### PSEG NUCLEAR L.L.C. SALEM/OPERATIONS

### S2.OP-AB.4KV-0001(Q) - REV, 10

### LOSS OF 2A 4KV VITAL BUS

- A. Biennial Review Performed: Yes \_\_\_\_ No  $\sqrt{}$
- B. Change Package(s) and Affected Document Number(s) incorporated into this revision: None

C. The following OTSC(s) were incorporated into this revision: None

#### **REVISION SUMMARY:**

The following changes were incorporated into this revision:

- Incorporated additional CAS item into the SELECTED CAS ITEMS pages, and Attachment 1, Continuous Action Summary indicating "IF AT ANY TIME 2A Vital Bus AND 2B Vital Bus are BOTH deenergized, <u>THEN</u> DISPATCH an Operator to manually CLOSE 2SW26, TURB AREA (TG HDR INLET MOV)". This change was incorporated to address the scenario where 2A and 2B Vital Busses are deenergized, and 2C is the only Vital Bus energized supplying either the 25 or 26 SW Pump. In this situation, a low SW header pressure condition will exist until the Turbine Building SW Header is manually isolated. Johnston Pump Company has indicated that operation of a SW pump at runout conditions for periods up to 30 minutes is acceptable with negligible risk of catastrophic failure due to poor hydraulic conditions. Following identification of the above indicated condition, it is intended an Operator be dispatched, and 2SW26 manually closed within 30 minutes to preclude further pump degradation. [70055569-0060]
- Revised SELECTED CAS ITEMS pages to indicate "Refer to EXHIBIT 1 for briefing sheet". This change was incorporated to provide additional clarification regarding usage of EXHIBIT 1, and is considered editorial in nature.

IMPLEMENTATI	ION REQUIREMENTS	Effective Date: 9/18/2-007
None		
APPROVED:	Operations Director - Sale	m 9-13-07 Date

- IF AT ANY TIME 2A Vital Bus restoration is <u>NOT</u> expected within 2 hours, <u>THEN</u>:
  - **OPEN** 2AVIB24, 2A SAFEGUARD EMERGENCY CABINET breaker (2A 115V Vital Bus, Elev. 100' Relay Rm).
  - SHUT DOWN 2A Diesel Generator IAW S2.OP-SO.DG-0001(Q), 2A Diesel Generator Operation.
- IF AT ANY TIME 2A Vital Bus AND 2B Vital Bus are BOTH deenergized, <u>THEN DISPATCH</u> an Operator to manually CLOSE 2SW26, TURB AREA (TG HDR INLET MOV).

s2.0P-AB.4KV-0001(0)

## LOSS OF 2A 4KV VITAL BUS

### 1.0 ENTRY CONDITIONS

DATE: \_\_\_\_\_ TIME: \_\_\_\_\_


- 1.1 The Overhead Annunciator Alarm Response Procedure.
- 1.2 Loss of 2A 4KV Vital bus as identified by the Operator.
- 1.3 Blackout Loading on 2A Vital Bus only.

### 2.0 IMMEDIATE ACTIONS

2.1 None

### 3.0 SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS

- \_\_\_\_ 3.1 INITIATE Attachment 1, Continuous Action Summary.
- 3.2 **INITIATE** Diesel Generator running checks for any operating Diesel Generator(s) IAW applicable procedures, while continuing with this procedure:
  - ★ S2.OP-SO.DG-0001(Q), 2A Diesel Generator Operation
  - S2.OP-SO.DG-0002(Q), 2B Diesel Generator Operation
  - \_\_\_\_ ♦ S2.OP-SO.DG-0003(Q), 2C Diesel Generator Operation
  - \_ 3.3 <u>IF 23 Charging Pump was providing Seal Injection and Charging Flow to Unit 1,</u> <u>THEN NOTIFY Unit 1 NCO.</u>
    - 3.4 Was 23 Charging Pump providing Seal Injection and Charging Flow to Unit 2?



