

# 1.0 THE SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT PLANT

## 1.1 Introduction

### 1.1.1 Introduction

On September 20, 2007 (Agency-wide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML072830407), STP Nuclear Operating Company (STPNOC), pursuant to Sections 103 and 185b of the Atomic Energy Act and Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (10 CFR) Part 52, Subpart C, submitted to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) an application for Class 103 combined licenses (COL) to construct and operate two new Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR) units designated as South Texas Project (STP) Units 3 and 4. On January 26, 2011, Nuclear Innovation North America (NINA or the applicant) submitted Revision 5 of the STP Units 3 and 4 COL application and identified a change in the lead applicant from STPNOC to NINA. The applicant also applied for the additional licenses that are required to possess and use source, special nuclear, and byproduct materials in connection with the operation of the plant. The proposed units are to be built on the applicant's existing site in Matagorda County, Texas, about 90 miles southwest of Houston. STP Units 3 and 4 are to be co-located with STP Units 1 and 2, two existing pressurized water reactors.

The COL application incorporates by reference the U.S. Certified ABWR (Docket No. 52-001), as the design for STP Units 3 and 4 as modified by the STPNOC Application to Amend the Design Certification for the ABWR. The ABWR has a pressure suppression primary containment system that is comprised of the drywell and wetwell along with supporting systems. The ABWR has a rated thermal power of 3,926 megawatt thermal (MWt), and the generator will deliver a net electrical power of about 1,300 megawatt electrical (MWe). The expected completion dates (fuel loading) for Units 3 and 4 are September 2014 and October 2015, respectively, with anticipated commercial operation dates of June 2015 and July 2016, respectively.

The STP COL application is organized as follows:

- **Part 1, General Financials**, provides an introduction to the application and includes certain corporate information pursuant to 10 CFR 50.33.
- **Part 2, Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)**, includes Tier 1 and Tier 2 departures and "supplements" or "supplemental information" pertaining to the standard design described in the certified ABWR design control document (DCD). The information in the FSAR is pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 52.79 and, in general, adheres to the content and format guidance in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.206.
- **Part 3, Environmental Report (ER)**, provides the environmental impacts of constructing and operating new nuclear units at the STP site, pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 51.50(c).
- **Part 4, Technical Specifications (TS)**, includes ABWR Generic TS and Bases and the STP Units 3 and 4 site-specific TS and Bases.

- **Part 5, Emergency Plan**, provides site emergency plan and supporting information, such as evacuation time estimates and applicable offsite State and local emergency plans for the STP site.
- **Part 6 is a place holder for a possible future site redress plan.**
- **Part 7, Departures Report**, includes “departures” and “exemptions” from the standard design described in the certified ABWR DCD. In Part 7 In accordance with Section VIII, “Processes for Changes and Departures,” of “Appendix A to Part 52--Design Certification Rule for the U.S. Advanced Boiling Water Reactor,” the applicant identifies and evaluates departures. Section 2 discusses departures requiring prior NRC approval, divided into Tier 1, Tier 2\*, Tier 2, and Technical Specifications departures from the approved ABWR DCD. Section 3 of Part 7 discusses Tier 2 departures that do not require prior NRC approval and are evaluated pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 52, Appendix A, Section VIII.B.5. In addition, to address some of the Tier 2 departures that do not require prior NRC approval, the staff engaged in 10 CFR Part 52, Appendix A, Section VIII.B.5 audits (similar to 10 CFR 50.59 process) with the applicant (ML092510426 and ML093360537).
- **Part 8, Security/Training Qualification/Safeguards Plan**, includes security plan and safeguards information that is withheld from public disclosure.
- **Part 9, Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC)** includes ABWR DCD Tier 1 information and the STP Units 3 and 4 ITAAC arranged as follows: (1) Introduction, (2) Design Certification ITAAC, (3) Site-Specific ITAAC, (4) Emergency Planning ITAAC, and (5) Physical Security ITAAC.
- **Part 10, Proprietary Information.**
- **Part 11, Mitigative Strategies Report**, is required by 10 CFR 52.80(d). This section contains the applicant’s Mitigative Strategies Report. In 2009, the *Code of Federal Regulations* was changed to require applicants to include, in their application, a description and plans for implementation of the guidance and strategies intended to maintain or restore core cooling, containment, and spent fuel pool cooling capabilities under the circumstances associated with the loss of large areas of the plant due to explosions or fire, as required by 10 CFR 50.54(hh)(2). The Mitigative Strategies Report addresses these requirements.

### 1.1.2 Summary of Application

Section 1.1 of the STP Units 3 and 4 COL FSAR incorporates by reference Section 1.1 of the certified ABWR DCD Revision 4, which is referenced in 10 CFR Part 52, Appendix A.

In addition, in COL FSAR Section 1.1, the applicant provides the following:

#### Format and Content:

This section contains general information regarding the format and content of the application. It also describes basic formatting conventions used in revising and supplementing the DCD; for example, the use of italicized text to indicate DCD information contained as a part of the FSAR.



- 10 CFR 52.77 requires the COL application to contain all information required by 10 CFR 50.33.
- 10 CFR 52.79 provides requirements for the technical information that must be contained in the FSAR.
- 10 CFR 52.79(d) provides additional requirements for a COL referencing a standard certified design.
- 10 CFR 52.80 provides requirements for additional technical information outside of the FSAR (e.g., ITAAC and the environmental report).
- 10 CFR 52.81 provides standards for reviewing the application.
- 10 CFR 52.83 provides for the finality of referenced NRC approvals (e.g., standard design certification and early site permits).
- 10 CFR 52.85 provides requirements for administrative reviews and hearings.
- 10 CFR 52.87 provides for referrals to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS).

#### Finality of Referenced NRC Approvals

In accordance with 10 CFR 52.83, “Finality of referenced NRC approvals; partial initial decision on site suitability,” if the application for a COL references a design certification rule (DCR), the scope and nature of matters resolved for the application and any combined license issued are governed by the relevant provisions addressing finality. For the ABWR DCR, finality is specifically addressed by 10 CFR 52.63, “Finality of standard design certifications,” and 10 CFR Part 52, Appendix A, Section VI. Based on the finality afforded to referenced certified designs, the scope of this COL application review—as it relates to the referenced certified design—is primarily limited to ensuring that the COL applicant adequately addresses the identified COL action items.

The contents of the FSAR are specified by 10 CFR 52.79(a), which requires the submission of information within the FSAR that describes the facility; identifies the design bases and the limits on its operation; and presents a safety analysis of the structures, systems, and components (SSCs) of the facility as a whole. For a COL application that references a design certification (DC), Section 52.79(d) requires the DCD to be included or incorporated by reference into the FSAR. Additionally, a COL application that references a DC must also contain the information and analysis required to be submitted within the scope of the COL application, but which is outside the scope of the DCD. This set of information addresses plant and site-specific information and includes all COL action or information items; design information replacing conceptual design information; and programmatic information that was not reviewed and approved in connection with the design certification rulemaking. In addition, 10 CFR Part 52 Appendix A, Section IV.A.3 states that an applicant for a combined license shall include, in the plant specific DCD, the proprietary and safeguards information referenced in the ABWR DCD.

The initial step in the NRC staff evaluation of the COL application is to confirm that the complete set of information required to be addressed within the COL application is addressed within the DC, as supplemented by the COL application or completely within the COL application.



does not require prior NRC approval because it is editorial in nature. In addition, alternate vendor qualifications are addressed in Section 1.4S of this SER.

The applicant's evaluation in accordance with 10 CFR Part 52, Appendix A, Section VIII Item B.5 determined that the above departures do not require prior NRC approval. Within the review scope of this section, the staff found it reasonable that these departures do not require prior NRC approval. In addition, the applicant's process for evaluating departures and changes to the DCD is subject to NRC inspections.

*COL License Information Item:*

- COL License Information Item 1.1      Design Process to Establish Detailed Design Documentation

With regard to this COL license information item, the staff agrees that the QAPD is an appropriate place to describe the design process to establish detailed design documentation. The QAPD is evaluated in Chapter 17 of this SER.

*Supplemental Information*

In order to meet the requirement of 10 CFR Part 52 Appendix A, Section IV.A.3 for proprietary information, the applicant provided all proprietary information referenced in the ABWR DCD in Part 10 of the application. Subsection 13.6.3 and Appendix 19C of the STP Units 3 and 4 FSAR reference safeguards information of the ABWR DCD. By letter dated October 18, 2010 (ML102930078), STPNOC confirms, by oath and affirmation, that it has possession of the referenced information and the right to use it in the licensing, design, construction and operation of STP Units 3 and 4. STPNOC also stated that they are prepared to submit the referenced information if the NRC determines that to be desirable. The staff has concluded that the applicant has met the requirements of 10 CFR Part 52, Appendix A, Section IV.A.3.

**1.1.5      Post Combined License Activities**

There are no post COL activities related to this section.

**1.1.6      Conclusion**

The NRC staff's finding related to information incorporated by reference is in NUREG-1503. NRC staff reviewed the application and checked the referenced DCD. The staff's review confirmed that the applicant has addressed the required information relating to "Introduction," and no outstanding information is expected to be addressed in the COL FSAR related to this section. Pursuant to 10 CFR 52.63(a)(5) and Part 52, Appendix A, Section VI.B.1, all nuclear safety issues relating to the introduction that were incorporated by reference have been resolved.

In addition, the staff concluded that the relevant information in the COL FSAR is acceptable, satisfies NRC regulations, and meets the requirements defined in the ABWR DCD, which is incorporated by reference into 10 CFR Part 52, Appendix A. The staff's conclusion is based on the following:



Tier 2 Departure Requiring Prior NRC Approval

- STD DEP 8.3-1 Plant Medium Voltage Electrical System Design

This departure changes the plant's medium voltage electrical system from a single 6.9 kilovolt (kV) system to a dual-voltage 13.8 kV and 4.16 kV system and affects the TS related to the design change.

Tier 2 Departures Not Requiring Prior NRC Approval

- STP DEP 1.1-2 Dual Units at STP 3 & 4

This departure recognizes that the ABWR DCD references a single unit, while the COL application is for two units.

- STD DEP 1.2-1 Control Building Annex

This design change relocates the reactor internal pump motor generator sets from the control building to a non-seismic control building annex.

- STP DEP 1.2-2 Turbine Building

This departure changes the design of the turbine building.

- STD DEP 3.8-1 Resizing the Radwaste Building

This design change resizes and makes other changes to the layout of the Radwaste Building (RW/B).

- STD DEP 9.1-1 Update of Fuel Storage and Handling Equipment

This departure updates the description of the fuel storage and handling equipment.

- STD DEP 9.4-3 Service Building HVAC System

This departure changes the design of the service building heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) system.

- STD DEP 9.4-4 Turbine Island HVAC System

This design change revises the turbine island HVAC system.

- STP DEP 10.2-1 Turbine Design

This departure changes the design of the turbine.

- STP DEP 10.4-2 Main Condenser

This departure changes the design of the main condenser.

- STD DEP 10.4-6 Load Rejection Capability

This departure changes the load rejection capability of STP Units 3 and 4.

- STD DEP 11.4-1 Radioactive Solid Waste Update

This departure modifies the solid waste management system.

- STD DEP Admin

This administrative departure recognizes that the size of the site is 12,220 acres rather than 12, 200 acres.

### COL License Information Items

- COL License Information Item 1.1a Plant Design and Aging Management

The application contains a supplemental description of the applicant's plan for plant design and aging management.

### **1.2.3 Regulatory Basis**

The regulatory basis for the information incorporated by reference is contained in NUREG–1503 Section 1.2. The regulatory basis for reviewing COL License Information Item 1.1a is in Section 1.0, of NUREG–0800.

In addition, in accordance with Section VIII, “Processes for Changes and Departures”, of “Appendix A to Part 52--Design Certification Rule for the U.S. Advanced Boiling Water Reactor,” the applicant identified Tier 1, and Tier 2 departures. Tier 1 departures are subject to requirements of 10 CFR Part 52, Appendix A, Section V.III.A.4. Tier 2 departures that affect technical specifications require prior NRC approval. These departures are subject to the requirements of Appendix A, Section V.III.C.4. Tier 2 departures not requiring prior NRC approval are subject to the requirements of 10 CFR 52, Appendix A, Section VIII.B.5, which are similar to the requirements in 10 CFR 50.59.

### **1.2.4 Technical Evaluation**

As documented in NUREG–1503, NRC staff reviewed and approved Section 1.2 of the certified ABWR DCD. The staff reviewed Section 1.2 of the STP Units 3 and 4 COL FSAR and checked the referenced ABWR DCD to ensure that the combination of information in the COL FSAR and information in the ABWR DCD represents the complete scope of information relating to this review topic.<sup>1</sup> The staff's review confirmed that the information in the application and the information incorporated by reference address the required information relating to general plant description.

The following items are also reviewed in this section:

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<sup>1</sup> See “*Finality of Referenced NRC Approvals*” in SER Section 1.1.3, for a discussion on the staff's review related to verification of the scope of information to be included in a COL application that references a design certification.



### Tier 2 Departure Requiring Prior NRC Approval

The following Tier 2 Departure identified by the applicant in this section requires prior NRC approval and the full scope of its technical impact may be evaluated in the other sections of this SER accordingly. For more information, refer to COL application Part 07, Section 5.0 for a listing of all FSAR sections affected by this departure.

- STD DEP 8.3-1 Plant Medium Voltage Electrical System Design

With respect to this section of the FSAR, the applicant has identified that STD DEP 8.3-1 results in necessary editorial revisions to ABWR DCD Subsections 1.2.2.13.2 - 1.2.2.13.5, 1.2.2.13.13, 1.2.2.13.17, and 1.2.2.14.1. Within the review scope of SER Section 1.2, the staff found that this departure is editorial in nature and is acceptable.

### Tier 2 Departures Not Requiring Prior NRC Approval

The following Tier 2 Departures not requiring NRC approval identified by the applicant in this section may also be addressed in other sections of this SER. For more information, refer to COL application Part 07, Section 5.0 for a listing of all FSAR sections affected by these departures.

