


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2009 Mid-Cycle Plant Safety Performance Summary

Plant/Site Name: Indian Point Unit 2

Assessment Period: July 1, 2008 - June 30, 2009

Outside of Scope



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(15 Pages)

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Condensate Storage Tank (CST) Underground Pipe Leak

Background: On February 16, 2009, Entergy operators identified and confirmed indications of leakage from a buried pipe under the auxiliary pump building floor associated with the Unit 2 CST return line. Entergy personnel excavated the area, unearthed the pipe, and identified a 1.5" diameter hole in the pipe. On February 21, 2009, Entergy personnel replaced the affected pipe section and declared the CST operable in accordance with the time limits of the applicable technical specification action statement. Resident inspectors independently determined that Entergy personnel identified the leak, replaced the pipe in accordance with regulatory requirements, and confirmed that liquid releases (tritium) were well below NRC regulatory limits.

Entergy completed a root cause evaluation in May 2009 and has developed corrective actions including extent-of-condition inspections to be completed by October 2009. It determined by Entergy personnel that the external protective coating was degraded in this localized area in part due to installation/backfill specification allowances during initial construction combined with soil environmental conditions at this elevation on site conducive to corrosion mechanisms.

NRC Outreach: The NRC staff communicated to government stakeholders in February 2009 via conference and phone discussions and email correspondence to describe our independent inspections and overall assessment.

- There were several local media articles published about this condition in February. Subsequently, the NRC staff received and responded to the following letters:
 - March 2009 letter from NY Congressional members (Engel, Hall, Lowey, Hinchey) regarding the pipe leak;
 - April 2009 conference call with Senator Gillibrand's staffer

Notes

- o April 2009 letter from Congressional members (Markey, Hall);
- o April 2009 letter from Senator Gillibrand (verbal discussion – no written response); and
- o March and April 2009 letters (four in total) from concerned members of the public.
- On July 13th, NRC regional and headquarters staff briefed Congressman Markey/Hall's staffers regarding the specifics of the IP2 CST pipe leak. In addition, the staff discussed the agencies approach to the inspection and aging management requirements for underground piping.

Release

Inspection Documentation: NRC inspectors completed the following ROP baseline inspections of the CST leak using risk insights:

- IR2009-002: Equipment alignment; maintenance risk; operability; modifications; testing; event follow-up; and
- IR2009-003: PIR sample.

Inspection Conclusions: The inspectors did not identify performance deficiencies surrounding the CST leakage event as documented in IR 2009-002/003. Additionally, the inspectors concluded that Entergy's corrective actions, specific to extent-of-condition planned inspections, appears to be reasonable in scope and pace to ensure that Entergy will have a reasonable assessment of underground piping conditions at the site.

Next Steps: The Branch will continue to maintain a focus on Entergy's underground piping inspections expected to be completed by October 2009 (The SRIs plan to review this activity through a maintenance rule sample inspection). Based on those results, the Branch will continue to consult the appropriate DRS technical expertise to ensure sufficient monitoring of licensee performance. Branch 2 will continue to work with NRR, LR, and Operating Experience to ensure updated information is provided to internal stakeholders. Additionally, the Branch will implement a communications plan for external stakeholders.

Outside of Scope

outside scope

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