- IF AT ANY TIME 2A Vital Bus restoration is <u>NOT</u> expected within 2 hours, <u>THEN</u>:
  - OPEN 2AVIB24, 2A SAFEGUARD EMERGENCY CABINET breaker (2A 115V Vital Bus, Elev. 100' Relay Rm).
  - SHUT DOWN 2A Diesel Generator IAW S2.OP-SO.DG-0001(Q), 2A Diesel Generator Operation.
- IF AT ANY TIME 2A Vital Bus AND 2B Vital Bus are BOTH deenergized, THEN DISPATCH an Operator to manually CLOSE 2SW26, TURB AREA (TG HDR INLET MOV).


\* Refer to EXHIBIT 1 for briefing sheet


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JSER RESPONSIBLE FOR VERIFYING REVISION, STATUS AND CHANGES

- IF AT ANY TIME 2A Vital Bus restoration is NOT expected within 2 hours, THEN:
  - **OPEN 2AVIB24, 2A SAFEGUARD EMERGENCY CABINET breaker** (2A 115V Vital Bus, Elev. 100' Relay Rm).
  - SHUT DOWN 2A Diesel Generator IAW S2.OP-SO.DG-0001(Q), 2A Diesel Generator Operation.
- IF AT ANY TIME 2A Vital Bus AND 2B Vital Bus are BOTH deenergized, <u>THEN DISPATCH</u> an Operator to manually CLOSE 2SW26, TURB AREA (TG HDR INLET MOV).

3.20 **OPEN** 21SW20 Turbine Area 21 Header isolation.

# CAUTION

Diesel Generator operation is limited by the following KW output ratings:

- 2600 KW continuous
- 2750 KW for 2000 hours
- 2860 KW for 2 hours 3100 KW for 30 minutes
- START/STOP the following 2A Vital Bus loads as necessary. 3.21
  - 21 Component Cooling Water Pump
  - 21 Service Water Pump
  - 22 Service Water Pump
  - 21 RHR Pump
  - 21 Safety Injection Pump
  - 21 Containment Spray Pump

# NOTE

Automatic starting of a CCW pump can cause a DISCHARGE FLOW HI alarm, closing 2CC131, RCP Thermal Barrier Valve.


IF the automatic start of a CCW pump closed 2CC131, 3.22 THEN OPEN 2CC131, RCP Thermal Barrier Valve AND PLACE in AUTO.

3.23 GO TO Step 3.41


- IF AT ANY TIME 2A Vital Bus restoration is <u>NOT</u> expected within 2 hours, <u>THEN</u>;
  - **OPEN** 2AVIB24, 2A SAFEGUARD EMERGENCY CABINET breaker (2A 115V Vital Bus, Elev. 100' Relay Rm).
  - SHUT DOWN 2A Diesel Generator IAW S2.OP-SO.DG-0001(Q), 2A Diesel Generator Operation.
- IF AT ANY TIME 2A Vital Bus AND 2B Vital Bus are BOTH deenergized, <u>THEN DISPATCH</u> an Operator to manually CLOSE 2SW26, TURB AREA (TG HDR INLET MOV).

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3.24 Is the AFW System required to maintain S/G level?



- \_\_\_\_ 3.25 START 22 AFW Pump.
  - 3.26 Is 22 AFW Pump running?



- 3.27 ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN level in 21 and 22 S/Gs between 33% and 44%; STEAM only 21 and 22 S/Gs.
- \_\_\_\_ 3.28 GO TO Step 3.33
  - 3.29 **CONTINUE** on with this procedure.

# CAUTION

Care must be taken when running 23 AFW Pump to prevent a Safety Injection due to Steam Generator △P.

- 3.30 START 23 AFW Pump as follows:
  - \_\_\_\_\_ A. ADJUST Speed Demand to "0".

YES ----

- B. START 23 AFW Pump.
- C. MAINTAIN level in all S/Gs between 33 and 44%.

--->

3.31 Is 23 AFW Pump running?

NO

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3.31 I \_\_\_\_\_ Salem **2** 

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GO TO Step 3.33

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Time

Time


- IF AT ANY TIME 2A Vital Bus restoration is <u>NOT</u> expected within 2 hours, <u>THEN</u>:
  - **OPEN** 2AVIB24, 2A SAFEGUARD EMERGENCY CABINET breaker (2A 115V Vital Bus, Elev. 100' Relay Rm).
  - SHUT DOWN 2A Diesel Generator IAW S2.OP-SO.DG-0001(Q), 2A Diesel Generator Operation.
- IF AT ANY TIME 2A Vital Bus AND 2B Vital Bus are BOTH deenergized, <u>THEN DISPATCH</u> an Operator to manually CLOSE 2SW26, TURB AREA (TG HDR INLET MOV).