- STP DEP 1.1-2 Dual Units at STP 3 & 4
- STD DEP 1.2-1 Control Building Annex
- STP DEP 1.2-2 Turbine Building
- STD DEP 3.8-1 Resizing the RW/B
- STD DEP 9.1-1 Update of Fuel Storage and Handling Equipment
- STD DEP 9.4-3 Service Building HVAC System
- STD DEP 9.4-4 Turbine Island HVAC System
- STP DEP 10.2-1 Turbine Design
- STP DEP 10.4-2 Main Condenser
- STD DEP 10.4-6 Load Rejection Capability
- STD DEP 11.4-1 Radioactive Solid Waste Update

### *Administrative Departure*

- STD DEP Admin

The applicant defines administrative departures as minor corrections, such as editorial or administrative errors in the referenced ABWR DCD (i.e., misspellings, incorrect references, table headings, etc.). The applicant identifies that this administrative departure recognizes that the size of the site is 12,220 acres rather than 12,200 acres. NRC staff found that this administrative departure does not affect the presentation of any design discussion or qualification of design margin. Therefore, this departure is acceptable.

The applicant's evaluation in accordance with 10 CFR Part 52, Appendix A, Section VIII Item B.5 determined that this departure does not require prior NRC approval. Within the review scope of this section, the staff found it reasonable that this departure does not require prior NRC approval. In addition, the applicant's process for evaluating departures and changes to the DCD is subject to NRC inspections.

### COL License Information Items

- COL License Information Item 1.1a Plant Design and Aging Management

This COL License Information Item directs the applicant to initiate life-cycle management early in the design process and to consider the design life requirements as outlined in Subsection 1.2.1.3 of the DCD. It also specifies that the aging management program shall cover the structures and components, and consider the potential corrosion causes, outlined in Subsection 1.2.1.3 of the DCD. This was tracked as Open Item 01-3 in the SER with open items.

The applicant describes the Design and Aging Management Program and breaks it down into the areas of Design Life, Design Life Maintenance, and Aging Management. The Design and Aging Management Program is broad and considers a variety of issues such as design margins, water quality, material selection, and environmental conditions. Detailed technical reviews of such programs are normally conducted as part of a license renewal process. The applicant is committed to following the programs described in the Generic Aging Lessons Learned (GALL) Report (NUREG-1801) to support license renewal. The GALL Report summarizes the staff's approved AMPs to manage or monitor the aging of structures and components that are subject to an AMP. The GALL Report also serves as a quick reference for applicants and staff reviewers to AMPs and activities that the staff determined will adequately manage or monitor the plant during the period of operation. The time-limited aging analysis (TLAA) programs or acceptable alternatives will be monitored and trended by the applicant to ensure that the component or structure does not exceed the design limits.

The staff found the applicant's response to COL License Information Item 1.1a acceptable and Open Item 01-3 is closed. If the applicant chooses to apply for license renewal, the requirements of 10 CFR Part 54 will apply.

#### **1.2.5 Post Combined License Activities**

There are no post COL activities related to this section.

#### **1.2.6 Conclusion**

The NRC staff's finding related to information incorporated by reference is in NUREG-1503. NRC staff reviewed the application and checked the referenced DCD. The staff's review confirmed that the applicant has addressed the required information relating to "General Plant Description," and no outstanding information is expected to be addressed in the COL FSAR related to this section. Pursuant to 10 CFR 52.63(a)(5) and Part 52, Appendix A, Section VI.B.1, all nuclear safety issues relating to the introduction that were incorporated by reference have been resolved.

In addition, the staff concluded that the relevant information in the COL FSAR is acceptable, satisfies NRC regulations, and meets the requirements defined in the ABWR DCD, which is incorporated by reference into 10 CFR Part 52, Appendix A. The staff's conclusion is based on the following:

- The staff reviewed the proposed Tier 1 standard departures with respect to Commission rules and regulations. For the purpose of the staff's Section 1.2 review, the staff determined

that the standard departures are consistent with Commission rules and regulations and has no adverse impact on public health and safety.

- For the purposes of the staff's Section 1.2 review, the staff found that the "Tier 2 Departure Requiring Prior NRC Approval" identified by the applicant has no adverse impact on public health and safety and is consistent with NRC rules and regulations.
- For the purposes of the staff's Section 1.2 review, the staff found that, for all of the "Tier 2 Departures Not Requiring Prior NRC Approval" identified by the applicant, it is reasonable that they do not require prior NRC approval.
- Within the review scope of this section, the staff's review confirmed that the applicant has adequately addressed COL license information 1.1a in accordance with Section 1.0, "Introduction and Interfaces," of NUREG-0800.

### **1.3 Comparison Tables**

This section of the FSAR highlights the principal design features of the plant and compares its major features with those of other BWR facilities.

Section 1.3 of the STP COL FSAR incorporates by reference—with no departures or supplements—Section 1.3, "Comparison Tables," of ABWR DCD Revision 4, which is referenced in 10 CFR Part 52, Appendix A. NRC staff reviewed the application and considered the referenced DCD to ensure that no issue relating to this section remains for review.<sup>1</sup> The staff's review confirmed that there is no outstanding information outside of the DCD related to this section. Pursuant to 10 CFR 52.63(a)(5) and Part 52, Appendix A, Section VI.B.1, all nuclear safety issues relating to the "Comparison Tables" have been resolved.

### **1.4 Identification of Agents and Contractors**

#### **1.4.1 Introduction**

This section of the COL FSAR identifies the primary agents and contractors for STP Units 3 and 4.

#### **1.4.2 Summary of Application**

Section 1.4 of the STP Units 3 and 4 COL FSAR incorporates by reference Section 1.4 of the certified ABWR DCD Revision 4, with no departures.

In addition, in COL FSAR Section 1.4, the applicant provides the following:

#### **Supplemental Information**

In Revision 5 of the STP Units 3 and 4 COL application, the applicant identifies NINA as the licensee responsible for the design and construction of STP Units 3 and 4. The applicant identifies STPNOC as the licensee responsible for the operation and maintenance of STP Units 3 and 4.

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<sup>1</sup> See "Finality of Referenced NRC Approvals" in SER Section 1.1.3, for a discussion on the staff's review related to verification of the scope of information to be included in a COL application that references a design certification.

The applicant identifies the Toshiba Power Systems Company (Toshiba) as responsible for the engineering, procurement, and construction (EPC) of STP Units 3 and 4. Toshiba also has overall responsibility for the design and construction of the facility and support of the COL application.

The applicant identifies Westinghouse Electric Corporation (Westinghouse or WEC) as a subcontractor with significant experience in the design, construction, inspection, and maintenance of nuclear power plants.

The applicant identifies Sargent & Lundy as a subcontractor providing engineering services, specifically for the design of the nuclear island but also for the reactor building, control building, radwaste buildings, and ultimate heat sink.

The applicant identifies the following specialized consultants:

- Tetra Tech NUS, Inc., prepared sections of the FSAR and the Environmental Report (ER) including socioeconomics, demographics, ecology, impacts of construction and operation, impacts of radioactive waste generation and transportation, and environmental impacts of postulated accidents.
- MACTEC Engineering and Consulting, Inc., performed geotechnical field and laboratory tests.
- William Lettis & Associates, Inc. performed geologic mapping and characterization of seismic sources.
- Risk Engineering, Inc., performed probabilistic seismic hazard assessments.
- Bechtel Corporation provided support with regard to the ER and site characterization.

### **1.4.3 Regulatory Basis**

The regulatory basis for the information incorporated by reference is in NUREG–1503. In addition, the relevant requirements for the Commission’s regulations and the associated acceptance criteria for reviewing supplemental information are in Section C.I.1.4 of RG 1.206.

### **1.4.4 Technical Evaluation**

As documented in NUREG–1503, NRC staff reviewed and approved Section 1.4 of the certified ABWR DCD. The staff reviewed Section 1.4 of the STP Units 3 and 4 COL FSAR and checked the referenced ABWR DCD to ensure that the combination of information in the COL FSAR and information in the ABWR DCD represents the complete scope of information relating to this review topic.<sup>1</sup> The staff’s review confirmed that the information in the application and the information incorporated by reference address the required information relating to identification of agents and contractors.

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<sup>1</sup> See “*Finality of Referenced NRC Approvals*” in SER Section 1.1.3, for a discussion on the staff’s review related to verification of the scope of information to be included in a COL application that references a design certification.

The following item is also reviewed in this section:

### Supplemental Information

In accordance with RG 1.206, Section C.I.1.4, "Identification of Agents and Contractors," the applicant has provided supplemental information that identifies the primary agents for the design, construction, and operation of the proposed facility. The applicant delineates the division of responsibility among the contractors. For each subcontractor and specialized consultant contractor, the applicant provides a history of nuclear-related work experience. Each subcontractor and specialized consultant is known and is acceptable to the staff for providing expertise in the technical area or in areas specified in the application. The staff found that the applicant has adequately addressed this supplemental information in accordance with Section C.1.1.4 of RG 1.206.

#### **1.4.5 Post Combined License Activities**

There are no post COL activities related to this section.

#### **1.4.6 Conclusion**

The NRC staff's finding related to information incorporated by reference is in NUREG-1503. NRC staff reviewed the application and checked the referenced DCD. The staff's review confirmed that the applicant has addressed the required information relating to "Identification of Agents and Contractors," and no outstanding information is expected to be addressed in the COL FSAR related to this section. Pursuant to 10 CFR 52.63(a)(5) and Part 52, Appendix A, Section VI.B.1, all nuclear safety issues relating to identification of agents and contractors and other documents that were incorporated by reference have been resolved.

In addition, the staff concluded that the relevant information in the COL FSAR is acceptable, satisfies NRC regulations, and meets the requirements defined in the ABWR DCD, which is incorporated by reference into 10 CFR Part 52, Appendix A. The staff's conclusion is based on the following:

- The NRC staff's review confirmed that the applicant has adequately addressed the supplemental information in accordance with Section C.I.1.4 of RG 1.206.

#### **1.4S Qualifications of Alternate Vendor**

This section does not exist in either the ABWR DCD or COL FSAR. The NRC staff has added this section to the SER in order to address issues regarding the applicant's alternate vendor qualifications.

##### **1.4S.1 Introduction**

NINA is the applicant for the COL. The EPC was awarded to Toshiba. As the Holder of the EPC, Toshiba will assume the duties normally assigned to the plant vendor and the entity that originally obtained the design certification. Because Toshiba is not the entity that originally obtained the design certification, it is referred to as an "alternate vendor."

Worldwide, Toshiba has been in the nuclear field since the late 1950s. Toshiba's experience as a subcontractor for nuclear power plant construction dates back to the 1960s and experience as

a prime contractor in nuclear power plant construction dates back to the early 1970s. Toshiba supplied the nuclear steam supply system for both the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station Unit No. 6 and Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station Unit No. 5 and supplied the balance of the plant (without the turbine and generator) for Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station Unit No. 7. These three plants are all ABWRs, though their designs differ from the U.S. certified ABWR design. Toshiba was also an associate of GE's in the development of the U.S. ABWR design.

The U.S. ABWR design certification FSER (NUREG-1503) describes the relationship between GE and its associates (including Toshiba) in support of the U.S. certified ABWR design. Recognizing Toshiba's contributions to the ABWR certified design, NRC staff proposed two activities for conducting the alternate vendor qualification review:

- (1) a review of the STPNOC due diligence summary report
- (2) audits or inspections, as necessary, conducted during Phase 1 of the COL application review to support the review of the STPNOC due diligence summary report

This section of the SER documents the review and findings of the associated audits and inspections. In preparing the safety evaluation, the staff addressed these fundamental questions:

- Since Toshiba is not the entity that obtained the design certification, what information needed to support the COL process may not be available to the applicant (e.g., proprietary topical reports or computer codes)? How does the applicant intend to fill the design-basis gaps caused by the unavailability of this information?
- Has the applicant adequately assessed the ability of Toshiba (and other contractors) to provide the information that must be reconstituted?
- Do we have a reasonable assurance that the process employed by the applicant was adequate to identify all design-basis information that must be reconstituted?
- Do we have a reasonable assurance that Toshiba and its contractors will be able to assume the duties normally assigned to the plant vendor and to the entity that originally obtained the design certification? Do they have the expertise and technical competence to adequately manage and control design changes and support the licensing process?
- What are the differences between the ABWR designs that Toshiba has already developed and the U.S. certified ABWR design? Is there a reasonable assurance that Toshiba can address these differences and provide a U.S. certified ABWR design?

#### **1.4S.2 Summary of Due Diligence Outline**

In a letter dated August 19, 2008, STPNOC submitted on the STP Unit 3 and 4 Dockets (ML082350161 [proprietary] and ML082350160 [non-proprietary]) outlines of the due diligence assessment of Toshiba's qualifications to provide the ABWR design for STP Units 3 and 4. The due diligence effort was intended to assess areas where, in the applicant's opinion, Toshiba may not have the direct experience necessary to support the U.S. certified ABWR design. The applicant evaluated, in detail, the areas of design documentation, ongoing technical development, licensing support, and the development and implementation of a supply chain.

In conducting the due diligence evaluation, the applicant divided the scope of work into the following nine basic tasks:

- (1) Design Documentation – This task identifies the references in licensing documents that must be reestablished or reconstituted in order to support the licensing process.
- (2) Unique Issues – This task identifies unique issues and develops an understanding of how these issues affect the plant's design.
- (3) Design-Basis Information – This task identifies the design-basis information required from Toshiba, including the ability to estimate the level of effort needed to provide that information.
- (4) Americanization – This task determines the impact of issues such as the conversion to U.S. units of measure (e.g., metric to English units); the use of U.S. Codes and Standards; and the shift from foreign to U.S. suppliers.
- (5) Engineering Schedule/Resources – This task updates the schedule and resource requirements identified in the results of the other tasks.
- (6) USNRC Interface – This task determines how to implement 10 CFR Part 52 with an alternate vendor and how to develop COL application revisions without the participation of the ABWR design applicant.
- (7) Specific Engineering Disciplines – This task develops action plans for addressing issues of seismic and structural design, safety-related I&C, the oscillation power range monitor (OPRM) system, human factors engineering, fuel analyses, probabilistic risk assessments, severe accident mitigation, and hydrodynamic loads.
- (8) Supply Chain – This task demonstrates that the engineering, procurement, and construction teams are able to deliver the required materials and equipment.
- (9) Mitigation Management Assessment – This task presents and summarizes mitigation management methods for uncertainties.

