# **Official Transcript of Proceedings**

## **NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**

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578th Meeting

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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION'S

ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS

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2	NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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4	578TH MEETING
5	ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS
6	(ACRS)
7	OPEN SESSION
8	+ + + +
9	FRIDAY
10	DECEMBER 3, 2010
11	+ + + +
12	ROCKVILLE, MARYLAND
13	+ + + +
14	The Advisory Committee met at the Nuclear
15	Regulatory Commission, Two White Flint North, Room
16	T2B1, 11545 Rockville Pike, at 8:30 a.m., Said
17	Abdel-Khalik, Chairman, presiding.
18	COMMITTEE MEMBERS:
19	SAID ABDEL-KHALIK, Chairman
20	J. SAM ARMIJO, Vice Chairman
21	JOHN W. STETKAR, Member-at-Large
22	SANJOY BANERJEE, Member
23	DENNIS C. BLEY, Member
24	MARIO V. BONACA, Member
25	CHARLES H. BROWN, JR., Member
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1	MICHAEL L. CORRADINI, Member
2	DANA A. POWERS, Member
3	HAROLD B. RAY, Member
4	JOY REMPE, Member
5	MICHAEL T. RYAN, Member
6	WILLIAM J. SHACK, Member
7	JOHN D. SIEBER, Member
8	DESIGNATED FEDERAL OFFICIAL:
9	DEREK WIDMAYER
10	NRC STAFF PRESENT:
11	VALERIE BARNES, RES/DRA
12	JAMES FIRTH, FSME
13	DIANE SIERACKI, OE
14	DAVE SOLORIO, OE
15	ROY ZIMMERMAN, OE
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### I-N-D-E-X

Introduction, agenda, Chairman Abdel-Khalik 4				
Opening Remarks, Member Bley 5				
Opening Remarks, discussion, led by Mr. Zimmerman. 6				
Briefing by and discussions with NRC representatives				
regarding draft final Commission's Safety Culture				
Policy Statement, Diane Sieracki,				
Committee Discussion				
Adjourn				

8:30 a.m.

### P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

CHAIRMAN ABDEL-KHALIK: The meeting will now come to order. This is the second day of the 578<sup>th</sup> meeting of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. During today's meeting, the Committee will consider the following:

- 1. Safety Culture Policy Statement
- 2. Preparation of ACRS Reports
- 3. Future ACRS Activities/Report of the Planning and Procedures Subcommittee
- 4. Reconciliation of ACRS comments and recommendations.

This meeting is being conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act. Mr. Derek Widmayer is the designated federal official for the initial portion of the meeting.

We have received no written comments or requests for time to make oral statements from members of the public regarding today's sessions there will be a phone bridge line.

Members of the public, Arizona Public Service and Human Performance Analysis Corp. will be listening to the safety culture policy statement

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discussions.

To preclude interruption of the meeting, the phone will be placed in a listen-in mode during the presentations and committee discussions. A transcript of portions of the meeting is being kept and it is requested that the speakers use one of the microphones, identify themselves and speak with sufficient clarity and volume so that they can be readily heard.

We will now proceed to the first item on today's agenda and Dennis Bley will lead us through that.

MEMBER BLEY: Thank you. We are going to hear from staff on the final safety culture policy statement. We had a safety culture subcommittee meeting a little over a year ago that was very tutorial, lots of information from many different sources, and one last month that went into the draft of the policy statement. We didn't get the final policy statement until a couple of weeks ago but it is pretty much in line with what we had seen before.

So at this time I would like to turn it over to staff to -- you have changed places.

MR. ZIMMERMAN: Thank you very much. My name again is Roy Zimmerman. I am the director of the

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NRC's Office of Enforcement and with me at the table are Dave Solorio - he is the branch chief who has the responsibility for the development of the safety culture policy statement -- and Diane Sieracki, who is a senior program manager in the area of safety culture and she will be providing the presentation shortly.

We thank the committee for this opportunity to be able to update you and brief you on the activities that we have under way associated with finalizing the draft safety culture policy statement.

As was just indicated, about a year ago the Subcommittee for Reliability and PRA was briefed by the staff and by external stakeholders on the progress and efforts that were under way associated with safety culture.

And then early last month, the subcommittee was again briefed on the accomplishments of what has occurred over the past year. We think that there's been considerable progress that has been made as we near the finalization of that policy statement.

And you are going to hear about a lot of those accomplishments and status of where we are from Diane shortly.

During that briefing that we had in November with the subcommittee, we benefitted greatly

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from the questions and insights that were brought to us by the subcommittee and we brought a number of those out in the documents themselves and also those insights that we will take with us into the implementation phase, so we thank the subcommittee for the great insights that they provided us at our last session.

Although the office of enforcement has the lead for the development of the safety culture policy statement, this has been very much a collaborative effort within the NRC. There have been over nine NRC offices that have been very actively involved because what we are talking about here is a policy statement that will be overarching for all those that we regulate, so there isn't one particular program office that takes the lead for the individual development of the items.

So with OE in the lead and the support through a Working Group and a steering committee that provided us great guidance, it was a very collaborative effort and very much appreciated. And we have representatives from those office interspersed through the audience today and we are glad that they are with us and for everything they have done to support this activity.

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Similarly we have had a very collaborative working environment with our external stakeholders. The industry again made up of a very large cross-section of the industry that we and agreement states regulate.

The interactions that we have had with our partners via the agreement states and the public themselves have provided us value comments throughout this two-year process and we compliment them for the role that they have played.

They have responded to two Federal Register notices with valuable comments and they have attended a variety of public meetings across the country, including a three-day public workshop. So we felt that the interactions with our stakeholders were very, very positive on this activity.

With regard to safety culture, we continue to view the need for a strong safety culture as a key component to good safety performance among those that we regulate.

In addition to past events that have occurred within our nuclear industry, we are also, as you are, well aware of recent high-profile events outside the nuclear field such as the Gulf Oil spill, the West Virginia coal mining accident and then here

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locally, Metrorail has had some difficulties.

And we continue to look at these to see if they give rise to the potential role that safety culture may have played with regard to these mishaps. The approach that we are using is one of operating experience.

We are intending to continue to look at these events, studies that have been done by other parties, and to draw from them so that we can learn not only from the events that have occurred in the nuclear industry and to share those with our industry and our internal staff.

But we also want to look at those that have occurred outside the nuclear industry where we can learn where safety culture potentially may have been weak and played a role in the event. So that's one of the initiatives we have under way.