- 3.32
   COOLDOWN to reduce S/G pressure to <500 psig (≈470°F Tavg)</td>

   AND MAINTAIN S/G levels with condensate pump(s) IAW S2.OP-IO.ZZ-0006(Q),

   Hot Standby To Cold Shutdown.
  - 3.33 Are all Service Water low pressure alarms clear?

  - 3.34 START additional Service Water Pumps as necessary to clear the low pressure alarms.
  - 3.35 Are all Service Water low pressure alarms clear?
  - $\underbrace{\qquad NO \qquad YES \longrightarrow GO TO Step 3.37}_{V}$  Time
- 3.36 INITIATE S2.OP-AB.SW-0001(Q), Loss of Service Water Header Pressure.
- 3.37 Are all Component Cooling Water low Flow alarms clear?
- - 3.38 **START** additional Component Cooling Water Pumps as necessary to clear the low flow alarms.
- 3.39 Are all Component Cooling Water low Flow alarms clear?



\_\_\_\_ 3.40 INITIATE S2.OP-AB.CC-0001(Q), Component Cooling Abnormality.

STATUS AND CHANGES

FOR VERIFYING REVISION,

RESPONSIBLE

JSER

- IF AT ANY TIME 2A Vital Bus restoration is <u>NOT</u> expected within 2 hours, <u>THEN</u>:
  - OPEN 2AVIB24, 2A SAFEGUARD EMERGENCY CABINET breaker (2A 115V Vital Bus, Elev. 100' Relay Rm).
  - SHUT DOWN 2A Diesel Generator IAW S2.OP-SO.DG-0001(Q), 2A Diesel Generator Operation.
- IF AT ANY TIME 2A Vital Bus AND 2B Vital Bus are BOTH deenergized, <u>THEN DISPATCH</u> an Operator to manually CLOSE 2SW26, TURB AREA (TG HDR INLET MOV).

- \_\_\_\_\_ 3.41 IF letdown isolated, THEN:
  - \_\_\_\_\_A. **OPEN** 2CV2 and 2CV277 <u>AND</u> **PLACE** in Automatic.
  - B. **ENSURE** Charging flow  $\approx 80$  gpm.
  - C. Simultaneously OPEN 2CV3, 2CV4 or 2CV5 AND ADJUST 2CV18 to maintain letdown pressure at  $\approx$  300 psig.
  - \_\_\_\_ D. PLACE 2CV18 in Automatic.
- \_\_\_\_ 3.42 IF Blackout Loading started 21 Aux Feed Pump, THEN:
  - A. **VERIFY** Steam Generator levels are being maintained above low level trip setpoint.
  - B. **DEPRESS** 21 AFW Pump START pushbutton to reset AFW Interlock.
  - C. OPEN 21-24SS94 to restore SGBD sampling to the 2R19 RMS.
    - D. IF SGBD is required to be established, <u>THEN RESTORE</u> IAW S2.OP-SO.GBD-0002(Q), Steam Generator Blowdown - Normal Operation
  - 3.43 IF 21 Aux Feed Pump is running and not required to maintain S/G levels, THEN:
    - \_\_\_\_\_ A. STOP 21 Aux Feed Pump.
    - B. **PERFORM** backleakage surveillance IAW S2.OP-PT.AF-0002(Q), Auxiliary Feedwater Backleakage.
- 3.44 **DISPATCH** an Operator to record any flags on the breaker relays.
- \_ 3.45 NOTIFY Maintenance to investigate the cause of the loss of bus.

- IF AT ANY TIME 2A Vital Bus restoration is <u>NOT</u> expected within 2 hours, <u>THEN</u>:
  - **OPEN** 2AVIB24, 2A SAFEGUARD EMERGENCY CABINET breaker (2A 115V Vital Bus, Elev. 100' Relay Rm).
  - SHUT DOWN 2A Diesel Generator IAW S2.OP-SO.DG-0001(Q), 2A Diesel Generator Operation.
- IF AT ANY TIME 2A Vital Bus AND 2B Vital Bus are BOTH deenergized, <u>THEN DISPATCH</u> an Operator to manually CLOSE 2SW26, TURB AREA (TG HDR INLET MOV).

