



444 South 16th Street Mall  
Omaha, NE 68102-2247

April 19, 2011  
LIC-11-0034

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Attn: Document Control Desk  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Reference: Docket No. 50-285

**SUBJECT: Part 21 Notification – Identification of Defect**

Pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(ii), Omaha Public District (OPPD), is providing written notification of the identification of a defect. This information was initially reported to the NRC Operations Center on March 21, 2011 (Event Number 46688).

The attachment to this letter provides the information required by 10 CFR 21.21(d)(4). In addition, the attachment discusses the relevance of this issue to the Fort Calhoun Station (FCS).

No commitments to the NRC are contained in this submittal.

Should you have questions or comments, please contact Ms. Susan Baughn at (402) 533-7215.

Sincerely,

J. A. Reinhart  
Site Vice President

JAR/rmc

Attachment: 10 CFR 21.21 Notification

c: E. E. Collins, Jr., NRC Regional Administrator, Region IV  
L. E. Wilkins, NRC Project Manager  
J. C. Kirkland, NRC Senior Resident Inspector  
INPO

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**10 CFR 21.21 NOTIFICATION**  
**Potter & Brumfield, KRP-14DG-125 Relays**

This notification follows the format of and addresses the considerations contained in 10 CFR 21.21(d)(4)(i)-(viii).

- (i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission:

**J. A. Reinhart, Site VP  
Omaha Public Power District  
Fort Calhoun Station  
444 South 16th Street Mall  
Omaha, NE 68102-2247**

- (ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect:

**The specific part is a Potter & Brumfield KRP-14-DG-125 Relay that is used in safety-related components.**

- (iii) Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect:

**The relay was manufactured by Potter & Brumfield a division of TYCO Electronics Corporation, supplied by Southern Testing Services a division of Argo Turbo Serve ATC.**

- (iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply:

**On March 17, 2011, during bench testing of the KRP-14DG-125 Relays, Fort Calhoun Station (FCS) discovered these relays were defective in that four of the relays had at least one contact that would not close properly after energizing and de-energizing the relay coils. If installed in the plant, the contacts failure to close properly could defeat the safety function of the relays that provide a signal to the component supported by that contact. The extent of this condition has been evaluated and none of the affected relays were released for installation in the plant.**

- (v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained:

**On March 21, 2011, the 10 CFR 21 evaluation of the failed relays was completed and the initial report was made to the NRC Operations Center. The responsible company officers were formally notified on March 21, 2011.**

- (vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for, being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured, or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part:

**Five relays received on May 30, 2008, passed bench testing and were installed in the FCS Emergency Diesel Generator engine controls.**

**The defective batch of relays were quarantined for further failure modes and effects testing. None of the affected relays have been installed in the plant.**

- (vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action:

**The defective KRP-14DG-125 relays were discovered during bench testing. The defective batch of relays were quarantined for further failure modes and effects testing. None of the affected relays are installed at FCS. Organizations participating in these corrective actions were FCS Engineering and Procurement.**

- (viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees:

**None**