



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
245 PEACHTREE CENTER AVENUE NE, SUITE 1200
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-1257

April 26, 2011

Ms. Nicole Holmes
Chief Operating Officer and Facility Manager
Global Nuclear Fuel – Americas, L.L.C.
P.O. Box 780, Mail Code J20
Wilmington, NC 28402

SUBJECT: GLOBAL NUCLEAR FUEL – AMERICAS, L.L.C.- NRC INTEGRATED
INSPECTION REPORT NO. 70-1113/2011-002

Dear Ms. Holmes:

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) conducted announced, routine inspections from January 24 through 28, February 14 through 18, and March 7 through 10, 2011, at your Wilmington, North Carolina, facility. The enclosed report presents the results of the inspection. The purpose of the inspection was to perform a routine review of the implementation of the Radioactive Waste Management and Transportation programs. This review was performed to determine whether activities authorized by the license were conducted safely and in accordance with NRC requirements. At the conclusion of the inspections, the findings were discussed with members of your staff at exit meetings held on January 27, February 18, March 10, and March 23, 2011.

The purpose of the inspection was to perform a routine review of the implementation of the operational safety, fire protection, management organization and controls, and operator training programs, and to follow-up on previously identified issues. This review was performed to determine whether activities authorized by the license were conducted safely and in accordance with NRC requirements.

The inspection was an examination of activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspection consisted of facility walk downs; selective examinations of relevant procedures and records; interviews with plant personnel; and plant observations. Throughout the inspection, observations were discussed with your managers and staff.

Based on the results of this inspection, the NRC has determined that a Severity Level IV violation of NRC requirements occurred. This violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV), consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy. This NCV is described in the subject inspection report. If you contest the violation or significance of the NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001, with copies to: (1) the Regional Administrator, Region II; and (2) the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, and its enclosure will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRC's document system (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html>.

If you have any questions, please call me at (404) 997-4629.

Sincerely,

/RA by M. Sykes/

Marvin D. Sykes, Chief
Fuel Facility Inspection Branch 3
Division of Fuel Facility Inspection

Docket No. 70-1113
License No. SNM-1097

Enclosure: NRC Inspection Report

cc w/encl:
Scott Murray, Manager
Facility Licensing
Global Nuclear Fuels – Americas, L.L.C.
Electronic Mail Distribution

Lee Cox, Chief
Radiation Protection Section
N.C. Department of Environmental
Commerce and Natural Resources
Electronic Mail Distribution

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ADAMS: Yes ACCESSION NUMBER: ML111170463 SUNSI REVIEW COMPLETE

OFFICE	RII:DFFI	RII:DFFI				
SIGNATURE	/RA by PS/	RA by MDS for/				
NAME	PStartz	MThomas				
DATE	4/22/2011	4/22/2011	5/ /2011	5/ /2011	5/ /2011	5/ /2011
E-MAIL COPY?	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO

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Letter to Ms. Nicole Holmes from Marvin D. Sykes dated April 26, 2011

SUBJECT: GLOBAL NUCLEAR FUEL – AMERICAS, L.L.C.- NRC INTEGRATED
INSPECTION REPORT NO. 70-1113/2011-002

Distribution w/encl:

M. Sykes, RII
M. Thomas, RII
O. López, RII
R. Johnson, NMSS
C. Ryder, NMSS
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**U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II**

Docket No.: 70-1113

License No.: SNM-1097

Report No.: 70-1113/2011-002

Licensee: Global Nuclear Fuel - Americas, LLC

Location: Wilmington, North Carolina

Dates: January 1, 2011 through March 31, 2011

Inspector: Leonard Pitts, Fuel Facility Inspector
Paul Startz, Fuel Facility Inspector
Mary Thomas, Senior Fuel Facility Inspector
Matthew Toth, Fuel Facility Inspector-in-Training

Approved by: Marvin D. Sykes, Chief
Fuel Facility Branch 3
Division of Fuel Facility Inspection

Enclosure

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Global Nuclear Fuel - Americas, LLC
NRC Inspection Report No. 70-1113/2011-002

This is a quarterly integrated inspection report that includes three routine, announced inspections that were conducted by NRC regional inspectors during normal shifts in the areas of operational safety, fire protection, management organization and controls, operator training, and follow-up to previously identified issues. During the inspection period, normal production activities were ongoing. These inspections included field observations of work activities, review of selected records, and interviews with plant personnel.

