

U.S. EPR Protection System Surveillance Testing and TELEPERM XS Self-Monitoring

ANP-10315NP
Revision 0

Technical Report

March 2011

AREVA NP Inc.

Non-Proprietary

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Nature of Changes

Item	Section(s) or Page(s)	Description and Justification
000		Original Release

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Nomenclature

Acronym	Definition
ADOT	Actuating Device Operational Tests
ALU	Actuation Logic Unit
AMS	Aeroball Measurement System
APU	Acquisition and Processing Unit
CRC	Cyclic Redundancy Check
CVCS	Chemical and Volume Control System
DNBR	Departure from Nucleate Boiling Ratio
EFW	Emergency Feedwater
ESF	Engineered Safety Feature
ESFAS	Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System
FMEA	Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
HMI	Human Machine Interface
I&C	Instrumentation and Controls
I/O	Input/Output
LCO	Limiting Conditions for Operation
MCR	Main Control Room
MS	Millisecond
MSI	Monitoring Service Interface
PACS	Priority and Actuator Control System
PS	Protection System
RCCA	Rod Cluster Control Assembly
RCCLS	Reactor Control Surveillance and Limitation System
RT	Reactor Trip
RTD	Resistance Temperature Detector
SAS	Safety Automation System
SCDS	Signal Conditioning and Distribution System
SDS	Signal Distribution System
SPND	Self-Powered Neutron Detector
SU	Service Unit
TXS	Teleperm XS
V&V	Verification and Validation

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 *Purpose*

This technical report presents the overall surveillance testing philosophy applied to the U.S. EPR Protection System (PS). The philosophy described herein is consistent with surveillance requirements found in U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 2, Chapter 16, Technical Specification 3.3.1. The overall surveillance testing philosophy is described with particular emphasis on:

- Describing complete testing coverage of the PS via overlapping tests, including self-testing and periodic surveillance testing.
- Providing detail regarding the self-testing features to demonstrate their adequacy.
- Describing conformance to regulatory requirements and guidance applicable to surveillance testing of the U.S EPR PS.

1.2 *Scope*

This technical report addresses the surveillance testing and self-monitoring of the U.S. EPR PS which, together, provide complete testing coverage from sensor through actuator. The scope of this report corresponds with the technical specification surveillance requirements applicable to the PS, which are found in U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 2, Chapter 16, Technical Specification 3.3.1.

Section 2.2.6 of this report is applicable to any system implemented with Teleperm XS (TXS) micro-processor based technology (e.g., U.S. EPR Safety Automation System (SAS)). The remainder of the report is specific to the U.S. EPR PS.

2.0 U.S. EPR PROTECTION SYSTEM SURVEILLANCE TESTING PHILOSOPHY

2.1 Overview

Descriptions in this report correspond with the U.S. EPR PS design as defined in ANP-10309, "U.S. EPR Digital Protection System Technical Report" (Reference 11).

The U.S. EPR PS surveillance testing philosophy consists of both periodic testing and self-tests that, together, provide complete coverage from sensor to actuator for reactor trip (RT) and engineered safeguard feature actuation functions. This philosophy takes advantage of comprehensive and wide-ranging self-test features of the TXS platform that render additional periodic testing of some portions of the system unnecessary.

The PS testing philosophy combines a series of overlapping tests that confirm that the system performs as required. IEEE 338-1987 (Reference 8), as endorsed by RG 1.118 (Reference 4), suggests that a single test encompassing each component from the sensor to the actuator is preferable, but allows a series of overlapping tests when a single test is not practical. In the U.S. EPR PS design, single functional tests from sensors to actuators are not practical. For example:

- Pressure relieving devices (e.g., pressurizer safety relief valves, main steam relief trains) cannot be tested during power operation. These devices are typically tested during refueling outages. However, much of the upstream instrumentation and controls (I&C) that performs initiation logic for these devices can be tested during power operation. A single functional test from sensor to actuator is not practical as it would require additional testing during refueling outages of the upstream I&C which is already tested during power operation.
- Surveillance requirements that involve the sensors, such as sensor calibration, can be performed by removing only an acquisition and processing unit (APU) from service. The ALUs in the same division can remain in service and continue performing their protective function based on redundant sensor measurements

from the other three PS divisions. A single functional test from sensor to actuator is not practical as it would require removing an entire PS division from service unnecessarily, while keeping the ALUs in service prevents the need to enter limiting conditions for operations (LCOs) for mechanical components controlled by the ALUs, but not involved in the testing.

- Surveillance requirements that involve generating PS outputs to the priority and actuator control system (PACS) can be performed by only removing the ALUs from service. The APUs in the same division can remain in service and continue performing their protective function of providing votes to trip to ALUs in other divisions. A single functional test from sensor to actuator is not practical as it would require removing an entire PS division from service unnecessarily.
- Two divisions of the PS are required to vote for the initiation of the majority of RT and engineered safety feature (ESF) functions (emergency diesel generator start signals are an exception). Two divisions of PS components would have to be removed from service and simultaneously tested in order to provide a single test from sensor to actuation device. Several functions receive input from multiple sensors. Coordination of multiple simultaneous simulated parameter changes, in multiple divisions, is impractical. In addition, removing multiple divisions of PS components would reduce the reliability of the PS to detect and respond to actual changes in operational conditions.
- Several RT and ESF functions receive input from multiple sensors whose inputs are combined in calculations to determine if the protective function is necessary. For example, the chemical and volume control system (CVCS) isolation on anti-dilution mitigation - standard shutdown conditions function combines inputs from the cold leg temperature (wide range), boron concentration - CVCS charging line, boron temperature - CVCS charging line, and CVCS charging line flow sensors in the calculation of reactor coolant system boron concentration. It is impractical to coordinate simultaneous simulated inputs from multiple sensors in order to determine the operability of the function.

- The RT function on low departure from nucleate boiling ratio (DNBR) receives 173 sensor inputs. It is not possible to design a single functional test from sensor to actuator that would test each combination and permutation of input sensor measurements and verify correct outputs for each case. However, sensor operational tests and calibrations can be performed individually on each of the 173 inputs to verify correct operation of the input channels.

Figure 2-1 represents the U.S. EPR PS overlap testing philosophy and shows which portions of the PS are periodically tested through technical specification surveillance requirements, and which parts are continuously tested through self-monitoring features.

2.2 Overlapping Test Coverage

This section addresses each of the various overlapping tests shown in Figure 2-1, identifies the system equipment covered by each test, and provides information about how the testing is generally performed. Specific testing strategies and procedures will be developed by each COL applicant referencing the U.S. EPR standard design. A COL applicant may choose to perform a surveillance testing alternative from those described in this section. Descriptions of how testing is performed in this section are not intended to constrain a licensee to only these methods. They simply demonstrate that at least one method exists to provide complete, overlapping test coverage of the PS.

