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SUBJECT: Interim deficiency rept re potential Limitorque valve actuator valve failure caused by excessive keyway depth. Suspect valve actuators w/41 tooth pinion gears will be inspected & replaced prior to fuel load for both units.

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H. Fred McCluskey
Site Vice President, Bellefonte Nuclear Plant

JUN 01 1993

BLRD-50-438/93-03
BLRD-50-439/93-03

10 CFR 50.55(e)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Gentlemen:

In the Matter of the Application of)
Tennessee Valley Authority)

Docket Nos. 50-438
50-439

**BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT (BLN) - UNITS 1 AND 2 - POTENTIAL
LIMITORQUE VALVE ACTUATOR FAILURE CAUSED BY EXCESSIVE KEYWAY
DEPTH - BLRD-50-438/93-03 AND BLRD-50-439/93-03 - INTERIM REPORT FOR
UNITS 1 AND 2**

Because BLN is in a long-term layup mode, the determination of reportability for the subject deficiency, BLPER930026, has not been completed at this time. Therefore, in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e), enclosure 1 provides the interim report for units 1 and 2. TVA expects to provide the final report on or before one year before fuel load for each unit. Enclosure 2 identifies the commitment made in this report.

Should there be any questions regarding this information, please telephone Ralph Shell, BLN Acting Site Licensing Manager, at (205) 574-8058.

H. Fred McCluskey
H. Fred McCluskey

Enclosures

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cc (Enclosures):

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ENCLOSURE 1
BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT (BLN) - UNITS 1 AND 2
POTENTIAL LIMITORQUE VALVE ACTUATOR FAILURE CAUSED BY
EXCESSIVE KEYWAY DEPTH
BLRD-50-438/93-03 AND BLRD-50-439/93-03
10 CFR 50.55(e)
PER BLPER930026

DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIENCY

Problem Evaluation Report (PER) No. BLPER930026 was issued at BLN as a result of the generic applicability review of Watts Bar Condition Adverse to Quality Report (CAQR) No. WBP890532.

The Watts Bar CAQR documented manufacturing deficiencies relative to the machining of the keyway in Limitorque operator pinion gears which was deemed reportable under 10 CFR 50.55(e) and 10 CFR 21. The subsequent 10 CFR 21 Notification issued by the Limitorque Corporation identified the suspect pinion gears to be those 41 tooth pinion gears utilized in operator types SMB, SB, and SBD, sizes 00 and 0, within a specified serial number range and any replacement gears furnished between August 1974 and August 1978.

A review of the Limitorque BLN records revealed that BLN did possess a significant quantity (approximately 250) of the suspect actuators. Many of the actuators are installed or designated for installation in safety-related systems throughout the plant, both Units 1 and 2.

SAFETY IMPLICATIONS

BLN is currently in a long-term layup mode and construction is not currently scheduled to resume at the facility for several years. It is not practical to immediately perform an inspection of the suspect operators since this would require disassembly of the actuator gear housing. The suspect operators will be inspected, defective pinion gears identified, and the potential impact on plant safety determined. PER BLPER930026 was generated to identify the suspect actuators and provides a means to track and determine applicability of the Limitorque 10 CFR 21 to BLN.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

As delineated in PER BLPER930026, the BLN Motor Operated Valve Refurbishment Procedures will include the requirement to perform an inspection of the keyway depth on the cited 41 tooth pinion gears and replace those found defective. This action will be completed one year prior to fuel load for both Units 1 and 2.

Further information will be provided when the inspections prescribed in the corrective actions of the PER have been completed so that the impact to plant safety can be accurately evaluated.

ENCLOSURE 2
COMMITMENT MADE TO THE NRC

The suspect Limitorque Motor Operated Valve Actuators with 41 tooth pinion gears will be inspected and replaced if found defective. This action will be completed one year before fuel load for both Units 1 and 2.