design basis threat of radiological sabotage as defined in 10 CFR 73.1, to prevent significant core damage and radiological sabotage; and

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- verified that the licensee was conducting security program reviews in accordance with 10 CFR 73.55(m) and that the licensee's protective strategy was included in a review as required by the regulation.

The inspectors reviewed protective strategy evaluation program-related issues during baseline inspection activities to verify that they were being entered into the licensee's corrective action program at an appropriate threshold, that adequate attention was being given to timely corrective actions, and that adverse trends were identified and adequately addressed.

The inspectors completed 42 of the required 42 samples.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4. **OTHER ACTIVITIES**

40A5 Other Activities

Inspection of Recently Amended Security Requirements

The inspectors reviewed the following areas to ensure that the licensee complied with the recently amended Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) program and security regulations.

To verify implementation of the revised requirements the NRC determined that certain elements of the licensee's implementation of these requirements should be inspected prior to March 31, 2011. The following documents inspection activities related to these elements.

1. Access Authorization (71130.01)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated this area by: reviewing program procedures, implementing procedures, and records; and conducting interviews with responsible personnel and plant employees.

The inspectors verified the licensee's access authorization program: (1) complied with the NRC-approved security plan and other regulatory requirements; (2) provided high assurance that personnel granted unescorted access were trustworthy, reliable, and did not constitute an unreasonable risk to public health and safety, or the common defense and security; (3) established a behavioral observation program that provided high assurance of continued reliability and trustworthiness of personnel with unescorted access; and (4) implemented the provisions of the insider mitigation program to effectively mitigate against the active and active violent insider.

The inspector conducted the following specific inspection activities:

- verified for granting unescorted access that the licensee: (e) ensured that a clinical interview by a licensed psychiatrist or psychologist was conducted for individuals who provided indication of disturbances in personality or psychopathology during the psychological assessment that may have implications on trustworthiness and reliability; (f) verified that individuals who were members of the population that performed one or more job functions critical to the safe and secure operation of the licensee's facility, as defined in 10 CFR 73.56(i)(1)(v)(B), were subject to a clinical interview by a licensed psychiatrist or psychologist as part of the psychological assessment; and
- verified for the insider threat and mitigation that the licensee: (c) implemented provisions for conducting psychological reassessments for individuals who performed one or more job functions critical to the safe and secure operation of the licensee's facility as identified in 10 CFR 73.56(i)(1)(v)(B) at intervals not to exceed 5 years.

The inspector reviewed access authorization related issues during baseline inspection activities to verify that they were being entered into the licensee's corrective action system at an appropriate threshold, that adequate attention was being given to timely corrective actions, and that adverse trends were identified and adequately addressed.

The inspector completed 3 of the required 44 sample. The remaining samples will be performed in a future baseline inspection.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

2. Equipment Performance, Testing and Maintenance (71130.04)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated this area by: reviewing procedures and records, conducting interviews with responsible personnel and plant employees, and performing walkdowns of the equipment being tested.

The inspectors verified that the security testing and maintenance program: (1) complied with the NRC-approved security plan and regulatory requirements; and (2) was being effectively implemented to assure the functionality and reliability of all security equipment necessary for intrusion detection and assessment; searches; and a rapid, capable response to a DBT and other contingencies.

The inspector conducted the following specific inspection activities:

- verified through observation of the perimeter intrusion detection system that:
(b) the system detected attempted or actual penetration of the PA perimeter

barrier before completed penetration and was tested in accordance with regulations and the licensee's testing procedures; (e) video assessment assets at the PA perimeter provided a visual display from which assessment could be made and provided real-time and play-back recorded video images of detected activities before and after each alarm annunciation and that these devices were tested in accordance with regulations and the licensee's testing procedures; (k) the intrusion detection and assessment equipment at the PA perimeter remained operable from an uninterruptible power supply and that this function was tested in accordance with regulations and licensee testing procedures;

- verified for alarm stations that: (b) the status of a detection point, locking mechanism or access control device could not be changed without the knowledge and concurrence of an alarm station operator and that this function was tested in accordance with regulations and licensee testing procedures; (g) both the central and secondary alarm stations were constructed, located, protected and equipped to the standards of the central alarm station so that both stations were equal and redundant such that all functions could be performed in both alarm stations; and
- verified for security communication systems that: (e) the licensee identified areas of its site where communication could be interrupted or could not be maintained and established alternative communication measures or otherwise accounted for these areas in implementing procedures.

The inspector reviewed Equipment Performance, Testing and Maintenance-related issues during baseline inspection activities to verify that they were being entered into the licensee's corrective action system at an appropriate threshold, that adequate attention was being given to timely corrective actions, and that adverse trends were identified and adequately addressed.