Operational Safety

The inspectors reviewed the implementation of selected IROFS and their management measures to ensure they were able to perform their intended safety function.

Fire Protection

The licensee demonstrated significant improvement in their fire protection program since the previous inspection in 2010. The inspectors identified deficiencies in the licensee's program for the detection and corrective maintenance of fire doors in the Dry Conversion Process area and opened Unresolved Item 2011-002-01. The inspectors identified deficiencies in the licensee's program for the detection and corrective maintenance of a corroded and defective process duct in the incinerator building and opened Inspector Follow-up Item 2011-002-02.

Management Organization and Control

The inspectors determined that the program audits met the license requirements, covered a wide range of safety concerns and were generally self-critical. The qualifications of the new management complied with license requirements. The identification, tracking, and closure of corrective actions were performed in accordance with established procedures. Revisions to operating procedures and facility equipment changes are being properly initiated, revised, reviewed, approved for release, and controlled.

Operator Training

The training program elements reviewed by the inspectors were in compliance with license requirements and regulations. Training requirements are implemented and maintained for licensee employees and contractors in accordance with license requirements. Training material and examinations were adequate to measure the knowledge level of the workers, and were current.

Attachment

List of Persons Contacted

List of Items Opened, Closed, and Discussed

Inspection Procedures Used

REPORT DETAILS

1. Summary of Plant Status

Global Nuclear Fuels - America, LLC manufactures uranium dioxide (UO_2) powder, pellets, and light water reactor fuel bundles at its Wilmington, NC facility. During the inspection period, the facility was converting uranium hexafluoride (UF_6) to UO_2 with a Dry Conversion Process (DCP) and performing UO_2 and gadolinia pellet and fuel fabrication operations. Waste operations consisted primarily of packaging and storage of dry waste and processing of wet sanitary waste.

2. Operational Safety (IP 88020)

a. Inspection Scope and Observations

The inspectors reviewed the integrated safety analysis (ISA) Summary and licensee operating procedures for the ceramics area. The inspectors performed area walk downs, in which process operations were observed and the existing items relied on for safety (IROFS) were evaluated.

The inspectors walked down sections of the gadolinium and uranium dioxide (UO_2) operating procedures and verified that IROFS were identified and operable at each operating station in the area. The inspectors observed an operator respond to active engineered control IROFS 30215, Gad Slugger Feed Hood Geometry Optical Sensor alarm. The inspectors also observed and interviewed an operator perform grinder pre-startup checks per procedure, OP 1040.12, "UO₂ Pellet Grinding", Revision 8. The operator was required to perform grinder pre-startup checks as operations were shutdown during the inspection due to the discovery of a can of material not having its required material transaction and being in the wrong location, Event Notification 46663. No other issues of significance were identified.

The inspectors walked down the ventilation system for the UO₂ grinders and verified that that "as-built" configuration matched the applicable drawings. The inspectors also interviewed the grinder operators regarding the procedural requirements and the operation of the Apitron [blowback] system for the grinders and the swarf hood for disposition of grinding swarf at the end of each shift. Operators were able to state that they changed the grinding swarf cans at the end of each shift. The operators showed the inspectors where the swarf can weight would indicate on the computer screen for the grinder and when the blowback system would operate. No issues of significance were identified.

The inspectors reviewed management measures and supporting documentation for designated IROFS to verify that safety controls were available and reliable. The inspectors reviewed functional test instructions, completed tests, and inspection records for the reviewed IROFS. The inspectors noted that functional tests were performed at the required frequency and that instructions contained the appropriate amount of detail to perform the test.

b. Conclusions

The inspectors reviewed the implementation of selected IROFS and their management measures to ensure they were able to perform their intended safety function.

