



10 CFR 50.73

RA11-034

April 29, 2011

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555

LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2

Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-11 and NPF-18

NRC Docket Nos. 50-373 and 50-374

Subject:

Licensee Event Report 2011-003-00

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Exelon Generation Company (EGC), LLC, is submitting Licensee Event Report Number 2011-003-00.

There are no regulatory commitments in this report. Should you have any questions concerning this report, please contact Mr. Terrence W. Simpkin, Regulatory Assurance Manager at (815) 415-2800.

Respectfully,

Peter J. Karaba Plant Manager

LaSalle County Station

Enclosure:

Licensee Event Report

cc:

Regional Administrator - NRC Region III

NRC Senior Resident Inspector - LaSalle County Station

NRC FOF (10-2010)	₹M 366	66 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION								APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 10/31/2013 Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA/Privacy Section (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to infocollects.resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information							
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) (See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)									infocollects.resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.								
LaSalle County Station, Unit 1									2. DOC	05000373	3 1						
	Secondary Containment Inoperable																
5. EVENT DATE 6. LER NUMBER 7. REPORT DATE									8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED								
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIA NUMBER		MONTH	DAY	YEAR	l	ITY NAME _aSalle Cour	nty Stat		0	05000374			
03	02	2011	2011	- 003		04	29	2011		ITY NAME N/A					DOCKET NUMBER N/A		
9. OPER	ATING	MODE	11	. THIS REP	ORT IS	UBMITTE	D PURSU	JANT TO	THE	REQUIREMEN'	TS OF 10	CFR §	: (Check	all th	at ap	ply)	
	001		20.2 20.2 20.2	201(b) 201(d) 203(a)(1) 203(a)(2)(i)		20.2203(a)(3)(i) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)			☐ 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) ☐ 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) ☐			50.73(50.73(50.73(50.73(a)(2)(vii) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)				
10. POWER LEVEL			□ 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) □ 50.36(c)(1 □ 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) □ 50.36(c)(2 □ 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) □ 50.46(a)(3 □ 20.2203(a)(2)(v) □ 50.73(a)(2 □ 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) □ 50.73(a)(2				0.36(c)(1) 0.36(c)(2) 0.46(a)(3) 0.73(a)(2)	(ii)(A) (ii) (i)(A)	□ 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) □ 50.7 □ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) □ 73.7 □ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) □ 73.7 □ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) □ OTH □ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) Spec			50.73(73.71(73.71(OTHE Specify	8(a)(2)(x) 1(a)(4) 1(a)(5)				
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Jeffery C. Williams, Shift Operations Superintendent													E NUMBER 5-2203	(Includ	e Area	Code)	
			13. COM	IPLETE ON	IE LINE F	OR EACH	1 СОМРО	NENT F	AILUR	E DESCRIBED	IN THIS	REPO	RT				
CAUSE		SYSTEM	COMPONENT				ORTABLE O EPIX	-E CAUSI		SYSTEM CO		COMPONENT MA FACT				ORTABLE D EPIX	
14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED ☐ YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)							Ø	NO		ECTED ISSION ITE		монтн	DA	·Υ	YEAR		
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On March 2, 2011, Unit 1 was in Mode 1 at 100% power and Unit 2 was in Mode 5 in a refueling outage, with fuel moves in progress. At 0928 hours CST, the Unit 1 Reactor Operator reported that the control room indication for secondary containment vacuum was 0.17 inch of vacuum water gauge. Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.6.4.1.1 requires that secondary containment vacuum be greater than or equal to 0.25 inch of vacuum water gauge. Secondary containment was declared inoperable, and a four-hour timeclock to restore secondary containment to operable status was started in accordance with TS 3.6.4.1 Required Action (RA) A.1. In addition, TS RAs C.1, C.2, and C.3 were entered, and fuel moves and core alterations on Unit 2 were immediately suspended. Personnel were dispatched to the Unit 1 Reactor Building and the Refuel Floor ventilation panels to observe local differential pressure readings, where the control room indication was confirmed.