The inspector completed 6 of the required 53 samples. The remaining samples will be performed in a future baseline inspection.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

3. Security Training (71130.07)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated this area by: reviewing program procedures, implementing procedures, and records; conducting interviews with responsible personnel and plant employees; and reviewing training drills and exercises.

For the nuclear security training program, the inspector verified that: (1) the licensee's implementation of its nuclear security training program was in accordance with the

regulatory requirements, NRC-approved security plans, and any other applicable NRC requirement; (2) security-personnel knowledge, skills and ability to conformed with the licensee's Training and Qualification (T & Q) plan, regulatory requirements, and any other applicable NRC requirements; and (3) equipment assigned to security personnel conformed to the licensee's T&Q plan, regulatory requirements, and any other applicable NRC requirements. The inspector conducted the following specific inspection activities.

The inspectors conducted the following specific inspection activities:

- verified for on-the-job training that: (b) the licensee's training and qualification program included, at a minimum, 40 hours of on-the-job contingency-based training for individuals assigned duties and responsibilities to implement the Safeguards Contingency Plan before the individual was assigned the duty or responsibility; and
- verified for the licensee's performance evaluation program that: (c) each member of each shift who was assigned duties and responsibilities required to implement the site's safeguards contingency plan and protective strategy participated in tactical drills and force-on-force exercises at the frequency prescribed in 10 CFR Part 73 Appendix B.

The inspectors reviewed security training-related issues during baseline inspection activities to verify that they were being entered into the licensee's corrective action system at an appropriate threshold, that adequate attention was being given to timely corrective actions, and that adverse trends were identified and adequately addressed.

The inspector completed 2 of the required 47 samples. The remaining samples will be performed in a future baseline inspection.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4. Fitness-for-Duty Program (71130.08)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated this area by: reviewing program procedures, implementing procedures, and records; conducting interviews with responsible personnel and plant employees; and performing walkdowns.

The inspectors verified that: (1) the licensee properly implemented FFD requirements, including 10 CFR Part 26 (subparts A through H, N, and O) and any other applicable NRC requirement that assured licensee personnel (including contractors and vendors) performed their tasks in a reliable and trustworthy manner and were not under the influence of any substance or mentally or physically impaired from any cause that affected their abilities to perform their duties safely and competently; (2) changes to the

licensee's FFD program made since the last inspection: (a) met commitments to resolve previously identified issues or NRC requirements; and (b) did not adversely affect the performance requirements as prescribed by regulatory requirements and any other applicable U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requirement; and (3) the licensee properly implemented FFD requirements, as prescribed by regulatory requirements including 10 CFR Part 26 (Subpart I) and any other applicable NRC requirement, to ensure, in part, that nuclear facility security force personnel were not assigned to duty while in a fatigued condition that reduced their alertness or ability to perform functions necessary to identify and promptly respond to plant security threats.

The inspectors conducted the following specific inspection activities:

- reviewed and evaluated licensee event reports, safeguards log entries, and corrective action documents dated between February 2010 and April 2010 (no licensee event reports were documented); and
- verified for security force work hours that: (a) security officers' work hour records did not exceed work hour limits; (b) the waivers issued from work hour limits were authorized and documented in accordance with the rule requirements.

The inspectors reviewed FFD-related issues during baseline inspection activities to verify that they were being entered into the licensee's corrective action system at an appropriate threshold, that adequate attention was being given to timely corrective actions, and that adverse trends were identified and adequately addressed.

The inspector completed 3 of the required 51 samples. The remaining samples will be performed in a future baseline inspection.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA6 Meetings

Exit Meeting

The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. F. A. Kearney and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on April 29, 2010. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee

F. Kearney, Site Vice President
M. Kanavos, Plant Manager
M. Hiter, Security Analyst
S. Gackstetter, Regulatory Assurance Manager
J. Cunningham, Security Manager
J. Waddell, Security Supervisor
D. Montgomery, Access Authorization

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

D. Lords, Resident Inspector

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened, Closed, Discussed

None

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

The following is a list of documents reviewed during the inspection. Inclusion on this list does not imply that the NRC inspector reviewed the documents in their entirety but rather that selected sections or portions of the documents were evaluated as part of the overall inspection effort. Inclusion of a document on this list does not imply NRC acceptance of the document, or any part of it, unless this is stated in the body of the inspection report.