2.2.1 Calibration

Calibration refers to the adjustment, as necessary, of a sensor output so that it responds within the necessary range and accuracy to known values of the parameter that the sensor monitors. Calibration includes all devices in the instrument channel required to function for an accurate parameter value to be received by the APU function computer.

In the U.S. EPR PS design, calibration includes the following equipment:

- Sensor.

- Sensor path through any black-box monitoring systems.
- Sensor path through the signal conditioning and distribution system (SCDS).
- Input module of the APU.
- APU function processor to the extent that the sensor measurement is acquired by the application software and the value used in the application software is viewed from the service unit (SU).

The method used to perform a calibration depends on the type of sensor being tested. In cases where the sensor is accessible, and suitable test equipment exists (typical pressure and level sensors), a substitute input to the sensor of the same nature as the monitored variable is used. The measurement value acquired by the application software in the function processor is viewed from the SU to verify accuracy of the measurement channel.

Calibration of resistance temperature detectors (RTDs) is performed by cross checks. During several isothermal plant conditions, the RTD values acquired in the APU function processor application software can be viewed via the SU. The values of redundant RTD measurement are compared at each of the isothermal conditions to determine an acceptable value. Calibration parameters can then be adjusted in the application software so that each RTD measurement is accurate with respect to the cross calibrated value.

Calibration of analog rod cluster control assembly (RCCA) position measurements is performed by comparing it to the digital RCCA position measurements. The analog position measurement acquired by the application software in the APU function processor can be viewed from the SU. This value is compared with the digital RCCA position measurement provided by the reactor control surveillance and limitation system (RCCLS) to verify consistency within a specified tolerance.

Calibration of self-powered neutron detectors (SPND) is performed based on flux mapping by the aeroball measurement system (AMS). The principles of SPND

calibration based on the AMS flux mapping are described in detail in Appendix B of ANP-10287P, "U.S. EPR Incore Trip Setpoint and Transient Methodology" (Reference 13). The resulting SPND calibration factors are entered into the APU function processor application software via the SU.

Calibration of boron concentration measurement is performed based on a reference measurement (e.g., chemical analysis of a sample of the fluid in the piping where the boron concentration measurement sensor is located). The boron concentration measurement acquired by the application software in the APU function processor can be viewed from the SU. This value is compared with the reference measurement to verify consistency within a specified tolerance.

Calibration of power range detectors is performed based on a power calorimetric and flux map performed at or above 20 percent reactor thermal power. The power range measurement acquired by the application software in the APU function processor can be viewed from the SU. The power range measurements are normalized based on the calorimetric and flux map results.

Calibration of intermediate range detectors is performed by obtaining the detector plateau or preamp discriminator curves, evaluating those curves, and comparing the curves with the manufacturer's data. The intermediate range measurement acquired by the application software in the APU function processor can be viewed from the SU and adjustments made based on results from comparing the curves with the manufacturer's data.

2.2.2 *Sensor Operational Test*

A sensor operational test is the injection of a simulated or actual signal into a PS division as close to the sensor as practicable, and capture of the injected signal when it reaches the application software of the APU function processor. This process allows verification of accuracy and response time of devices between the sensor and the APU function processor.

In the U.S. EPR PS design, sensor operational tests include the following equipment:

- Sensor signal path through any black-box monitoring systems.
- Sensor signal path through the signal conditioning and distribution system (SCDS).
- Input module of the APU.
- APU function processor to the extent that the sensor measurement is acquired by the application software and the value used in the application software is viewed from the SU.

The method used to perform a sensor operational test is the same for all sensor types. This method consists of injecting a test signal into either the black-box monitoring system or the SCDS, allowing the signal to propagate to the APU function processor, and reading the test signal via the SU. The test signals are injected via permanently installed test plugs so that no lifting of leads, temporary jumpers, or make-shift connections are required. The use of a portable test computer allows injection of a precise test signal and allows precise measurement of the time required for the signal to reach the APU function processor.

Figure 2-2 shows the concept for performing sensor operational tests for sensors that are processed by black box monitoring systems. Figure 2-3 shows the concept for sensors that are not processed by black box monitoring systems.

2.2.3 Setpoint Verification

Setpoint verification is performed to verify that correct values for nominal trip setpoints reside in the application software of the APU function processor. This verification is performed periodically to protect against human errors that may lead to an incorrect value for a nominal trip setpoint being loaded into the APU.

In the U.S. EPR PS design, setpoint verification includes the following equipment:

- The APU function processor to the extent that the nominal trip setpoint value

resides in the application software of the function processor.

The setpoint verification is performed by displaying the setpoint values residing in the APU application software on the SU, and manually compares those values with reference values (e.g., those documented in plant setpoint calculations).

2.2.4 Response Time Tests

Response time tests are used to verify that the PS actuation response times are less than or equal to the maximum values assumed in the accident analysis. The entire actuation path from sensor to actuator is subject to response time testing. For the reasons cited in Section 2.1, response time testing is performed as a series of overlapping tests that include each component in the actuation path.

2.2.4.1 Sensors

The response time of the sensor can be tested by providing a substitute input of the same nature as the monitored variable and recording the time the sensor output takes to accurately reflect the substitute input. In many cases, this type of testing is cumbersome and requires removing the sensor from its installed location to perform the testing. Alternatively, a licensee can submit a topical report to the NRC that justifies excluding sensors from response time testing. In either case, the response time of the sensor must be included in the periodic determination that the overall PS actuation function responds within the maximum time assumed in the plant accident analyses.

2.2.4.2 Sensor Output to APU Function Processor

The response time of the equipment between the sensor output and the APU function processor can be verified during performance of the sensor operational tests as described in Section 2.2.2.

2.2.4.3 APU Inputs to ALU Outputs

The response time of the equipment comprising the APU, ALU, and communication links between the two is tested using a test input signal, allowing the test signal to

propagate through the APU, communication networks and ALU, and acquiring the test signal output from the ALU. Simple logic dedicated to the response time test is included in the application software of the APU and ALU function processors. This means the response time testing can be performed while the PS equipment is actively functioning without impacting the logic that performs the protective functions. The response time of an actuation path can be accurately measured through a dedicated logic path that does not include the protective function logic for the following reasons:

- Binary and analog inputs to a function processor are read once by the function processor at the beginning of each clock cycle.
- Inputs received via data communication messages are read once by the function processor at the beginning of each clock cycle.
- Logical functions in the application software are performed once during each clock cycle.
- Binary or analog outputs are updated once with the results of the logical functions at the end of each clock cycle.
- Output data communication messages are output once at the end of each clock cycle.

This deterministic behavior dictates that the response time is the same for all signals processed by the same function processor and follows the same communication path between function processors.