In a letter dated December 18, 2008, STPNOC submitted proprietary (ML083660245) and non-proprietary (ML083660244) revisions to the outline of the due diligence effort. These revisions update STPNOC's decision on the disposition of various documents associated with the ABWR design.

### **1.4S.3 Regulatory Basis**

The application for certification of the U.S. ABWR design was filed by GE Nuclear Energy. As the Holder of the EPC, Toshiba will provide the design for STP Units 3 and 4. The regulations in 10 CFR 52.73(a) allow an alternate vendor to supply a certified design; however, the regulations require the alternate vendor to be demonstrated as qualified to supply that design.

## **1.4S.4 Technical Evaluation**

### **1.4S.4.1 Design-Basis Documentation**

In order to supply a design for the U.S. Certified ABWR, Toshiba will have to translate the design descriptions in the DCD into a workable design and support that design throughout the licensing process. Some information in the DCD or in its references may not be publically available, either because it is proprietary to the design certification applicant or for other reasons. The unavailability of information could result in gaps in the design-basis documentation, which could make it necessary for the applicant to reconstitute certain information.

The applicant has performed a thorough review of the DCD, the NRC staff's FSER of the DCD (NUREG-1503), and the applicant's COL application. The applicant has identified the references cited in these documents and grouped those references into three categories: direct references (i.e., documents cited directly); embedded references (i.e., documents cited in a direct reference); and indirect references (i.e., technical statements that are not associated with a direct reference).

The result of the applicant's review is a proprietary Direct Reference Master List with 162 references that the applicant provided in the December 18, 2008, revised due diligence submittal. The applicant grouped these references into eight major categories (the second category has three subcategories). Each category is associated with a proposed method of disposition. The categories and proposed dispositions for the references are as follows:

- Category 1 Reference was replaced with a report that changed the licensing basis.
- Category 2A New reports were needed to support the STP COL application.
- Category 2B New reports were written for closing the ITAAC.
- Category 2C New reports were needed at the time of the COL issuance.
- Category 3 Reference was replaced as part of the license fuel amendment.
- Category 4 No replacement was necessary (e.g., the applicant is authorized to use the reference).
- Category 5 Reference was replaced by a new report (NRC staff approval is not necessary).
- Category 6 Superseded documents are not required for STP Units 3 and 4.
- Category 7 Document is no longer valid; the information is in the COL application.
- Category 8 Documents are not applicable to STP Units 3 and 4.

The staff reviewed the applicant's reference list and the proposed methods of disposition for both completeness and acceptability, taking into account the experience and abilities of the applicant; the Holder of the EPC; and the other contractors and subcontractors identified in this section of the SER. The staff determined that the following areas warranted additional

inspection, audit, or other information before a conclusion on vendor qualifications could be reached.

### Pressure-Temperature Limits

Approved pressure-temperature (P/T) limits or an approved pressure-temperature limits report (PTLR) is required to support the issuance of a COL. The P/T limits in the ABWR DCD are representative curves only; they are not approved plant-specific curves that are appropriate for incorporation by reference. GE's methodology for developing P/T limits is in proprietary documents.

In response to a request for this documentation, the applicant submitted a PTLR in July 2009 for NRC staff to review. This PTLR review included the methodology for developing acceptable P/T limits. The staff's review is in the appropriate section of Chapter 5 of this SER.

### Neutron Fluence Projection

The impact of radiation embrittlement of the reactor vessel must be evaluated to support the COL issuance. GE's staff-approved methodology for determining radiation embrittlement is in a proprietary document.

In addition to the PTLR, the applicant submitted a methodology for determining the impact of radiation embrittlement on the reactor vessel. The NRC staff's review of this methodology is in the appropriate section of Chapter 5 of this SER.

### Containment Analytical Model

The ABWR containment combines design features of Mark II and Mark III containments. The vent system is a combination of vertical (Mark II design) and horizontal (Mark III design) drywell-to-wetwell vent systems, and the wetwell (suppression pool and air space) is similar to a Mark II. The referenced NEDO-20533 report and its supplement were originally written for predicting Mark III transients. Adapting these models to simulate the ABWR design is possible but was not straightforward, as discussed in the NRC staff's evaluation of ABWR DCD Subsection 6.2.1.2, NUREG-1503, dated July 1994. It was only after receiving a letter dated May 22, 1992, which provided additional justification and documented a May 6, 1992, meeting where GE clarified assumptions, that the NRC staff concluded that the use of NEDO-20533 for the ABWR is acceptable.

The applicant states in Section 4.1 of Revision 0 of the Due Diligence Report that Toshiba has access and shares ownership rights to the ABWR common engineering documents, and Toshiba has either already acquired the required design documentation for STP Units 3 and 4 or has the capability to develop or reconstitute the necessary documentation, which the staff confirmed during an inspection of Toshiba's facilities in Japan in July 2009.

Based on this review of the information in the application, the staff determined that inspection efforts were necessary in the area of containment analysis. The staff needed to confirm that the models and analytical assumptions described in NEDO-20533 and its supplements have been correctly implemented into the GOTHIC code, so that the calculated containment peak pressures are bounded by the approved DCD containment analysis. In addition, the staff needed to confirm that the GOTHIC analysis is bounded by the GE analysis and has been

benchmarked against applicable empirical test data. The results of the staff's efforts in this area are detailed in Chapter 6 of this SER.

### Containment Hydrodynamic Loads

The evaluation of containment hydrodynamic loads is closely related to the implementation of NEDO-20533 models and assumptions in the STP GOTHIC analysis, as discussed in Subsection 1.4.2.9.

The NRC staff's evaluation of the original GE application is included in Subsection 6.2.1.6 of NUREG-1503. The staff noted that direct application of the Mark II methodology (PISCM Code) to the ABWR design is inappropriate due to the differences in vent configurations. GE had to develop a special correlation to account for the uneven pool slug rise observed in the Mark III Pressure Suppression Test Facility (PSTF) tests. In addition, the staff noted that the Mark II pool swell model (PSAM Code) is unacceptable, and the ultimate acceptance is based on comparisons with the database. The staff further stated that "as a result, the use of the program for configurations other than those encompassed by the test data would not be accepted without further comparisons with applicable test data."

The applicant acknowledges in the due diligence report that (1) there is a lack of explicit benchmark data for the horizontal vent design, (2) further benchmarking is planned, and (3) Toshiba has access to and permission to use the data collected from a Mark III test. A separate technical report was submitted for NRC to review and approve in parallel with the COL application review. The results of the staff's efforts in this area are in Section 6.2 of this SER.

Based on the review of the information in the application, the staff determined that inspection efforts were necessary in the area of vent clearing and pool swell analytical models, including the available database and computer benchmarking, if any. The results of the staff's inspection efforts are in Subsection 1.4S.4.2 of this SER.

### Instrumentation and Control

NRC staff reviewed the outline of the applicant's due diligence efforts and determined that a high-level inspection is appropriate of the EPC team's qualifications to design and implement I&C systems for STP Units 3 and 4. The staff specifically wanted to evaluate the EPC team's technical capabilities and qualifications to specify, manufacture, test, and implement a field programmable gate array (FPGA) -based nuclear monitoring system that includes an OPRM, a startup range nuclear monitoring system, a power range nuclear monitoring system, and other non-safety-related components. The staff focused on the development of the OPRM, which is a first-of-a-kind product for Toshiba, and on the use of FPGA technology, which is a first-of-a-kind technology for safety-related applications in the U.S. nuclear industry.

The staff also determined the need to inspect the EPC team's abilities and to specify, manufacture, test, and implement an FPGA-based reactor trip isolation system, which is a first-of-a-kind product for both Toshiba and the U.S. nuclear industry. The staff also determined the need to inspect the EPC team's abilities to design and integrate several different digital I&C platforms for both safety-related and non-safety-related systems. The staff conducted these inspections at Toshiba's Yokohama and Fuchu facilities in Japan in July 2009. The results of the staff's inspections are in Subsection 1.4S.4.2 of this SER.

## Quality Assurance

To justify the independent assessment of Toshiba's qualifications as an alternate vendor, the staff verified that Toshiba had implemented a QA Program that complies with the requirements of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50, "Quality Assurance Program Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants," (Appendix B) and a program for reporting defects and non-conformances consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 21, "Reporting of Defects and Noncompliance," in a manner that provides a reasonable assurance that Toshiba is capable of supplying the design of the ABWRs for STP Units 3 and 4. Specific areas of the staff's inspection included the following:

- *Alternate Vendor Qualification* – NRC inspectors reviewed ABWR engineering documents, licensing technical reports referenced in the ABWR DCD, and applicable test data to independently confirm that Toshiba has access to the ABWR engineering documents that form the design-basis documents for the certified U.S. ABWR design.
- *10 CFR Part 21 Program* – NRC inspectors reviewed Toshiba's policies and implementation procedures that govern the 10 CFR Part 21 Program to verify compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 21, "Reporting of Defects and Non-compliances."
- *Quality Assurance Program* – NRC inspectors reviewed Toshiba's QA policies and implementing procedures that govern the QA Program to verify compliance with the requirements of Criterion II, "Quality Assurance Program," of Appendix B.
- *Design Control* – NRC inspectors reviewed Toshiba's QA policies and implementation procedures that govern the design control process to verify compliance with the requirements of Criterion III, "Design Control," of Appendix B.
- *Procurement Document Control* – NRC inspectors reviewed Toshiba's QA policies and implementation procedures that govern the procurement document control process to verify compliance with the requirements of Criterion IV, "Procurement Document Control," of Appendix B.
- *Document Control* – NRC inspectors reviewed Toshiba's QA policies and implementation procedures that govern the document control process to verify compliance with the requirements of Criterion VI, "Document Control," of Appendix B.
- *Control of Purchased Materials, Equipment, and Services* – NRC inspectors reviewed Toshiba's QA policies and implementation procedures that govern the control of purchased materials, equipment, and services to verify compliance with the requirements of Criterion VII, "Control of Purchased Material, Equipment, and Services," of Appendix B.
- *Non-Conforming Materials, Parts, or Components* – NRC inspectors reviewed Toshiba's QA policies and implementation procedures that govern the nonconforming materials, parts, or components to verify compliance with the requirements of Criterion XV, "Nonconforming Materials, Parts or Components," of Appendix B.
- *Corrective Action* – NRC inspectors reviewed Toshiba's QA policies and implementation procedures that govern the corrective action process to verify compliance with the requirements of Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," of Appendix B.

- *Training and Qualifications* – NRC inspectors reviewed Toshiba’s QA policies and implementation procedures that govern the control of training and qualifying personnel performing activities affecting quality to verify compliance with the requirements of Criterion II, “Quality Assurance Program,” of Appendix B.
- *Initial Test Program (ITP)* – NRC inspectors reviewed Toshiba’s QA policies and implementation procedures that govern the process used to develop and implement the STP Units 3 and 4 Initial Plant Test Program.

The staff conducted these reviews during inspections of Toshiba’s Yokohama and Fuchu engineering facilities in Japan in July 2009. During the inspections, staff had access to translated documentation. The staff’s conclusions as a result of these inspections are in Subsection 1.4S.4.2 of this SER.

#### **1.4S.4.2 Specific Inspection Findings**

##### Containment Analytical Model

The P/T calculation was performed by Westinghouse using the GOTHIC computer code. Toshiba did not provide any specific test data as a basis for the GOTHIC qualification. However, the selected Horizontal Vent Tests (HVTs) were used for code verification. The NRC inspector confirmed that Toshiba has access to the HVT test data to be used to verify the GOTHIC code for the P/T calculation.

##### Containment Hydrodynamic Loads

A pool swell analysis was performed by Westinghouse using the GOTHIC code. The code was benchmarked against the GE PSTF test data (5800 series). Toshiba provided the test data in the form of a “derivative document” based on the GE data. Toshiba presented a first revision of this document during the July 2009 inspection. The NRC inspector confirmed that Toshiba has access to the GE PSTF test data and that the process being used to develop the Toshiba derivative document is acceptable.

Hydrodynamic loads were defined by Toshiba and provided to the STP for use in a licensing structural analysis. The definition of the pressure-forcing functions for the condensation oscillation (CO) and chugging (CH) loads will be based on the HVT test data (full-scale and subscale), as defined in the internal derivative document. The Toshiba derivative document for CO and CH loads was not yet complete at the time of the inspection and verification of the document was tracked as Open Item 01-4. On March 16, 2010 and June 17, 2010, the staff performed an audit of the STP and Toshiba documentation for hydrodynamic loads to support the staff’s evaluation of Toshiba as an EPC alternate vendor for the STP. Based on this audit and review, the staff concluded that STPNOC has demonstrated that Toshiba is qualified to provide the certified design information associated with hydrodynamic loads (ML101820358). Open Item 01-4 is closed. The hydrodynamic loads are addressed in Section 3.8 and in Section 6.2 of this SER.

For the safety/relief valve (SRV) loads, Toshiba will use the GE empirical correlation developed for the X-quenchers that are to be used in the STP ABWR. This correlation was previously approved by the NRC for BWR licensing applications. The NRC inspector confirmed that Toshiba has access to the GE data developed for the X-quenchers.

### Instrumentation and Control

Based on GE's publically available algorithms and logic for the OPRM system, Toshiba has already developed an OPRM prototype using the FPGA technology. Toshiba is essentially following the software QA process suitable for developing safety-related, central processing unit-based digital I&C systems, in accordance with the EPRI Topical Report-107330, "Generic Requirements Specification for Qualifying a Commercial PLC for Safety-Related Applications in Nuclear Power Plants."

NRC inspectors concluded that Toshiba has the experience and capability to supply the OPRM system for STP Units 3 and 4. Toshiba also demonstrated through its past experience in Japan and its ongoing efforts with STP Units 3 and 4 the ability to integrate the various I&C safety and non-safety platforms for the entire plant. A more detailed presentation of the staff's findings is in the NRC Inspection Report (IR 05200012/2009-202 and 05200013/2009-202 dated August 28, 2009 [ML092370709]).

