



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

April 29, 2011

Mr. Paul Freeman  
Site Vice President  
c/o Michael O'Keefe  
Seabrook Station  
NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC  
P.O. Box 300  
Seabrook, NH 03874

SUBJECT: SEABROOK STATION, UNIT NO. 1 - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT RE:  
RELOCATION OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS RELATED  
TO ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES (TAC NO. ME4201)

Dear Mr. Freeman:

The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment No.125 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-86 for the Seabrook Station, Unit No. 1 (Seabrook). This amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to your application dated June 28, 2010.

The amendment deletes TS 3/4.8.4.2, "Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices and Protective Devices for Class 1E Power Sources Connected to Non-Class 1E Circuits" and relocates the information to the Seabrook Technical Requirements Manual.

A copy of our safety evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly *Federal Register* notice.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "G. Edward Miller".

G. Edward Miller, Project Manager  
Plant Licensing Branch I-2  
Division of Operating Reactor Licensing  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-443

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 125 to NPF-86
2. Safety Evaluation

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UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

NEXTERA ENERGY SEABROOK, LLC, ET AL.\*

DOCKET NO. 50-443

SEABROOK STATION, UNIT NO. 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 125  
License No. NPF-86

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment filed by NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC, et al., (the licensee) dated June 28, 2010, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

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\*NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC is authorized to act as agent for the: Hudson Light & Power Department, Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Electric Company, and Taunton Municipal Light Plant and has exclusive responsibility and control over the physical construction, operation and maintenance of the facility.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-86 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 125, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B are incorporated into the Facility License No. NPF-86. NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days. Implementation shall include the relocation of information from the Technical Specifications to the Technical Requirements Manual as described in the licensee's application dated June 28, 2010.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Harold K. Chernoff, Chief  
Plant Licensing Branch I-2  
Division of Operating Reactor Licensing  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the License and  
Technical Specifications

Date of Issuance: April 29, 2011

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 125

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-86

DOCKET NO. 50-443

Replace the following page of Facility Operating License No. NPF-86 with the attached revised page. The revised page is identified by amendment number and contains a marginal line indicating the area of change.

Remove  
3

Insert  
3

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A, Technical Specifications, with the attached revised pages as indicated. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change.

Remove  
viii  
3/4 8-21  
3/4 8-22  
3/4 8-23

Insert  
viii  
3/4 8-21  
3/4 8-22  
3/4 8-23

- (4) NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR 30, 40, and 70, to receive, possess, and use at any time any byproduct, source, and special nuclear material as sealed neutron sources for reactor startup, sealed sources for reactor instrumentation and radiation monitoring equipment calibration, and as fission detectors in amounts as required;
- (5) NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR 30, 40, and 70, to receive, possess, and use in amounts as required any byproduct, source, or special nuclear material without restriction to chemical or physical form, for sample analysis or instrument calibration or associated with radioactive apparatus or components;
- (6) NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR 30, 40, and 70, to possess, but not separate, such byproduct and special nuclear materials as may be produced by the operation of the facility authorized herein; and
- (7) DELETED

C. This license shall be deemed to contain and is subject to the conditions specified in the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I and is subject to all applicable provisions of the Act and to the rules, regulations, and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect; is subject to the additional conditions specified or incorporated below:

(1) Maximum Power Level

NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC, is authorized to operate the facility at reactor core power levels not in excess of 3648 megawatts thermal (100% of rated power).

(2) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 125\*, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B are incorporated into the Facility License No. NPF-86. NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

(3) License Transfer to FPL Energy Seabrook, LLC\*\*

- a. On the closing date(s) of the transfer of any ownership interests in Seabrook Station covered by the Order approving the transfer, FPL Energy Seabrook, LLC\*\*, shall obtain from each respective transferring owner all of the accumulated decommissioning trust funds for the facility, and ensure the deposit of such funds and additional funds, if necessary, into a decommissioning trust or trusts for Seabrook Station established by FPL Energy Seabrook, LLC\*\*, such that the amount of such funds deposited meets or exceeds the amount required under 10 CFR 50.75 with respect to the interest in Seabrook Station FPL Energy Seabrook, LLC\*\*, acquires on such dates(s).

\* Implemented

\*\* On April 16, 2009, the name "FPL Energy Seabrook, LLC" was changed to "NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC".