One method for performing this response time testing is shown in Figure 2-4. A single manual control is used to provide hardwired inputs to APU in each of the four PS divisions. The same control also starts the timer of a test machine. Each APU processes the test signal and sends it via data communication to an ALU in one division, where a two-out-of-four logic is performed on the four test signals. The ALU then provides a dedicated output that is acquired by the test machine and stops the timer. The test is then repeated using the same APU in each division, but acquiring the

test output from an ALU in another division. This testing is repeated until each APU-to ALU-actuation path has been tested.

Each function processor and communication module in the PS operates strictly cyclically with a fixed, pre-determined cycle time. They also operate asynchronously from one another. Because of this, while the response time is the same for all signals using the same path, this response time varies. For example, in one instance an input signal could change near the end of a clock cycle and be read-in at the beginning of the next cycle. In another instance the input signal could change just after the beginning of a clock cycle and not read- in until the beginning of the next cycle. These two instances result in two slightly different response times. Due to this effect, each response time test must be performed multiple times, verifying that each test result does not exceed the response time requirements for the system.

2.2.4.4 ALU Outputs to Actuator

The response time of the equipment between the ALU output and the actuator can be verified during performance of the actuating device operational tests (ADOT) as described in Section 2.2.5.

2.2.5 Actuating Device Operational Test

An ADOT consist of operating the actuating device and verifying the correct operation of each device from the outputs of the PS to the actuator.

In the U.S. EPR PS design, ADOT includes the following equipment:

- ALU function processor to the extent that the application software provides a signal to the output module to simulate an actuation output.
- Output modules of the ALU.
- PACS priority module for engineered safety feature actuation system (ESFAS) initiations.
- Switchgear for ESFAS initiations.

- Plant actuator for ESFAS initiations.
- Trip breakers and trip contactors for RT initiations.

Different methods are used to perform ADOT for ESFAS functions and RT functions.

2.2.5.1 ADOT for ESFAS Actuators

For ESFAS actuators, two overlapping tests (i.e., no-go test and go test) are used to provide test coverage of each component between the PS outputs and the actuator. In a no-go test, the PS outputs are activated and acquired by the PACS priority module, but the outputs of the priority module are blocked to prevent the actuator from responding. In a go test, the non-safety-related I&C is used to exercise the actuator via the PACS priority module. The ADOT confirms both the functional capability and response time of the equipment between the PS outputs and the actuator.

2.2.5.1.1 ESFAS “No-Go” ADOT

Each ESFAS actuator has a dedicated PACS priority module. For a given ESFAS function, the PS sends actuation signals to the priority modules corresponding to the actuators required for that function. The no-go test duplicates this functionality by prompting the PS to send actuation outputs to all priority modules involved in a particular ESFAS function. All ESFAS priority modules are tested on a function-by-function basis. The test is initiated via the SU and performed by dedicated logic in the ALU application software.

Figure 2-5 shows logic that could be used to perform a no-go test. The example in Figure 2-5 is for an ESFAS function that includes three actuators. When the test release parameter has been set to “1,” the test is initiated. A dedicated ALU output is generated to block the output of the priority module to prevent the actuator from responding. The blocking signal lasts for 5 seconds and is overridden if, at any time during the 5 seconds, a legitimate protection function is initiated. Two seconds after the blocking signal is generated, the ALU actuation outputs for the ESFAS function are activated and sent to the group of priority modules involved in the function being tested.

This ALU output is acquired by a test machine, via a permanently installed test connection, to verify that the ALU output is generated and to start a timer. The output of each priority module is also acquired by the test machine, via a permanently installed test connection, to verify that the signal was processed correctly by the priority logic and to stop the timer. In this way, the functionality of the ALU output module, wiring between the ALU and priority module, and the priority logic are verified. The response time of each priority module is also verified.

The primary reason a test machine is needed for this test is to verify the response time of the priority logic. A COL applicant referencing the U.S. EPR standard design may propose to exclude the priority logic from periodic response time testing. This would require the applicant to submit a topical report justifying that approach. If the priority logic is excluded from response time testing, the priority logic outputs can be wired to the monitoring service interface (MSI) computer, and the functionality verified via the SU.

2.2.5.1.2 ESFAS “Go” ADOT

The go portion of the ESFAS ADOT overlaps the no-go test in the priority logic of the PACS and includes the switchgear and the actuator itself. The go tests are performed on a per-actuator basis (i.e., each actuator is operated individually). This testing consists of exercising the actuator from the operator’s normal human machine interface (HMI) in the main control room (MCR). The operator takes a manual action from the PICS to initiate operation of the actuator. The signal is transferred from the PICS to the PAS and then to the PACS priority logic via the PACS communication module. The priority logic then provides an output to the switchgear, and the actuator responds accordingly. The time stamping capabilities of the PAS are used to capture the time of the actuation output and the time that indication is received that the actuator has responded. The nature of feedback to PAS that the actuator has completed its action depends on the type of actuator and the maintenance procedures used by the plant operator. Typically, limit switches are used to indicate valve actions and either pump speed or flow measurements are used to determine that a pump has achieved its rated

speed or flow. In this way, both the functionality and response time of each component downstream of the PACS is verified. Figure 2-6 shows the concept for the go test portion of ADOT.

2.2.5.1.3 ADOT for PS ESFAS Outputs to Other I&C Systems

There are three cases where the PS sends an output to another I&C system as part of an ESFAS function:

- Partial cooldown output to SAS to control main steam relief control valves.
- Emergency feedwater (EFW) actuation output to SAS to control SG level.
- Output to TG I&C for turbine trip following an RT.

For these three cases, a no-go test is used to verify that the PS output signal is generated and received by either the SAS or TG I&C. Plant technical specifications require testing of the outputs from SAS or TG I&C to their respective ESFAS actuators.

2.2.5.2 ADOT for Reactor Trip

Functional testing of the ALU RT outputs and trip devices (i.e., breakers and contactors) can be performed during plant operation per division. Four divisional RT manual controls are provided to the operator on the SICS. Each of these manual controls is acquired by the ALUs in one PS division, and combined with the automatic RT logic in the application software to generate an RT output. Activation of each manual control results in opening one RT breaker and one fourth of the RT contactors. This does not cause a reactor scram as RT outputs from two PS divisions are required to interrupt power to the RCCAs. Position indications of the trip breakers and contactors are acquired by the PAS and displayed to the operator on PICS to verify that the trip devices have responded to the divisional RT signal.

Rod drop testing is performed during refueling outages in accordance with U.S. EPR Technical Specification, Surveillance Requirement 3.1.4.3. The same manual controls from SICS can be used for this purpose except that all four controls are activated

simultaneously to achieve actual RCCA insertion into the core. The response times related to the trip devices and RCCA insertion are measured as part of this testing.

2.2.6 Self-Monitoring Features

Information contained in this section is generically applicable to TXS microprocessor based systems (applies to both PS and SAS).

Self-monitoring features fall into one of two main categories: Inherent self-monitoring, and engineered self-monitoring. Inherent self-monitoring features are those that are contained in the TXS system software and are present in every TXS system.