At this point I want to get into the bulk of the presentation, so let me introduce our principle presenter this morning --

MEMBER ARMIJO: Excuse me, Mr. Zimmerman.

MR. ZIMMERMAN: Yes. Yes.

MEMBER ARMIJO: Before you go further, I haven't been part of that subcommittee so I just want to get a big picture --

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1	MR. ZIMMERMAN: Sure.
2	MEMBER ARMIJO: of where the safety
3	culture policy is leading. Will it be followed up with
4	regulations and enforcement, you know, you're the
5	Office of
6	MR. ZIMMERMAN: Office of Enforcement
7	MEMBER ARMIJO: you know, what are you
8	going to enforce?
9	MR. ZIMMERMAN: Very good question.
10	MEMBER ARMIJO: And then the other question
11	I had is if and when this policy statement is put in
12	place, what legal effect does it have? For example, if
13	a member of the public wants to intervene in some
14	regulatory matter, can they cite the safety culture as
15	a basis for their intervention, saying well, this
16	applicant or licensee has a poor safety culture based
17	on their personal reading as opposed to the
18	MR. ZIMMERMAN: Right.
19	MEMBER ARMIJO: So I'm just trying to
20	figure out where is this all going to lead?
21	MEMBER BONACA: Relating to this question -
22	_
23	MEMBER ARMIJO: Pardon me, Mario?
24	MEMBER BONACA: Relating to your question I
25	have an additional kind of question. About four years

ago, there was a development of some instructions to the resident inspectors, which they had been given, and they have been giving feedback to us through some visits we had at different regions.

And the guidance to the inspectors was quite effective, it seems to me. And so it would be interesting in the context of the question of Dr. Armijo to understand how that links together with his top-down policy statement.

MR. ZIMMERMAN: Thank you. Good questions. The approach that we are currently on is one of a policy statement that will express the Commission's expectations. It is not a requirement, although we considered whether we should got he requirement route vs. the policy statement and our view is that we feel that there is time, that if we don't receive the type of support that we expect in the embracing of this policy statement by our stakeholders, then we are holding in abeyance the rulemaking aspect.

What we have found over the last couple of years is very positive, a lot of very good, healthy energy from the industry. We have not had to convince the industry that this is an important area that warrants attention. They have put energy into this, they have already started in many, many cases to

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develop their programs and implement their programs.

So what you won't see are violations of this policy statement coming out. We will, again, hold in our hip pocket that if for some reason we are not accomplishing what we expect to accomplish through the policy statement then rulemaking is always another alternative.

But I'm optimistic that through the implementation phase and additional training for some of the licensees that we don't deal with as regularly, we recognize that not all of our different industry groupings if you will are on the same path in terms of how far along they are on this.

Some of the smaller gauge users, to use as an example, compared to the reactors and what they have progressed, they are different, and that's fine. It's a matter of treating each in an appropriate manner for what they need in order to be able to understand. We want them to embrace safety culture and to understand it and not look at this as a flash in the pan, as the hot issue of the week or the in their own words, be able year, and to, articulate important why this is in their organization, whether it's power hospital, gauges in the back of a truck used for

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density gauge measurement with very few people in their company, we want it to be covering all of those.

MEMBER ARMIJO: I appreciate that. The issue on the legal -- what does it mean legally from the standpoint of the public using it or abusing it?

MR. ZIMMERMAN: It's expectations and it will be watched -- what will happen is the lead will transfer to the program offices so for reactors, NRR will pick it up, NMSS will pick up fuel facilities for implementation.

We will go into a support role to be able to aid them in the necessary training and rollout steps necessary for the expectations to be understood through various types of meetings and edition types of documents.

But again, it is a document that does not have the backing of a requirement. It is making clear what the expectations are. We have seen nothing but good faith and high energy from all corners of the industry thus far.

MEMBER SIEBER: Maybe I could add something. The safety culture policy statement really conceptually has two components. One of them is to try to develop a set of behaviors which lead to successful operation of facilities. And that includes leadership

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skills and all of this other thing.

The other one is to -- the other object is to have a number of processes that deal with key elements, for example your work control system and your identification and recording of --

MR. ZIMMERMAN: Right, the traits.

MEMBER SIEBER: the deficiencies, and how they are dealt with, prioritization. You can make rules. In fact the ROP is based on this safety culture policy statement. And you can have rules and to the extent that a lot of enforcement is concerned, it's based on ROP concept. ROP concepts have their origin in safety culture.

But if you were to look at 100 nuclear power plants and as you know, that's about how many there are, power reactors, you will find a distribution of skilled management, and at the very top there are some very successful leaders. The organization is focused on safety productivity, public safety, their own safety, productivity and somewhere in there down the line comes actually making a profit.

And at the other end, you find folks where the organization, on the organization chart is different than the organization that actually exists in the plant. Maybe the union steward is the most

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effective leader in the plant. And people may not have the enthusiasm and 3 the motivation to go into the depth of the detail. That's pretty hard to put into a regulatory sense, 5 except when you measure and the ROP dose that, and I think the focus here is to move policy mostly into the 6 this basis, ROP and regulate on and it's 8 performance-based approach. 9 MEMBER ARMIJO: Well yes, that's kind of 10 the key things I'm looking for. What we are already 11 doing in measuring through the ROP. 12 MR. ZIMMERMAN: And that goes to Mario's 13 question. 14 MEMBER ARMIJO: Yes, quantitative stuff, 15 objective stuff, as opposed to subjective use. MEMBER SIEBER: The Commission's had this 16 17 since `81 basically, or `82 --. 18 MEMBER ARMIJO: Okay. MEMBER SIEBER: and developed it fairly 19 well, but this goes back through centuries. That's why 20 21 people win and lose wars. That's why some cultures are successful and others are not. 22 23 MEMBER BONACA: The reason I asked the 24 question before was because I found that these

procedures, you know, we commented about four years

ago are quite developed and they are very effective in a way and most of all during the meetings we had with regions during summer visits, we had very positive experience from the resident inspectors.

I mean, clearly they embrace those reviews. They understand very clearly what it means repeat events and there is a structure to that.

So, no, I appreciate also the policy statement but is there a gap right now between the development of the policy statement and separately, these guidelines which are already in place? Or are we paying attention to making sure that they have meshed together?

MR. ZIMMERMAN: Yes, I think the safety culture policy statement, when it is finalized, is a good underlying document to support what's being done in the ROP. They won't conflict with each other, and I think that as you indicated, the cross-cutting item in safety culture and the ROP is one that the staff use in a positive way.