- 3.46 **NOTIFY** SM/CRS to reference the following:
  - Attachment 2, Applicable ODCM and Technical Specifications Requiring Action - 8 Hours or Less Modes 1-4
  - Attachment 3, Applicable ODCM and Technical Specifications Requiring Action - 8 Hours or Less Modes 5-6
  - Event Classification Guide
- \_\_\_\_ 3.47 IF 2A 460/230V Vital Buses are deenergized, THEN INITIATE S2.0P-AB.460-0001(Q), Loss of 2A 460/230V Vital Buses.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 3.48 When the problem is resolved <u>AND</u> the bus is de-energized, **PERFORM** the following:
  - A. OPEN 2AVIB24, 2A SAFEGUARD EMERGENCY CABINET Breaker (2A 115V Vital Bus, Elev. 100' Relay Rm).
  - B. **RESTORE** 2A Vital Bus to Normal Operation IAW S2.OP-SO.4KV-0001(Q), 2A 4KV Vital Bus Operation.
  - 3.49 When the problem is resolved <u>AND</u> the bus is energized from 2A EDG ALIGN 2A EDG for automatic operation following SEC actuation IAW S2.OP-SO.DG-0001(Q), 2A Diesel Generator Operation.

- <u>IF AT ANY TIME</u> 2A Vital Bus restoration is <u>NOT</u> expected within 2 hours, <u>THEN</u>:
  - OPEN 2AVIB24, 2A SAFEGUARD EMERGENCY CABINET breaker (2A 115V Vital Bus, Elev. 100' Relay Rm).
  - SHUT DOWN 2A Diesel Generator IAW S2.OP-SO.DG-0001(Q), 2A Diesel Generator Operation.
- <u>IF AT ANY TIME</u> 2A Vital Bus <u>AND</u> 2B Vital Bus are BOTH deenergized, <u>THEN DISPATCH</u> an Operator to manually CLOSE 2SW26, TURB AREA (TG HDR INLET MOV).

\* Refer to EXHIBIT 1 for briefing sheet

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### 4.0 **COMPLETION AND REVIEW**

- 4.1 **CIRCLE** Entry Condition number in Section 1.0, <u>OR EXPLAIN</u> Entry Condition in Comments Section of Attachment 4.
- 4.2 **COMPLETE** Attachment 4, Sections 1.0 and 2.0, <u>AND</u> FORWARD this procedure to SM/CRS for review and approval.
- 4.3 SM/CRS **PERFORM** the following:
  - A. **REVIEW** this procedure with Attachment 4 for completeness and accuracy.
  - B. **COMPLETE** Attachment 4, Section 3.0.
  - C. FORWARD completed procedure to Operations Staff.

## END OF PROCEDURE

### ATTACHMENT 1 (Page 1 of 1)

### CONTINUOUS ACTION SUMMARY

## <u>NOTE</u>

Extended "No Load" operation of 2A Emergency Diesel Generator will result in excessive carbon buildup. If a generator load can not be applied, then running time should be limited to  $\leq$ 2 hours. Diesel Generator operation without electrical load for >2 hours requires loading to 1500KW at 1125KVAR for a minimum of 1 hour prior to shutdown.

- 1.0 <u>IF AT ANY TIME</u> 2A Vital Bus restoration is <u>NOT</u> expected within 2 hours, <u>THEN</u>:
  - 1.1 **OPEN 2AVIB24, 2A SAFEGUARD EMERGENCY CABINET breaker** (2A 115V Vital Bus, Elev. 100' Relay Rm).
  - 1.2 SHUT DOWN 2A Diesel Generator IAW S2.OP-SO.DG-0001(Q), 2A Diesel Generator Operation.
- 2.0 <u>IF AT ANY TIME</u> 2A Vital Bus <u>AND</u> 2B Vital Bus are BOTH deenergized, <u>THEN</u> **DISPATCH** an Operator to manually CLOSE 2SW26, TURB AREA (TG HDR INLET MOV).