Engineered self-monitoring features are those that are designed on a project-specific basis as part of the application software.

The inherent and engineered self-monitoring features together provide exhaustive coverage of detecting failures that could prevent performance of a safety function. The coverage of the self-monitoring features is shown in Table 2-5.

2.2.6.1 Software Based Self-Test (Inherent)

Extensive self-testing is designed as part of the TXS system software. It consists of one part, which is executed once during every startup (i.e., extended self-test), and another part, which is processed repeatedly during operation of the TXS function processor (i.e., continuous self-test). Table 2-1 provides an overview of the self-tests including whether they are executed as part of continuous and/or extended self-testing.

The continuous self-test performs only those tests which can be performed without affecting the operation of the application software. The continuous self-test is executed repeatedly during the function processor's cyclic processing. It is executed as an operating system task with the lowest priority. Thus, the operating system schedules the continuous self-test only if no other task with higher priority (e.g., the cyclic processing of application software and the processing of service commands) is pending. If the continuous self-test detects an error, it activates the exception-handler to receive error

information. The exception-handler (see Section 2.2.6.3) then executes a reset or shutdown of the function processor.

Executing each test of the continuous self-test task takes several minutes, the exact amount of time depends on the free time available in each clock cycle after the application processing and the service task. The runtime environment monitors the periodic execution of the continuous self-test. If the continuous self-test is not complete after one hour, the runtime environment issues an error message to the SU. This error message is also transferred to the application software for inclusion in engineered alarms to the operator.

The extended self-test is initiated by resetting the function processor; it is performed as part of the function processor's startup routine. During the extended self-test, additional tests are performed which can not be performed during operation without affecting the processing of the application software. Any errors detected by the extended self-test prevent the function processor from starting its cyclic processing. The function processor is halted and information about the detected error can be retrieved locally by connecting a PC with diagnostic tools software to the function processor.

2.2.6.2 *Hardware Watchdog (Inherent)*

TXS function processors are equipped with a hardware based watchdog timer. The monitoring time of the watchdog is the cycle time of the runtime environment + 110 millisecond (ms). The hardware watchdog must be re-triggered by the runtime environment software before its expiration. If the software fails to do so, an error is assumed and a hardwired signal is used to indicate a processor failure, and to switch off the (input/output (I/O) modules' power supply to verify a defined fail-safe behavior of the affected function processor, independently from software based monitoring. Additionally, the exception-handler is activated, initiating a specific response (see section 2.2.6.3).


2.2.6.3 Exception-Handler (Inherent)

The exception handler is activated when exceptional situations are encountered during runtime (also in case of a fault detected by the cyclic self-test). After activation, the exception-handler deactivates all output boards through driver calls, and cyclic communication is stopped. Self monitoring result information is saved, which includes: exception type, exception number, exception address, memory dump and stack dump.

Depending on the type of fault, the exception-handler either resets or halts the function processor, as indicated. If a second exceptional situation occurs within a specified period after a reset (depends on cycle time: e.g., 5 minutes for a 50 ms cycle), the function processor is deactivated. Tables 2-2, 2-3, and 2-4 show the exceptional situations that activate the exception handler.

2.2.6.4 Error Detection by the Runtime Environment (Inherent)





2.2.6.5 Communication Monitoring

Communication in the TXS system is performed cyclically with a fixed communication cycle time. The communication cycle is the same for all function processors in the system and is specified during the design process. Communication messages are sent once every communication cycle. The receiver performs a series of checks:

- Message header check: Which contains the following information:
 - Protocol version
 - Sender ID
 - Receiver ID
 - Message ID
 - Message type
 - Message length.
- Message age monitoring: The message age is monitored by the runtime environment cycle counter, which is included by the sender in every transferred message. In case one message does not arrive in time, the values of the message from the previous cycle are allowed to be reused. If for two consecutive communication cycles no new and valid message has been received in time, the signals included in the message are marked with an error status.

If one of the listed checks fails, the affected data are marked with an error status. An error message is issued and transferred to the service unit. These checks are performed by the runtime environment of the function processors. Independently from

this, the firmware of the communication processor module performs additional checks (e.g., destination address check, frame check, sequence check). If these checks fail, the received data packet is discarded by the communication module resulting in a loss of the data packet. This loss is then treated by the function processor as previously described (based on message age monitoring).

2.2.6.6 *Monitoring of the Continuous Self-Test*

The runtime environment monitors the operation of the cyclic self-test. If the cyclic self-test does not complete one self-test cycle within one hour, the runtime environment issues an error message. This does not disrupt runtime environment operation. In particular, the processing of the application software functions is not affected.

2.2.6.7 *Engineered Self-Monitoring Features*

In addition to the inherent self-monitoring performed by the TXS system software / hardware, additional monitoring is implemented in the application software on a project-specific basis. The engineered monitoring features included in the U.S. EPR design are:

- Monitoring runtime environment message flags to be used in alarm processing.
- Monitoring the signal status of input signals.
- Checking the channel: Analog input measurements received by each safety division are sent to the divisional MSIs and then to the gateways. Within the gateway, signals from redundant divisions are compared for consistency. Inconsistent measurements trigger an indication to the MCR.
- Checking rationality: For example range monitoring of analog input signals or monitoring anti-valent binary input signals. This includes live-zero monitoring for analog signals (i.e., values below 3.5 mA in case of 4-20 mA signals are interpreted as invalid signals, allowing to detect a faulty signal source).

Detection of faults through engineered self-monitoring is then used to:

- Initiate an alarm or indication in the MCR.
- Mark affected signals as faulty and exclude them from further processing.
- Initiate specific measures, such as using a replacement value or triggering/blocking an I&C function (especially in case of multiple faults).

Object	Comment	During Startup Only (1) During Startup and as part of Cyclic Testing (2)

Table 2-2—CPU Exceptions

Table 2-3—FPU Exceptions




Table 2-4—Hardware Exceptions




Table 2-5—Self-Monitoring Features Coverage

Note:

1. Depends on system architecture used

Figure 2-1—U.S. EPR PS Testing Philosophy Overview



**Figure 2-2—Sensor Operational Testing Including Black Box
Monitoring**



**Figure 2-3—Sensor Operational Testing Excluding Black Box
Monitoring**



Figure 2-4—APU and ALU Response Time Test



Figure 2-5—ESFAS “No-Go” Test Concept





Figure 2-6—ESFAS “Go” Test Concept



3.0 CONFORMANCE WITH REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS AND GUIDANCE

This section addresses U.S. EPR conformance with regulatory requirements and guidance relevant to testing provisions for the PS.

3.1 GDC 21 “Protection System Reliability and Testability” [1]

Requirement:

The PS shall be designed to permit periodic testing of its functioning when the reactor is in operation, including a capability to test channels independently to determine failures and losses of redundancy that may have occurred.