Shortly thereafter, secondary containment vacuum indication returned to its normal reading of approximately 0.5 inches of vacuum water gauge. At 0942 hours CST, secondary containment was declared operable and the associated RAs were exited. At 1000 hours, fuel moves and core alterations were resumed on Unit 2.

The cause of the event could not be determined; however, it is suspected that both Unit 2 steam tunnel airlock doors were simultaneously opened for a short period. Corrective actions include replacing the interlock magnets and switches to assure reliability, and to provide plant barrier training for personnel who traverse secondary containment doors.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) **CONTINUATION SHEET**

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET		3. PAGE				
LaSalla Caunty Station Unit 1	05000373	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.	2	OF	3
LaSalle County Station, Unit 1	03000373	2011	- 003 -	0		Oi.	

NARRATIVE

LaSalle County Station Units 1 and 2 are General Electric Company Boiling Water Reactors with 3546 Megawatts Rated Core Thermal Power.

A. CONDITION PRIOR TO EVENT:

Unit(s): 1 / 2

Event Date: March 2, 2011

Event Time: 0928 CST

Reactor Mode(s): 1 / 5 Mode(s) Name: Power Operation / Refuel

Power Level: 100 / 0 percent

B. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

On March 2, 2011, Unit 1 was in Mode 1 at 100% power and Unit 2 was in Mode 5 in a refueling outage. with fuel moves in progress. At 0928 hours CST, the Unit 1 Reactor Operator reported that the control room indication for secondary containment [NG] vacuum was 0.17 inch of vacuum water gauge. Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.6.4.1.1 requires that secondary containment vacuum be greater than or equal to 0.25 inch of vacuum water gauge. Secondary containment was declared inoperable, and a four-hour timeclock to restore secondary containment to operable status was started in accordance with TS 3.6.4.1 Required Action (RA) A.1. In addition, TS RAs C.1, C.2, and C.3 were entered, and fuel moves and core alterations on Unit 2 were immediately suspended. Personnel were dispatched to the Unit 1 Reactor Building and the Refuel Floor ventilation panels to observe local differential pressure readings, where the control room indication was confirmed. No ventilation system operational problems were identified.

Shortly thereafter, secondary containment vacuum indication returned to its normal reading of approximately 0.5 inches of vacuum water gauge. At 0942 hours CST, secondary containment was declared operable and the associated RAs were exited. At 1000 hours, fuel moves and core alterations were resumed on Unit 2.

This occurrence is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) and (D) as an event or condition that alone could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material and to mitigate the consequences of an accident. This event constitutes a safety system functional failure.

C. CAUSE OF EVENT:

The cause of the event could not be determined; however, it is suspected that both Unit 2 steam tunnel airlock doors were simultaneously opened and held open to transport material during outage demobilization activities. Interviews with personnel working in the area could not confirm this apparent cause; however, there is no evidence of ventilation system problems that would have caused the differential pressure transient.

D. SAFETY ANALYSIS:

The safety significance of this event was minimal. The secondary containment was inoperable for a brief period of approximately 14 minutes, which is significantly less than the four-hour Completion Time to restore the secondary containment to operable status allowed by TS 3.6.4.1 Condition A. The Reactor Building-to-outside differential pressure remained negative throughout the period that the secondary containment was inoperable.

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(10-2010)

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LaSalle County Station, Unit 1	05000373	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.	3	OF	3
Lasaile County Station, Onit	03000373	2011	- 003 -	0			

NARRATIVE

E. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

- The interlock magnets and switches will be replaced to assure reliability.
- Plant barrier training will be conducted for all personnel who traverse secondary containment doors.
- New signage regarding plant barrier requirements will be developed and placed on the secondary containment doors.

F. PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES:

A review of Licensee Event Reports submitted by LaSalle over the past ten years found no previous occurrences of an unplanned inoperable secondary containment.

G. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA:

This is not applicable, as no component failure occurred.