### Quality Assurance

*Alternate Vendor Qualifications* – Based on the areas reviewed during the inspection, NRC inspectors independently confirmed STPNOC's due diligence review of Toshiba. The inspectors concluded that STPNOC's due diligence review adequately demonstrates that Toshiba is qualified to supply the ABWR certified design, as required by 10 CFR 52.73(a). The staff also found a reasonable assurance that Toshiba has the capabilities and technical competence necessary to assume the duties normally assigned to the design vendor. A more detailed presentation of the staff's findings is in the NRC Inspection Report (IR 05200012/2009-202 and 05200013/2009-202 dated August 28, 2009 [ML092370709]).

*10 CFR Part 21 Program* – NRC inspectors concluded that Toshiba's program requirements for 10 CFR Part 21 are consistent with the regulatory requirements of 10 CFR Part 21 and are being effectively implemented. A more detailed presentation of the staff's findings is in the NRC Inspection Report (IR 05200012/2009-202 and 05200013/2009-202 dated August 28, 2009 [ML092370709]).

*Appendix B Program* – NRC inspectors concluded that Toshiba's requirements for the QA Program are consistent with the regulatory requirements of Criterion II of Appendix B. Based on the limited sample of documents reviewed, the inspectors also determined that Toshiba's Quality Assurance Manual (QAM) and associated procedures related to the QA Program are being effectively implemented. A more detailed presentation of the staff's findings is in the NRC Inspection Report (IR 05200012/2009-202 and 05200013/2009-202 dated August 28, 2009 [ML092370709]).

*Design Control* – NRC inspectors concluded that Toshiba's program requirements for design control are consistent with the regulatory requirements of Criterion III of Appendix B. Based on the limited sample of design documentation reviewed, the inspectors also determined that Toshiba's QAM and associated design control procedures are being effectively implemented. A more detailed presentation of the staff's findings is in the NRC Inspection Report (IR 05200012/2009-202 and 05200013/2009-202 dated August 28, 2009 [ML092370709]).

*Procurement Document Control* – NRC inspectors concluded that Toshiba's program requirements for procurement document control are consistent with the regulatory requirements of Criterion IV of Appendix B. Based on the limited sample of documents reviewed, the NRC

inspectors also determined that Toshiba's QAM and associated procedures for procurement document control are being effectively implemented. A more detailed presentation of the staff's findings is in the NRC Inspection Report (IR 05200012/2009-202 and 05200013/2009-202 dated August 28, 2009 [ML092370709]).

*Document Control* – NRC inspectors concluded that Toshiba's program requirements for document control are consistent with the regulatory requirements of Criterion VI of Appendix B. Based on the limited sample of documents reviewed, the inspectors also determined that Toshiba's QAM and associated document control procedures are being effectively implemented. A more detailed presentation of the staff's findings is in the NRC Inspection Report (IR 05200012/2009-202 and 05200013/2009-202 dated August 28, 2009 [ML092370709]).

*Control of Purchased Materials, Equipment, and Services* – The NRC inspectors made a finding relative to the use of an external audit checklist in performing internal audits; Toshiba is taking action to allow for the use of more appropriate checklists. The inspectors concluded that Toshiba's program requirements for the control of purchased materials, services, and equipment are consistent with the regulatory requirements of Criterion VII of Appendix B. Based on the limited sample of documents reviewed, the inspectors also determined that Toshiba's QAM and associated procedures for the control of purchased materials, equipment, and services are being effectively implemented. A more detailed presentation of the staff's findings is in the NRC Inspection Report (IR 05200012/2009-202 and 05200013/2009-202 dated August 28, 2009 [ML092370709]).

*Nonconforming Materials, Parts, or Components* – NRC inspectors concluded that Toshiba's program requirements for the control of nonconforming materials, parts, or components are consistent with the regulatory requirements of Criterion XV of Appendix B. Based on the limited sample of documents reviewed, the inspectors also determined that Toshiba's QAM and associated procedures for the control of nonconforming materials, parts, or components are being effectively implemented. A more detailed presentation of the staff's findings is in the NRC Inspection Report (IR 05200012/2009-202 and 05200013/2009-202 dated August 28, 2009 [ML092370709]).

*Corrective Action* – The NRC inspectors made a finding relative to the timeliness of some corrective actions; Toshiba is revising its procedures to improve in this area. The inspectors concluded that Toshiba's program requirements for corrective actions are consistent with the regulatory requirements of Criterion XVI of Appendix B. Based on the limited sample of documents reviewed, the inspectors also determined that Toshiba's QAM and associated corrective action procedures are being effectively implemented. A more detailed presentation of the staff's findings is in the NRC Inspection Report (IR 05200012/2009-202 and 05200013/2009-202 dated August 28, 2009 [ML092370709]).

*Training and Qualification* – The NRC inspectors found that there was no implementing procedure for the new training database; nevertheless, Toshiba QA staff were knowledgeable on how the database works. Toshiba initiated a corrective action to address the lack of procedural guidance. The inspectors found that Toshiba's program requirements for training and qualifying personnel performing activities affecting quality are consistent with the regulatory requirements of Criterion II of Appendix B. Based on the limited sample of training and qualification records reviewed, the inspectors also determined that Toshiba's QAM and associated training and qualification procedures are being effectively implemented. A more detailed presentation of the staff's findings is available in the NRC Inspection Report (IR 05200012/2009-202 and 05200013/2009-202 dated August 28, 2009 [ML092370709]).

*Initial Test Program* – NRC inspectors concluded that STPNOC and Toshiba have adequate design and change controls for documenting STP Units 3 and 4 ITP changes and/or Tier 2 departures. The inspectors also concluded that STPNOC and Toshiba have provided adequate procedures to document overlapping activities between the ITP and the ITAAC. A more detailed presentation of the staff’s findings is in the NRC Inspection Report (IR 05200012/2009-202 and 05200013/2009-202 dated August 28, 2009 [ML092370709]).

#### **1.4S.5 Post Combined License Activities**

There are no post COL activities related to this section.

#### **1.4S.6 Conclusion**

NRC staff reviewed the information in the application and performed audits to determine the qualification of Toshiba as an alternate vendor. The staff’s review concluded that Toshiba is qualified to supply the design in accordance with 10 CFR 52.73(a).

### **1.5 Requirements for Further Technical Information**

In its application, the COL applicant who references a certified design should identify any requirements for further technical information related to those portions of the facility that are not certified, including an estimated schedule for providing the additional technical information that was not included with the initial COL application submittal and which may be necessary for issuance of a COL.

Section 1.5 of the STP COL FSAR incorporates by reference, with no departures or supplements, Section 1.5, “Requirements for Further Technical Information,” of the certified ABWR DCD, Revision 4, which is referenced in 10 CFR Part 52, Appendix A. NRC staff reviewed the application and checked the referenced DCD to ensure that no issue relating to this section remains for review.<sup>1</sup> The staff’s review confirmed that there is no outstanding issue related to this subsection. Pursuant to 10 CFR 52.63(a)(5) and Part 52, Appendix A, Section VI.B.1, all nuclear safety issues relating to the “Requirements for Further Technical Information” have been resolved.

#### **1.5S Other Regulatory Considerations**

This section does not exist in either the ABWR DCD or COL FSAR. NRC staff has added this section to the SER in order to address issues regarding other regulatory considerations for the applicant.

##### **1.5S.1 Applicant Technical Qualifications—10 CFR 52.97(a)(32)**

STPNOC currently owns and operates the STP Units 1 and 2 nuclear power plants. Based on STPNOC’s experience and demonstrated performance related to the construction and operation of these existing nuclear units, the staff concluded that STPNOC is technically qualified to engage in the activities associated with a COL for STP Units 3 and 4 in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 52.97(a)(1)(iv). In assuming responsibility for the design and construction of STP Units 3 and 4, NINA organized itself by transitioning the previously existing STPNOC

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<sup>1</sup> See “*Finality of Referenced NRC Approvals*” in SER Section 1.1.3, for a discussion on the staff’s review related to verification of the scope of information to be included in a COL application that references a design certification.

organization responsible for the development of STP Units 3 and 4 from STPNOC to NINA. This transition included the programs, processes and procedures developed by STPNOC for STP Units 3 and 4. Therefore, the staff concludes that NINA is also technically qualified to engage in the activities associated with a COL for STP Units 3 and 4 in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 52.97(a)(1)(iv).

### **1.5S.2 Applicant Financial Qualifications and Organization Considerations**

The staff's evaluation of the applicant's financial qualifications is in Appendix 1-B to this chapter.

### **1.5S.3 Nuclear Waste Policy Act**

Section 302(b) of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended, requires as a precondition to the issuance or renewal of a license to a person to use a utilization or production facility under Section 103 or Section 104 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 [42 U.S.C. 2133, 2134] that the applicant for such license shall have entered into a contract under Section 302 with the Secretary or that the Secretary affirms in writing that the applicant is actively and in good faith negotiating with the Secretary for a contract under this section. The COL application did not contain information regarding a contract for the disposal of high-level radioactive waste.

NRC staff issued RAI 01-16, which requested the applicant to identify the Department of Energy (DOE) contract number applicable to STP Units 3 and 4 for the disposal of high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel. The applicant's response to RAI 01-16 dated December 8, 2009 (ML093450355), identifies the requested DOE contract numbers as DE-CR01-09RW09007 (for STP Unit 3) and DE-CR01-09RW09008 (for STP Unit 4). The staff found this response acceptable, and RAI 01-16 is closed. Accordingly, the staff concluded that the applicant has satisfied the requirements of Section 302(b) of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

### **1.5S.4 Consultation with Department of Homeland Security**

In accordance with Section 657 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, the NRC consulted with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) with respect to STPNOC's COL application for the STP Units 3 and 4. During January 30, 2008 through February 1, 2008, DHS performed a site visit and was accompanied by NRC staff (ML080520367). On September 5, 2008, NRC issued the DHS consultation report regarding the DHS site visit with the applicant (ML082340558). The DHS report concludes that the applicant and NRC staff have satisfied the requirements of Section 657 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005.

### **1.5S.5 Receipt, Possession, and Use of Source, Byproduct and Special Nuclear Material Authorized by 10 CFR Part 52 Combined Licenses.**

In the September 20, 2007, cover letter to Revision 0 of the COL application, STPNOC requested other licenses that would be required to receive, possess, and use source, byproduct, and special nuclear materials in connection with the operation of Unit 3. The staff notes that such licenses would be in accordance with Commission regulations in 10 CFR Parts 30, 40, and 70. The staff evaluation of the 10 CFR Parts 30, 40 and 70 license application is in Appendix 1-C to this chapter.

### **1.5S.6 Aircraft Impact Assessment 10 CFR Part 50.150**

Before the docketing date of the COL application for STP Units 3 and 4, 10 CFR Part 52, Subpart C, "Combined Licenses," Section 52.79 was revised. A new paragraph, (a)(47), was added requiring the applicant's FSAR to contain the information required by 10 CFR 50.150, "Aircraft Impact Assessment." However, the COL application did not address the new requirement. This was being tracked as Open Item 01-7.

On June 30, 2009, STPNOC submitted an application to amend the Design Certification Rule for the U.S. ABWR (ML092040048). On September 23, 2010, STPNOC submitted the revised final application (ML102770376). The purpose of the application is to amend the design to comply with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.150, "Aircraft Impact Assessment." STPNOC references the ABWR standard design as modified by the STPNOC application to amend the ABWR design.

As part of the design certification amendment review, NRC staff reviewed the application and found STPNOC's ABWR amendment acceptable, because the information meets 10 CFR 50.150 and does not adversely affect the previously certified design (ML1027101980). As part of the COL application review, the staff issued RAI 01-18 and requested the applicant to incorporate by reference the ABWR aircraft impact amendment in the next revision of the FSAR. In addition, this RAI requested the applicant to identify (1) any site-specific design changes to address the aircraft impact assessment (AIA); (2) if any of the Tier 1 or Tier 2 departures had any effect on the key design features credited in the AIA; and (3) any additional Tier 1 and Tier 2 departures to implement the AIA. In a letter dated August 4, 2010 (ML 102180178), the applicant stated that Revision 4 of the STP Units 3 and 4 COL application will incorporate by reference the ABWR amendment application for aircraft impact. The applicant added that no STP Units 3 and 4 site-specific design changes are anticipated to address aircraft impacts. In addition, the applicant reviewed all Tier 1 and Tier 2 departures, as described in Part 7 of the STP Units 3 and 4 COL application. The applicant determined that none of the departures affects the overall conclusions relative to aircraft impact. Furthermore, no additional departures for STP Units 3 and 4 will be needed to address the requirements of 10 CFR 50.150.

In RAI 01-20, the staff requested that the applicant describe how they came to the conclusion that "none of the departures affects the overall conclusions in Appendix 19S relative to aircraft impact" as stated in the response to RAI 01-18. The staff also requested that the applicant provide a list of departures that were related to key design features credited in the AIA. Finally, the staff requested that the applicant document the conclusions in the Departures Report. In a response dated March 1, 2011 (ML110630408), the applicant provided a list and brief description of the departures that relate to key design features that were credited for AIA as described in Appendix 19S.4 of the STP ABWR DCD amendment application. The applicant performed an evaluation of each departure to determine if that departure would have changed the conclusion as stated in Section 19S.5, which states, "This assessment based upon NEI 07-13, concludes that the ABWR can continue to provide adequate protection of the public health and safety in the event of an impact of a large, commercial aircraft, as defined by the NRC. The aircraft impact would not inhibit the ABWR's core cooling capability and spent fuel pool integrity based on best estimate calculations." The results of the applicant's evaluation show that all of the key design features credited in Appendix 19S.4 are either unaffected or enhanced by the identified departures, and therefore, the conclusions in Appendix 19S.5 are unaffected by these departures. These departures do not adversely impact the basic design and physical separation of the ECCS, and do not affect the alternate feedwater injection (AFI) system. These departures do not adversely affect the location and design of the reactor building, control building, turbine building, or the spent fuel pool and its supporting structure that are credited in the AIA assessment. These departures do not affect the ability of the primary

containment to protect components inside the containment from a postulated aircraft impact. These departures do not change the design and location of fire barriers (including doors) as described in FSAR Sections 9.5.1 and 9A.4 for the reactor building and control building to limit the effects of internal fires created by a postulated aircraft impact. The applicant stated that the detailed evaluation for each departure is available for NRC review. In addition, the applicant proposed to revise the Departure Report to include the overall conclusion of the evaluations. The staff reviewed the applicant's response to RAI 01-20 and determined that the applicant evaluated the STP Units 3 and 4 departures affecting AIA key design features and considered the effect of the departures on the original assessment required by 10 CFR 50.150(c). RAI 01-20 is resolved. Verification of changes to the Departures Report in the next revision of the FSAR is being tracked as **Confirmatory Item 01-6**.