Conformance:

This requirement is satisfied by U.S. EPR PS conformance with RG 1.22 and 1.118. Conformance to these RGs is described in Sections 3.3 and 3.5, respectively.

3.2 GDC 22 “Protection System Independence” [1]

Requirement:

The protection system shall be designed to assure that the effects of natural phenomena, and of normal operating, maintenance, testing, and postulated accident conditions on redundant channels do not result in loss of the protection function.

Conformance:

Sufficient redundancy is provided in the U.S. EPR PS so performing periodic testing does not prevent the ability of the system to respond to a bona fide accident. Technical Specifications contained in U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 2, Chapter 16, LCO 3.3.1 verify that all PS functions remain available while the plant is operating in a mode where the functions are required.

3.3 Regulatory Guide 1.22 “Periodic Testing of Protection System Actuation Functions” [2]

Regulatory Position 1:

The protection system should be designed to permit periodic testing to extend to and include the actuation devices and actuated equipment.

- a. The periodic tests should duplicate, as closely as practicable, the performance that is required of the actuation devices in the event of an accident.
- b. The protection system and the systems whose operation it initiates should be designed to permit testing of the actuation devices during reactor operation.

Conformance:

ADOT surveillance tests include the actuation devices and actuated equipment as described in Section 2.2.5. The ADOT surveillance testing includes exercising the actuation devices in the same manner that they are required to operate to respond to an accident. The actuation devices can be tested during reactor operation as described in conformance to Regulatory Position 2.

Regulatory Position 2:

Acceptable methods of including the actuation devices in the periodic tests of the protection system are:

- a. Testing simultaneously all actuation devices and actuated equipment associated with each redundant protection system output signal;
- b. Testing all actuation devices and actuated equipment individually or in judiciously selected groups;
- c. Preventing the operation of certain actuated equipment during a test of their actuation devices;

- d. Providing the actuated equipment with more than one actuation device and testing individually each actuation device.

Conformance:

Testing actuation devices and actuated equipment is performed individually or in judiciously selected groups as described in Sections 2.2.5.1.2 and 2.2.5.2. In cases where testing the actuated equipment would result in unsafe plant conditions, the actuated equipment is provided with more than one actuation device and the actuation devices are tested individually.

Regulatory Position 3:

Where the ability of a system to respond to a bona fide accident signal is intentionally bypassed for the purpose of performing a test during reactor operation:

- a. Positive means should be provided to prevent expansion of the bypass condition to redundant or diverse systems, and
- b. Each bypass condition should be individually and automatically indicated to the reactor operator in the MCR.

Conformance:

Sufficient redundancy is provided in the U.S. EPR PS so performing periodic testing does not prevent the ability of the system to respond to a bona fide accident. Technical Specifications in U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 2, Chapter 16, LCO 3.3.1 verify that all PS functions remain available while the plant is operating in a mode where the functions are required. While bypasses for periodic testing do not prevent the system from performing its function, these bypasses are nonetheless automatically indicated in the MCR on the PICS.

Regulatory Position 4:

Where actuated equipment is not tested during reactor operation, it should be shown that:

- a. There is no practicable system design that would permit operation of the actuated equipment without adversely affecting the safety or operability of the plant;
- b. The probability that the protection system will fail to initiate the operation of the actuated equipment is, and can be maintained, acceptably low without testing the actuated equipment during reactor operation, and
- c. The actuated equipment can be routinely tested when the reactor is shut down.

Conformance:

In the U.S. EPR design, the only actuated equipment that cannot be tested during reactor operation are those whose operation would adversely affect the safety or operability of the plant (e.g., RCCAs for RT, certain pressure relieving valves). The Technical Specification intervals for surveilling such equipment are based on reliability of the equipment, and support their testing during re-fueling outages. All such equipment can be tested when the reactor is shut down.

3.4 *Regulatory Guide 1.47 "Bypassed and Inoperable Status Indication for Nuclear Power Plant Safety Systems" [3]*

Regulatory Position 1:

Administrative procedures should be supplemented by a system that automatically indicates at the system level the bypass or deliberately induced inoperability of the protection system and the systems actuated or controlled by the protection system.

Conformance:

Automatic indication of bypasses is provided on the PICS in the MCR. This includes bypasses of PS equipment, and bypasses of the systems actuated by the PS.

Regulatory Position 2:

The indicating system of Regulatory Position 1 above should also be activated automatically by the bypassing or deliberately induced inoperability of any auxiliary or supporting system that effectively bypasses or renders inoperable the protection system and the systems actuated or controlled by the protection system.

Conformance:

Automatic indication of bypasses is provided on the PICS in the MCR. This includes bypasses of electrical auxiliary support features.

Regulatory Position 3:

Automatic indication in accordance with Regulatory Positions 1 and 2 above should be provided in the control room for each bypass or deliberately induced inoperable status that meets all of the following conditions:

- a. Renders inoperable any redundant portion of the protection system, systems actuated or controlled by the protection system, and auxiliary or supporting systems that must be operable for the protection system and the systems it actuates to perform their safety-related functions;
- b. Is expected to occur more frequently than once per year; and
- c. Is expected to occur when the affected system is normally required to be operable.

Conformance:

Automatic indication of bypasses is provided for the PS, the systems actuated by the PS, and electrical auxiliary support systems regardless of the expected frequency of bypass occurrences.

Regulatory Position 4:

Manual capability should exist in the control room to activate each system-level indicator provided in accordance with Regulatory Position 1 above.

Conformance:

The PICS in the MCR provides the capability to manually activate each bypass indication.

3.5 Regulatory Guide 1.118 “Periodic Testing of Electric Power and Protection Systems” [4]

Regulatory Position:

“Conformance with the requirements of IEEE Std. 338-1987, "Criteria for the Periodic Surveillance Testing of Nuclear Power Generating Station Safety Systems," provides a method acceptable to the NRC staff for satisfying the Commission's regulations with respect to periodic testing of electric power and protection systems if the following exceptions are complied with”

Conformance:

Conformance to this regulatory position is satisfied by U.S. EPR PS conformance to IEEE Std. 338-1987 as described in Section 3.8. The exceptions noted in the regulatory position are taken into account in Section 3.8.

3.6 NUREG-0800, BTP 7-17 “Guidance on Self-Test and Surveillance Test Provisions” [6]

Acceptance Criteria:

Surveillance test and self-test features for digital computer-based protection systems should conform to the guidance of Regulatory Guide 1.22 and Regulatory Guide 1.118. Bypasses necessary to enable testing should conform to the guidance of Regulatory Guide 1.47.

Conformance:

U.S. EPR PS conformance to RGs 1.22, 1.47 and 1.118 is described in Sections 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5, respectively.

Acceptance Criteria:

Failures detected by hardware, software, and surveillance testing should be consistent with the failure detectability assumptions of the single-failure analysis and the failure modes and effects analysis.