The industry has sent signals to the NRC that they would like us to take a couple of steps back and use the self-assessments that they have piloted a few times and allow us to take more of an overview from a little bit of a distance rather than such a

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hands-on approach.

And I want to be careful speaking for NRR who is here in the audience, but as I understand it, NRR is indicating, not right away, this is new, the cross-cutting item is working well just the way it is right now. We applaud you for what you are doing with your own self assessments. Let's get a little run time here and understand once the policy statement is out, some more run time with the safety culture, crosscutting item and then we will see if there's something that we want to engage in dialogue but no promises.

But we don't see anything here that conflicts and we work very closely with NRR to avoid that.

MEMBER CORRADINI: So can I just summarize everything I heard. So one, this is philosophical. Two, the ROP process as is will move forward and it may be potentially noodled with but at this point, at least for reactors, because you made a point of saying there's material facilities or fuel cycle facilities -

MR. ZIMMERMAN: That are not covered by it.

MEMBER CORRADINI: Right, exactly. So I
guess my -- I want to make sure, tog et to Mario's
point, that at least the way the inspectors are doing

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their current work, it is based on a process that is in place and this is a philosophical umbrella to compare and contrast what is being done going forward. Is that a fair statement? MR. ZIMMERMAN: Yes. MEMBER CORRADINI: Okay. MEMBER ARMIJO: Okay thank you. Ι appreciate that. MR. ZIMMERMAN: Okay, а little history on -- I now realize that time is important this morning. Diane has her Masters' management and organizational behavior. She has over 25 years of experience in the nuclear industry, 10 of which are in the safety conscious work environment area. Her most recent position before joining the NRC quite recently, in August, is she was the fleet manager at Dominion with responsibility across the fleet in the employee concerns program. With that, let me turn it over to Diane. MS. SIERACKI: Thank you Roy. Good morning. Good discussion and I may be able to add some points to it as we go along as well.

like to start with just a very quick overview of the

This morning I'd like to talk about -- I'd

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background because I understand that the subcommittee has heard background a year ago and we also had a meeting about a month ago.

But some of you on the full committee, I just want to get you a little bit up to speed and I'll go through it rather quickly.

Outreach activities, as Roy mentioned, that's really the part that has been instrumental in getting us to where we are now, in getting our stakeholders involved and so I'll go through what we have been doing over the past year.

And then wrap up with the final safety culture policy statement and the Commission paper and what you will see there.

Okay, just very quickly, background. This effort started way over two years ago, with a directive by the Commission, basically asking the staff to look at the material areas now, and the agreement states. Look at the reactor process which Mario mentioned and see if that is being effective.

And then what should we do with safety and security? Should we have two policy statements or one? So the staff looked at that, had a workshop in February of `09 and got some stakeholder feedback, and the results of that were a paper that went up to the

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Commission recommending that we do one policy statement.

The ROP was looked at. Their self-assessment process is effective and they look it routinely, and that the Commission paper did include a strategy for including the agreement states and material licensees.

With that, the Commission brought down a directive to go ahead, publish one statement and consider vendors and suppliers when you do so, comport terminology because there's a lot of activity that has been done in the past, John mentioned that, and then engage a broad range of stakeholders.

So what we did is we took the Commission's directive and published that draft policy statement in November of 2009. It was out there for a 120 day comment period.

At the end of that comment period, we received 52 responses, basically wrapped around three themes. Individuals were looking for clarity on policy statement implementation. Here you have the statement, what will we do to implement it? Again along those lines of are you going to enforce this, will there be violations, what will you be doing on implementation.

Feedback was don't include security in the

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safety culture definition or the traits and I'll get into some of that discussion just in a few moments so we'll let that one for now.

Implications of a policy statement versus a regulation. There was some confusion: what does this mean? What's a regulation? Why isn't it a regulation?

So what we did is we had the Working Group and the steering committee that Roy mentioned, made up of our program offices, take a look at these comments and help to bring those to resolution.

What we did is we put the policy statement versus regulation language into a subsequent FRN so that we could basically educate our stakeholders on what the difference was and let them know that in fact we did want to stay with a policy statement now which is not regulations, not enforceable, but as Roy mentioned, we'll see how we do with that, and if we need to get into something further we will later on down the road.

During that time frame that the public comments were coming in, we also had a workshop in February of 2010. It was a three-day workshop. Really that -- the output from that workshop was instrumental in getting us to the final safety culture policy statement and I will get into that in depth a bit

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later in this discussion. I want to stay at the level of outreach activities for now.

Through May and August, we had NRC staff presenting to various conferences and forums, panels et cetera, including a workshop on vendor oversights so that we could bring the vendors and suppliers up to speed, really educating them on what the policy statement was all about and getting feedback.

Again, those were members of the program offices as well as the OE office that went out and did some of that.

We had an additional teleconference, public meeting, with the panelists from the February workshop that I just mentioned, and members of the public in July of 2010.

We went over the results of the public comments, the three that I mentioned, issues about implementation, security and also rulemaking versus policy statement.

We discussed the inclusion of security in the traits and the definition with the workshop panelists and the public at that time, and we continued to receive endorsement for the workshop definition in traits, which I will explain in a few moments.

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The inclusion of security was a point of discussion, both between and among the staff as well as stakeholders. We had feed back that some wanted security in. Some did not. Overwhelmingly, most of the stakeholders did not see it as a term being necessary to be included, and that is because there are other important aspects as well, such as emergency planning and radiation protection and why wouldn't we then call out each of those in the definition or traits.

Certainly security is important, but why would we call it out? So the staff took that and had numerous discussions and it is very important, it's one of our pillars, and we needed to get it involved in some fashion.

So what happened was, with many discussions we came to what is termed a preamble, so we have in the policy statement, I know you have each have a copy of it, we have a definition and then a preamble which basically says what a trait is and then in informs the user that you need to consider security when you are looking at these traits, commensurate with its significance as we move through.

I think it's a good way to kind of help everyone to get where they need to be. We have covered security. We feel comfortable as a staff and the

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stakeholders can buy into that because it is commensurate with the significance and as it affects them in their own regulated community.

Next page. After we wrapped up some of those efforts, staff decided it would be a good idea to once again publish the policy statement in the Federal Register. And so we did that in September for a 30-day comment period.

The reasons behind that were the fact that we had a different definition in traits than we had in the original November `09 FRN and we wanted to actually include the traits within the statement of policy. They have not been included previously, and we wanted to talk about the preamble for security. Also wanted to make it applicable to vendors and suppliers. We included expectations for agreement states. And we asked whether an INPO validation study result should be considered.