The staff reviewed Revision 4 of the STP Units 3 and 4 application and found that the applicant did not adequately incorporate by reference the latest revision of the STP ABWR DCD amendment application. In RAI 01-19, the staff requested that the application incorporate by reference the latest revision of the STP ABWR DCD amendment application and identify every place in the STP Units 3 and 4 application where the amendment will be incorporated by reference. In the response to RAI 01-19, the applicant stated that they will update the next revision of the FSAR to incorporate Revision 3 of the STPNOC DCD supporting the ABWR DCD amendment in every location in the FSAR where the amendment revises the DCD. This resolves RAI 01-18. Open Item 01-7 is resolved and verification of changes to the next revision of the FSAR is being tracked as **Confirmatory Item 01-7**.

Pending resolution of Confirmatory Items 01-6 and 01-7, the staff concludes that the applicant, by incorporating by reference STPNOC's proposed amendment to the ABWR design certification, has satisfied the requirements of 10 CFR 50.150 and 52.79(a)(47).

## **1.6 General Electric Topical Reports and Other Documents**

### **1.6.1 Introduction**

This section of the certified ABWR DCD contains a comprehensive listing of GE reports that are applicable to the ABWR design.

### **1.6.2 Summary of Application**

Section 1.6 of the STP Units 3 and 4 COL FSAR incorporates by reference Section 1.6 of the certified ABWR DCD Revision 4, with no departures.

In addition, in COL FSAR Section 1.6, the applicant provides the following:

#### **Supplemental Information**

Table 1.6-2 is a supplemental tabulation of GE Topical Reports incorporated by reference as part of the COL application.

### 1.6.3 Regulatory Basis

The regulatory basis for the information incorporated by reference is in NUREG–1503. In addition, the regulatory basis for reviewing supplemental information is in NUREG–0800 Section 1.1.6, “Material Referenced.”

### 1.6.4 Technical Evaluation

As documented in NUREG–1503, NRC staff reviewed and approved Section 1.6 of the certified ABWR DCD. NRC staff reviewed Section 1.6 of the STP Units 3 and 4 COL FSAR and checked the referenced ABWR DCD to ensure that the combination of information in the COL FSAR and information in the ABWR DCD represents the complete scope of information relating to this topic.<sup>1</sup> The staff’s review confirmed that the information in the application and the information incorporated by reference address the required information relating to General Electric topical reports and other documents.

The following item is also reviewed in this section:

#### Supplemental Information

The applicant’s supplement to this section consists of incorporating by reference NEDO-32686-A, “Utility Resolution Guidance for ECCS [emergency core cooling system] Suction Strainer Blockage,” October 1998. This is a topical report approved by the NRC staff. The staff therefore found it appropriate to incorporate this report by reference.

### 1.6.5 Post Combined License Activities

There are no post COL activities related to this section.

### 1.6.6 Conclusion

The NRC staff’s finding related to information incorporated by reference is in NUREG–1503. NRC staff reviewed the application and checked the referenced DCD. The staff’s review confirmed that the applicant has address the required information relating to “General Electric Topical Reports and other Documents,” and no outstanding information is expected to be addressed in the COL FSAR related to this section. Pursuant to 10 CFR 52.63(a)(5) and Part 52, Appendix A, Section VI.B.1, all nuclear safety issues relating to General Electric topical reports and other documents that were incorporated by reference have been resolved.

In addition, the staff concluded that the relevant information in the COL FSAR is acceptable, satisfies NRC regulations, and meets the requirements defined in the ABWR DCD, which is incorporated by reference into 10 CFR Part 52, Appendix A. The staff’s conclusion is based on the following:

- The staff’s review confirmed that the applicant has adequately addressed the supplemental information in accordance with Section 1.1.6 of NUREG–0800.

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<sup>1</sup> See “*Finality of Referenced NRC Approvals*” in SER Section 1.1.3, for a discussion on the staff’s review related to verification of the scope of information to be included in a COL application that references a design certification.

## **1.7 Drawings**

### **1.7.1 Introduction**

This section of the certified ABWR DCD contains drawings that are pertinent to the basic ABWR design. The section also details certain conversion factors, drawing symbols, and drawing standards utilized in the certified ABWR DCD. Furthermore, the STP Units 3 and 4 COL FSAR provides site-specific complementary information.

### **1.7.2 Summary of Application**

Section 1.7 of the STP Units 3 and 4 COL FSAR incorporates by reference Section 1.7 of the certified ABWR DCD Revision 4.

In addition, in COL FSAR Section 1.7, the applicant provides the following:

#### Tier 1 Departures

- STD DEP T1 2.14-1 Hydrogen Recombiner Requirements Elimination

This design change removes the hydrogen recombiners. Table 1.7-1 contains a list of system piping and instrumentation diagrams (P&IDs), some of which are affected by the removal of the hydrogen recombiners.

- STD DEP T1 3.4-1 Safety-Related I&C Architecture

This design change revises the safety-related I&C architecture.

#### COL License Information Item

- COL License Information Item 1.2 P&ID Pipe Schedule

This COL license information item directs COL applicants to complete the P&ID schedule labeled as "COL applicant." The applicant addresses this item in Subsection 1.7.2.1 by identifying the minimum pipe schedule for ANSI nominal pipe sizes for any individual piping system shown on a P&ID.

#### Supplemental Information

The applicant identifies two supplements to the DCD. FSAR Table 1.7-6 documents additional or updated I&C and electrical drawings, and Table 1.7-7 includes system drawings that are not part of the ABWR DCD.

### **1.7.3 Regulatory Basis**

In accordance with Section VIII, "Processes for Changes and Departures," of "Appendix A to Part 52--Design Certification Rule for the U.S. Advanced Boiling Water Reactor," the applicant identifies Tier1 departures. Tier 1 departures are subject to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 52, Appendix A, Section VIII.A.4.

The regulatory basis for the information incorporated by reference is in NUREG–1503. The regulatory basis for reviewing the COL license information items is in Section 1.1.7, “Drawings and Other Detailed Information,” of NUREG–0800. In addition, the relevant requirements for the Commission’s regulations and associated acceptance criteria for reviewing supplemental information are in Section 1.0, “Introduction and Interfaces,” of NUREG–0800.

#### **1.7.4 Technical Evaluation**

As documented in NUREG–1503, the staff reviewed and approved Section 1.7 of the certified ABWR DCD. NRC staff reviewed Section 1.7 of the STP Units 3 and 4 COL FSAR and checked the referenced ABWR DCD to ensure that the combination of information in the COL FSAR and information in the ABWR DCD represents the complete scope of information relating to this review topic.<sup>1</sup> The staff’s review confirmed that the information in the application and the information incorporated by reference address the required information relating to drawings.

##### Tier 1 Departures

The following Tier 1 Departures identified by the applicant in this section require prior NRC approval in the form of an exemption and the full scope of their technical impact may be evaluated in the other sections of this SER accordingly. For more information, refer to COL application Part 07, Section 5.0 for a listing of all FSAR sections affected by these Tier 1 departures. In addition, compliance with 10 CFR Part 52, Appendix A, Section VIII.A.4 for these Tier 1 departures will be addressed by the staff in Appendix 1-A to this chapter.

- STD DEP T1 2.14-1 Hydrogen Recombiner Requirements Elimination

With respect to this section of the FSAR, the applicant has identified that STD DEP T1 2.14-1 results in a needed modification to DCD Table 1.7-1 and the modified portion of the table has been included in this section of the applicant’s FSAR. Within the review scope of SER Section 1.7, the staff found that this departure is editorial in nature and therefore acceptable.

- STD DEP T1 3.4-1 Safety-Related I&C Architecture

With respect to this section of the FSAR, the applicant has identified that STD DEP T1 3.4-1 results in needed modifications to DCD Table 1.7-5 and the modified portion of the table has been included in this section of the applicant’s FSAR. Within the review scope of SER Section 1.7, the staff found that this departure is editorial in nature and therefore acceptable.

##### COL License Information Item

- COL License Information Item 1.2 P&ID Pipe Schedule

This COL license information item directs the applicant to complete specific P&ID pipe schedules. The staff agreed that the applicant has provided this information in Subsection 1.7.2.1 of the FSAR. To the extent that the technical information in that section needs to be evaluated, the evaluation will be in the appropriate chapter of this SER or in a future audit or inspection.

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<sup>1</sup> See “Finality of Referenced NRC Approvals” in SER Section 1.1.3, for a discussion on the staff’s review related to verification of the scope of information to be included in a COL application that references a design certification.

### Supplemental Information

The applicant included Table 1.7-6 which contains a list of I&C and electrical drawings that are not part of the DCD. Each drawing is associated with a particular chapter in the FSAR. The information in these drawings is addressed, as necessary, in the technical evaluation of the individual chapters.

The applicant includes Table 1.7-7 which contains a list of system drawings not included in the ABWR DCD. Each drawing is associated with a particular chapter in the FSAR. The information in these drawings is addressed, as necessary, in the technical evaluation of the individual chapters.

#### **1.7.5 Post Combined License Activities**

There are no post COL activities related to this section.

#### **1.7.6 Conclusion**

The NRC staff's finding related to information incorporated by reference is in NUREG-1503. NRC staff reviewed the application and checked the referenced DCD. The staff's review confirmed that the applicant has addressed the required information relating to "Drawings," and no outstanding information is expected to be addressed in the COL FSAR related to this section. Pursuant to 10 CFR 52.63(a)(5) and Part 52, Appendix A, Section VI.B.1, all nuclear safety issues relating to "Drawings" that were incorporated by reference have been resolved.

In addition, the staff concluded that the relevant information in the COL FSAR is acceptable, satisfies NRC regulations, and meets the requirements defined in the ABWR DCD, which is incorporated by reference into 10 CFR Part 52, Appendix A. The staff's conclusion is based on the following:

- The staff reviewed the proposed Tier 1 standard departures with respect to Commission rules and regulations. For the purpose of the staff's Section 1.7 review, the staff determined that the standard departures are consistent with Commission rules and regulations and has no adverse impact on public health and safety.
- Within the review scope of this section, the staff's review confirmed that the applicant has adequately addressed COL license information 1.7 in accordance with Section 1.0, "Introduction and Interfaces," of NUREG-0800.
- The staff's review confirmed that the applicant has adequately addressed the supplemental information in accordance with Section 1.0, "Introduction and Interfaces," of NUREG-0800.

### **1.8 Conformance with Standard Review Plan and Applicability of Codes and Standards**

#### **1.8.1 Introduction**

Section 1.8, of the FSAR addresses the requirement of 10 CFR 52.79(a)(41) that COL applicants referencing a certified design should provide an evaluation of conformance to the guidance in the NRC standard review plan (SRP) that was in effect 6 months before the docket date of the COL application for the site-specific portions of the facility design that are not

included in the referenced certified design. Section 1.8 also addresses the applicability of Codes, Standards, and RGs.

The applicant has added a new section titled, "Site Parameters, Interface Requirements, COL License Information Items, and Conceptual Design Information," to supplement Section 1.8 of the FSAR and to conform with the guidance in RG 1.206. This new section is designated as Section 1.8S. Section 1.8S identifies the FSAR chapters where site parameters, interface requirements, COL license information items, and replacement conceptual design information (CDI) are addressed.

## **1.8.2 Summary of Application**

Section 1.8 of the STP Units 3 and 4 COL FSAR incorporates by reference Section 1.8 of the certified ABWR DCD Revision 4, Section 1.8S is a new section providing supplemental information on conformance with the site parameters, interface requirements, COL license information items, and conceptual design information.

In addition, in COL FSAR Sections 1.8 and 1.8S, the applicant provides the following:

### Tier 1 Departure

- STD DEP T1 2.14-1 Hydrogen Recombiner Requirements Elimination

The applicant modified Table 1.8-20 by revising the applicable version of RG 1.7, "Control of Combustible Gas Concentration in Containment."

### Tier 2\* Departure

- STD DEP 1.8-1 Tier 2\* Codes, Standards, and Regulatory Guide Edition Change

The applicant updated entries in Tables 1.8-7, 1.8-20, and 1.8-21 to reflect the affected changes in codes, standards, and RGs in the ABWR DCD.

### Tier 2 Departures Not Requiring Prior NRC Approval

- STD DEP 5A-1 Deletes Appendix on Compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.150

The applicant updated Table 1.8-20 by deleting RG 1.150 for ultrasonic testing of reactor vessel welds. This test is performed in accordance with American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Section XI Appendix VIII, as required by 10 CFR 50.55a.

- STD DEP 6C-1 Containment Debris Protection for ECCS Strainers

This departure identifies the ECCS strainer design for preventing debris from clogging the strainers during long-term recirculation cooling, following the loss-of-coolant accident (updates Table 1.8-20 for RG 1.82 Revision 3).

- STD DEP 9.1-1 Update of Fuel Storage and Handling Equipment

This departure updates the entry in Table 1.8-21a for codes and standards related to the construction of an overhead and gantry crane.

- STP DEP 9.5-1 Diesel Generator Jacket Cooling Water System

The departure withdraws RG 1.108 and replaces it with RG 1.9, Revision 3 in Table 1.8-20.

- STD DEP 11.2-1 Liquid Radwaste Process Equipment

This departure updates the entry for RG 1.143 to Revision 2 in Table 1.8-20 and completely replaces this section of the ABWR DCD.

### Supplemental Information

Section 1.8 of the STP Units 3 and 4 FSAR includes the following revisions to the RGs in Table 1.8-20, which reflect the changes to DCD Table 1.8-20 resulting from various departures and conformance to RG 1.206.

