

OPERATING TEST COMMENTS

JPM COMMENTS

1. JPM No. 2010-301-AT-01R – Unable to setup simulator to support performance of MODE 5 Shiftly/Daily Surveillance
 - a. Changed from a MODE 5 to MODE 4 surveillance
 - b. Changed K/A from 2.1.44 to 2.1.18
 - c. Changed task elements due to changes in MODE to include:
 - i. Recording of Torus Water Level
 - ii. Recording of RPV Flange Temperature
 - iii. Identification abnormal indication for annunciator 3D57
 - iv. Identification of abnormal RHR configuration
 - v. Identification of abnormal SRM indication
2. JPM No. 2010-301-AT-01S
 - a. Changed K/A from 2.1.44 to 2.1.40 to reflect SRO nature of JPM
 - b. Changed SRM verification step
 - i. From 1 SRM below 3 cps to 2 SRMs below 3 cps
 - ii. Included completed SRM signal to noise verification packages to be evaluated
 - c. Included Secondary Containment Differential Pressure Correction Tables as required material
3. JPM No. 2010-301-AT-02
 - a. Revised to allow use of IPCS including addition of appropriate cues
 - b. Revised to include data tables (information to be provided when requested); allows performance in classroom setting rather than in Simulator
4. JPM No. 2010-301-AT-03S
 - a. Changed task from “Assess Shutdown Risk” to “Evaluate a Temporary Change Notice” since procedure guidance for assessing risk was too generic to support a JPM.
 - b. Replacement JPM from bank
5. JPM No. 2010-301-AT-04R
 - a. Changed to RO only
 - b. Revised required materials to include Mock Up RWP and Survey Map
6. JPM No. 2010-301-AT-04S
 - a. Added new SRO only JPM to Review and approve Discharge Permit
 - b. Replacement JPM from bank
7. JPM No. 2010-301-AT-05S
 - a. Updated to reflect changes in procedure.
8. JPM No. 2010-301-CR-04
 - a. Included a recommended IC for setup
 - b. Added clarifying information to evaluator prompt and note
9. JPM No. 2010-301-CR-05
 - a. Added step to setup to ensure that injection path is isolated
 - b. Added step to un-isolate injection path
 - c. Included preferred level band in evaluator notes.

10. JPM No. 2010-301-CR-07
 - a. Added guidance for simulator operator to act as RO responsible for maintaining reactor period and ranging of IRMs
11. JPM No. 2010-301-IP-02
 - a. Changed valve number and fuse location to simplify access to panel
12. JPM No. 2010-301-IP-03
 - a. Added clarifying information for evaluator
 - b. Added missed step

SCENARIO COMMENTS

1. Scenario 1
 - a. Eliminated reactivity manipulation to shorten scenario run time
 - b. Increased delay time for sticking IRM to provide a more noticeable indication of failure.
 - c. Included additional role play messages for communicator
 - d. Added clarification that applicants may isolate RCIC before auto isolation signal is actuated
 - e. Added clarifying note for CRD Flow transmitter failure
 - f. Added clarifying not related to exiting ATWS EOP power leg to SCRAM AOP
 - g. Changed mechanical vacuum pump failure from a credited component failure to simply an observation of failure
2. Scenario 2
 - a. Changed RR Pump trip event type from Reactivity Manipulation to Component malfunction due to insufficient time between initiation of malfunction and automatic trip of pump.
 - b. Added Role-Play communications
 - c. Revised Bypass Valve Test expected actions to include both procedurally allowed methods for reclosing valve.
 - d. Revised expected TS actions for failed accumulator to provide more detail
 - e. Added expectation for insertion of CRAM array in response to RR Pump Trip
 - f. Revised response actions for Feed Pump suction strainer clogging to include possibility that applicants may trip pump rather than perform a controlled shutdown of pump (power already low enough to support single pump operation due to RR pump trip response)
3. Scenario 3
 - a. Changed CW system rupture event type from "Major" to "Component" failure.
 - b. Revised severity of SBFW Injection valve failure to permit some injection to ensure that response to small break LOCA is driven by containment parameters and not RPV parameters
 - c. Eliminated RCIC malfunction and changed HPCI failure from a credited malfunction to recognition of failure.
 - d. Added Role-Play communications
 - e. Changed stator water cooling malfunction from TCV failure to HX fouling
 - f. Added clarifying information where needed.