### ATTACHMENT 2 (Page 1 of 1)

## APPLICABLE ODCM AND TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS REQUIRING ACTION - 8 HOURS OR LESS MODES 1-4

### NOTE

- All conditions must be evaluated in terms of the operability of redundant equipment to determine if T/S 3.0.3 or T/S 3.8.1.1 is applicable.
- Loss of 2A 4KV Bus renders 21 AFP inoperable (S24KV-2AD1AX1D). [70022802]
   Loss of #2 AFP Room Cooler renders 23 AFP inoperable (S2230-2AY1EP2D).

<u>LCO #</u>	<u>TSAS</u>	<u>TITLE</u>
3.9.12	Immediate	Fuel Handling Area Ventilation System, (Suspend Fuel Handling)
3.4.5	1-Hour	Relief Valves (PORVs), Loss of power to 2PR6
3.6.1.1	1-Hour	Containment Integrity - due to inoperable 21SW20
3.8.1.1	1-Hour	A.C. Sources
3.8.2.3	2-Hour	125 VDC Distribution - Operating (Battery Chargers)
3.8.2.5	2-Hour	28 VDC Distribution - Operating (Battery Chargers)
3.6.3	4-Hour	Containment Isolation Valves
3.7.1.2	6-Hour	Auxiliary Feedwater System (Modes 1-3) 21 AND 23 AFPs are inoperable
3.7.6	4 hours	CREACS - Due to loss of power to 21 EACS Fan
3.8.2.1	8-Hour	A.C. Distribution - Operating
ODCM	-	Radioactive Liquid Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation (S/G Blowdown Line)

# ATTACHMENT 3 (Page 1 of 1)

# APPLICABLE ODCM AND TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS REQUIRING ACTION - 8 HOURS OR LESS MODES 5-6

<u>LCO #</u>	TITLE
3.1.2.1	Boration Systems Flow Paths - Shutdown (Suspend core alterations or positive reactivity changes)
3.4.1.4	Cold Shutdown (RHR Loop Operability), (Suspend Boron Dilution operations)
3.7.6	4 hours CREACS - Due to loss of power to 21EACS Fan
3.8.1.2	A.C. Sources - Shutdown (Suspend core alterations or positive reactivity changes)
3.8.2.2	A.C. Distribution - Shutdown, (Establish containment integrity within 8 hours)
3.8.2.4	125 VDC Distribution - Shutdown (Battery chargers), (Establish containment integrity within 8 hours)
3.8.2.6	28 VDC Distribution - Shutdown (Battery Chargers), (Establish containment integrity within 8 hours)
3.9.8.1	Coolant Circulation (RHR Loop Operability), (Suspend operations increasing decay heat or reducing Boron concentration)
3.9.12	Fuel Handling Area Ventilation System, (Suspend fuel movement or crane operation with loads over fuel pool)
ODCM	Radioactive Liquid Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation (S/G Blowdown Line)

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### ATTACHMENT 4 (Page 1 of 2)

# **COMPLETION SIGN-OFF SHEET**

1.0 **<u>COMMENTS</u>** (INCLUDE procedure deficiencies and corrective actions. Attach additional pages as necessary.)

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### ATTACHMENT 4 (Page 2 of 2)

### **COMPLETION SIGN-OFF SHEET**

# 2.0 SIGNATURES

Print	Initials	Signature	Date
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## 3.0 SM/CRS FINAL REVIEW AND APPROVAL

This procedure with Attachment 4 is reviewed for completeness and accuracy. Entry conditions and all deficiencies, including corrective actions, are clearly recorded in the COMMENTS Section of this attachment.

Signature:

SM/CRS

Date:\_\_\_\_

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#### EXHIBIT 1 (Page 1 of 1)

## **BRIEFING SHEET**

# NOTE

The following items are a list of potential topics which should be covered during the briefing at SM/CRS discretion.

## 1) SAFETY

Exercise appropriate industrial safety in the vicinity of operating diesel generators.

### 2) TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS AND ECGs

- Refer to Attachment 2 or Attachment 3, as applicable.
- With the Unit in Modes 1-3, if 2PR6 is not restored to operable status within one hour, 2PR1 must be placed in MANUAL to comply with T.S. 3.4.5.
- An inoperable 21SW20 requires entry into T.S. 3.6.1.1 in Modes 1-4. The 21SW20 shall be CLOSED within one hour and remain CLOSED to satisfy the requirements of T.S. 3.6.1.1.
- Due to loss of power to 21EACS Fan the CREACS must be placed in the Maintenance Mode of Operation IAW S2.OP-SO.CAV-0001(Q), within 4 hrs from the loss of power, in Modes 1-6, to comply with T.S. 3.7.6.

