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TO THE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS  
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**

**NRC RESPONSE TO RECENT NUCLEAR EVENTS IN JAPAN AND THE CONTINUING  
SAFETY OF THE U.S. COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR REACTOR FLEET**

**APRIL 6, 2011**

The staff of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is deeply saddened by the tragedy in Japan. I and many of my colleagues on the NRC staff have had many years of very close and personal interaction with our regulatory counterparts and we would like to extend our condolences to them and to the Japanese people.

**Introduction**

The NRC is mindful that our primary responsibility is to ensure the adequate protection of the public health and safety of the American people. We have been very closely monitoring the activities in Japan and reviewing available information. Review of this information, combined with our ongoing inspection and licensing oversight, allows us to say with confidence that the U.S. plants continue to operate safely. There has been no reduction in the licensing or oversight function of the NRC as it relates to any of the U.S. licensees as a result of the substantial effort we are making to assist Japan.

We have a long history of conservative regulatory decision-making. We have been using risk insights to help inform our regulatory process, and, over more than 35 years of civilian nuclear power in this country, we continually make improvements to our regulatory framework as we learn from operating experience.

Notwithstanding the very high level of support being provided to respond to events in Japan, we continue to maintain our focus on our domestic responsibilities.

I'd like to begin with a brief overview of our immediate and continuing response, including our recommendation for U.S. Citizens in Japan to evacuate out to 50 miles from the Fukushima-Daiichi site. I then will discuss the reasons for our confidence in the safety of the U. S. commercial nuclear reactor fleet, and the path forward that we will take to ensure we learn any lessons we need to from events in Japan. Finally, I will give you an overview of NRC incident response capabilities here in the U.S.

### **The NRC's immediate and Continuing Response to Events in Japan**

On Friday, March 11<sup>th</sup>, an earthquake hit Japan, resulting in the shutdown of more than 10 reactors. From what we know now, it appears possible that the reactors' response to the earthquake went according to design. The ensuing tsunami, however, appears to have caused the loss of normal and emergency AC power to the six units at the Fukushima Daiichi site; it is those six units that have received the majority of our attention since that time. Units One, Two, and Three at the site were in operation at the time of the earthquake. Units Four, Five, and Six were in previously scheduled outages.

Shortly after 4:00 AM EDT on Friday, March 11th, the NRC Emergency Operations Center made the first call, informing NRC management of the earthquake and the potential impact on U.S. plants. We went into the monitoring mode at the Emergency Operations Center and the first concern for the NRC was possible impacts of the tsunami on U.S. plants and radioactive materials on the West Coast, and in Hawaii, Alaska, and U.S. Territories in the Pacific.

On that same day, we began interactions with our Japanese regulatory counterparts

and dispatched two experts to help at the U.S. Embassy in Japan. By Monday, we had dispatched a total of 11 staff to Japan. We have subsequently rotated in replacement staff to continue our on-the-ground assistance in Japan. The areas of focus for this team are: 1) to assist the Japanese government with technical support as part of the USAID response; and 2) to support the U.S. Ambassador. The NRC's Chairman, Dr. Gregory Jaczko, traveled to Tokyo on March 28<sup>th</sup> to convey directly to his Japanese counterparts a message of support and cooperation, and to discuss the situation. While our focus now is on helping Japan in any way that we can, the experience will also help us assess the potential implications for U.S. citizens and the U.S. reactor fleet in as timely a manner as possible.

We have had ongoing interaction with the White House, Congressional staff, our state regulatory counterparts, a number of other federal agencies, and international regulatory bodies around the world. We recently sent an NRC staff member to Hawaii to support the United States Armed Forces Pacific Command (USPACOM).

The NRC response in Japan and our Emergency Operations Center continue with the dedicated efforts of NRC staff working in teams on a rotating basis around-the-clock. The entire agency is coordinating and pulling together in response to this event so that we can provide assistance to Japan while continuing the activities necessary to fulfill our domestic responsibilities.