3. **Fire Protection (IP 88055)**

a. **Inspection Scope and Observations**

The inspectors verified the presence and integrity of fire dampers, fire louvers, fire walls, and through-wall penetration seal systems. The inspectors verified that a surveillance program was in place to inspect and functionally test fire doors, dampers, and louvers with passive actuation devices. The inspectors verified that compensatory measures were in place for unsealed penetrations due to construction activities. The inspectors noted that the licensee had recently replaced several in-duct fire dampers in the Dry Conversion Process (DCP) area and that the new dampers and installation methods increased the ease of replacement, repair, and periodic testing. No issues of significance were identified with fire dampers and wall penetrations. The inspectors identified a fire door in the Dry Conversion Process (DCP) building that did not properly close and latch. The licensee repaired the door and a follow-up inspection confirmed proper operation. Two days later the inspectors identified two additional doors in the DCP that did not properly close and latch. The inspectors noted that the licensee had replaced several fire doors and had retrofitted closure hardware in an attempt to improve the reliability of the fire doors. The inspectors opened URI 2011-002-01 concerning the licensee's lack of an effective program in maintaining the proper operation of fire doors.

The inspectors walked down production areas to verify that fixed and transient combustible loads were managed in accordance with procedures. Production areas including the dry conversion process building and other production areas with no fire sprinkler protection were inspected more thoroughly. Areas with fire sprinklers did contain combustibles such as a few wood pallets but was not excessive. No issues of significance were identified.

The inspectors walked down the fire detection system and noted that detection devices were not obstructed. The inspectors verified that the fire alarm panel had normal AC power available and a backup battery in place. The inspectors also verified that various satellite panels were capable of monitoring the operation of the fire pumps, tamper switches, pull stations, and water flow alarms. No issues of significance were identified.

The inspectors verified that portable fire extinguishers were provided per National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 10 and access to the fire extinguishers was unobstructed by plant equipment or other work related activities. The inspectors noted that the general condition of fire extinguishers was satisfactory. The inspectors also verified that standpipe systems were pressurized, isolation valves were open, flow/check valves were in place, pressure gauges were calibrated or replaced as required, and the systems appeared fully functional. The inspectors confirmed that the licensee had identified that the standpipe in the incinerator building had sustained significant corrosion damage and was scheduled to be replaced. The inspectors witnessed a regularly scheduled functional test of the diesel engine powered fire water pump. No safety issues were identified.

The inspectors verified that the licensee had an Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance (ITM) program in place to ensure that fire protection equipment remained operable. The inspectors noted that the ITM program for the fire alarm and fire suppression systems

included requirements of NFPA 72, NFPA 10, and NFPA 25. No issues of significance were identified.

The inspectors walked down the production areas and assessed the implementation of active, passive, and administrative fire protection controls and to verify their operational lineup and readiness. The inspectors also reviewed samples the licensee's inspection, testing, and maintenance (ITM) records. The fire protection systems reviewed included standpipes, electric/diesel fire pumps and water distribution systems, surface impoundments and water tower water reservoirs, fire alarm and detection devices, hydrants, fire extinguishers, and fire barriers. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's internal audits of fire protection systems to verify that management of the fire protection program had been conducted in accordance with the licensee requirements.

The inspectors identified a 6" aluminum duct in the incinerator building that was heavily corroded with multiple perforations. The inspectors noted that the ventilation duct was pulling air from a glove box through a high-efficiency (HEPA) filter. The glove box was utilized for packaging incinerator ash. The inspectors opened IFI 2011-002-02 and notified the licensee that future inspections will follow-up and evaluate the corrective actions taken to repair the duct and revisions to their inspection efforts to identify these types of equipment failures in the future.

b. Conclusions

The licensee demonstrated significant improvement in their fire protection program since the previous inspection in 2010. The inspectors identified deficiencies in the licensee's program for the detection and corrective maintenance of fire doors in the Dry Conversion Process area and opened Unresolved Item 2011-002-01. The inspectors identified deficiencies in the licensee's program for the detection and corrective maintenance of a corroded and defective process duct in the incinerator building and opened Inspector Follow-up Item 2011-002-02. No other significant issues were identified.