Let me talk about these just a little bit, because many of this goes right into the end policy statement.

We included the traits, something that hadn't been done before, and the reason for that is because the traits that were developed at the workshop and that you will see in the final very shortly, are

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very concise and brief and they lend a little more -they take the definition and they give it some more
meat, if you will, and it also meets the Commission's
expectation that we want our regulated communities to
adopt the safety culture policy statement and these
are attributes or traits if you will of traits
themselves on the top.

Lots of different language out there, and one thing that I wanted to mention, on Mario's topic, common language is an issue that we really need to be concerned about because in the components that we have right now in the ROP, we have components and aspects, and out in the nuclear industry, we have principles and attributes.

If you look into the international community, we have characteristics and now we are talking traits. And so there is an effort to get everybody on board, that's why this is a great vehicle to get this out for our material licensees, fuel cycles, in addition to the reactors, so that we are all talking the same language.

And I can say that our reactor community is very on board with this and in fact is planning on changing their principles if we get a directive by the Commission that this is the way to go, change the

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principles to match those traits as we move along so that their documentation on the industry will be the same, with respect to the ROP and how the policy statement might intertwine there.

A possibility would be that the Commission directs that we change some of those components to match the traits and flesh those out with the reactor community so we are talking that common language.

So that was really an effort, that we wanted to make it very clear for our users that this is the definition and these are the traits included in the statement of policy.

Applicability to vendors and suppliers. When we did the initial FRN in November, we had gotten feedback that this should be effective to your vendors and suppliers. Why wouldn't it be, because we are all working in the same arena with nuclear materials et cetera.

The question -- and we always had some comments from our RIC session that we did last March, that it would be a benefit to have vendors and suppliers underneath this umbrella.

The question comes in as to how will you implement that, and that is something that we are going to have to look at as we move into that

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implementation phase. We are aware of that. The program offices are aware of that.

It may be a little easier in some areas than others. One of the things that you can do is you can put contract language into your contract. We did that with the safety conscious work environment policy statement when that was issued.

There's also ways to look at you vendors, if they are supplying safety-related materials or components, we do audits through QA programs right now. We could add these types of things in there, the licensees could.

So there are some things in place already that we could use and we will definitely look at that in the implementation phase.

INPO validation study results. I am not going to get into that in any detail. I just want you to be aware that during this time frame, NEI through the reactor community contracted with INPO to conduct a validation study based on the traits that you see in the policy statement.

And what they did is they had a survey and they have sent that out to the reactor community, gathered all of that data and did some analysis and the results of that pretty much confirmed that the

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traits that we have come up with are the right traits. There are some groups that are a little bit different, but essentially they support the traits as we see them.

Okay, next page. The September FRN public comments out of that, we had 23 responses, basically two themes. Our regulated community wanted us to make a distinction between licensees and the policy and give them credit for what they have already done.

The reactor community as you know has come a long way but the hospitals and fuel cycle facilities, even new construction, they've already begun some of this process, and what they don't want is for us to have a policy statement that would essentially ask them to take out everything that they have done so far and start over.

So this will be building on what they have already -- what they already have out there, and we have words to that effect in the policy statement.

Stakeholders also requested continued involvement. That was almost unanimously. They really want to be involved. We've had them involved a lot up to this point in the development phase and they absolutely want to be involved in the implementation phase and that is the plan. The program offices will

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be working with their constituents as they move forward.

During this time frame we also had one final public meeting, a one-day meeting held out west on September 28. It was an opportunity for us to have some of our stakeholders present their thoughts and ideas on where we are at right now, and we also had a presentation done on those validation study results that I spoke about so that we could give that information to our stakeholders and they had it when they provided their final comments.

Now I want to get into what I am going to call the real meat of this. The February workshop, the three-day workshop.

It was a panel of 16 stakeholders from various affiliations. You can see some of them there. The agreement states were there. We had medical facilities, fuel cycle facilities, gauge manufacturers, NDE folks, reactor folks et cetera. There were 16 people and also an audience of participants.

Those panelists worked together in breakout sessions with the other attendees and reached alignment on a definition and eight traits of a positive safety culture. And those definitions and

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traits will help us to come to a common terminology as I mentioned previously.

Next slide. I'm going to get into how that was done. This is the definition that came out of the efforts of the workshop and if we think back to the November `09, the first draft, safety culture policy statement, that definition was crafted by the NRC and did looked international what we was we at organizations, domestic organizations, basically did some benchmarking and we ended up with the IAEA INSAG definition and made some changes to it.

So the panel took that definition. They took what IAEA has. They took what is in the components and aspects for the ROP, looked at INPO's principles and attributes, looked at some of the theory that's out there, Dr. Shein et cetera, and we have presentations by others who had definitions and so on.

So we did take an opportunity to comport terminology and came up with this definition. It has stood the test of time, throughout all of the public comment periods, outreach activities that we did to gain feedback from others as we took this out at conferences et cetera, and it has been the definition that we have in the final statement of policy and it

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is nuclear safety culture, core values and behaviors resulting from a collective commitment by leaders and individuals to emphasize safety over competing goals, to ensure protection of people and the environment.

Next page. The traits that I mentioned. You'll see there are nine there, and there's a reason for that, I'll get into it.

The first eight were developed by the workshop and how was that done? Those 16 stakeholders, we went through -- I was actually a panel member on behalf of Dominion at the time, and what we did is we took -- we did a sticky exercise and that means we just brainstormed, what does safety culture look like? What does that mean to me? -- wrote it down on stickies and put it up on a board.

And then what we did is we -- very scientific -- we binned these into what looked like this looks like it belongs together, when we talked about corrective action program processes that you can trend issues and bring things up.

So we put all of those up on the board, put them together in what we will call bins, and then we gave descriptions to those bins, which is really the traits.

So it wasn't very scientific, but what it

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brought to the table was the thoughts for all of these different regulated entities and what does this look like in my environment and my community, and keeping in mind that we also had principles and components and characteristics out there for us to look at. And if you were to look at those other documents you'd see that some of these are almost word for word from those other -- using that same terminology. So those --MEMBER CORRADINI: Can I ask a question about that? MS. SIERACKI: Yes. MEMBER CORRADINI: So you as Dominion, if you were to look at those, what was missing at Dominion at the time you developed these nine? MS. SIERACKI: We were using as most of the reactor community the principles, the INPO principles. MEMBER CORRADINI: Which means --MS. SIERACKI: What was missing there was safety conscious work environment. There wasn't a strong -- they had trust permeates the organization and that's Environment for Raising Concerns on this list. MEMBER CORRADINI: Okay. SIERACKI: Of course as a reactor MS.