S05 Protective Strategy Evaluation (71130.05)

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
	Clinton Power Station Security Plan (SGI)	8
SY-AA-10	Physical Protection Process Description	0
SY-AA-101	Physical Protection Program	4
SY-AA-101-103	Observation and Inspection of Security Barriers	6
SY-AA-101-103 att 1	Vehicle Barrier System Inspection Program Guideline	6
SY-AA-101-103 att 2	PAVA Inspection Program Guideline	6
SY-AA-101-103 att 3	Weekly Vehicle Barrier System Observation	6
SY-AA-101-104	Revision, Control, and Distribution of Site Security Plans and Implementing Procedures/T&RM	10
SY-AA-101-106	Control and Classification of Safeguards Information, Safeguards Information-Modified Handling, and Sensitive Unclassified Non-Safeguards Information	13
SY-AA-101-106-1002	Use of Encryption Software for Safeguards Information	1
SY-AA-101-107	Control and Classification of Contraband or Prohibited Items	7
SY-AA-101-110	Maintaining Search Integrity Between Stations	6
SY-AA-101-112	Searching Personnel, Vehicles, Packages, and Cargo	18
SY-AA-101-112-1001	Exit Searches	1
SY-AA-101-114	Processing Emergency Response Vehicles and Personnel	5
SY-AA-101-115	Controlling Gates and Power Operated Active Vehicle Barriers	8
SY-AA-101-117	Routine Processing and Escorting of Personnel and Vehicles	18
SY-AA-101-118	Control of Badges	3
SY-AA-101-119	Control of Receiving Warehouses	6
SY-AA-101-120	Control of Security Access Control Devices	4

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<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
SY-AA-101-121	Security response to the Station Emergency Plan	4
SY-AA-101-122	Testing Security Equipment	17
SY-AA-101-122-1001	Performance of Security System Tests	6
SY-AA-101-124	Operation of the Security Control Centers	8
SY-AA-101-125-1002	Weapons and Ammunition Control	3
SY-AA-101-125	Inventory and Control of Security Equipment	10
SY-AA-101-126-1001	Nuclear Security Turnover and Briefing	3
SY-CL-101-115-1001	Clinton AVB Traffic Control	2
SY-CL-101-122-1001	Clinton Site Specific Equipment Testing	0
SY-CL-101-2000 F01	Perimeter Intrusion Detection System Performance Testing Log	2
SY-CL-101-2000 F03	Tactical Response Card	4
SY-CL-101-2000 F07	Complete SCC Checklist	3
SY-CL-101-2000 F08	Complete Operational Test Log	4
SY-CL-101-2000 F24	Vehicle/Foot Patrol Checklist	7
SY-AA-101-126-1001-F-01	Requirements for Assuming Duty	1
SY-AA-101-127	Preparing for Demonstrations	2
SY-AA-101-127-1001	Response to Anti-Nuclear Protests at Exelon Stations or Corporate Offices	1
SY-AA-101-128	Response to Strikes and Labor Disturbances	3
SY-AA-101-130	Security Responsibilities for Station Personnel	12
SY-AA-101-130-F04	Receipt of Bomb Threat	1
SY-AA-101-130-F04	Evaluation of Proposed Lay-Down Area or Isolation/Clear Zone Change	0
SY-AA-101-132	Assessment and Response to Suspicious Activities and Security Threats	15
SY-AA-101-132-1001	Tampering Investigation Protocol	1
SY-AA-101-132-1002	Challenging Unauthorized/Suspicious Individuals	0
SY-AA-101-133	Integrated Response Plan with Off-Site Response Agencies	8
SY-AA-101-133-F-01	Supporting Law Enforcement Agency Response Capability	0
SY-AA-101-133-F-02	Incident Command System-Position Worksheet	0
SY-AA-101-136	Use of Classified Information	0
SY-AA-101-137	OCA Checkpoint Operations	7
SY-AA-101-137-F-01	Vehicle Inspection Quick Reference Checklist	0