4. Operator Training/Retraining (88010)

a. Inspection Scope and Observations

The inspectors interviewed plant operators and determined that the operators were knowledgeable of their operating processes and the testing requirements for the IROFS. Changes to a procedure or changes to a process were readily identified by operators through the computerized system used by the licensee to control these activities. Key safety actions required for continued qualification were accomplished and acknowledge by the operators in a timely manner and as required by site procedures.

The inspectors reviewed training records for initial and refresher training in nuclear criticality safety, radiation protection, specific process area skills and general emergency areas and determined that they were in compliance with 10 CFR 19.12 and the license requirements.

The inspectors evaluated the training program structure and determined that no substantive programmatic changes had occurred during the last year. The inspectors reviewed a sample of training records that included initial and annual refresher general employee training and job specific production training.

No findings of significance were identified.

b. Conclusions

The training program elements reviewed by the inspectors were in compliance with license requirements and regulations. Training requirements are implemented and maintained for licensee employees and contractors in accordance with license requirements. Training material and examinations were adequate to measure the knowledge level of the workers, and were current.

5. **Management Organization and Controls (88005)**

a. Inspection Scope and Observations

The inspectors reviewed the internal and external audits of the following programs: Radiation Safety, Criticality Safety, Chemical & Industrial Safety, Environmental, MC&A, Fire & Explosion Protection and Emergency Preparedness.

The inspectors attended several management meetings (e.g., FMO production, EHS, Annual ALARA, etc.) and determined that these meetings adequately reviewed facility information in order to address actual or potential safety issues and the addition of new processes. The inspectors reviewed the 2010 Safety Committee meeting minutes. The inspectors reviewed the actions described in the meeting minutes and determined that the licensee had adequately assessed the issues presented at the Safety Committee meetings.

The inspectors conducted interviews with members of the site's management team and determined that the licensee had made few management changes since the last inspection. The changes did not have a significant impact on the responsibilities and functions specified in the license.

The inspectors reviewed the site's recent safety related procedure changes, the procedure change control program and reviewed selected recent procedural changes.

The inspectors reviewed the license's problem identification and resolution program to determine if the program was being conducted in accordance with the licensee's procedures and license conditions. The inspectors reviewed multiple problem identification and resolution program entries related to items relied on for safety (IROFS). Additionally the inspectors reviewed the licensee's Root Cause Analysis for the UO₂ Furnace Loss of Geometry.

The inspectors reviewed samples of operating procedures and production equipment undergoing revisions and modifications to ensure the changes were conducted in accordance with the license's configuration management guidelines.

No findings of significance were identified.

b. Conclusions

The inspectors determined that the program audits met the license requirements, covered a wide range of safety concerns and were generally self-critical. The qualifications of the new management complied with license requirements. The identification, tracking, and closure

of corrective actions were performed in accordance with established procedures. Revisions to operating procedures and facility equipment changes are being properly initiated, revised, reviewed, approved for release, and controlled.

6. Follow-up on Previously Identified Issues

(Discussed) Unresolved Item (URI) 70-1113/2009-011-01: During review of Change Request 3653, the inspectors noted that the licensee's removal of the 30B cylinder as a sole IROFS (#10101) was because it did not consider the rupture of a cylinder containing liquid UF6 as a credible event due to the rigorous DOT requirements for testing the cylinders. The licensee did not provide further documented justification during the inspection, and the inspectors were not aware of any testing that demonstrated a cylinder containing liquid UF6 could not rupture if dropped. While three new IROFS were established for training for rupture of a cylinder containing liquid UF6, training was held to instruct those staff who handle UF6 cylinders, and the licensee's operating procedures do not allow the movement of liquid UF6 cylinders, the licensee has yet to analyze the rupture of a cylinder containing liquid UF6 as a not credible event. This item will remain opening pending review of the licensee's analysis.

