

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401  
400 Chestnut Street Tower II

SNRC REGION II  
ATLANTA, GEORGIA

August 10, 1981

8170011 A8:46

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region II - Suite 3100  
101 Marietta Street  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 - RESPONSE TO VIOLATION 50-438/81-14-02 -  
INADEQUATE HANGER DRAWING DESIGN


This is in response to R. C. Lewis' letter dated July 15, 1981, report numbers 50-438/81-14, 50-439/81-14, concerning activities at the Bellefonte Nuclear Plant which appeared to have been in violation of NRC regulations. Enclosed is our response to the citation.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please get in touch with D. L. Lambert at FTS 857-2581.

To the best of my knowledge, I declare the statements contained herein are complete and true.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY



L. M. Mills, Manager  
Nuclear Regulation and Safety

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Victor Stello, Jr., Director (Enclosure)  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, DC 20555

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ENCLOSURE

BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1  
SEVERITY LEVEL V VIOLATION  
INADEQUATE HANGER DRAWING DESIGN  
RESPONSE TO VIOLATION 50-438/81-11-01

Description of Violation

10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III requires measures to be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and design basis, as defined in paragraph 50.2 and as specified in the licensee application, for those structures, systems, and components to which this appendix applies are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures and instructions. Bellefonte Alternate Criteria states that in its development a Seismic Displacement limit of 1 inch was imposed. This means that alternately analyzed piping has a possibility of moving a total of 1 inch plus any thermal movement during a seismic event. Some seismic restraints may be designed so that the pipe does not have sufficient clearance to move in an unrestrained direction without contacting the support structure. If this happens the support would be subjected to a load that had not been considered in its design.

Contrary to the above between March 23 - April 2, 1981, the resident inspector identified two examples of seismic supports not complying with the above criteria.

Admission or Denial of Alleged Violation

TVA admits the violation occurred as stated.

TVA discussed the subject violation with the resident inspector, J. D. Wilcox, in a telephone conference on July 30, 1981. In that conference, it was agreed that the response to the above violation be included in the final report to the NRC on nonconformance report BLN BLP 8109. TVA will discuss all aspects of the deficiencies identified in hanger design in that report.