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UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 125

TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-86

SEABROOK STATION, UNIT NO. 1

DOCKET NO. 50-443

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated June 28, 2010 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML101870104), NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC (NextEra or the licensee) submitted license amendment request (LAR) LAR 10-03 to revise the technical specifications (TSs) for Seabrook Station, Unit No. 1 (Seabrook). The proposed amendment would delete TS 3/4.8.4.2, "Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices and Protective Devices for Class 1E Power Sources Connected to Non-Class 1E Circuits," and relocate the information to the Seabrook Technical Requirements Manual (TRM).

2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC's or the Commission's) regulatory requirements related to the content of the TSs are set forth in Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (10 CFR) Section 50.36, "Technical specifications." This regulation requires that the TSs include items in the following five specific categories: (1) safety limits, limiting safety system settings, and limiting control settings; (2) limiting conditions for operation (LCOs); (3) surveillance requirements (SRs); (4) design features; and (5) administrative controls. The regulation does not specify the particular requirements to be included in a plant's TSs.

On July 22, 1993 (58 FR 39132), the Commission published a "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specifications Improvements for Nuclear Power Reactors" (Final Policy Statement) which discussed the criteria to determine which items are required to be included in the TSs as LCOs. The criteria were subsequently incorporated into the regulations by an amendment to 10 CFR 50.36 (60 FR 36953, July 19, 1995). Specifically, 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) requires that a TS LCO be established for each item meeting one or more of the following criteria:

Criterion 1

Installed instrumentation that is used to detect, and indicate in the control room, a significant abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary.

Criterion 2

A process variable, design feature, or operating restriction that is an initial condition of a design basis accident or transient analysis that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier.

Criterion 3

A structure, system, or component that is part of the primary success path and which functions or actuates to mitigate a design basis accident or transient that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier.

Criterion 4

A structure, system, or component which operating experience or probabilistic risk assessment has shown to be significant to public health and safety.

As discussed in the *Federal Register* (FR) notice for the final rule dated July 19, 1995 (60 FR 36955):

LCOs that do not meet any of the criteria, and their associated actions and surveillance requirements, may be proposed for relocation from the technical specifications to licensee-controlled documents, such as the FSAR [Final Safety Analysis Report]. The criteria may be applied to either standard or custom technical specifications.

In its application dated June 28, 2010, the licensee proposed to delete TS 3/4.8.4.2 and relocate the information to the Seabrook TRM which is a licensee-controlled document.

As discussed in Section 16.3, "Technical Specification Improvement Program," of the Seabrook Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR):

The Technical Specification Improvement Program for Seabrook Station involves the relocation of certain technical specifications into other licensee-controlled documents. These documents are the UFSAR and the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM). The majority of the technical specifications are relocated into Section 16.3 of the UFSAR.

In order to facilitate routine day-to-day use, Section 16.3 of the UFSAR has been relocated into the Technical Requirements Manual (TRM). The TRM contains information that would otherwise be contained in Section 16.3 of the UFSAR. The Core Operating Limits Report (COLR) is also located in the TRM. The COLR section of the TRM is submitted to the NRC upon each update. The information is not duplicated in Section 16.3 of the UFSAR to eliminate the inherent problems associated with maintaining accurate information in duplicate locations.

Changes to the TRM are processed in accordance with the UFSAR change guidance contained in Chapter 6 of the Regulatory Compliance Manual (NARC) and are submitted to the NRC as part of the UFSAR update required by 10 CFR 50.71(e).

Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) guidance document NEI 98-03, Revision 1, "Guidelines for Updating Final Safety Analysis Reports" (ADAMS Accession No. ML003779028) lists the following methods of controlling the TRM on page 7 of Appendix A:

The TRM or other licensee controlled document is explicitly "incorporated by reference" into the UFSAR. Under this approach, the referenced document is subject to the change control requirements of 10 CFR 50.59 and the update/reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.71(e), e.g., periodic submittal of change pages, etc.

The TRM or other licensee controlled document is treated in a manner consistent with procedures fully or partially described in the UFSAR. Under this approach, the referenced document is maintained on-site in accordance with licensee administrative processes, and changes are evaluated using 10 CFR 50.59.

Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.181, "Content of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.71(e)" dated September 1999 (ADAMS Accession No. ML992930009), states that Revision 1 of NEI 98-03 provides methods that are acceptable to the NRC staff for complying with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.71(e).

### 3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

#### 3.1 Background

The function of the electrical equipment protective devices associated with TS 3/4.8.4.2 is to detect and isolate faults that could occur in the electrical distribution system. This TS pertains to two types of electrical equipment protective devices: (1) containment penetration conductor overcurrent devices; and (2) protective devices for Class 1E power sources connected to non-Class 1E circuits.