(Closed) Unresolved Item (URI) 70-1113/2010-002-02: Inspectors identified four sprinklers that appeared to be blocked by ventilation ducts near the furnace area and not in compliance with the requirements of NFPA 13 regarding obstruction to sprinkler discharge and spray pattern development. The inspectors performed a field verification of new sprinkler heads installed in the pellet press room and reviewed a revised drawing showing the modifications made to the fire sprinkler system, Drawing 6868-SP-403X, Revision 16, dated February 11, 2011. This item is closed.

(Closed) Violation (VIO) 70-1113/2010-002-03: The licensee failed to install automatic detection equipment in areas where fire or explosion hazards were present. Specifically, fire hazards (i.e., combustible material) were present in the Process Technology laboratory area and automatic detection equipment was not installed. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective actions, performed a field verification, and concluded that the licensee had reconnected the PTL laboratory sprinkler system and the system was functional. Reviewed drawing 6868-SP-403X, Revision 16, and confirmed that the drawing had been revised showing the fire sprinkler supply pipeline reconnected. The sprinkler system reconnection successfully corrected the lack of fire protection with the presence of combustible and flammable materials in the PTL laboratory. This item is closed.

(Closed) Unresolved Item (URI) 70-1113/2010-002-04: NFPA 101, Life Safety Code, Chapters 7.8 and 7.9 requires the presence and documented maintenance of adequate emergency lighting to allow safe egress from buildings. Emergency lighting in egress routes in several areas of the licensee's facility were not operating. The inspectors reviewed the emergency lighting deficiencies identified during the previous fire protection inspection and determined that the licensee had implemented a rigorous program that ensured emergency lighting systems were adequate for evacuation and maintained in a manner that ensured reliable operation. The licensee's efforts included: the replacement and installation of numerous emergency lighting fixtures, completion of extensive surveys to determine the adequacy of emergency lighting during power outages, identification and labeling of emergency lighting fixtures, evaluated and established evacuation routes with adequate emergency lighting, completion of a facility light fixture inventory and drawings, and the implementation of an extensive preventative maintenance program. This item is closed.

(Closed) Inspector Follow-up Item (IFI) 70-1113/2010-04-01: Corrective actions proposed by the licensee and to review the training material used in the special training. The inspectors reviewed records and discussed IFI 2010-04-01 with the licensee's Fuels EHS Manager. The inspectors determined that this manager had received the required special training and had then accepted another position within General Electric that is not involved in the nuclear industry. The inspectors reviewed the special training provided to the manager and determined that the licensee has completed the required corrective actions. Inspector Follow-up Item (IFI) 70-1113/2010-04-01 is closed.

(Discussed) Inspector Follow-up Item IFI 70-1113/2010-04-02: Review the circumstances of this event and track the licensee actions to address the employee perceptions. The inspectors reviewed records and discussed IFI 2010-04-02 with the licensee's Fuels EHS Manager. The inspectors determined that at the time of this inspection the licensee had not completed all of the supervisory training required to address this issue. The licensee is developing training related to recognizing and addressing employee perceptions of retaliation. This licensee is planning to provide this training to the site's supervisors and managers. Inspector Follow-up Item (IFI) 70-1113/2010-04-02 remains open.

(Closed) Licensee Event Report LER 70-1113/2010-005: Accident Evaluation Improperly Analyzed in the Integrated Safety Analysis, Event Number 46244. The inspectors reviewed the corrective actions taken in response to the powder spill and taken to prevent recurrence. This item is closed.

(Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 70-1113/2010-008: Degradation of an Item Relied on for Safety, Event Number 46168. The inspectors reviewed the corrective actions taken in response to the powder spill and taken to prevent recurrence. This item is closed.

(Discussed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 70-1113/2010-009: Incomplete Documentation of Controls in ISA Summary for Hydrogen Containment, Event Number 46243. The licensee implemented IROFS related changes on the hydrogen piping and controls systems in the DCP. New IROFS had been implemented and additional changes are planned. The inspectors reviewed changes to the equipment in the field and noted no deficiencies. The additional IROFS were based upon theoretical failure events that could result in damage to the hydrogen piping system and inadequate

performance of the hydrogen detectors that might not detect hydrogen in the desired time frame. Changes evaluated during the inspection included: tubing had been installed on hydrogen piping flanges to duct potential leaking hydrogen to a hydrogen detector, reprogrammed the hydrogen alarms into the production automation system, added an additional hydrogen detector, and locked-out a hoist above the hydrogen piping. Future changes included relocating the hydrogen piping to another area and further evaluation is planned. This issue was considered incomplete and will remain open.

(Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 70-1113/2010-006: Unanalyzed Condition When Fuel Pellet Boats Became Stacked, Event Number 46305. The inspectors reviewed the corrective actions taken in response to this event. These corrective actions included several

controls to prevent boat stacking to maintain furnace geometry. The inspectors determined that the self-identified and -corrected failure to analyze for furnace geometry and thus failed to meet performance requirements is a non-cited violation in accordance with section 2.3.2.b of the Enforcement Policy, Non-Cited Violation 70-1113/2011-002-03.

Exit Meeting

The inspection scope and results were summarized on April 26, 2011 with S. Murray, Manager, Licensing & Liabilities and other members of the licensee's staff. Although proprietary information and processes were reviewed during this inspection, proprietary information is not included in this report.

ATTACHMENT

1. LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

<u>Name</u>	<u>Title</u>
J. Reynolds	Manager, Fuels Environmental Health and Safety
S. Murray	Manager, Licensing & Liabilities
P. Ollis	Licensing & Liabilities Engineer
A. Mabry	Radiation Safety program Manager
M. Venters	Manager, Emergency Preparedness
M Grimstead	Manager, Training
J. Reeves	Manager, Integrated Safety Analysis
F. Beaty	FMO Controls
C. Goode	Logistics Team Leader
D. Holden	Sr. Logistics Specialist
M. Huntley	Nuclear Measurements
R. Martyn	Manager, Material Control & Accounting
K. McGowan	DCP Engineer
M. Short	Area Manager
W. Stout	Project Manager, Energy Solutions

2. LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

<u>Item Number</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Description</u>
URI 70-1113/2009-011-01	DISCUSSED	During review of Change Request 3653, the inspectors noted that the licensee's removal of the 30B cylinder as a sole IROFS (#10101) was because it did not consider the rupture of a cylinder containing liquid UF6 as a credible event due to the rigorous DOT requirements for testing the cylinders.
URI 70-1113/2010-002-02	CLOSED	Licensee installed additional sprinklers in the pellet press room.
VIO 70-1113/2010-002-03	CLOSED	Licensee reconnected fire sprinkler system in the PTL laboratory.
URI 70-1113/2010-002-04	CLOSED	Licensee addressed emergency lighting deficiencies.
IFI 70-1113/2010-004-01	CLOSED	Corrective actions proposed by the licensee and to review the training material used in the special training.

<u>Item Number</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Description</u>
IFI 70-1113/2010-04-02	DISCUSSED	Review the circumstances of this event and track the licensee actions to address the employee perceptions.
LER 70-1113/2010-005	CLOSED	Accident Evaluation Improperly Analyzed in the Integrated Safety Analysis, Event Number 46244.
LER 70-1113/2010-008	CLOSED	Degradation of an Item Relied on for Safety, Event Number 46168.
LER 70-1113/2010-009	DISCUSSED	Incomplete Documentation of Controls in ISA Summary for Hydrogen Containment, Event Number 46243.
LER 70-1113/2010-006	CLOSED	Unanalyzed Condition When Fuel Pellet Boats Became Stacked, Event Number 46305.
URI 70-1113/2011-002-01	OPEN	Licensee lacks an effective program for detecting and maintaining the proper operation of fire doors.
IFI 70-1113/2011-002-02	OPEN	Licensee lacks an effective program for detecting and maintaining ventilation duct in the incinerator building.
NCV 70-1113/2011-002-03	CLOSED	Failure to analyze for furnace geometry.

3. INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED

IP 88005 Management Organization and Control
 IP 88010 Operator Training
 IP 88020 Operational Safety
 IP 88055 Fire Protection Annual