Conformance:

The system-level PS failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) is contained in Reference 11. The system-level analysis assumes that there are no failures that cannot be detected by either surveillance testing or self-testing. U.S. EPR FSAR Tier 1, Section 2.4.1 contains ITAAC commitments to perform an additional FMEA at the replaceable component level to validate the failure assumptions of the system-level FMEA. This assumption is consistent with the complete testing coverage described throughout this report.

Acceptance Criteria:

Digital computer-based I&C systems should include self-test features to confirm computer system operation on system initialization.

Digital computer-based I&C systems should generally include continuous self-testing. Some small, stand-alone, embedded digital computers may not need self-testing. Typical self-tests include monitoring memory and memory reference integrity, using watch-dog timers or processors, monitoring communication channels, monitoring central processing unit status, and checking data integrity.

Conformance:

Each PS function processor is subjected to an extended self-test which is automatically performed on each instance of processor initialization. The extended self-test is described in Section 2.2.6.1.

The PS design contains extensive self-testing that is performed continuously (every clock cycle). These self-testing features are described in Sections 2.2.6.1 through 2.2.6.5.

Acceptance Criteria:

The design of automatic self-test features should maintain channel independence, maintain system integrity, and meet the single-failure criterion during testing. The scope and extent of interfaces between software that performs protection functions and software for other functions such as self-test should be designed to minimize the complexity of the software logic and data structures. The safety classification of the hardware and software used to perform automatic self-testing should be equivalent to the tested system unless physical, electrical, and communications independence are maintained such that no failure of the test function can inhibit the performance of the safety function.

Conformance:

The TXS self test features are designed as an integral part of the system software of each function processor. As such, these features are classified as safety-related and are designed and qualified to safety-related standards. Self-tests are performed

separately within each function processor and, therefore, have no impact on independence between redundant divisions or on the system's ability to withstand single failures. Self-testing has no impact on the ability of each function processor to perform its safety function as the self-tests are executed at the end of each clock cycle after the processor has finished processing its application software (except in case the self-test detects a fault and resets or shuts down the processor, which is the desired behavior).

Acceptance Criteria:

The positive aspects of self-test features should not be compromised by the additional complexity that may be added to the safety system by the self-test features. The improved ability to detect failures provided by the self-test features should outweigh the increased probability of failure associated with the self-test feature.

Conformance:

The TXS self-test features are designed as an integral part of the system software of each function processor, which minimizes the complexity associated with the inclusion of these features. The assignment of the self-test routines as the lowest priority activity of the processor and their performance only at the end of each clock cycle minimizes the potential for failures associated with the self-test feature.

Acceptance Criteria:

Self-test functions should be verified during periodic functional tests.

Conformance:

Self-test functionality is not directly tested via periodic functional testing. To do so would require injection of faults into the safety system; which is neither prudent nor necessary. It is not prudent because it risks permanent damage to the safety system that may prevent correct functioning in the future, and because it would be difficult to determine that the injected fault had been completely "removed" from the system

following the testing. It is not necessary because reasonable assurance of correct self-test operation is provided via other means:

- Indirect periodic testing: The function processors and communication paths are exercised as part of other surveillance testing as described in Sections 2.2.1 through 2.2.5. This verifies that faults resulting in the inability of the equipment to perform its safety function would be detected. Such faults should be detected by self-tests and, if such a fault is detected during other surveillance testing, then incorrect operation of the self-test features are also detected.
- Self-test qualification and configuration control: The TXS system software, including the software used in the self-test process, is developed and tested using a quality program as described in Reference 10. This verifies that the self-test features function properly. TXS system software contains an identification file providing a CRC checksum for all files which are delivered within a package (e.g., executable programs, dynamic-link libraries, object modules, pre-links, header files) The CRC checksum of the complete TXS system software installation forms a unique identification of the version. When the TXS system software is loaded onto the TXS processing unit, the CRC checksum of the loaded TXS system software on the TXS processing unit is manually verified to match the CRC checksum of the originally developed and tested TXS system software. This verifies that the system software containing self-test features is identical to that which was tested and verified to operate correctly.
- Continuous monitoring of the self-test: Two mechanisms are used to continuously monitor correct operation of the self-test: the hardware watchdog timer and the runtime environment. The hardware watchdog timer (described in Section 2.2.6.2) will trip if a failure in the self-test features causes a stop of the function processors cyclic operation. The runtime environment initiates an alarm if the complete set of self-test routines is not completed within one hour.
- Periodic extended self-test: The periodic initiation of the extended self-test includes checks of the memory containing the cyclic self-test software, and a

CRC check to verify that the system software containing the self-test routines is identical to the routines initially loaded onto the function processor.

Acceptance Criteria:

Systems should be able to conduct periodic surveillance testing consistent with the technical specifications and plant procedures. As delineated in Regulatory Guide 1.118, periodic testing consists of functional tests and checks, calibration verification, and time response measurements.

Conformance:

Sections 2.2.1 through 2.2.6 describe how the PS is designed to conduct periodic surveillance testing consistent with technical specifications. Conformance with RG 1.118 via conformance with IEEE Std 338-1987 is addressed in Section 3.8.

Acceptance Criteria:

As required by IEEE Std. 279-1971, Clause 4.13, or IEEE Std. 603-1991, Clause 5.8.3, and as stated in Regulatory Guide 1.47, if the protective action of some part of a protection or safety system is bypassed or deliberately rendered inoperative for testing, that fact should be continuously indicated in the control room. Provisions should also be made to allow operations staff to confirm that the system has been properly returned to service.

Conformance:

Conformance to guidance relative to bypassed/inoperable status indication is described in Section 3.4.

Acceptance Criteria:

Regulatory Guide 1.118 states in part that test procedures for periodic tests should not require makeshift test setups. For digital computer-based systems, makeshift test

setups, including temporary modification of code or data that must be appropriately removed to restore the system to service, should be avoided.

Conformance:

As described in Sections 2.2.1 through 2.2.5, any temporary connections used for surveillance testing are made using permanently installed test connections. Temporary modification of data, in the form of changeable parameters, is used in certain surveillance tests (see Section 2.2.5.1.1). If the parameter is not changed back following testing, it does not prevent the function processor from performing its function. This is verified by the “pulse” function shown in Figure 2-5. Plant post-maintenance testing procedures will include verification that the changeable parameter is changed back to its proper state following surveillance testing.

Acceptance Criteria:

If automatic test features are credited with performing surveillance test functions, provisions should be made to confirm the execution of the automatic tests during plant operation. The capability to periodically test and calibrate the automatic test equipment should also be provided. The balance of surveillance and test functions not performed by the automatic test feature should be performed manually to meet the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.118. In addition, the automatic test feature function should conform to the same requirements and considerations (e.g., test interval) as the manual function.

Conformance:

There are no automatic test features using automatic test equipment credited to perform surveillance testing in the U.S. EPR PS design.