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community, we also were in line with the components as you do root causes et cetera, because that's under the ROP. So we are very familiar with both sides, but really it was an exercise in just, what does it look like as a worker in the plant? What does this look like for safety culture.

MEMBER BLEY: Mike, at the Subcommittee they laid out these different definitions and how they realigned so they were pretty complete except for one or two exceptions.

MS. SIERACKI: And they really do correlate very closely to the language that is already out there. So essentially we ended up with these eight traits. I am going to talk about Questioning Attitude just for a moment, how that ended up on there.

The workshop came up with these traits and then the Working Group and the steering committee, which we have been talking about, took a look at those, just changed the language, tweaked it a bit, did not make any substantive changes, and I'll give you an example.

When the workshop put together the traits, for leadership they had leadership safety behaviors as the title and the staff changed that to Leadership Safety Values and Actions, just to provide a little

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bit more clarity, so they changed it somewhat from the workshop.

Questioning Attitude was added. Based on the validation study that we talked about just very briefly from INPO, and also because we have been thinking about complacency, with the Davis-Besse incident et cetera, and that's an area that we thought we want to put a little emphasis on in the policy statement and Questioning Attitude is an area where you can talk about complacency.

MEMBER BROWN: Isn't that similar to Environment for Raising Concerns, though? I mean, they're kind of coupled together --

MS. SIERACKI: It is.

MEMBER BROWN: Some of it looks a little bit duplicative.

MS. SIERACKI: And that's why you didn't see it from the workshop members, because they thought of Questioning Attitude as a part of raising concerns and as a part of Leadership Safety Values. It should be a part of Problem Identification and Resolution and so they embedded Questioning Attitude.

And that's why really our stakeholders are not having a problem with adding another one in Questioning Attitude, because if is very important.

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The staff -- we felt that it's important enough to bring it out and call it out because it addresses complacency.

Now, as we go through this process, you will see the next tier which affects implementation, and it might make a little bit more sense on how the different regulated communities are going to take this into the next level, which is implementation.

MR. ZIMMERMAN: I look at it a little bit differently, that the Environment for Raising Concerns can be a top-down, from the leadership in terms of what kind of chemistry do they put -- what's the personality they're putting into that organization? Is it one that chills, I told you what to do so just go do it, don't ask a lot of questions?

What are they putting out and permeating out there as the environment that these people have to work in? The Questioning Attitude in my mind is a much more individualistic item, that we want individuals to not get complacent, that -- I'm not sure if this is right or wrong, but it was here yesterday and it was here the day before that, so it must be okay so I'm just going to walk right past it, rather than wondering, I'm not sure it was there a month ago, something seems to have changed. I ought to pursue

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this or have somebody pursue it and write it up.

So I see a little bit of a difference in - and these can be interpreted slightly different by
different organizations and you know our goal is, when
they use these overarching umbrella items, variable to
make these their own, as they tier them down one more
level for their own use. The next level down will be
different for the reactor compared to the hospital.
They will have different items and branch out.

A key that I spoke about with the subcommittee that I think is very important is that these can't just be words on a page. The managers have to be and the staff have to be able to read this and understand it and believe it and take it on board and not view this as a flash in a pan and this thing's going to be gone in a month.

They need to be able to relate to this and buy into this process. And the way to buy into it is the way Diane said, is they've had a chance to work with a clean sheet of paper to help build this themselves and when we went into it we were a little concerned that the power reactor community that has been involved in this longer, could potentially lead this discussion, but the other licensees and certificate holders really held their own with the

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38 power reactor community, and went toe to toe with them, to be able to make sure they came up with a list that they all felt very comfortable with. It was encouraging to watch the way they worked this out. MEMBER BONACA: Now some of these traits are much more powerful than others, it seems to me, so far as action. For example, Environment for Raising and the opposite which is discouraging Concerns raising concerns is against the law, so you really -this is not a trait alone. It just is close to an area where there is legal requirements. Personal -- Work Processes I think is more general. I don't know if there is a distinction there that one could make. I'm just looking at some of them, I mean, I'm not saying they're inappropriate, some of them are more effective and powerful than others. MEMBER CORRADINI: Some are subservient to others. That's your point too. MEMBER BONACA: Yes.

MR. ZIMMERMAN: We have more --

MS. SIERACKI: Yes. And I do want to just address that just briefly. One thing to add to the Questioning Attitude which Roy had mentioned. One other thing that makes that a little bit unique is the

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fact that in Environment for Raising Concerns, the individual has to have a Questioning Attitude and you have to have support from them. So it really is both top and from the bottom up.

Questioning Attitude also would be encouragement of what is new out there? I mean, not just am I questioning what we have always done, but what about creativity? What about is there a better way of doing it? And so that's part of that questioning attitude too so it is a little bit broader than what the workshop had looked at inside some of the other traits.

And then to address Mario's point, these are not prioritized and so it isn't a list of first, second, third, fourth. Some do carry more weight and I think you will see that and there are a couple of more slides for me to explain the way we are doing this, but you will see that in the implementation phase, as to which ones become more important and which ones are less important, depending on the regulated community that is looking at them.

The one thing I do want to point out, leadership is the first trait here and that was done by the staff and it was based on input that we received from public comments in both of the public

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comment periods as well as other information that we have gotten from stakeholders that leaders walk the talk and it is the most important trait. And so we did move that up to the top, but otherwise there isn't a priority in the mix. MR. SOLORIO: Dr. Brown, I'd just like to add --8 MEMBER BROWN: I'm Mr. Brown. 9 MR. SOLORIO: Okay, Mr. Brown --10 MEMBER BROWN: I'd like the degree, but I'd 11 have to work for it. That's beyond me. 12 MR. SOLORIO: With respect to Questioning 13 Attitude, a theme from the public was --14 MEMBER BROWN: Oh, I'm not questioning that 15 MR. SOLORIO: complacency, and when I look 16 17 at what INPO said for their validation, they also said 18 Questioning Attitude is something that we think is 19 important in the reactor industry, and it's 20 interesting to me that you had two different, you 21 might say, segments come up with a general conclusion 22 that complacency was an issue that we needed to 23 address and to me it made a lot of sense to add it as 24 another trait.