The containment penetration conductor overcurrent devices are installed to minimize the potential for damaging an electrical penetration (e.g., heating effect due to overcurrent conditions could potentially affect the penetration seals) resulting from a fault in a component inside containment or in cabling which penetrates the containment. As discussed in Seabrook UFSAR Section 8.3, the containment electrical penetrations are designed to withstand, without loss of mechanical integrity, the maximum fault current versus time conditions that could result from single random failures of circuit overload devices. In addition, as stated in the UFSAR, the coordination of the breakers and fuses in the penetration circuits assures that long or short

duration overcurrents that are capable of damaging the penetration will be interrupted before they cause damage.

As discussed in the licensee's application dated June 28, 2010, the Seabrook electrical system associates all non-Class 1E circuits with Class 1E circuits. Non-Class 1E circuits have the potential to degrade a Class 1E circuit. Therefore, these associated circuits are provided with at least one protective device to prevent degradation of the Class 1E circuit. As discussed in Seabrook UFSAR Section 8.3, the protective devices for non-Class 1E loads connected to Class-1E buses are coordinated such that failure of all the non-Class 1E loads will not result in tripping the incoming breaker to the Class 1E bus.

The licensee's application stated that the proposed relocation of TS 3/4.8.4.2 to the TRM is justified because the associated LCO does not meet any of the criteria in 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii). The licensee also stated the proposed relocation is consistent with NUREG-1431, "Standard Technical Specifications, Westinghouse Plants," Revision 3, dated June 2004, because the Standard TSs [STS] do not contain the TS requirements for these electrical protective devices.

The NRC staff agrees that the requirements proposed for relocation to the TRM from the Seabrook TSs are not within the scope of requirements included in NUREG-1431. The staff evaluated the proposed relocation of the Seabrook TS requirements against the criteria of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) as discussed below in Safety Evaluation (SE) Sections 3.2 through 3.5 .

### 3.2 Evaluation of Proposed TS Relocation against Criterion 1

Criterion 1 applies to:

Installed instrumentation that is used to detect, and indicate in the control room, a significant abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary.

As discussed above in SE Section 3.1, the function of the electrical equipment protective devices associated with LCO 3.8.4.2 is to detect and isolate faults that could occur on the electrical distribution system. This equipment does not involve installed instrumentation that is used to detect, and indicate in the control room, a significant abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary. Therefore, the NRC staff finds that the subject LCO does not meet Criterion 1.

### 3.3 Evaluation of Proposed TS Relocation against Criterion 2

Criterion 2 applies to:

A process variable, design feature, or operating restriction that is an initial condition of a design basis accident or transient analysis that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier.

The electrical equipment protective devices associated with LCO 3.8.4.2 help to preserve the assumptions in the accident and transient analyses by enhancing proper equipment operation. However, the equipment is not considered a process variable, design feature, or operating restriction that is an initial condition of a design basis accident (DBA) or transient analysis that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier. Therefore, the NRC staff finds that the subject LCO does not meet Criterion 2.

### 3.4 Evaluation of Proposed TS Relocation against Criterion 3

Criterion 3 applies to:

A structure, system, or component that is part of the primary success path and which functions or actuates to mitigate a design basis accident or transient that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier.

As discussed above in SE Section 3.1, the containment electrical penetrations are designed to withstand, without loss of mechanical integrity, the maximum fault current versus time conditions that could result from single random failures of circuit overload devices. As also discussed in SE Section 3.1, the protective devices for non-Class 1E loads connected to Class-1E buses are coordinated such that failure of all the non-Class 1E loads will not result in tripping the incoming breaker to the Class 1E bus. As such, the Class 1E equipment would be available to provide the necessary safety functions.

With respect to Criterion 3, the Final Policy Statement (58 FR 39137) stated, in part, that:

A safety sequence analysis is a systematic examination of the actions required to mitigate the consequences of events considered in the plant's Design Basis Accident and Transient analyses, as presented in Chapters 6 and 15 of the plant's FSAR (or equivalent chapters). Such a safety sequence analysis considers all applicable events, whether explicitly or implicitly presented. The primary success path of a safety sequence analysis consists of the combination and sequences of equipment needed to operate (including consideration of the single failure criteria), so that the plant response to Design Basis Accidents and Transients limits the consequences of these events to within the appropriate acceptance criteria.