## 3) PARAMETERS TO BE MONITORED

- Diesel Generator loading.
- Reactor Power to ensure it remains <100% if 21 AFP started.

### 4) **CONTINGENCIES**

- Refer to Attachment 1 of S2.OP-AB.460-0001(Q) for a list of 460V equipment lost.
- All Tech Spec considerations must be evaluated in terms of redundant equipment operability to determine if T/S 3.0.3 or T/S 3.8.1.1 are applicable (refer to S2.OP-SO.DG-0005(Q)).
- Reactivity affects of running 21 AFP.
- ♦ Limit unloaded running time of Diesel Generator to <2 hrs.</p>

#### LOSS OF 2A 4KV VITAL BUS TECHNICAL BASES DOCUMENT

## 1.0 <u>REFERENCES</u>

#### 1.1 <u>Technical Documents</u>

A. Salem Generating Station Updated Final Safety Analysis Report:
 1. Section 8.3.1.2

B.	Salem	Generating	Station	Technical	Sp	ecifications	Unit 2:
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- 1. 3.1.2.1 Boration System Flow Paths Shutdown
- 2. 3.1.2.2 Boration Systems Flow Paths Operating
- 3. 3.1.2.3 Charging Pump Shutdown
- 4. 3.1.2.4 Charging Pumps Operating
- 5. 3.1.2.5 Borated Water Sources
- 6. 3.1.2.6 Boric Acid Storage System Operability
- 7. 3.3.3.8 Steam Generator Blowdown Line
- 8. 3.4.1.4 Cold Shutdown (RHR Loop Operability)
- 9. 3.4.4 Pressurizer (Heater Emergency Power Supply)
- 10. 3.4.5 Relief Valves (PORVs)
- 11. 3.5.2 ECCS Subsystems Tavg  $\geq$  350°F
- 12. 3.5.3 ECCS Subsystems Tavg < 350°F
- 13. 3.6.1.1 Containment Integrity
- 14. 3.6.2.1 Containment Spray System
- 15. 3.6.2.2 Spray Additive System
- 16. 3.6.2.3 Containment Cooling System
- 17. 3.6.3 Containment Isolation Valves
- 18. 3.6.4.2 Electric Hydrogen Recombiners W
- 19. 3.7.1.2 Auxiliary Feedwater System
- 20. 3.7.3 Component Cooling Water System
- 21. 3.7.4 Service Water System
- 22. 3.7.6 Control Room Emergency Air Conditioning System
- 23. 3.7.7 Auxiliary Building Exhaust Air Filtration System
- 24. 3.8.1.1 A.C. Sources
- 25. 3.8.1.2 A.C. Sources
- 26. 3.8.2.1 A.C. Distribution Operating
- 27. 3.8.2.2 A.C. Distribution Shutdown
- 28. 3.8.2.3 125 VDC Distribution Operating (Battery Chargers)
- 29. 3.8.2.4 125 VDC Distribution Shutdown (Battery Chargers)
- 30. 3.8.2.5 28 VDC Distribution Operating (Battery Chargers)
- 31. 3.8.2.6 28 VDC Distribution Shutdown
- 32. 3.9.8.1 Coolant Circulation (RHR Loop Operability)
- 33. 3.9.8.2 Low Water Level (RHR Loop Operability)
- 34. 3.9.12 Fuel Handling Area Ventilation System
- 35. 6.8.4.g Radioactive Effluent Control Program (ODCM)