MEMBER BROWN:

Oh,

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I'm not questioning

that. From the -- I'm trying to look at your list. The longer a list of culture items, the less people will have any idea of what you are talking about. This has got nine items on it. And if I --

MS. SIERACKI: Let me --

MEMBER BROWN: Let me finish my point and then you can shoot me down, okay?

(Laughter.)

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MEMBER BROWN: I mean, when I look at the list, work through Work Processes, Continuous I Learning, Problem Identification and Resolution, Effective Safety Communication, those items, Respectful Work Environment, take those, those are execution type, you know, items as opposed to Questioning Attitude, Environment for Raising Concerns, Personal Accountability and Safety Value -- now I would have -- personal opinion. From my background I would reduced those are the culture issues, the other ones are --

MEMBER RYAN: Programmatic.

MEMBER BROWN: -- programmatic type issues on execution. So -- and that's just -- I was in the naval nuclear program for 35 years and we didn't have a policy statement.

MEMBER CORRADINI: You had an admiral,

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(Laughter.)

MEMBER BLEY: You had a respectful environment.

MEMBER BROWN: Well, I wouldn't call -yes, respectful work environment you could --

It was respectful in a way that most people wouldn't have understood, back in the `50s, `60s, `70s and early `80s. But, so, I think you said it, the comment, I think, was that you Mike?

MEMBER RYAN: Yes.

MEMBER BROWN: Those are programmatic issues whereas the cultural aspects are the items — at least those are the items I would have focused on in this. I don't have any problem with them, but I would have had a sort of — here's the big overarching items. Here's things necessary to execute those. How do you — I mean, an Effective Safety Communication, what do I mean by that?

Do I speak nicely and carry a big stick or -- well yes, we used to yell at people. The other point is, when you look at some of those items, they become involved with metrics. And as soon as you lay metrics into a culture issue, you -- it has become bean-counting. It's not a -- I mean, how many meetings

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and how many training sessions do I have to have to teach people about safety culture, or whatever those -

So all I am trying to do is characterize. I have no problem. Don't think we have a problem. People will have to address this obviously. It's just that the more stuff to reemphasize, the more stuff you put in this long list, the less the key items, in my personal opinion, get the focus.

I mean, I thought it was great you added the Questioning Attitude onto it, I thought that was the right way to go, so I would have picked four of them, put the other ones down into the programmatic issues, and say well here's the big things, here's how you help execute those.

MEMBER RYAN: Charlie, I don't -- I am sympathetic to your point but I think if you pick one that's kind of in the middle, Problem Identification and Resolution, to me to identify a problem is in its start a cultural issue. Can I do that without getting my head pounded?

MEMBER BROWN: Environment for Raising Concerns picks that up.

MEMBER RYAN: Yes, but you know, the rubber meets the road on how does this work. And then the

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resolution process typically has some technical review aspects and management assessment and financial assessment and all that to prioritize whatever comes out of that resolution process.

So I struggle a little bit with how do you

So I struggle a little bit with how do you separate one from the other so much, because I think they really overlap quite a bit.

MS. SIERACKI: Well, and I can --

MEMBER RYAN: I hear your point but it's hard to put them in two boxes and say everything is in its right box now.

MS. SIERACKI: And you're probably correct that you could have taken those four and put the other ones underneath it in the implementation phase, which is where we are going next.

But the team, the members that put this together and again, from all of those other regulated communities felt that these were very important to call out.

And it's not just a matter of having the program, and there are a couple of words that we attached. I'll just give you the problem identification resolution.

"The organization ensures that issues potentially impacting safety or security are properly

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identified, fully evaluated and promptly addressed and corrected, commensurate with their significance."

So it's not just having the program, it's really being effective, it's people using the program.

You're going to see that flashed up.

I'm going to give you an example of leadership in just a minute, on the types of things that, were in that sticky exercise if you will, to flesh that out. It'll give you an idea of the thought process that the team went through when the picked these.

But bottom line is each of those members of that panel felt that every one of these were important enough and had enough underneath them to call it a trait, to rise to that level.

And again, these -- oh, I'm sorry. They are not made for inspection. That I can tell you. We did not think of them from the thought of, gee, what can they inspect, was not on the table. Yes.

MEMBER ARMIJO: I have a question about Work Processes, why that would be a safety culture trait.

Are we talking about effectiveness of work processes or work processes focused on safety or -- to me that's a routine, operational issue and I don't understand

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1	what it has to do with a safety culture trait.
2	MS. SIERACKI: Well if you think of, even -
3	_
4	MEMBER ARMIJO: I understand, and I'm with
5	Charlie on this thing, the key ones are Leadership
6	Safety Values and Actions, Personal Accountability,
7	Questioning Attitude, Environment for Raising
8	Concerns. Those to me are the kinds of things that I
9	could sit back and say that's safety culture.
10	The rest of this stuff looks like it's
11	routine stuff. Maybe I'm from the reactor
12	MEMBER BLEY: I think the problem is the
13	routine hasn't always been there to support a safety
14	culture and that's why they're
15	MEMBER ARMIJO: If you have those other
16	things
17	MEMBER SIEBER: The routine is a trap. It
18	really is. Once you think it's routine
19	MEMBER ARMIJO: That's why I don't want it
20	to be in there.
21	MEMBER SIEBER: then nothing improves.
22	MEMBER ARMIJO: Okay, never mind, I'm not
23	going to I wasn't on your Committee but go ahead.
24	MEMBER BLEY: I'd like you to think about -
25	- you've got 10 more slides and you need to get

through them. But as you go through the rest, we are moving toward the implementation, if you could attach rough dates to when you think things are supposed to happen, that would be helpful.

MS. SIERACKI: Okay I will do that.

MR. SOLORIO: Just a reminder, for Dr. --

MEMBER ARMIJO: Armijo.

MR. SOLORIO: Armijo. This was meant to apply to all licensees, so in the material side of the house, things that you might think are normal on the reactor side of the house, were things that they started thinking about, but we need to have more work processes for what we do.

So it's applying to a much wider spectrum.

MEMBER BLEY: There's one thing I'd like to toss in. I think some of this might have to do with what you do in the implementation phase, how you distribute these ideas to organizations and the like.

MS. SIERACKI: Exactly.

MEMBER RYAN: I want to add maybe a second question on to Dennis's too. I think that there's a division within the non-reactor area of licenses, of broad scope and specific licenses in terms of this word processes. As a broad scope licensee, we had a very formal process a lot like a reactor to develop

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procedures, review them technically, get them approved, implement them, change control, all that kind of stuff.