- RG 1.75, Revision 3
- RG 1.82, Revision 3
- RG 1.84, Revision 33
- RG 1.136, Revision 3
- RG 1.142, Revision 2
- RG 1.143, Revision 2
- RG 1.153, Revision 1
- RG 1.85 has been withdrawn

Similarly, the departures and conformance to RG 1.206 result in revisions to Table 1.8-21 providing the following Codes and Standards:

- American Concrete Institute ACI 349–1997
- ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Codes, Section III, Division 2, 2001, Edition with 2003 Addenda
- Military (MIL) STD 461E–1999
- MIL STD 462E–1999
- Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) Standard (Std) 279–1971, has been replaced by IEEE Std 603–1991
- IEEE Std 384–1992
- IEEE Std 603–1991
- MIL STD 1478–1991, has been cancelled by the U.S. Department of Defense

- International Building Code, 2006
- IEEE Std 665–1995

Section 1.8S, “Site Parameters, Interface Requirements, COL License Information Items, and Conceptual Design Information,” includes Table 1.8S-1, which cross-references FSAR sections that demonstrate conformance to each of the site parameters. Table 1.8S-2 cross-references FSAR sections that describe conformance to the interface requirements. Table 1.8S-3 identifies the FSAR sections that replace the conceptual design information and address the impact of any differences between the conceptual and site-specific designs.

### **1.8.3 Regulatory Basis**

The regulatory basis of the information incorporated by reference is in NUREG–1503. In addition, the relevant requirements for the Commission’s regulations and associated acceptance criteria for reviewing supplemental information are in Section 1.1.9, “Conformance with Regulatory Criteria,” of NUREG–0800.

In addition, in accordance with Section VIII, “Process for Changes and Departures,” of Appendix A to Part 52--Design Certification Rule for the U.S. Advanced Boiling Water Reactor,” the applicant identifies Tier 1, Tier 2\*, and Tier 2 departures. Tier 1 and Tier 2\* departures require prior NRC approval and are subject to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 52, Appendix A, Section V.III.A.4, and V.III.B.6, respectively. Tier 2 departures that do not require prior NRC approval are subject to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 52, Appendix A, Section VIII.B.5, which are similar to the requirements in 10 CFR 50.59.

### **1.8.4 Technical Evaluation**

As documented in NUREG–1503, NRC staff reviewed and approved Section 1.1 of the certified ABWR DCD. The staff reviewed Section 1.8 of the STP Units 3 and 4 COL FSAR and checked the referenced ABWR DCD to ensure that the combination of the information in the COL FSAR and the information in the ABWR DCD appropriately represents the complete scope of information relating to this review topic.<sup>1</sup> In addition, the staff also reviewed Section 1.8S to ensure that the applicant has provided the required information consistent with the guidance of RG 1.206, Part III, Section C.I.1.8 and Section C.III.1.9. The staff’s review confirmed that the information in the application and the information incorporated by reference address the required information relating to conformance with the SRP and the applicability of codes and standards.

In addition, the impact of changes in the conformance with the SRP and the applicability of Codes and Standards may receive additional technical evaluations within the appropriate chapters of this SER.

The staff reviewed the information in the COL FSAR:

#### *Tier 1 Departure*

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<sup>1</sup> See “Finality of Referenced NRC Approvals” in SER Section 1.1.3, for a discussion on the staff’s review related to verification of the scope of information to be included in a COL application that references a design certification.

The following Tier 1 Departures identified by the applicant in this section require prior NRC approval in the form of an exemption and the full scope of their technical impact may be evaluated in the other sections of this SER accordingly. For more information, refer to COL application Part 07, Section 5.0 for a listing of all FSAR sections affected by these Tier 1 departures. In addition, compliance with 10 CFR Part 52, Appendix A, Section VIII.A.4 for these Tier 1 departures will be addressed by the staff in Appendix 1-A to this Chapter.

- STD DEP T1 2.14-1 Hydrogen Recombiner Requirements Elimination

With respect to this section of the FSAR, the applicant has identified that STD DEP T1 2.14-1 results in a revision to Table 1.8-20 that updates the version of RG 1.7 in the ABWR DCD. Within the review scope of SER Section 1.8, the staff found that this departure is editorial in nature and is therefore acceptable.

#### Tier 2\* Departure

The following Tier 2 Departure identified by the applicant in this section requires prior NRC approval and the full scope of its technical impact may be evaluated in the other sections of this SER accordingly. For more information, please refer to COL application Part 07, Section 5.0 for a listing of all FSAR sections affected by this departure.

- STD DEP 1.8-1 Tier 2\* Codes, Standards, and RG Edition Change

With respect to this section of the FSAR, the applicant has identified that STD DEP 1.8-1 results in revision to Tables 1.8-7, 1.8-20 and 1.8-21 that reflect the affected changes in Codes, Standards, and RGs in the ABWR DCD. Within the review scope of SER Section 1.8, the staff found that this departure is editorial in nature and is therefore acceptable.

#### Tier 2 Departures Not Requiring Prior NRC Approval

The following Tier 2 Departures not requiring NRC approval identified by the applicant in this section may also be evaluated in other sections of this SER accordingly. For more information, refer to COL application Part 07, Section 5.0 for a listing of all FSAR sections affected by these departures.

- STD DEP 5A-1 Deletes Appendix on Compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.150
- STD DEP 6C-1 Containment Debris Protection for ECCS Strainers
- STD DEP 9.1-1 Update of Fuel Storage and Handling Equipment
- STD DEP 9.5-1 Diesel Generator Jacket Cooling Water System
- STD DEP 11.2-1 Liquid Radwaste Process Equipment

The applicant's evaluation in accordance with 10 CFR Part 52, Appendix A, Section VIII Item B.5 determined that these departures do not require prior NRC approval. Within the review scope of this section, the staff found it reasonable that these departures do not require prior NRC approval. In addition, the applicant's process for evaluating departures and changes to the DCD is subject to NRC inspections.

#### Supplemental information

Section 1.8 of the STP Units 3 and 4 FSAR includes additional editorial revisions to ABWR DCD Table 1.8-20, which update the revisions of RGs as a result of various departures and

conformance to RG 1.206. Within the review scope of SER Section 1.8, the staff found that these supplemental changes are editorial in nature and are acceptable. The adherence to the correct revision of the applicable RGs is addressed by the staff, as necessary, in the appropriate technical review section of this SER.

Section 1.8 of the STP Units 3 and 4 FSAR includes additional editorial revisions to the ABWR DCD Table 1.8-21, which update the revisions and applicable Codes and Standards. Within the review scope of SER Section 1.8, the staff found that these supplemental changes are editorial in nature and are acceptable. The adherence to the correct Codes and Standards is addressed by the staff, as necessary, in the appropriate technical review section of this SER.

Section 1.8 of the STP Units 3 and 4 FSAR includes a supplemental Table 1.8-21a. This table is described as a site specific supplement to ABWR DCD table 1.8-21. Table 1.8-21a identifies Codes and Standards for Site-Specific Systems. Within the review scope of SER Section 1.8, the staff found that this table is editorial in nature and is acceptable. The adherence to the correct Codes and Standards for Site-Specific Systems is addressed by the staff, as necessary, in the appropriate technical review section of this SER.

Section 1.8S of the STP Units 3 and 4 FSAR includes Tables 1.8S-1, 1.8S-2 and 1.8S-3, which cross references to the FSAR sections where site-specific parameters, interface requirements, COL license information items, and replacement conceptual design information are discussed. Within the review scope of SER Section 1.8, the staff found that these tables are editorial in nature and are therefore acceptable. The cross references to the FSAR sections where site-specific parameters, interface requirements, COL license information items, and replacement conceptual design information are addressed by the staff, as necessary, in the appropriate technical review section of this SER.

#### *Site-Parameters*

The applicant has included supplemental section 1.8S.1 and table 1.8S-1 that presents information regarding the conformance of the STP Units 3 and 4 site with the ABWR DCD site-parameters. Within the review scope of SER Section 1.8, the staff found that this supplemental section is acceptable. The conformance of the STP 3 and 4 site with site parameters is evaluated in Chapter 2.0 of this SER.

#### *Interface Requirements*

The applicant has included Supplemental Section 1.8S.2 and Table 1.8S-2, which presents information regarding conformance of STP Units 3 and 4 to the interface requirements for completing site-specific designs for the facility. Within the review scope of SER Section 1.8, the staff found that this supplemental section is acceptable. The staff's review found the applicant correctly cross-references the FSAR sections in which conformance to the interface requirements is described.

#### *COL License Information Item*

The applicant has included Supplemental Section 1.8S.3, which indicates that the list of the ABWR COL license information items is in Section 1.9 of Tier 2 of the referenced ABWR DCD. Table 1.9-1 in Section 1.9 of the DCD provides a cross-reference to the FSAR sections in which these COL license information items are addressed. The staff's review found this information acceptable.

### Replacement of Conceptual Design Information

The applicant has included Supplemental Section 1.8S.4 and Table 1.8S-3, which presents information regarding replacement of CDI included in the ABWR DCD for certain systems that are outside the scope of the standard design and are site-specific. The FSAR replaces the CDI with a description and evaluation of the site-specific design. Table 1.8S-3 identifies the FSAR sections that replace the CDI. These sections address the impact of any differences between the conceptual and site-specific design on the standard design and the design probabilistic risk assessment. Within the review scope of SER Section 1.8, the staff found that this supplemental section is acceptable. The replacement of CDI is addressed by the staff, as necessary, in the appropriate technical review section of this SER.

#### **1.8.5 Post Combined License Activities**

There are no post COL activities related to this section.

#### **1.8.6 Conclusion**

The NRC staff's finding related to information incorporated by reference is in NUREG-1503. NRC staff reviewed the application and checked the referenced DCD. The staff's review confirmed that the applicant has addressed the required information relating to "Conformance with Standard Review Plan and Applicability of Codes and Standards", no outstanding information is expected to be addressed in the COL FSAR related to this section. Pursuant to 10 CFR 52.63(a)(5) and Part 52, Appendix A, Section VI.B.1, all nuclear safety issues relating to "Conformance with Standard Review Plan and Applicability of Codes and Standards" that were incorporated by reference have been resolved.

In addition, the staff concluded that the relevant information in the COL FSAR is acceptable, satisfies NRC regulations, and meets the requirements defined in the ABWR DCD, which is incorporated by reference into 10 CFR Part 52, Appendix A. The staff's conclusion is based on the following:

- The staff reviewed the proposed Tier 1 standard departures with respect to Commission rules and regulations. For the purpose of the staff's Section 1.8 review, the staff determined that the standard departures are consistent with Commission rules and regulations and has no adverse impact on public health and safety.
- For the purposes of the staff's Section 1.8 review, the staff found that the "Tier 2\* Departure" identified by the applicant has no adverse impact on public health and safety and is consistent with NRC rules and regulations.
- For the purposes of the staff's Section 1.8 review, the staff found that for all of the "Tier 2 Departures Not Requiring Prior NRC Approval" identified by the applicant, it is reasonable that they do not require prior NRC approval.
- Within the review scope of this section, the staff's review confirmed that the applicant has adequately addressed the supplemental information in accordance with Section 1.0, "Introduction and Interfaces," of NUREG-0800 and the supplemental information is consistent with NRC regulations.

## **1.9 COL License Information and 1.9S Conformance with Regulatory Criteria**

### **1.9.1 Introduction**

Section 1.9, “COL License Information,” of the FSAR references Section 1.9 of the ABWR DCD for the list of COL license information items. The applicant has added a new section titled, “Conformance with Regulatory Criteria” to Supplement Section 1.9 of the FSAR in conformance with the guidance of RG 1.206. This new section of the FSAR is designated as 1.9S and addresses applicable RG, the SRP, Generic Issues (GIs), and Operational Experience (Generic Communications).

The COL applicant in accordance with 10 CFR 52.79(a)(41), must address conformance with the SRP sections that were in effect 6 months before the docket date of the COL application for the site-specific portions of the facility design that are not included in the referenced certified design. The evaluation required by 10 CFR 52.79(a)(41) includes an identification and description of all differences in design features, analytical techniques, and procedural measures proposed for a facility and those corresponding features, techniques, and measures given in the SRP acceptance criteria. Where a difference exists, the evaluation shall discuss how the proposed alternative provides an acceptable method of complying with the Commission’s regulations, or portions thereof, that underlie the corresponding SRP acceptance criteria.

According to RG 1.206, COL applicants should provide an evaluation of conformance with the guidance in NRC RGs in effect 6 months before the submittal date of the COL application for the site-specific portions of the facility design that are not included in the referenced certified design. That evaluation also includes an identification and description of departures from the guidance in the NRC RGs as well as acceptable justifications for any alternative approaches proposed.

The COL application, in accordance with 10 CFR 52.79(a)(20), must provide proposed resolutions to applicable unresolved safety issues and medium- and high priority generic safety issues identified in the version of NUREG-0933 current on the date up to 6 months before the docket date of the application and which are technically relevant to the design, for the site-specific portions of the facility design that are not included in the referenced certified design. The COL application should address how these issues pertain to operational aspects of the facility.

The COL application, in accordance with 10 CFR 52.79(a)(37), must provide the information necessary to demonstrate how operating experience insights have been incorporated into the plant design. According to RG 1.206, the COL application should address this requirement by describing how operating experience insights from generic letters and bulletins issued after the most recent revision of the applicable SRP and 6 months before the docket date of the application, or comparable international operating experience, have been incorporated into the plant design, for the site specific portions of the facility design that are not included in the referenced certified design.

### **1.9.2 Summary of Application**

Section 1.9 of the STP Units 3 and 4 COL FSAR incorporates by reference Section 1.9 of the certified ABWR DCD, Revision 4, referenced in 10 CFR Part 52, Appendix A, Section 1.9S is a new supplemental information addressing applicable RGs, the SRP, GIs, and Operational Experience (Generic Communications).

In addition, in COL FSAR Sections 1.9, and 1.9S, the applicant provides the following:

Tier 1 Departure

- STD DEP T1 3.4-1 Safety-Related I&C Architecture

This departure revises the safety-related I&C architecture. The applicant modifies the title of the COL License Information Item 19.8 in Table 1.9-1 of the ABWR DCD to be consistent with the new naming convention in the revised I&C architecture.

