

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401

400 Chestnut Street Tower II

November 25, 1980

50-438/439

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region II - Suite 3100  
101 Marietta Street  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - LINK ROD ASSEMBLY - DELAVEL  
DIESELS - NCR DELAVEL NO. 4 - FINAL REPORT

The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-OIE Inspector  
R. W. Wright on October 27, 1980, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e).  
Enclosed is our final report. We consider 10 CFR Part 21 to be applic-  
able to this deficiency. This deficiency was also reported for Hartsville  
and Phipps Bend Nuclear Plants.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please get in touch with  
D. L. Lambert at FTS 857-2581.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

L. M. Mills, Manager  
Nuclear Regulation and Safety

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Victor Stello, Jr., Director (Enclosure) ✓  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, DC 20555

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## ENCLOSURE

BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2  
LINK ROD ASSEMBLY - DELAVEL DIESELS  
NCR DELAVEL NO. 4  
10 CFR 50.55(e)  
FINAL REPORT

### Description of Deficiency

Transamerica Delavel (TDC) informed TVA of a potential problem in TDC-supplied diesel generators at the Bellefonte, Hartsville, and Phipps Bend Nuclear Plants. This was reported to NRC-OIE under 10 CFR 21 by letter dated September 19, 1980, from D. H. Martini (of TDC) to Victor Stello of the NRC. The problem is that the dowel counterbore of the link rod assembly may be too shallow. This condition, if it exists, could result in the failure of that assembly and ultimately in the unavailability of the diesel generators.

### Safety Implications

The diesel generators constitute the preferred source of electrical power for essential safety features in the event of offsite power loss. The diesel generators must be maintained at high levels of confidence in order to ensure operation of essential safety features. If the potential deficiency had gone undetected and resulted in a failure of the diesel generators, this source of emergency power might have been eliminated.

### Corrective Action

TDC has described the inspection method required to determine whether this defect is present. The components of the diesels supplied to Bellefonte are in position. Documentation which completely describes the potential defect has been written and tags have been attached to the diesels. These tags indicate that the link rod assemblies must be inspected according to instructions supplied by TDC. If the defect is detected, the documentation requires correction of the deficiency before release. Also, the inspection has been entered into the documented itinerary ("punchlist") to ensure that it has been done before the diesels are first started up.

TVA will complete the inspection and make any necessary repairs before startup of each diesel unit. This will be conducted according to the Martini letter of September 19, 1980.

PART 21 IDENTIFICATION NO.

80-285-002

COMPANY NAME

Tennessee Valley Authority

DATE OF LETTER 11/20/80

DOCKET NO. 50-438/434

DATE DISTRIBUTED 12/2/80 p.m.

ORIGINAL REPORT

SUPPLEMENTARY

## DISTRIBUTION:

REACTOR (R)



IE FILES

EES

REGIONS I,II,III,IV,V

VENDOR BR. R-IV

LOEB / MPA MNB 5715

AEOD MNB 7602

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ASLBP E/W 450

CENTRAL FILES 016

CENTRAL FILES (CHRON)

~~PDR~~

LPDR

TERA

FUEL CYCLE &amp;



MATERIALS (M)

IE FILES

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SAFEGUARDS (S)



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CENTRAL FILES (CHRON)

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PDR

LPDR

TERA

## ACTION:

PRELIMINARY EVALUATION OF THE ATTACHED REPORT INDICATES LEAD RESPONSIBILITY FOR

FOLLOWUP AS SHOWN BELOW:

IE



NRR



NMSS



OTHER



EES

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REV. 8/1/80  
9/17/80  
12/2/80