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SUBJECT: Deficiency rept re failure to seperate B-train cables from A-Valve vault room.Initially reported on 850320.Engineering Change notices issued to remove existing conduits & accociated cables from A-Valve vault room.

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APR 0 8 1994

BLRD-50-438/85-12
BLRD-50-439/85-12

10 CFR 50.55(e)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Gentlemen:

In the Matter of the Application of)	Docket Nos. 50-438
Tennessee Valley Authority)	50-439

BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT (BLN) - FAILURE TO SEPARATE B-TRAIN CABLES FROM THE A-VALVE VAULT ROOM - BLRD-50-438/85-12 AND BLRD-50-439/85-12 - FINAL REPORT

The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-OIE Inspector Al Ignatonis on March 20, 1985 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as NCR BLN NEB 8504. The first interim report was submitted on April 16, 1985, and a second interim report was submitted on October 16, 1985. Enclosure 1 provides the final report for the subject deficiency. Enclosure 2 identifies the commitment being made as a result of this report.

Should there be any questions regarding this information, please telephone G. M. Morrison, BLN Acting Site Licensing Manager, at (205) 574-8057.

Fred McCluskey
H. Fred McCluskey

Enclosures
cc: See page 2

JE71

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ENCLOSURE 1

BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT (BLN) - UNITS 1 AND 2
FAILURE TO SEPARATE B-TRAIN CABLES FROM THE A-VALVE VAULT ROOM
BLRD-50-438/85-12 AND BLRD-439/85-12

FINAL REPORT

Description of Deficiency

A TVA internal design review determined that a large number of B-train cables pass through the A-valve vault room but are not connected to any equipment within the room. This cable routing is an apparent violation of the requirements of design criteria N4-50-D741 (Physical Separation Outside the Primary Containment), Sections 5.1.2.e and 5.1.6.a. This condition is attributed to design error and oversight of the requirements of design criteria N4-50-D741.

Safety Implications

A steam line break in the A-valve vault room could result in a complete loss of auxiliary feedwater to steam generator A. Steam generator B auxiliary feedwater could also be lost if the B-train circuit boards are incapacitated by adverse effects on the B-train cables passing through the A-valve vault room, resulting in inadvertent isolation of the B-train auxiliary feedwater. Loss of all auxiliary feedwater during a steam line break event could adversely affect plant safety.

Corrective Actions

BLN has determined that the corrective action is to remove and re-route the Class 1E conduits and associated B-train cables that are located in but do not terminate in the A-valve vault room. The original design of the routing of conduits for the auxiliary feedwater system was performed in 1977. TVA has since improved the design review process by issuing new procedures and has provided training which should prevent recurrence of similar situations. No additional action needed to prevent recurrence is required.

Corrective action document, BLNNEB8504, Revision 0 was initiated. Engineering Change Notices (ECN) ECN-3374 (Unit 1) and ECN-3375 (Unit 2), have been issued to remove the existing conduits and associated cables (as applicable) from the A-valve vault room. The construction activity associated with each of these ECNs is scheduled to be completed one year before fuel loading for each unit.

ENCLOSURE 2

BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT - UNITS 1 AND 2
FAILURE TO SEPARATE B-TRAIN CABLES FROM THE A-VALVE VAULT ROOM
BLRD-50-438/85-12 AND BLRD-50-439/85-12
NCR BLNNEB8504

COMMITMENT

ECN-3374 and ECN-3375, to re-route the B-train cables for each unit, will be completed by one year before fuel load for each unit.