Supplemental Information

Section 1.9S, provides supplemental information to address applicable RGs, SRP, GIs, and Operational Experience. Table 1.9S-1 of the STP Units 3 and 4 FSAR lists the applicable Division 1 and Division 8 RGs that were in effect in March 2007, which STP Units 3 and 4 conform to for the site-specific portions of the facility design not included in the referenced ABWR DCD. The operational aspects of the facility are included. Table 1.9S-1 also includes those RGs with which the departures from the referenced ABWR DCD conform. Table 1.9S-2 lists an evaluation of the exceptions from the RGs, which are noted as “COL Applicant” in the DCD. Table 1.9S-3 addresses conformance to the March 2007 SRP for the site-specific portions of the facility design. Table 1.9S-4 addresses conformance to the March 2007 SRP for the Tier 1 and Tier 2\* departures. The applicant consistent with the guidance in RG 1.206, addresses conformance with the March 2007 SRP for the Tier 1 and Tier 2\* departures for the site specific portions of the facility design that were not included in the reference ABWR DCD. Table 1.9S-5 addresses GIs identified in Table 19B of the referenced ABWR DCD as the responsibility of the COL applicant. Table 1.9S-6 addresses those generic communications (Generic Letters and Bulletins) identified in the referenced ABWR DCD Table 1.8.22 as the responsibility of the COL applicant.

**1.9.3 Regulatory Basis**

The regulatory basis of the information incorporated by reference is in NUREG–1503. In addition, the relevant requirements for the Commission’s regulations and associated acceptance criteria for reviewing COL license information and supplemental information are in Section 1.0, “Introduction and Interfaces,” of NUREG–0800.

In accordance with Section VIII, “Processes for Changes and Departures,” of “Appendix A to Part 52--Design Certification Rule for the U.S. Advanced Boiling-Water Reactor,” the applicant identifies one Tier 1 departure. This departure requires prior NRC approval and is subject to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 52, Appendix A, Section VIII.A.4.

**1.9.4 Technical Evaluation**

As documented in NUREG–1503, the staff reviewed and approved Section 1.9 of the certified ABWR DCD. The staff reviewed Section 1.9 of the STP Units 3 and 4 COL FSAR and checked the referenced ABWR DCD to ensure that the combination of the information in the COL FSAR and the information in the ABWR DCD appropriately represents the complete scope of

information relating to this review topic.<sup>1</sup> The staff also reviewed Section 1.9S to ensure that the applicant has provided the required information consistent with the guidance of RG 1.206, Part III, Section C.I.1.9. The staff's review confirmed that the information in the application and the information incorporated by reference address the required information relating to COL license information and conformance with regulatory criteria.

In addition, the impact of changes in the COL license information and conformance with regulatory criteria may receive additional technical evaluations within the appropriate chapters of this SER.

The staff reviewed the information in the COL FSAR:

### Tier 1 Departure

The following Tier 1 Departure identified by the applicant in this section require prior NRC approval in the form of an exemption and the full scope of its technical impact may be evaluated in the other sections of this SER accordingly. For more information, refer to COL application Part 07, Section 5.0 for a listing of all FSAR sections affected by this Tier 1 departure. In addition, compliance with 10 CFR Part 52, Appendix A, Section VIII.A.4 for this Tier 1 departure will be addressed by the staff in Appendix 1-A to this chapter.

- STD DEP T1 3.4-1 Safety-Related I&C Architecture

With respect to this section of the FSAR, the applicant has identified that STD DEP T1 3.4-1 results in an revision to COL License Information Item 19.8 in Table 1.9-1 of the ABWR DCD to be consistent with the new naming convention in the revised I&C architecture. Within the review scope of SER Section 1.9, the staff found that this departure is editorial in nature and is acceptable.

### Supplemental Information

Consistent with 10 CFR 52.79(a) and the guidance in RG 1.206, Section 1.9S, provides supplemental information addressing applicable RGs, SRP, GIs, and Operational Experience.

The staff reviewed Table 1.9S-1, "Site-Specific Conformance with Regulatory Guides," in order to confirm that it lists Division 1 and Division 8 RGs and uses the correct RG revisions. Additionally, the staff reviewed the list of RGs in Table 1.9S-2 annotated as "COL Applicant" in the reference ABWR DCD Table 1.8-20. The staff noted that the applicant's FSAR does not address RGs related to quality assurance. The staff issued RAI 01-14 and the applicant responded by letter dated October 29, 2009 (U7-C-STP-NRC-090187, ML093430301). The staff found that the applicant's response was insufficient. The staff issued RAI 17.5-9 requesting the applicant to clarify the inconsistencies between FSAR Table 1.9S and Part IV of the QAPD. The applicant's response to RAI 17.5-9, dated March 17, 2010 (ML100770388), includes proposed revisions to FSAR Tables 1.9S-1 and 1.9S-2, which reference Part IV of the QAPD to address conformance. The evaluation of this RAI is in Section 17.5 of this SER.

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<sup>1</sup> See "Finality of Referenced NRC Approvals" in SER Section 1.1.3, for a discussion on the staff's review related to verification of the scope of information to be included in a COL application that references a design certification.

Consistent with RG 1.206, the applicant notes that the only applicable medium-or high priority generic issue listed in NUREG-0933, Appendix B, Rev.21, dated June 30, 2006, is Generic Issue 156.6.1 regarding pipe break effects on systems and components. The site-specific portions of the STP Units 3 and 4 design that are not included in the referenced ABWR DCD meet the criteria of SRP 3.6.1 Revision 3 and SRP 3.6.2 Revision 2 (dated March 2007), which address this issue. The staff found this evaluation reasonable and sufficient.

The staff reviewed Table 1.9S-4 and found that the applicant consistent with the guidance in RG 1.206 has addressed conformance with the March 2007 SRP for the Tier 1 and Tier 2\* departures for the site specific portions of the facility design that were not included in the reference ABWR DCD. The staff's review found three SRP sections in Table 1.8-19 of DCD Tier 2 that are listed as the responsibility of the COL applicant but are not included in Table 1.9S-3 or in Table 1.9S-4, which indicates nonconformance to the SRP. These sections are SRP Section 9.5.2, "Communication Systems"; SRP Section 13.5.2, "Operating and Maintenance Procedures"; and SRP Section 17.2, "Quality Assurance During the Operations Phase." The staff issued RAI 01-13 requesting the applicant to reconcile these apparent omissions. The applicant's response to RAI 01-13 dated October 15, 2009 (ML092920179), states that COL FSAR Table 1.9S-4 will be updated to include these omissions. The staff found this response acceptable, and this RAI was being tracked as **Confirmatory Item 01-4**. However, the staff noted that this table does not address Tier 2 departures requiring prior NRC approval. This issue was tracked as **Open Item 01-5** in the SER with open items. In the letter dated June 10, 2010 (ML101650104), the applicant provided revised Table 1.9S-4, which includes the missing Tier 2 departure that requires prior NRC approval. The revised change was to be incorporated into the next revision of the FSER. The staff reviewed Revision 4 of the FSAR and verified that the FSAR was revised as stated in the response to RAI 01-13 and the June 10, 2010 letter. Confirmatory Item 01-4 and Open Item 01-5 are now closed.

The staff reviewed the resolution comments included in Table 1.9S-5 and found that they reasonably and adequately address the GIs identified as the responsibility of the COL applicant in Table 19B of the referenced ABWR DCD.

The staff also reviewed Table 1.9S-6, "COL Applicant Resolution of Generic Communication Issues." The staff found that the applicant has adequately addressed all relevant Generic Letters and Inspection and Enforcement Bulletins.

Based on the above, The NRC staff's review found the applicant has provided sufficient information in Section 1.9S for conformance with RG 1.206.

### **1.9.5 Post Combined License Activities**

There are no post COL activities related to this section.

### **1.9.6 Conclusion**

The NRC staff's finding related to information incorporated by reference is in NUREG-1503. NRC staff reviewed the application and checked the referenced DCD. The staff's review confirmed that the applicant has addressed the required information relating to "Conformance with Standard Review Plan and Applicability of Codes and Standards," no outstanding information is expected to be addressed in the COL FSAR related to this section. Pursuant to 10 CFR 52.63(a)(5) and Part 52, Appendix A, Section VI.B.1, all nuclear safety issues relating to "COL License Information Items" that were incorporated by reference have been resolved.

In addition, the staff concluded that the relevant information in the COL FSAR is acceptable, satisfies NRC regulations, and meets the requirements defined in the ABWR DCD, which is incorporated by reference into 10 CFR Part 52, Appendix A. The staff's conclusion is based on the following:

- The staff reviewed the proposed Tier 1 standard departure with respect to Commission rules and regulations. For the purpose of the staff's Section 1.9 review, the staff determined that the standard departure is consistent with Commission rules and regulations and has no adverse impact on public health and safety.
- Within the review scope of this section, the staff's review confirmed that the applicant has adequately addressed the supplemental information in FSAR Section 1.9S in accordance with Section 1.0, "Introduction and Interfaces," of NUREG-0800 and the supplemental information is consistent with NRC regulations.

### **1.10S Impact of Construction Activities on Units 1 and 2**

The review of this section was tracked as **Open Item 01-9** in the SER with open items. The applicant provides an evaluation of the potential hazards to the SSCs important to safety of the operating units, STP Units 1 and 2, resulting from construction activities at STP Units 3 and 4, as well as a description of their managerial and administrative controls to be used to provide assurance that the limiting conditions for operation (LCO) are not exceeded as a result of construction activities, in accordance with 10 CFR 52.79(a)(31). In addition, the applicant provided an assessment of potential impacts of construction of Unit 4 on Unit 3 when Unit 3 is operational.

Construction activities include site exploration, grading, clearing, and installation of drainage and erosion-control measures; boring, drilling, dredging, demolition, and excavating; storage and warehousing of equipment; and construction, erection, and fabrication of new facilities. The applicant provided an assessment of the potential construction activity hazards, the SSCs important to safety for the operating units, the potentially impacted SSCs and LCOs, along with the applicable managerial and administrative controls to be used to provide assurance that LCOs for the operating units are not exceeded as a result of construction activities at the multi-unit site. On June 10, 2010 (ML101650105), the applicant provided STP Units 3 and 4 Procedure U7-P-EN02-005, "Interface Evaluations of Units 3 and 4 on Units 1 & 2" to demonstrate its compliance with the regulations at 10 CFR 52.79(a)(31) as articulated in the draft Interim Staff Guidance (ISG) COL/ISG-022, "Interim Staff Guidance on Impact of Construction of New Nuclear Power Plants on Operating Units at Multi-Unit Sites." In addition, this procedure identifies the managerial and administrative controls and communications between the units to preclude and mitigate the potential impacts to STP Units 1 and 2 SSCs, including; engineering and licensing documents, environmental, security and the emergency programs.

Based on its review, the staff found that the applicant's Procedure U7-P-EN02-005 "Interface Evaluations of Units 3 & 4 on Units 1 & 2" is consistent with the program elements of 10 CFR 52.79(a)(31) as expressed in the draft COL/ISG-022 and therefore, is acceptable. The applicant satisfies 10 CFR 52.79(a)(31) and Open Item 01-9 is closed.

## **APPENDICES 1A and 1AA Response to Three Mile Island (TMI) Related Matters, and Plant Shielding to Provide Access to Vital Areas and Protective Safety Equipment for Post-Accident Operation,**

### **1A-1AA.1 Introduction**

Appendix 1A of the STP Units 3 and 4 FSAR addresses TMI-related matters; and Appendix 1AA addresses plant shielding to provide access to vital areas and protective safety equipment for post-accident operations.

### **1A-1AA.2 Summary of Application**

Appendices 1A and 1AA of the STP Units 3 and 4 COL FSAR incorporates by reference Appendices 1A and 1AA of the certified ABWR DCD, Revision 4. In addition, in COL FSAR Appendices 1A and 1AA, the applicant provides the following:

#### **Appendix 1A Response to TMI Related Matters**

##### Tier 1 Departures

- STD DEP T1 2.3-1 Deletion of MSIV Closure and Scram on High Radiation

This departure evaluates the deletion of the reactor Scram and the MSIV closure on the high main steamline radiation monitor trip. This departure affects TMI Action Plan III.D.1.1(1).

- STD DEP T1 2.4-3 RCIC Turbine/PUMP

This departure evaluates an alternate design for the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) turbine/pump. This departure affects TMI Action Plan III.K.3(15).

- STD DEP T1 2.14-1 Hydrogen Recombiner Requirement Elimination

This departure evaluates the removal of hydrogen recombiners and associated components. This departure affects TMI Action Plans II.B.3, II.E.4.3, II.F-3, and III.D.1.1(1).

##### COL License Information Items

Appendix 1A.3, "COL License Information," addresses COL License Information Items 1.5 through 1.12:

- COL License Information Item 1.5 Emergency Procedures and Emergency Procedures Training Program

This COL license information item addresses the requirement to develop and implement emergency procedures based on the emergency procedures guidelines (EPGs) before fuel loading (Subsection 1A.2.1). The emergency procedures will be consistent with the plant operating procedure development plan in Section 13.5. This item is in response to TMI Action Plan I.C.1.3. (Commitment [COM] 1A-1).

- COL License Information Item 1.6            Review and Modify Procedures for Removing Safety-Related Systems from Service

This COL license information item addresses administrative procedures to be developed by the licensee before fuel loading, which will require approval for the performance of surveillance tests and maintenance for safety-related systems, including equipment removal from service and return to service to assure that the operability status is known. These procedures will be consistent with the plant operating procedure development plan in Section 13.5. This item is in response to TMI Action Plan II.K.1.(10). (COM 1A-2).

- COL License Information Item 1.7            In-Plant Radiation Monitoring

This COL license information item addresses equipment, training, and procedures necessary to accurately determine the presence of airborne radioiodine in areas within the plant, where plant personnel may be present during an accident, consistent with Section 13.5. The equipment will be specified and the training and procedures will be consistent with FSAR Section 12.3, "Radiation Protection Design Features." This item is in response to TMI Action Plan II.D.3.3 (3). (COM 1A-3).

- COL License Information Item 1.8            Reporting Failures of Reactor System Relief Valves

This COL license information item addresses administrative procedures to be developed by the licensee before fuel loading, which will direct that failures of reactor system relief valves be reported in the licensee's annual report to the NRC. These procedures will be consistent with the plant operating procedure development plan in Section 13.5. This item is in response to TMI Action Plan II.K.3 (3). (COM 1A-4).

- COL License Information Item 1.9            Report on ECCS Outages

This COL license information item addresses administrative procedures to be developed by the licensee before fuel loading, which direct that instances of the unavailability of the ECCS because of component failure, maintenance outage (both forced or planned), or testing shall be collected and reported to the NRC annually. These reports may consist of the performance indicator report for mitigating systems periodically provided to the NRC as part of the Reactor Oversight Process. These procedures will be consistent with the plant operating procedure development plan in Section 13.5. This item is in response to TMI Action Plan II.K.3 (17). (COM 1A-5).