Acceptance Criteria:

The safety classification and quality of the hardware and software used to perform periodic testing should be equivalent to that of the tested system. The design should maintain channel independence, maintain system integrity, and meet the single-failure

criterion during testing. Commercial digital computer-based equipment used to perform periodic testing should be appropriately qualified for its function.

Conformance:

The TXS self test features are designed as an integral part of the system software of each function processor. As such it is designed and qualified to safety-related standards. External test equipment used to perform surveillance testing (e.g., SU, test machines) does not perform any safety-related functions and is not required to be designed to safety-related standards. Such equipment is designed and implemented under the TXS quality assurance program as described in Reference 10. The quality assurance program uses a graded approach to quality to verify that digital computer-based equipment used to perform periodic testing is appropriately qualified for its function.

Acceptance Criteria:

The design should have either the automatic or manual capability to take compensatory action on detection of failed or inoperable component. The design capability and plant technical specifications, operating procedures, and maintenance procedures will be consistent with each other.

Plant procedures will specify manual compensatory actions and mechanisms for recovery from automatic compensatory actions.

Mechanisms for operator notification of detected failures will comply with the system status indication provisions of IEEE Std. 603-1991 and will be consistent with, and support, plant technical specifications, operating procedures, and maintenance procedures.

Conformance:

Any failed component in the PS design can be removed from service consistent with the prescribed actions in the U.S. EPR Technical Specifications. Plant procedures are

outside the scope of this report. Conformance to guidance relative to inoperable status displays are described in Section 3.4.

3.7 *IEEE Std 603-1998 [7]*

The design of U.S. EPR I&C systems conforms to IEEE 603-1998 in lieu of IEEE 603-1991 based on an alternative request pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(a)(3)(i).

Clause 5.7 “Capability for Testing and Calibration”:

Capability for testing and calibration of safety system equipment shall be provided while retaining the capability of the safety systems to accomplish their safety functions. The capability for testing and calibration of safety system equipment shall be provided during power operation and shall duplicate, as closely as practicable, performance of the safety function. Testing of Class IE systems shall be in accordance with the requirements of IEEE Std 338- 1987. Exceptions to testing and calibration during power operation are allowed where this capability cannot be provided without adversely affecting the safety or operability of the generating station. In this case:

- Appropriate justification shall be provided (e.g., demonstration that no practical design exists),
- Acceptable reliability of equipment operation shall be otherwise demonstrated, and
- The capability shall be provided while the generating station is shut down.

Conformance:

The capability for testing and calibrating the PS is described throughout this report. Plant technical specifications provide appropriate controls to verify that the capability of the PS to perform its safety functions is retained during testing and calibration. Conformance to IEEE Std 338-1987 is addressed in Section 3.8. Exceptions to testing actuated equipment during plant operation are addressed in Section 2.1.

Clause 5.8.3 “Indication of Bypasses”:

If the protective actions of some part of a safety system have been bypassed or deliberately rendered inoperative for any purpose other than an operating bypass, continued indication of this fact for each affected safety group shall be provided in the control room.

- a.) This display instrumentation need not be part of the safety systems.
- b.) This indication shall be automatically actuated if the bypass or inoperative condition is expected to occur more frequently than once a year, and is expected to occur when the affected system is required to be operable.
- c.) The capability shall exist in the control room to manually activate this display indication.

Conformance:

Conformance to guidance relative to bypassed/inoperable status displays are described in Section 3.4.

Clause 6.5.1 “Checking the Operational Availability”

Means shall be provided for checking, with a high degree of confidence, the operational availability of each sense and command feature input sensor required for a safety function during reactor operation. This may be accomplished in various ways; for example:

- a.) By perturbing the monitored variable,
- b.) Within the constraints of 6.6, by introducing and varying, as appropriate, a substitute input to the sensor of the same nature as the measured variable, or

- c.) By cross-checking between channels that bear a known relationship to each other and that have readouts available.

Conformance:

The operational availability of each PS input sensor is provided during reactor operation. Sensor calibration and operational tests are described in Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2.

3.8 IEEE 338-1987 [8]

IEEE 338-1987 contains sections for design requirements and testing program requirements. The design requirements are addressed in this section. Testing program requirements are not addressed as the testing program employed by a licensee referencing the U.S. EPR Design Certification is outside the scope of this report.

Design Requirement:

- (1) Design shall provide the capability for periodic surveillance testing that simulates, as closely as practicable, the required safety function performance.

Conformance:

The U.S. EPR PS provides the capability for periodic surveillance testing to the extent required to provide reasonable assurance that the system will reliably perform its safety functions. This testing capability is described in Sections 2.2.1 through 2.2.5.

Design Requirement:

- (2) Test equipment interfaces and installed test equipment shall not cause a loss of independence between redundant channels or load groups.

Conformance:

Test equipment interfaces are provided via appropriate isolation devices as described in Sections 2.2.1 through 2.2.5. Generally, testing is performed on only one redundant

portion of the PS at a time. The exception is response time testing. As shown in Figure 2-4, isolation is provided between redundant divisions during response time testing.

Design Requirement:

(3) Safety systems should be designed with due consideration of the impact of testing on plant availability, maintainability, operation, operational mode, and limiting conditions for operation. Coincidence logic may be provided where necessary to fulfill this provision.

Conformance:

Redundancy and coincidence voting logic are provided in the PS design to accommodate plant availability, maintainability, operation, and limiting conditions for operation.

Design Requirement:

(4) Testability shall be considered in the selection of all components of the safety system. Sensors should be accessible and, where practicable, installed such that their calibration can be verified in place. When selecting actuation devices, their status indication capability shall be considered.

Conformance:

The TXS platform has been selected for use in the U.S. EPR PS. The TXS platform provides extensive self-testing capability and modular design that is flexible to allow for appropriate periodic surveillance testing. Selection of other components of the safety system (e.g., sensors and actuation devices) is outside the scope of this report.

Design Requirement:

(5) Design shall provide for the functional testing capability of the safety system. Simultaneous testing of the system from sensor to actuated equipment is the preferred

method. However, where this is not practical, the system design shall provide overlap testing capability.

Conformance:

Section 2.1 describes the impracticality of simultaneous testing of the PS from sensor to actuated equipment, and identifies the overlap testing capability that is provided in lieu of simultaneous testing of the system.

Design Requirement:

(6) Interrelationship among the systems, components, and human factors in each phase of the test activity should be considered and reflected in the system design. Test points, test devices, and associated test equipment should be located to facilitate performance of periodic surveillance testing.

Conformance:

Conformance with this aspect of testing is outside the scope of this report.

Design Requirement:

(7) A means of communication shall be provided between personnel associated with the test and the MCR to ensure that control room operators and associated test personnel are cognizant of the status of those systems under test. In addition, a means of communication shall be provided so that personnel associated with the test can adequately communicate.

Conformance:

Conformance with this aspect of testing is outside the scope of this report.