So there is a group of non-reactor licensees that are broad scope licensees that have a program that looks an awful lot like a reactor, though maybe not as complicated. So I think there is a division.

MS. SIERACKI: Okay, let's move on. This is just a visual on how this was put together. Safety culture definition at the top, the nine traits now that flesh out from a very high level perspective, what t definition is, and the application is really tier 3. You have heard us maybe say that term today. steps And it really is the which is next implementation.

In tier 3, the stakeholders will be involved with the program offices and work out what dose this really mean for a fuel cycle facility, for a gauge manufacturer, for NEA people. What does this really mean? And that's going to happen in the implementation phase.

The next slide will give you an idea of what that looks like. This is a tier 3 exercise. There were probably 30 others. I'm just giving you a couple

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of points that came up that put us into that bin of Leadership Safety Values and Behaviors.

Management is out in the field. They resolve conflict. Rewards and sanctions are used to reinforce desired positive safety behaviors. Actions match words, in other words, walk the talk. Schedules are realistic and do not challenge safety standards.

So these are the types of things that will happen in the implementation phase that are tier 3 topics that will flesh out what that trait means in each of these organizations.

MEMBER BROWN: Excuse me, you're going to have procedures and descriptions?

MS. SIERACKI: No.

MEMBER BROWN: That's that sounded -- you said tier -- I was looking at your previous slide, under application, and it says, "Illustrates high level descriptions are translated to lower level descriptions. Describes programs, processes, procedures, practices, behaviors." I mean, it's almost like you have a handbook.

MS. SIERACKI: No, it's not --

MEMBER BROWN: No, not wait, you are expecting the licensees, excuse me, I guess I'm trying to get it in perspective as to what you expect to see

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from them when you do look at it and I'm not talking about an enforcement regimen. That's not -- but the expectations of what you would expect to see from the licensees.

MR. ZIMMERMAN: The industry wants this. This is their chance to tailor the umbrella that applies to everybody to their organizations. In the hospitals, we are looking at patient safety first, is one of the types of items that they are going to bring out, that the power reactor community likely will not be bringing out.

So, they want their chance to be able to tailor, customize safety culture for their organization, because they are going to stand up in front of their people and explain safety culture to them for our organization, for our hospital and they are going to go through the items that they pick to try to bring it home for them.

And they need to bring it home for them. There's got to be a little bit of emotion in the room when they are talking. Otherwise it's just another management meeting and this will go by the wayside. So they have really got to get it ingrained.

That's the reason why they played such a large role in building it from the bottom up, and

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that's why tier 3 is extremely important, so they have free hand to be able to build what they feel is the necessary customization for their organization. And I think they are very much looking forward to this opportunity. They don't view this as a work product, but as the way they communicate with their staff on a regular basis.

MS. SIERACKI: And it may be that they will do some training for their staff after they put this together. It may be that they will put together a procedure to potentially have a -- not a corrective action program but something along those lines.

So it may be that they will do that. Will we require any of that? This is a policy statement at this point.

MEMBER CORRADINI: So can I say it a different way again? So this is a philosophical umbrella, once the umbrella has developed, if the expectation is that any licensee will look at their current procedures and practices, reflect on the philosophy and see that there is some alignment. But something may change, nothing may change.

MS. SIERACKI: I'm going to guess --

MR. ZIMMERMAN: It's possible.

MEMBER CORRADINI: I mean, the range of

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possibilities are that.

MR. ZIMMERMAN: But they need to have that opportunity to say okay, we are overarching, we are underneath there with the reactors, with the non-power reactors, with the gauge users, the industrial user, we are in there with everybody, with this overarching trait level.

Now what do we want to do differently to bring it home for our staff so we don't lose them?

MEMBER CORRADINI: Okay. Because the reason I am asking the question so directly is I am a chair of a department that has a reactor that is a non-power reactor that is regulated by the NRC. I do not this to change what is a good practice in my current environment with my reactor operators, my reactor director and assistant directors.

So I have a stake in it. Maybe that's a conflict of interests. So I'm listening to this to make sure that I don't make it worse but actually potentially make it better.

MR. ZIMMERMAN: That would be the goal, to make it better.

MR. SOLORIO: I would just add, the framework we set up is to allow the licensees to show us how what they are already doing might mesh with

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what the high-level expectations on the traits are.

The medical community in their public comments, or maybe it was the veterans administration, said look, we are already doing a lot of what you are asking for in these high-level traits. We think we have it, and we set it up so they can show us.

MEMBER RYAN: Sorry I was just going to say, there's another dimension to this I don't think you have specifically touched on, although in a way you have, and whoever wants to answer it is fine by me. But the action in terms of numbers of licensees is not NRC. It's the agreement states.

So you have got the Organization of Agreement States, the CRCPD and all that and I'm sure you've been in contact with those folks. What is their reaction, you know, and this is a community where cost drives a lot of their thinking on some of these things. I'm sure you've heard that comment. Any thoughts for our summary of what the agreement state licensees think about all this?

MS. SIERACKI: We did -- and James -- I'm going to have James answer this. He is actually -- we actually had someone from the agreement states speak to the subcommittee. They were at the table at the meeting in February and they have supported the

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definition in traits and I'm going to let James just speak on that a bit, on what their thoughts are going forward. James?

MR. FIRTH: Yes, James Firth, NRC staff.

I'll take it on a couple of levels. First, the question on resources. Right now a lot of the states are suffering a lot economically, so they are concerned about this being regulations which would then require them to make drastic changes.

The states also feel that what they are doing is consistent largely with the policy statement, that in some respects focusing on things that are not specifically violations is going back to previous practices where they could use more information more holistically to see where the licensees are running into problems and address those earlier.

MEMBER RYAN: Leading indicators --

MR. FIRTH: To some extent and by having the common language, by having the policy statement, it gives an opportunity for, whether it's NRC or the agreement states, to work with our licensees or their licensees on trying to address things early, having a common language that rather than having a licensee fall short and having weaknesses in a number of these areas grow and magnify over time where it really

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becomes a problem to correct that in the organization, if things are seen earlier from an outside perspective, it gives an opportunity for earlier correction.

It may not be a leading indicator per se but it still allows for early correction where weaknesses are developing. But generally the agreement states are supportive of a policy statement and increased focus on safety culture.

And you still have, as with any diverse set of states, there's going to be some different perspectives in terms of just how valuable they see that versus their concerns about other things.

We also have an IMPEP program which looks at how the states are doing it, and they feel, we have had a number of comments from the states saying the process is working, it's already embedded in that, so we should continue to do that.