- COL License Information Item 1.10          Procedures for Reactor Venting

This COL license information item addresses EPGs to be written for the ABWR that will be applicable to STP Units 3 and 4. The ABWR EPGs are in Appendix 18A. The operator procedures will use the ABWR EPGs and will be developed before fuel loading. These procedures will be consistent with Section 13.5. This item is in response to TMI Action Plan II.B.1. (COM 1A-6).

- COL License Information Item 1.11          Testing of SRV and Discharge Piping

Testing of the SRVs and discharge piping is included in the ITP described in Section 14.2. This item is in response to TMI Action Plan II.D.1.

- COL License Information Item 1.12 RCIC Bypass Start System Test

With respect to STD DEP T1 2.4-3, the applicant has removed the RCIC bypass line and valve. Therefore the applicant has replaced the RCIC bypass start system test with the RCIC start test. This modified RCIC start test is included in the Initial Test Program (ITP) described in Section 14.2. This item is in response to TMI Action Plan II.K.3 (15).

## **Appendix 1AA Plant Shielding to Provide Access to Vital Areas and Protective Safety Equipment for Post-Accident Operation**

### Tier 1 Departures

- STD DEP T1 2.4-1 Residual Heat Removal System and Spent Fuel Pool Cooling

This departure updates entries in Table 1AA-2 to add equipment to the list. The entries are consistent with the need to keep spent fuel pool cooling during post-accident operations.

- STD DEP T1 2.14-1 Hydrogen Recombiner Requirements Elimination

This departure updates entries in Table 1AA-3 that are consistent with design changes associated with the removal of hydrogen recombiners and associated equipment.

### Tier 2 Departures Not Requiring Prior NRC Approval

- STD DEP 1AA-1 Shielding Design Review

This departure allows for changes in the Appendix to reflect revisions to the integrated doses for the environmental qualification of safety-related equipment.

- STD DEP Admin

This departure updates entries in Table 1AA-2 that are consistent with the affected changes to the ABWR DCD.

## **1A-1AA.3 Regulatory Basis**

The regulatory basis for the information incorporated by reference is in NUREG–1503. In addition, the relevant requirements for the Commission’s regulations and associated acceptance criteria for reviewing COL license information and supplemental information are in Section 1.0 of NUREG–0800.

In addition, in accordance with Section VIII, “Process for Changes and Departures,” of “Appendix A to Part 52--Design Certification Rule for the U.S. Advanced Boiling Water Reactor,” the applicant identifies Tier 1 and Tier 2 departures. Tier 1 departures require prior NRC approval and are subject to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 52, Section V.III.A.4. Tier 2 departures that do not require prior NRC approval are subject to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 52, Appendix A, Section VIII.B.5, which are similar to the requirements in 10 CFR 50.59.

#### 1A-1AA.4 Technical Evaluation

As documented in NUREG–1503, the staff reviewed and approved Section 1.4 of the certified ABWR DCD. NRC staff reviewed Section 1A-1AA of the STP Units 3 and 4 COL FSAR and checked the referenced ABWR DCD to ensure that the combination of information in the COL FSAR and information in the ABWR DCD represents the complete scope of information relating to this review topic.<sup>1</sup> The staff’s review confirmed that the information in the application and the information incorporated by reference address the required information relating to TMI-related matters and plant shielding to provide access to vital areas and protective safety equipment for post-accident operation.

##### Tier 1 Departures

The following Tier 1 Departures identified by the applicant in this section require prior NRC approval in the form of an exemption and the full scope of their technical impact may be evaluated in the other sections of this SER accordingly. For more information, refer to COL application Part 07, Section 5.0 for a listing of all FSAR sections affected by these Tier 1 departures. In addition, compliance with 10 CFR Part 52, Appendix A, Section VIII.A.4 for these Tier 1 departures will be addressed by the staff in Appendix 1-A to this Chapter.

- STD DEP T1 2.3-1 Deletion of MSIV Closure and Scram on High Radiation

With respect to this section of the FSAR, the applicant has identified that STD DEP T1 2.3-1 results in revisions to Section 1A.2.34. Within the review scope of SER Section 1A-1AA, the staff found that this departure is editorial in nature and is therefore acceptable.

- STD DEP T1 2.4-1 Residual Heat Removal System and Spent Fuel Pool Cooling

With respect to this section of the FSAR, the applicant has identified that STD DEP T1 2.4-1 results in revisions to Section 1AA.5.1.2 and Table 1AA-2 of the ABWR DCD. Within the review scope of SER Section 1A-1AA, the staff found that this departure is editorial in nature and is therefore acceptable.

- STD DEP T1 2.4-3 RCIC Turbine/PUMP

With respect to this section of the FSAR, the applicant has identified that STD DEP T1 2.4-3 results in revisions to Sections 1A.2.23 and 1A.2.34 of the ABWR DCD. Within the review scope of SER Section 1A-1AA, the staff found that this departure is editorial in nature and is therefore acceptable.

- STD DEP T1 2.14-1 Hydrogen Recombiner Requirements Elimination

With respect to this section of the FSAR, the applicant has identified that STD DEP T1 2.14-1 results in revisions to Sections 1A.2.7, 1A.2.13, 1A.2.17, 1A.2.34, 1AA.3.2, 1AA.5.1.3 and

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<sup>1</sup> See “*Finality of Referenced NRC Approvals*” in SER Section 1.1.3, for a discussion on the staff’s review related to verification of the scope of information to be included in a COL application that references a design certification.



- Commitment (COM 1A-3) – Provide equipment, training, and procedures to accurately determine the presence of airborne radioiodine in areas within the plant where plant personnel may be present during an accident.
- Commitment (COM 1A-4) – Provide administrative procedures, before fuel loading, which require that failures of reactor system relief valves be reported in the licensee's annual report to the NRC.
- Commitment (COM 1A-5) – Provide administrative procedures, before fuel loading, which require that instances of ECCS unavailability because of component failure, maintenance outage (both forced or planned), or testing shall be collected and reported to the NRC annually.
- Commitment (COM 1A-6) – Develop operator procedures that use the ABWR emergency procedure guidelines for reactor venting, before fuel loading.

### **1A-1AA.6 Conclusion**

The NRC staff's finding related to information incorporated by reference is in NUREG–1503. NRC staff reviewed the application and checked the referenced DCD. The staff's review confirmed that the applicant has addressed the required information relating to "TMI Related Matters" and "Plant Shielding to Provide Access to Vital Areas and Protective Safety Equipment for Post-Accident Operation," no outstanding information is expected to be addressed in the COL FSAR related to this section. Pursuant to 10 CFR 52.63(a)(5) and Part 52, Appendix A, Section VI.B.1, all nuclear safety issues relating to "TMI Related Matters" and "Plant Shielding to Provide Access to Vital Areas and Protective Safety Equipment for Post-Accident Operation," that were incorporated by reference have been resolved.

In addition, the staff concluded that the relevant information in the COL FSAR is acceptable, satisfies NRC regulations, and meets the requirements defined in the ABWR DCD, which is incorporated by reference into 10 CFR Part 52, Appendix A. The staff's conclusion is based on the following:

- The staff reviewed the proposed Tier 1 standard departures with respect to Commission rules and regulations. For the purpose of the staff's Section 1.A-1AA review, the staff determined that the standard departures are consistent with Commission rules and regulations and has no adverse impact on public health and safety.
- For the purposes of the staff's Section 1A-AA review, the staff found that for all of the "Tier 2 Departures Not Requiring Prior NRC Approval" identified by the applicant, it is reasonable that they do not require prior NRC approval.
- Within the review scope of this section, the staff's review confirmed that the applicant has adequately addressed COL License Information Items 1.5 through 1.12 in accordance with Section 1.0, "Introduction and Interfaces," of NUREG–0800.

### **Appendix 1B**

This appendix is not used in either the ABWR DCD or the applicant's FSAR.

### **Appendix 1C ABWR Station Blackout Considerations**

## 1C.1 Introduction

This appendix describes (a) how the ABWR design addresses station blackout (SBO) events; (b) how the ABWR design complies with 10 CFR 50.63 SBO requirements; and (c) where supporting documentation to these conformances exist in Tier 2.

## 1C.2 Summary of Application

Section 1C of the STP Units 3 and 4 COL FSAR incorporates by reference Section 1C in Revision 4 of the certified ABWR DCD.

In addition, in COL FSAR Section 1.2, the applicant provides the following:

### Tier 2\* Departure

- STD DEP 1.8-1 Tier 2\* Codes, Standards, and Regulatory Guide Edition Change

The applicant updated entries in Table 1.C-3 to reflect the affected changes in codes, standards, and RGs in the ABWR DCD.

### Tier 2 Departure Requiring Prior NRC Approval

- STD DEP 8.3-1 Plant Medium Voltage Electrical System Design

This departure changes the plant's medium voltage electrical system from a single 6.9 kilovolt (kV) system to a dual-voltage 13.8 kV and 4.16 kV system and affects the TS related to the design change.

### COL License Information Items

- COL License Information Item 1.13 Station Blackout Procedures

This COL license information item addresses the requirement to provide procedures for SBO events, including the use of a combustion turbine generator (CTG). The applicant has identified that the SBO procedures will be developed consistent with the plant operating procedure development plan identified in FSAR Section 13.5 (COM 1C-1).

## 1C.3 Regulatory Basis

The regulatory basis for the information incorporated by reference is in NUREG-1503. In addition, the relevant requirements for the Commission's regulations and associated acceptance criteria for reviewing COL license information and supplemental information are in Section 1.0 of NUREG-0800.

In addition, in accordance with Section VIII, "Process for Changes and Departures," of "Appendix A to Part 52--Design Certification Rule for the U.S. Advanced Boiling Water Reactor," the applicant identifies Tier 2\* and Tier 2 departures. Tier 2\* departures require prior NRC approval and are subject to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 52, Appendix A, Section V.III.B.6. Tier 2 departures that require prior NRC approval are subject to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 52, Appendix A, Section VIII.C.4., which are similar to the requirements in 10 CFR 50.59.

## 1C.4 Technical Evaluation

As documented in NUREG–1503, NRC reviewed and approved Section 1C of the certified ABWR DCD. The staff reviewed Section 1C of the STP Units 3 and 4 COL FSAR. The staff also checked the referenced ABWR DCD to ensure that the combination of information in the COL FSAR and information in the ABWR DCD represents the complete scope of information relating to this review topic.<sup>1</sup> The staff’s review confirmed that the information in the application and the information incorporated by reference address the required information relating to ABWR station blackout considerations.

### Tier 2\* Departure

The following Tier 2 Departure identified by the applicant in this section requires prior NRC approval, and the full scope of its technical impact may be evaluated in the other sections of this SER accordingly. For more information, please refer to COL application Part 07, Section 5.0 for a listing of all FSAR sections affected by this departure.

- STD DEP 1.8-1 Tier 2\* Codes, Standards, and Regulatory Guide Edition Change

With respect to this section of the FSAR, the applicant has identified that STD DEP 1.8-1 results in a revision to Section 1C.2.2.2 and Table 1C-3 in the ABWR DCD. Within the review scope of SER Section 1.8, the staff found that this departure is editorial in nature and is therefore acceptable.

### Tier 2 Departure Requiring Prior NRC Approval

The following Tier 2 Departure identified by the applicant in this section requires prior NRC approval, and the full scope of its technical impact may be evaluated in the other sections of this SER accordingly. For more information, refer to COL application Part 07, Section 5.0 for a listing of all FSAR sections affected by this departure.

- STD DEP 8.3-1 Plant Medium Voltage Electrical System Design

With respect to this section of the FSAR, the applicant has identified that STD DEP 8.3-1 results in revisions to Subsections 1C.2.2.2, 1C.2.3.1.1, 1C.2.3.1.3, 1C.2.3.2 and Tables 1C-1, 1C-2, and 1C-3 in the ABWR DCD. Within the review scope of SER Section 1C, the staff found that this departure is editorial in nature and is acceptable.

### COL License Information Item

The staff reviewed the applicant’s resolution to COL License Information Item 1.13, and found that the applicant has addressed this item, as required by the DCD. The staff found the applicant’s commitment is reasonable and sufficient within the review scope of this section. Further technical evaluation of this item is in SER Section 13.5.

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<sup>1</sup> See “Finality of Referenced NRC Approvals” in SER Section 1.1.3, for a discussion on the staff’s review related to verification of the scope of information to be included in a COL application that references a design certification.

## **1C.5 Post Combined License Activities**

The applicant identifies the following commitment:

- Commitment (COM 1C-1) – The applicant is required to develop operator procedures for Station Blackout (SBO) events including the use of a combustion turbine generator (CTG), before fuel loading, which use the ABWR plant operating procedures.

The staff reviewed the applicant's resolution to COL License Information Item 1.13 and found that the applicant has addressed this item, as required by the DCD. The staff found the applicant's commitment reasonable and sufficient within the review scope of this section. Further technical evaluation of this item is in SER Section 13.5.

## **1C.6 Conclusion**

The NRC staff's finding related to information incorporated by reference is in NUREG–1503. NRC staff reviewed the application and checked the referenced DCD. The staff's review confirmed that the applicant has addressed the required information relating to "ABWR Station Blackout Considerations," and no outstanding information is expected to be addressed in the COL FSAR related to this section. Pursuant to 10 CFR 52.63(a)(5) and Part 52, Appendix A, Section VI.B.1, all nuclear safety issues relating to ABWR station blackout procedures that were incorporated by reference have been resolved.

In addition, the staff concluded that the relevant information in the COL FSAR is acceptable, satisfies NRC regulations, and meets the requirements defined in the ABWR DCD, which is incorporated by reference into 10 CFR Part 52, Appendix A. The staff's conclusion is based on the following:

- For purposes of the staff's Section 1C review, the staff found that departures STD DEP 1.8-1 and STD DEP 8.3-1 are acceptable and are consistent with NRC rules and regulations.
- Within the review scope of this section, the staff's review confirmed that the applicant has adequately addressed COL license information 1.13 in accordance with Section C.III.4.3 of NUREG–1.206.