## 1.2 Procedures

- A. S2.OP-AB.CC-0001(Q), Component Cooling Abnormality
- B. S2.OP-AB.460-0001(Q), Loss of 2A 460/230 Vital Buses
- C. S2.OP-SO.DG-0001(Q), 2A Diesel Generator Operation.
- D. S2.OP-SO.DG-0002(Q), 2B Diesel Generator Operation
- E. S2.OP-SO.DG-0003(Q), 2C Diesel Generator Operation
- F. S2.OP-SO.GBD-0002(Q), Steam Generator Blowdown Normal Operation
- G. S2.OP-SO.4KV-0001(Q), 2A 4KV Vital Bus Operation
- H. S2.OP-PT.AF-0002(Q), Aux Feed Backleakage
- I. S2.OP-SO.RHR-0001(Q), Initiating RHR
- J. S2.OP-AB.RHR-0001(Q), Loss of RHR
- K. S2.OP-AB.RHR-0002(Q), Loss of RHR at Reduced Inventory
- L. S2.OP-AB.SW-0001(Q), Loss of Service Water Header Pressure

## 1.3 Drawings

A. 203061, 4160V Vital Buses

## 1.4 Conformance Documents

A. None

## 1.5 Other

- A. Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM)
- B. DCP 80065299, Restoration Of The Positive Displacement Pump As The Normal Charging Pump

## 2.0 DISCUSSION

2.1 This procedure provides the direction necessary for plant operation with a loss of 2A 4KV Vital Bus power. It is the intent of this discussion to provide the reasoning behind the logic and flowpath of the procedure. It is not intended to provide additional direction to the procedure.

## 2.2 Entry Conditions

- A. Entry conditions are based on operator recognition that a single Vital Bus has been lost. The symptoms available to the Operator are as follows:
  - 2A 4KV Vital Bus Voltmeter
  - Numerous alarms associated with bus undervoltage, bus trip.

## 2.3 Immediate Actions

None

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### 2.4 Subsequent Actions

- A. The initial steps in this section has the Operator initiating operating checks of any running Diesel Generators followed by the operators starting redundant equipment, powered from another source, to replace those loads which could have been lost if the bus remains de-energized. 23 Charging Pump may be cross tied to Unit 1 CVCS charging header from the Unit 2 RWST to provide a Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Function IAW 10CFR Part 50 Appendix R Regulation.
- B. The next actions check to see if the bus power is restored. If the bus is powered from the DG, the Emergency Loading is reset.
- C. The next systems to be looked at are Auxiliary Feedwater, Service Water, Component Cooling Water and Letdown in that order due to the priority of the need for operation of those systems.
- D. At this point the plant is in a stable condition. The operators are reminded to reset Aux Feedwater Interlock to regain control of the S/G blowdown and sampling valves and to remove from service any Aux Feedwater Pump not required, to prevent an overpower condition and thermal shock with the addition of cold water to the system. Time can now be spent making notifications to maintenance. An operator can be sent out to record breaker relay status.
- E. The instructions necessary to start/load the Diesel Generator if it had failed to do so automatically, are not needed in this procedure. The decision on when and how to do so would be made by the SM/CRS as deemed necessary.

### 2.5 Attachments:

- A. <u>Attachment 1, Continuous Action Summary</u> Provides actions to be continuously monitored during procedure use.
  - CAS 1.0 This CAS ensures extended "no load" operation of the EDG is precluded to prevent excessive carbon buildup. When vital bus restoration is not expected to occur within two hours, the diesel generator is secured.
  - CAS 2.0 This CAS addresses the scenario where 2A and 2B Vital Busses are deenergized, and 2C is the only Vital Bus energized supplying either the 25 or 26 SW Pump. In this situation, a low SW header pressure condition will exist until the Turbine Building SW Header is manually isolated. Johnston Pump Company has indicated that operation of a SW pump at runout conditions for periods up to 30 minutes is acceptable with negligible risk of catastrophic failure due to poor hydraulic conditions. Following identification of the above indicated condition, it is intended an Operator be dispatched, and 2SW26 manually closed within 30 minutes to preclude further pump degradation.
- B. <u>Attachment 2, Applicable ODCM and Technical Specifications Requiring Action -</u> <u>8 Hours or Less Modes 1-4</u> - Self-Explanatory
- C. <u>Attachment 3, Applicable ODCM and Technical Specifications Requiring Action -</u> <u>8 Hours or Less Modes 5-6</u> - Self-Explanatory
- D. Attachment 4, Completion Sign-Off Sheet Self-Explanatory
- E. <u>Exhibit 1, Briefing Sheet</u> Brief Sheet that indicates various topics including Safety, Technical Specifications and ECGs, Parameters to be Monitored, and Contingencies to be discussed during a shift briefing.

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