

**From:** Banic, Merrilee  
**Sent:** Friday, March 25, 2011 8:01 AM  
**To:** Guzman, Richard  
**Cc:** Salgado, Nancy; Markley, Michael; Mensah, Tanya  
**Subject:** RE: G20110174 (Floyd Rudman)

I agree with Rich's recommendation.

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**From:** Mensah, Tanya  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 24, 2011 3:34 PM  
**To:** Guzman, Richard; Banic, Merrilee  
**Cc:** Salgado, Nancy; Markley, Michael  
**Subject:** RE: G20110174 (Floyd Rudman)

Rich, I am in agreement with your recommendation to proceed down the path of general correspondence (w/ coordination as you stated). I did share this feedback with Tom earlier today and he was in agreement. I think Lee is out of the office for the remainder of the day. She should get back to you soon to provide you with her recommendation.

Thanks everyone for your time earlier today!

I will not be in the office tomorrow. But may be checking email periodically if anything urgent arises.

Thanks,

Tanya

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**From:** Guzman, Richard  
**Sent:** Thursday, March 24, 2011 3:30 PM  
**To:** Banic, Merrilee  
**Cc:** Salgado, Nancy; Mensah, Tanya; Markley, Michael  
**Subject:** G20110174 (Floyd Rudman)

Lee,

As discussed during today's meeting, I believe the appropriate agency process to respond to the Rudman e-mail is via routine/general correspondence. I recommend that we treat it as such and respond via e-mail, and then place the email in ADAMS as an official agency record. I would coordinate with OIP, Region, and our Communication Team for inputs (and concurrence on the proposed response). Believe this will also reduce undue administrative burden on the staff while still following a process to openly respond to a public inquiry or petition request. My recommendation is based in part on:

- Per MD 8.11, Section A(2), "NRC's Receipt of a Petition (Assignment of Staff Action): *If the document [1] does not cite 10 CFR 2.206 and [2] does not meet the criteria for review under that section, the staff will respond to it under some other process (e.g., routine correspondence, allegations. If a petition meets the criteria but does not specifically cite 10 CFR 2.206, the staff will attempt to contact the petitioner by telephone to determine if he or she wants the request processed pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206. The*

*staff may determine that a request forwarded for staff action is not a petition for enforcement-related action but, rather, a petition for rulemaking, for example.*

Since [1] the request does not meet the criteria for 2.206 review [i.e., (a) no request for enforcement action such as issuing an order, NOV, or civil penalty and/or (b) facts constituting bases for taking the particular action are not provided/specified] and [2] it does not cite 10 CFR 2.206, I believe we are on firm ground to handle this one under routine correspondence. (Mr. Rudman's email is pasted below for your convenience).

Do you have any objections w/this recommendation and proposed path? Mike M. and Tanya M. are also on cc: for their comment on this recommendation. Before I contact Mr. Rudman per MD 8.11 as an assigned Petition Manager (and effectively start the 2.206 process), I'd like for us to make the call at this point and agree on the applicable agency process for handling this request.

Thanks,  
Rich

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**From:** Floyd Rudmin [<mailto:profrudmin@yahoo.ca>]  
**Sent:** Monday, March 14, 2011 6:14 AM  
**To:** OPA1 RESOURCE  
**Subject:** concern about nuclear power safety at Nine Mile reactor

Good morning.

I live in Kingston, Ontario, across the lake from the reactor at Oneida. The Chernobyl reactor failure and now the Fukushima reactor failures (plural), all have been caused by lack of back-up cooling of the reactor cores. What is shameful, is that in both sites, there was only one redundancy back up for cooling. The Japanese and American engineers who planned the Fukushima reactors, could not imagine that an earthquake and a tidal wave would happen at the same time. The earthquake automatically shut down the reactor, as planned, but at the same time terminating the reactors own electrical supply to run the pumps. The diesel generators started up, as planned. And then the tidal wave disabled the generators, and the reactor core went uncooled for many hours.

If we know that loss of coolant will cause catastrophe, then why do these systems have only one set of back up cooling systems?

There should be 4 or 5 back-up electrical systems, of different types, including batteries. There should be on-site back-up supplies of coolant fluids. Several different storage systems, not just one extra. It should not happen that a nuclear power plant has to pump sea water to cool a reactor. There should be several back-up pump systems, not one.

All of the redundant back-ups should be stored and sited in different places and in different ways.

Can you confirm to me that the Oneida nuclear power plant has multiple back-up systems, of different types? If they do not, would you please take immediate action to command the company that runs that reactor to spend the money to have many redundancy back-ups, of different types, sited at different spots, stored in different ways.

Sincerely,  
Floyd Rudmin