Design Requirement:

(8) Automatic testing features should be considered when selecting the type of testing system. However, where a programmable digital computer is included in the design, whether integrated or portable, automatic testing features are subject to the provisions of this standard and ANSI/IEEE/ANS 7-4.3.2-1982.

Conformance:

Extensive self-test features are included in the PS design and are addressed in this report. Conformance to the applicable standards are addressed for the self-tests throughout Section 3 of the report.

Design Requirement:

(9) Design considerations for testing the electrical power, instrumentation, and controls portion of the safety system shall be coordinated with the testing provisions of associated mechanical and fluid systems.

Conformance:

Testing electrical power systems is outside the scope of this report, however sufficient redundancy is provided in the PS design to accommodate testing of systems that provide electrical power to the PS. Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 address the measures included in the design to accommodate testing provisions of instrumentation. Section 2.2.5.1.1 addresses the measures included in the design to accommodate testing provisions of ESFAS mechanical and fluid systems.

Design Requirement:

(10) Provisions used for perturbing the same or a substitute process variable are preferred over using simulated signals to verify overall tripping of each protective

channel. Where perturbing the monitored variable or substitute is not practical, the proposed alternative tests shall have documented justification.

Conformance:

Tripping of each protective channel is not required by U.S. EPR Plant Technical Specifications, and is not necessary as a result of using a software based digital PS. The purpose of this type of test in analog PSs was to detect and correct drift that occurred in the bi-stable setpoint devices. Software-based setpoints do not experience drift. In the U.S. EPR design, a combination of sensor operational tests and calibration are used to detect and correct drift in the input channels. A combination of setpoint verification and self-testing is used to verify that the setpoints contained in the PS software are valid.

Design Requirement:

(11) Means should be included in the design to facilitate response time testing from sensor input to, and including, the actuated equipment if required by Clause 6.3.4.

Conformance:

Means are provided in the PS design to facilitate response time testing from sensor to actuator. Section 2.2.4 describes response time testing.

Design Requirement:

(12) Where practical, test devices, such as test blocks, should be incorporated into the design to eliminate the application and removal of wires in order to perform periodic surveillance testing. These devices shall not interfere with the operability or safety function of the component or system under test.

Conformance:

Where temporary connections are used for testing, permanently installed test connections are provided in the design. These test connections do not interfere with the operability or safety function of the PS. The test descriptions in Sections 2.2.1 through 2.2.5 identify when a permanently installed test connection is used.

Design Requirement:

(13) Where practical, means shall be included in the design to prevent the simultaneous application of any bypass condition to redundant channels or load groups during testing.

Conformance:

In the PS design, the SU is used to place equipment in maintenance bypass for testing. The SU can only be connected to one PS division at a time.

Design Requirement:

(14) Where redundant components are used within a single channel or load group, the design should permit each component to be tested independently.

Conformance:

In the PS design, redundant ALUs exist within each division. Response time testing and no-go actuating device operational tests can be performed on each ALU individually.

Design Requirement:

(15) The system should be designed such that the removal of fuses or opening of breakers is only required for the purposes of testing if such action causes the actuation of the logic for a channel or load group. For example, the actuation of a loss of channel power supply is simulated by the removal of its fuses.

Conformance:

The surveillance tests described in this report do not require removing fuses or opening breakers. Testing of electrical power supply systems is outside the scope of this report.

Design Requirement:

(16) Indication should be provided in the control room if a portion of the safety system is inoperable or bypassed. Systems that are frequently placed in a bypass or inoperative condition for the purposes of testing should have automatic indication.

Conformance:

Conformance to guidance relative to bypassed/inoperable status displays are described in Section 3.4.

3.9 IEEE Std 7-4.3.2-2003 [9]**Clause 5.5.2 “Design for Test and Calibration”:**

Test and calibration functions shall not adversely affect the ability of the computer to perform its safety function. Appropriate bypass of one redundant channel is not considered an adverse effect in this context. It shall be verified that the test and calibration functions do not affect computer functions that are not included in a calibration change (e.g., setpoint change).

Verification and validation (V&V), configuration management, and QA shall be required for test and calibration functions on separate computers (e.g., test and calibration computer) that provide the sole verification of test and calibration data. V&V, configuration management, and QA shall be required when the test and calibration function is inherent to the computer that is part of the safety system.

Conformance:

Sections 2.2.1 through 2.2.6 describe the testing and calibration functions included in the PS design. Performance of these functions does not prevent the PS from performing its safety function. The TXS self-test features are designed as an integral part of the system software of each function processor. As such, it is designed and qualified to safety-related standards. External test equipment used to perform surveillance testing (e.g., SU, test machines) does not perform any safety-related functions and is not required to be designed to safety-related standards. Such equipment is designed and implemented under the TXS quality assurance program as described in Reference 10. The quality assurance program uses a graded approach to quality to provide reasonable assurance that digital computer-based equipment used to perform periodic testing is appropriately qualified for its function.

Clause 5.5.3 "Fault Detection and Self-Diagnostics":

The reliability requirements of the safety system shall be used to establish the need for self-diagnostics. Self diagnostics are not required for systems in which failures can be detected by alternate means in a timely manner. If self-diagnostics are incorporated into the system requirements, these functions shall be subject to the same V&V processes as the safety system functions.

If reliability requirements warrant self-diagnostics, then computer programs shall incorporate functions to detect and report computer system faults and failures in a timely manner. Conversely, self-diagnostic functions shall not adversely affect the ability of the computer system to perform its safety function, or cause spurious actuations of the safety function.

When self-diagnostics are applied, the following self-diagnostic features shall be incorporated into the system design:

- a) Self-diagnostics during computer system startup

- b) Periodic self-diagnostics while the computer system is operating
- c) Self-diagnostic test failure reporting

Conformance:

The high reliability of the TXS platform is verified by the inclusion of self-test features in the platform design. The self-test features are designed as an integral part of the system software and, as such, are subject to the same safety-related V&V requirements as the rest of the system software. The assignment of the self-test routines as the lowest priority activity of the processor and their performance only at the end of each clock cycle minimize potential for failures associated with the self-test feature. Self-tests are performed during processor startup, continuously during operation, and report detected failures as described in Section 2.2.6.

4.0 REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50 Appendix A, "General Design Criteria."
2. Regulatory Guide 1.22, "Periodic Testing of Protection System Actuation Functions."
3. Regulatory Guide 1.47, "Bypassed and Inoperable Status Indication for Nuclear Power Plant Safety Systems."
4. Regulatory Guide 1.118, "Periodic Testing of Electric Power and Protection Systems."
5. Regulatory Guide 1.171 (1997), "Software Unit Testing for Digital Computer Software Used in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Plants."
6. NUREG-0800, "Standard Review Plan", BTP 7-17, Revision 5.
7. IEEE Std 603-1998, "IEEE Standard Criteria for Safety Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations."
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