The 50 mile evacuation recommendation that the NRC made to the U.S. Ambassador in Japan was made in the interest of protecting the health and safety of U.S. citizens in Japan. We based our assessment on the conditions as we understood them at the time. Since communications with knowledgeable Japanese officials were limited and there was a large degree of uncertainty about plant conditions at the time, it was difficult to accurately assess the

potential radiological hazard. In order to determine the proper evacuation distance, the NRC staff performed a series of calculations using NRC's RASCAL computer code to assess possible offsite consequences. The computer models used meteorological model data appropriate for the Fukushima Daiichi vicinity. Source terms were based on hypothetical, but not unreasonable, estimates of fuel damage, containment, and other release conditions. These calculations demonstrated that the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) Protective Action Guidelines could be exceeded at a distance of up to 50 miles from the Fukushima site, if a large-scale release occurred from the reactors or spent fuel pools. The U.S. emergency preparedness framework provides for the expansion of emergency planning zones as conditions require. Acting in accordance with this framework, and with the best information available at the time, the NRC determined that evacuation out to 50 miles for U.S. citizens was a prudent course of action, and would be consistent with what we would do under similar circumstances in the United States, and we made that recommendation to the Ambassador and other U.S. Government agencies.

Let me note here in concluding this section of my remarks that the U.S. government has an extensive network of radiation monitors across this country. Monitoring equipment at nuclear power plants and in the EPA's system has identified trace amounts of radioactive isotopes consistent with the Japanese nuclear incident, but still far below levels of public health concern. We feel confident, based on current data, that there is no reason for concern in the United States regarding radioactive releases from Japan.

### **Continuing Confidence in the Safety of U.S. Nuclear Power Plants**

I will now turn to the factors that assure us of ongoing domestic reactor safety. We

have, since the beginning of the regulatory program in the United States, used a philosophy of Defense-in-Depth, which recognizes that nuclear reactors require the highest standards of design, construction, oversight, and operation, and does not rely on any single layer for protection of public health and safety. We begin with designs for every individual reactor in this country that take into account site-specific factors and include a detailed evaluation for any natural event, such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, and tsunamis, as they relate to that site.

There are multiple physical barriers to radiation in every reactor design. Additionally, there are both diverse and redundant safety systems that are required to be maintained in operable condition and frequently tested to ensure that the plant is in a high condition of readiness to respond to any scenario.

We have taken advantage of the lessons learned from previous operating experience to implement a program of continuous improvement for the U.S. reactor fleet. We have learned from experience across a wide range of situations, including, most significantly, the Three Mile Island accident in 1979. As a result of those lessons learned, we significantly revised emergency planning requirements and emergency operating procedures for licensees, and made substantive improvements in NRC's incident response capabilities. We also addressed many human factors issues regarding control room indicators and layouts, added new requirements for hydrogen control to help prevent explosions inside of containment, and created requirements for enhanced control room displays of the status of pumps and valves.

Two significant changes after Three Mile Island were the expansion of the Resident Inspector Program and the incident response program. Today, there are at least two

Resident Inspectors at each nuclear power plant. The inspectors have unfettered access to all licensees' activities, and serve as NRC's eyes and ears at the power plant. The NRC headquarters operations center and regional incident response centers are prepared to respond to all emergencies, including any resulting from operational events, security events, or natural phenomena. Multidisciplinary teams in these centers have access to detailed information regarding licensee facilities, and access to plant status information through telephonic links with the Resident Inspectors, an automated emergency response data system, and directly from the licensee over the emergency notification system. NRC's response would include the dispatch of a site team to augment the Resident Inspectors on site, and integration with the licensee's emergency response organization at their Emergency Offsite Facility. The program is designed to provide independent assessment of events, to ensure that appropriate actions are taken to mitigate the events, and to ensure that State officials have the information they would need to make decisions regarding protective actions.

As a result of the events of September 11, 2001, we identified important pieces of equipment that, regardless of the cause of a significant fire or explosion at a plant, we want licensees to have available and staged in advance, as well as new procedures, training requirements, and policies that would help deal with a severe situation.

Our program of continuous improvement based on operating experience will include evaluation of the significant events in Japan as well as what we can learn from them. We already have begun enhancing inspection activities through temporary instructions to our inspection staff, including the Resident Inspectors and the region-based inspectors in our four

Regional offices, to look at licensees' readiness to deal with both the design basis accidents and the beyond-design basis accidents. The information that we gather will be used for additional evaluation of the industry's readiness for similar events, and will aid in our understanding of whether additional regulatory actions need to be taken in the immediate term.