It is the intent of this criterion to capture into Technical Specifications only those structures, systems, and components that are part of the primary success path of a safety sequence analysis. Also captured by this criterion are those support and actuation systems that are necessary for items in the primary success path to successfully function. The primary success path for a particular mode of operation does not include backup and diverse equipment (e.g., rod withdrawal block which is a backup to the average power range monitor high flux trip in the

startup mode, safety valves which are backup to low temperature overpressure relief valves during cold shutdown).

The penetration conductor overcurrent protective devices are installed to minimize the damage from a fault in a component inside containment or in conductors that penetrate containment. The protective devices for Class 1E power sources prevent failure of a non-Class 1E circuit from degrading a Class 1E circuit. Although these devices enhance equipment operation, they are not a structure, system, or component that is part of the primary success path whose function or actuation mitigates a DBA or transient that either assumes the failure of, or presents a challenge to, the integrity of a fission product barrier. Therefore, the NRC staff finds that the subject LCO does not meet Criterion 3.

### 3.5 Evaluation of Proposed TS Relocations against Criterion 4

Criterion 4 applies to:

A structure, system, or component which operating experience or probabilistic risk assessment has shown to be significant to public health and safety.

With respect to Criterion 4, the Final Policy Statement (58 FR 39137) stated, in part, that:

It is the Commission policy that licensees retain in their Technical Specifications LCOs, action statements and Surveillance Requirements for the following systems (as applicable), which operating experience and PSA [probabilistic safety assessment] have generally shown to be significant to public health and safety and any other structures, systems, or components that meet this criterion:

- Reactor Core Isolation Cooling/Isolation Condenser,
- Residual Heat Removal,
- Standby Liquid Control, and
- Recirculation Pump Trip.

The Final Policy Statement further stated that:

The Commission expects that licensees, in preparing their Technical Specification related submittals, will utilize any plant-specific PSA or risk survey and any available literature on risk insights and PSAs. This material should be employed to strengthen the technical bases for those requirements that remain in Technical Specifications, when applicable, and to verify that none of the requirements to be relocated contain constraints of prime importance in limiting the likelihood or severity of the accident sequences that are commonly found to dominate risk.

The licensee's application dated June 28, 2010, stated that:

The electrical protective devices are not a structure, system, or component that operating experience or probabilistic safety assessment has shown to be significant to the public health and safety. The electrical protective devices are not risk-significant and the Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 50.65) does not require these protective devices to be monitored for unavailability.

As discussed above, the electrical equipment protective devices associated with LCO 3.8.4.2 enhance equipment operation. Based on the statements in the Final Policy Statement and the information provided in the licensee's submittal, the NRC staff finds that the subject LCO does not meet Criterion 4.

### 3.6 Technical Evaluation Conclusion

Based on the evaluation in SE Sections 3.2 through 3.5, the NRC staff finds that LCO 3.8.4.2 does not meet the criteria in 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) requiring inclusion in the TSs.

As discussed in SE Section 2.0, the licensee proposes to relocate TSs 3/4.8.4.2 to the Seabrook TRM. Future changes to relocated TS requirements will be subject to the change control requirements of 10 CFR 50.59 and the update/reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.71(e). As such, the NRC staff finds that there is reasonable assurance that future changes to the relocated requirements will be made in a manner that continues to protect public health and safety.

Based on the above findings, the NRC staff concludes that relocation of TS 3/4.8.4.2 to the Seabrook TRM is acceptable. The licensee has also proposed to revise the associated TS index page to reflect relocation of TSs 3/4.8.4.2. This change is administrative in nature and, therefore, is acceptable.

The licensee has also proposed to relocate the associated TS Bases information to the TRM in accordance with the TS Bases Control Program. The NRC staff agrees that the TS Bases Control Program is the appropriate process for updating the affected TS Bases information.

### 4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the New Hampshire and Massachusetts State officials were notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State officials provided no comments.

### 5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to the installation or use of facility components located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes SRs.

The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts and no significant change in the types of any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (75 FR 67403). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

## 6.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner; (2) there is reasonable assurance that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: R. Ennis

Date: April 29, 2011

April 29, 2011

Mr. Paul Freeman  
Site Vice President  
c/o Michael O'Keefe  
Seabrook Station  
NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC  
P.O. Box 300  
Seabrook, NH 03874

SUBJECT: SEABROOK STATION, UNIT NO. 1 - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT RE:  
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TO ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES (TAC NO. ME4201)

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A copy of our safety evaluation is also enclosed. Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's biweekly *Federal Register* notice.

Sincerely,  
*/ra/*

G. Edward Miller, Project Manager  
Plant Licensing Branch I-2  
Division of Operating Reactor Licensing  
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Docket No. 50-443

Enclosures:

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