



December 30, 2010

Docket No. 50-443
SBK-L-10236

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn.: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Seabrook Station
Submittal of Changes to the Seabrook Station Technical Specification Bases

NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC submits the enclosed changes to the Seabrook Station Technical Specification Bases. The changes were made in accordance with Technical Specification 6.7.6.j., "Technical Specification (TS) Bases Control Program." Please update the Technical Specification Bases as follows:

REMOVE

Page B 3/4 6-5

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INSERT

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Should you have any questions concerning this submittal, please contact me at (603) 773-7745.

Sincerely,

NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Michael O'Keefe". The signature is written in a cursive style and is positioned above a horizontal line.

Michael O'Keefe
Licensing Manager

cc: NRC Region I Administrator
G. E. Miller, NRC Project Manager, Project Directorate I-2
W. J. Raymond, NRC Senior Resident Inspector

*ADD/
MRR*

Enclosure to SBK-L-10236

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

BASES

3/4.6.5 CONTAINMENT ENCLOSURE BUILDING

3/4.6.5.1 CONTAINMENT ENCLOSURE EMERGENCY AIR CLEANUP SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the Containment Enclosure Emergency Air Cleanup System ensures that during LOCA conditions containment vessel leakage into the annulus, and radioactive materials leaking from engineered safety features equipment, from the electrical penetration areas, and from the mechanical penetration tunnel, will be filtered through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber trains prior to discharge to the atmosphere.

The EAH system components associated with this Technical Specification include those dampers, fans, filters, etc., and required ductwork and instrumentation that evacuate or isolate areas, route air, and filter the exhaust prior to discharge to the environment. Included among these components are:

- Containment enclosure cooling fans (EAH-FN-5A and 5B)
- Containment enclosure ventilation area return fans (EAH-FN-31A and 31B)
- Containment enclosure emergency exhaust fans (EAH-FN-4A and 4B)
- Charging pump room return air fans (EAH-FN-180A and 180B)
- Containment enclosure emergency clean up filters (EAH-F-9 and F-69)
- PAB / CEVA isolation dampers (PAH-DP-35A, 36A, 35B, and 36B)

The EAH system also provides cooling to the following areas and equipment during normal and emergency operation: containment enclosure ventilation equipment area, the charging pumps, safety injection pumps, residual heat removal pumps, containment spray pumps, and the mechanical penetration area. However, the EAH cooling function is not associated with this Technical Specification, but rather is controlled under Technical Requirement 24, Area Temperature Monitoring.

3/4.6.5.2 CONTAINMENT ENCLOSURE BUILDING INTEGRITY

CONTAINMENT ENCLOSURE BUILDING INTEGRITY ensures that the release of radioactive materials from the primary containment atmosphere will be restricted to those leakage paths and associated leak rates assumed in the safety analyses. This restriction, in conjunction with operation of the Containment Enclosure Emergency Air Cleanup System, will limit the SITE BOUNDARY radiation doses to within the dose guideline values of 10 CFR 50.67 during accident conditions.

Verifying that the enclosure boundary is intact, or has integrity, involves confirming that the doors are closed except during normal transit entry and exit. Normal transit includes opening doors as necessary to permit the movement of people and equipment through the doorway. This may also include opening doors to confirm actuation of door alarms and for other activities that do not interfere with the ability of the door to immediately close and seal. Propping open a door and obstructing the doorway with equipment, cables, hoses, etc., such that it cannot be immediately closed is not normal transit entry and exit. Additionally, pressure boundary seals must also be intact to maintain the integrity of the containment enclosure.

ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

BASES

3/4.8.1 AC SOURCES (Continued)

To reduce the risk of performing extended EDG maintenance activities of up to 14 days while on-line a non-safety related supplemental emergency power system (SEPS) may be relied on when available. The SEPS is designed to provide back up power to either emergency bus whenever one of the emergency diesel generators (EDG) is out of service, particularly during Modes 1 through 4 operation. The SEPS is verified available and an operational readiness status check is performed when it is anticipated that one of the EDGs will be inoperable for longer than the allowable outage time of 72 hours. The design of the SEPS is capable of providing the required safety and non-safety related loads in the event of a total loss of offsite power and if one or both emergency diesel generators fail to start and load. During these events it is assumed that there is no seismic event or an event that requires SEPS to support safeguards actuation, e.g., safety injection, containment building spray, etc.

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES

The initial conditions of DBA and transient analyses in the UFSAR, Chapter 6 (Ref. 4) and Chapter 15 (Ref. 5), assume ESF systems are OPERABLE. The AC electrical power sources are designed to provide sufficient capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability of necessary power to ESF systems so that the fuel, Reactor Coolant System (RCS), and containment design limits are not exceeded. A discussion of these limits may be found in the Bases for Section 3/4.2, Power Distribution Limits; Section 3/4.4, Reactor Coolant System; and Section 3/4.6, Containment Systems.

The OPERABILITY of the AC electrical power sources is consistent with the initial assumptions of the Accident analyses and is based upon meeting the design basis of the unit. This results in maintaining at least one train of the onsite or offsite AC sources OPERABLE during Accident conditions in the event of:

- a. An assumed loss of all offsite power or all onsite AC power and
- b. A worst case single failure.

The AC sources satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36.

The SEPS is not designed for DBA loads and is not credited in the accident analyses.

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO)

Two qualified circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E Electrical Power System and separate and independent EDGs for each train ensure availability of the required power to shutdown the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition after an anticipated operational occurrence (AOO) or a postulated DBA. One of the required, independent offsite AC sources consists of the circuit from an offsite transmission line through the UATs to buses E5 and E6. Operability of this circuit requires that both UAT supply breakers be closed, energizing the emergency buses. The second required independent offsite AC source consists of the circuit from a separate offsite transmission line through the RATs to buses E5 and E6. For this circuit to be operable, each emergency bus RAT supply breaker must be either (1) closed, or (2) in standby with capability for automatic closure.

Each offsite circuit must be capable of maintaining rated frequency and voltage, and accepting required loads during an accident, while connected to the ESF buses.