


2009 End-of-Cycle Plant Safety Performance Summary

Plant/Site Name: Indian Point Unit 2

Assessment Period: January 1, 2009 - December 31, 2009

Outside of Scope



Outside of Scope

(16 Pages)

Outside of Scope

outside
of
scope

Condensate Storage Tank (CST) Underground Pipe Leak

Background: On February 16, 2009, Entergy operators identified and confirmed indications of leakage from a buried pipe under the auxiliary pump building floor associated with the Unit 2 CST return line. Entergy personnel excavated the area, unearthed the pipe, and identified a 1.5" diameter hole in the pipe. On February 21, 2009, Entergy personnel replaced the affected pipe section and declared the CST operable in accordance with the time limits of the applicable technical specification action statement. Resident inspectors independently determined that Entergy personnel identified the leak, replaced the pipe in accordance with regulatory requirements, and confirmed that liquid releases (tritium) were well below NRC regulatory limits.

Entergy completed a root cause evaluation in May 2009 and has developed corrective actions including extent-of-condition inspections to be completed by October 2009. It was determined by Entergy personnel that the external protective coating was degraded in this localized area in part due to installation/backfill specification allowances during initial construction combined with soil environmental conditions at this elevation on site conducive to corrosion mechanisms.

NRC Outreach: The NRC staff communicated to government stakeholders in February 2009 via conference and phone discussions and email correspondence to describe our independent inspections and overall assessment.

- There were several local media articles published about this condition in February 2009. Subsequently, the NRC staff received and responded to the following letters:
 - March 2009 letter from NY Congressional members (Engel, Hall, Lowey, Hinchey) regarding the pipe leak;
 - April 2009 conference call with Senator Gillibrand's staffer
 - April 2009 letter from Congressional members (Markey, Hall);
 - April 2009 letter from Senator Gillibrand (verbal discussion – no written response); and
 - March and April 2009 letters (four in total) from concerned members of the public.
- On July 13th, NRC regional and headquarters staff briefed Congressman Markey/Hall's staffers regarding the specifics of the IP2 CST pipe leak. In addition, the staff discussed the agencies approach to the inspection and aging management requirements for underground piping.

Inspection Documentation: NRC inspectors completed the following ROP baseline inspections of the CST leak using risk insights:

- IR2009-002: Equipment alignment; maintenance risk; operability; modifications; testing; event follow-up; and
- IR2009-003: PIR sample.

Inspection Conclusions: The inspectors did not identify performance deficiencies surrounding the CST leakage event as documented in IR 2009-002/003. Additionally, the inspectors concluded that Entergy's corrective actions, specific to extent-of-condition planned inspections, appears to be reasonable in scope and pace to ensure that Entergy will have a reasonable assessment of underground piping conditions at the site.

(Updates since Mid-Cycle)

- On December 16, 2009, the NRC received a copy of a letter from a concerned individual to Congressman Markey, with copies to NY Congressionals, Chairman Jaczko and Inspector General Bell. The letter asserted that the NRC provided inaccurate, incomplete, and misleading information in response to questions from Congressmen Markey and Hall related to the Indian Point Unit 2 CST underground piping leak and NRC activities associated with underground piping. Rob
- On January 16, 2010, the Branch became aware of information that indicated Congressmen John Adler of NJ, Edward Markey of MA, and John Hall of NY, have asked the General Accounting Office to investigate the condition of buried piping systems at nuclear plants including Indian Point.
- Appropriate offices within the NRC considered the next steps. As of the writing of this assessment, the Branch has not been requested to support stakeholder communication in this regard.

Next Steps:

- Conduct PIR sample in 2nd quarter to evaluate Entergy's corrective actions to address buried piping with focus on the NDE testing and excavation being conducted by Entergy on underground piping at IPEC: and
- Continue to maintain awareness of stakeholder communications and provide support to OEDO/PAO/SLO as needed. (Issue continues to have very high government/public stakeholder interest)

Outside of Scope

outside
none

Outside of Scope

(13 Pages)