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<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
SY-AA-101-141	Security Emergent Issues Response	0
SY-AA-101-142	Federal Firearms Disability regulations	0
SY-AA-101-143	Security Pertinent Information Program	0
SY-AA-102	Exelon's Nuclear Fitness-for-Duty Program	14
SY-AA-102-202	Testing For Cause	15
SY-AA-102-203	Treatment Plan and Follow-Up Testing	6
SY-AA-102-204	Random Selection and Notification Process	9
SY-AA-102-1001	Exelon Nuclear Station Owner-Controlled Area (OCA) Fitness-for-Duty Program	2
SY-AA-103-500	Access Authorization Program	10
SY-AA-103-501	Access Authorization Categories and Requirements	9
SY-AA-103-503	Psychological Assessments	7
SY-AA-103-510	Insider Mitigation Program	1
SY-AA-103-517	Inprocessing Personnel (Employee and Contractor)	8
SY-AA-150-1001	Exelon Nuclear Security Training	5
SY-AA-150-1001 att 1	Exelon-Specific Critical Task List	5
SY-AA-150-1001-F-02	Armed Officer-Individual Qualification Record	1
SY-AA-150-1001-F-04	Response Team Leader-Individual Qualification Record	0
SY-AA-150-1001-F-07	Security Training Schedule	0
SY-AA-150-1001-F-19	Contingency OJT Drills	0
SY-AA-150-1001-F-20	Armed Responder Contingency OJT Requirements	0
SY-AA-150-1001-F-22	Response Team Leader Contingency OJT Requirements	0
SY-AA-150-1002	Security Drills and Exercises	4
SY-AA-150-1004	Exelon Nuclear Security OJT Program	0
SY-AA-500-127	Safety/Security Interface	0
SY-AA-1001	Loggable/Reportable Matrix	5
SY-AA-1004	Hostage/Duress Situations	1
SY-AA-1013	General Guidance for Use of the Itemizer3 Explosives Detector	3
SY-AA-1015	Security Contingency Equipment Inspection and Maintenance	8
SY-AA-1015-F-01	Record of Semi-Annual Inspections	0
SY-AA-1015-F-02	Record of Monthly Contingency Equipment Inspection	0
SY-AA-1015-F-05	Glock 17 and 22 Material Condition Inspection/Functionality/Accuracy Tests	0

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<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
SY-AA-1015-F-07	Rifle Material Condition Inspection/Functionality/Accuracy Tests	0
SY-AA-1015-F-11	Intent and Use of the Bore Scope	0
SY-AA-1015-F-12	Barrel Evaluation Criteria	0
SY-AA-1015-F-13	Magazine Material Condition Inspection	0
SY-AA-1015-F-14	Ammunition Documentation, Inspection, Storage, and Inventory Log	0
SY-AA-1015-F-17	Contingency Weapon and Equipment Inspection Matrix	0
SY-AA-1016	Watch-Standing Practices and Communications	10
SY-AA-1016 att 1	Phonetic Alphabet Table	10
SY-AA-1016 att 2	Post Turnover Checklist	10
SY-AA-1016 att 3	Authorized Attentiveness Aids	10
SY-AA-1020	Supervisor Post Checks and Post Orders	6
SY-AA-1020-F-03	BRE Quarterly Material Condition Checklist	0
SY-AA-1020-F-06	Defensive Strategy Material Condition Considerations	0
SY-AA-1021	Millennium Protective Mask	5
SY-AA-1021 att 1	Millennium Protective Mask Inspection Log	5
SY-AA-1022	Miles Equipment Usage	1
SY-AA-1024	Security Performance, and Oversight, and Indicator's	3
SY-AA-103-503	Psychological Assessments	7
	Fatigue Management and Work Hour Limits	8
	Exelon Nuclear Training Outline "Security Communications Equipment"	
	Exelon MMPI Reports	2009-2010
	State Licenses for Clinical Psychologists Access Authorization Critical Group List	April 26, 2010
SY-CL-101-122-1001	Clinton Site Specific Equipment Testing	0
SY-CL-101-2000-F-19	Security Key and Core Change Worksheet	0
CPS 3511.01	Security Electrical Distribution	February 4, 2005
CPS 3511.01E001	Security Distribution Electrical Lineup	February 4, 2005
	Security Personnel Work Schedule	October, 2009-April, 2010
LS-AA-126-1001	FASA Self-Assessment Plan	01011856-02
LS-AA-125	Corrective Action Program (CAP) Procedure	9
	Corrective Action Program Reports (Security-Related);	February 2010 – April 2010
	Security Event Reports (SER)	February 2010 – April 2010

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

AVB	Active Vehicle Barrier
BRE	Ballistic Resistant Enclosure
CAP	Corrective Action Program
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
DBT	Design Basis Threat
DRS	Division of Reactor Safety
FASA	Focus Area Self-Assessment
FFD	Fitness-for-Duty
IDS	Intrusion Detection System
NOS	Nuclear Oversight
NRC	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
OCA	Owner-Controlled Area
PA	Protected Area
PI	Performance Indicator
PIDS	Perimeter Intrusion Detection System
SER	Security Event Reports
SGI	Safeguards Information
VA	Vital Area
VBS	Vehicle Barrier System

C. Pardee

Should you have any questions concerning this inspection, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.

Sincerely,

/RA by D. Funk for/

Eric Duncan, Chief
Plant Support Branch
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