NRC has also issued an information notice to the licensees to make them aware of the events in Japan, and the kinds of activities we believe they should be engaged in to verify their readiness. In response to the events licensees have voluntarily verified their capabilities to mitigate conditions that result from severe accidents, including the loss of significant operational and safety systems, are in effect and operational. Licensees are verifying the capability to mitigate a total loss of electric power to the nuclear plant. They also are verifying the capability to mitigate problems associated with flooding and the resulting impact on systems both inside and outside of the plant. Also, licensees are confirming that any necessary mitigating equipment is in place to compensate for the potential loss of equipment due to seismic events appropriate for the site, because each site has its own unique seismic profiles.

Subsequent to the 1979 event at Three Mile Island, there have been a number of new regulatory requirements imposed by the NRC that have enhanced the domestic fleet's preparedness against some of the problems we are seeing in Japan. The "station blackout" rule requires every plant in this country to analyze what the plant response would be if it were to lose all alternating current so that it could respond using batteries for a period of time, and then have procedures in place to restore alternating current to the site and provide cooling to the core.

The hydrogen rule requires modifications to reduce the impacts of hydrogen generated for beyond-design basis events and core damage. There are equipment qualification rules that require equipment, including pumps and valves, to remain operable

under the kinds of environmental temperature and radiation conditions that you would see under a beyond-design basis accident. With regard to the type of containment design used by the most heavily damaged plants in Japan, the NRC has had a Boiling Water Reactor Mark I Containment Improvement Program since the late 1980s, which has required installation of hardened vent systems for containment pressure relief, as well as enhanced reliability of the automatic depressurization system.

The final factor I want to mention with regard to our belief in the ongoing safety of the U.S. fleet is the emergency preparedness and planning requirements in place that provide ongoing training, testing, and evaluations of licensees' emergency preparedness programs. In coordination with our federal partner, the Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA), these activities include extensive interaction with state and local governments, as those programs are evaluated and tested on a periodic basis.

### **The Path Ahead**

Beyond the initial steps to address the experience from the events in Japan, the Chairman, with the full support of the Commission, directed the NRC staff to establish a senior level agency task force to conduct a methodical and systematic review of our regulatory processes to determine whether the agency should make additional improvements to our regulatory system and to make recommendations to the Commission for its policy direction. This activity will have both near-term and longer-term objectives.

For the near term effort, we are beginning a 90-day review. This review will evaluate all of the available information from the Japanese events to identify immediate or near-term operational or regulatory issues potentially affecting the 104 operating reactors in the U.S., including their spent fuel pools. Areas of investigation will include: the ability to protect

against natural disasters; response to station blackouts; severe accidents and spent fuel accident progression; radiological consequence analysis; and severe accident management issues. Over this 90-day period, we will develop recommendations, as appropriate, for changes to inspection procedures and licensing review guidance, and recommend whether generic communications, orders, or additional regulations are needed.

This 90-day effort will include a briefing to the Commission after approximately 30 days to provide a snapshot of the regulatory response and the condition of the U.S. fleet based on information we have available at that time. This briefing will also ensure that the Commission is both kept informed of ongoing efforts and prepared to resolve any policy recommendations that surface. I believe we will have limited stakeholder involvement in the first 30 days to accomplish this. However, over the 90-day and longer-term efforts we will seek additional stakeholder input. At the end of the 90-day period, a report will be provided to the Commission and to the public. The task force's longer-term review will begin as soon as the NRC has sufficient technical information from the events in Japan.

The task force will evaluate all technical and policy issues related to the event to identify additional potential research, generic issues, changes to the reactor oversight process, rulemakings, and adjustments to the regulatory framework that should be pursued by the NRC. We also expect to evaluate potential interagency issues, such as emergency preparedness, and examine the applicability of any lessons learned to non-operating reactors and materials licensees. We expect to seek input from stakeholders during this process. A report with appropriate recommendations will be provided to the Commission within 6 months of the start of this evaluation. Both the 90-day and final reports will be made publicly available in accordance with normal Commission processes.

## **Conclusion**

In conclusion, I want to reiterate that we continue to make our domestic responsibilities for licensing and oversight of the U.S. licensees our top priority and that the U.S. plants continue to operate safely. In light of the events in Japan, there is a near-term evaluation of their relevance to the U.S. fleet underway, and we are continuing to gather the information necessary for us to take a longer, more thorough look at the events in Japan and their lessons for us. Based on these efforts, we will take all appropriate actions necessary to ensure the continuing safety of the U.S. fleet.