And when you look at the regulations on the material side as well as I think you have on the reactor side, that some of the elements of safety culture are either implicit or explicit in the regulations.

So even though this is a policy statement, there

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is, on some of these, a regulatory foundation in the regulations. So we wouldn't be deciding on violations on the policy statement, but there may be some things that correlate to specific requirements that are already in place.

MEMBER RYAN: Has the Organization of Agreement States and the Conference on Radiation Control Program Directors taken an active interest in the program?

MR. FIRTH: Yes, they have. And --

MEMBER RYAN: They will really be kind of the focus for the state agency folks.

MR. FIRTH: Yes, and we have been -- all along the way we have been talking with both organizations as well as all of the states. We have periodic teleconferences with them. We have had someone from the Organization of Agreement States participate in a number of these workshops.

The February 2010 workshop, they have decided that they wanted to take more of a facilitative role similar to NRC, because they want to allow the licensees and the other stakeholders to really work on developing a language. They didn't want to intrude as much in the process.

But they have been supportive of the whole

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57 process. In the most recent Organization of Agreement States meeting, there was a session on safety culture and that included presentations by both NRC as well as someone from the Organization of Agreement States and then we had a discussion among the states. MEMBER Dow did you handle RYAN: why is this different question, than the IMPEP program? MR. FIRTH: Well, it's -- I mean, there's -MEMBER RYAN: I mean, I can where they are aligned in my own mind, but. MR. FIRTH: In terms of implementation, we want to see how things develop in the policy statement we have to do the more strategic look in terms of what .changes we want to make in our program, whether it be in terms of -- whether there's changes

inspection frequency, with how communicate we licensees. But we have not made any changes to the IMPEP program at this time.

MEMBER RYAN: So you're really kind of waiting to see how you will float and I put it in quotes "inspect" the safety culture aspects of a program, or --?

MR. FIRTH: There was like region three has

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tried to put increased emphasis on safety culture and they identified a couple of licensees that had numerous problems and so as part of the problem identification resolution process, they focus on was the licensee getting to safety culture as a route cause?

So they used some of the inspection procedures that were developed for reactors in terms of the questions that are used. So they used that to help them put a little more attention on safety culture in those cases. So there were a couple of cases where they have done that. But we haven't done anything across the board on the materials stuff.

DDS. I'd just add for region three they are doing that somewhat as a pilot I think.

MEMBER RYAN: Well, that's good. And I guess the last thought I have in my head is in the larger agreement state licensees I can see where it would have a lot of utility and be a good element.

But somewhere, maybe after the hospital group, somewhere down the line, you've got small users. They've got gauges, instruments, articles, very small licenses that don't have a lot of material.

Is there a cutoff for having to deal with the large body in terms of just sheer numbers of

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licensees that really don't need the full Monty?

MR. FIRTH: Yes, and we have thought about that some. We still have to again make some of the decisions but I mean there's one element that's in terms of, what is the risk that is associated with their activities?

MEMBER RAY: There you go, so it's a risk-based --

MR. FIRTH: You also have in terms of what are the number of licensees, what's the complexity. The approach we are taking at this point is that there are some licensees that it may make sense just the education and awareness will get us the best benefit from the policy statement, that we don't necessarily need to make the changes in any of our routine interactions with the licensees, butt we may keep bringing it to their attention, mention along the way.

And we have already made a lot of strides in terms of getting word out to agreement state licensees as well as NRC materials licensees, about the development of the policy statement and the importance of safety culture.

So the awareness is the first step. And it may be that that in some cases is as far as we go. In others we might want to make more specific and

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structural changes in what we want to do.

MEMBER RYAN: Sounds reasonable, I mean it's a graded approach, is really what it boils down to.

MR. FIRTH: Yes.

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MEMBER RYAN: Thank you. That's great. Thank you very much.

MS. SIERACKI: Okay. If you go to the next slide. And we had some of this discussion already, why these traits? We did benchmark domestic, international, terminology and standards as I mentioned before --

MEMBER POWERS: Can I ask you a question about this benchmarking?

MS. SIERACKI: Pardon me?

MEMBER POWERS: Something just bothers me about these traits that I don't understand. They seem to be the product of leaving some sticky notes on boards and things like that. Do we in fact know that an organization say with a well developed sense of personal accountability is in fact safer than an organization with a well developed sense of group accountability or some -- whatever the alternative to personal accountability is. Do we know that, or is that just a product of a bunch of people getting

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together and putting sticky notes on a board?

MR. SOLORIO: I guess I would start to answer that by saying just like I guess in the case of PRA, you know expert elicitation panels are used to try to come up with what people think are the appropriate things to focus on.

In this case, we started with somewhat of a literature search in terms of what is out there right now, as you heard the Dr. -- also referring to scholars like Dr. Shein and what they think is important.

And we asked this group of individuals who were representing their areas, most of them were in leadership positions so they already had a very high understanding of what's important for making an organization safe, to reflect on a lot of this current literature in this area.

So while it was described as sticky notes,

I think the actual term is called mind mapping. It's a

strategic planning type of approach that's used and we

asked them to come up with this.

MEMBER POWERS: What I'm really hitting on is okay, you got these experts in there, I mean, they are experts because they write papers in journals or something like that. Do they write it based on

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anything quantitative, measured? I mean, I had no idea what the exact office at the personal accountability is but I will say okay, maybe it's group accountability.

Has anybody ever tried to measure and say, yes, we'll develop personal accountability, it's much better than having group accountability.

Okay? And is there anything quantitative on that or is that just people's imagination and thought?

MEMBER BLEY: I think it is right -- I think the other side of it is there in incidents and reviews of incidents you can find cases where you can cite the lack of these as contributors to the -- but I don't think what you are looking for sits there anywhere.

MEMBER POWERS: What I have observed, Dennis, is that any time we have an event at a plant, we send some of our expert and safety culture up there and they'll come back and say yes, verily, this organization had a bad safety culture.

I have never seen us send somebody off to a plant that did not have an event and come back and say ah, this place has a good safety culture or a bad safety culture or anything like that. It's always

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after-the-fact demonstrations.

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MEMBER BLEY: Would you like to --

DR. BARNES: Yes, the mic is back here.

MEMBER BLEY: Yes, use the mic, announce yourself and help us out.

MEMBER ARMIJO: You can just lower that mic a little bit so you can speak into it.

DR. BARNES: I'm not quite sure how to -- is it working?

MEMBER BLEY: Yes, you're on.

DR. BARNES: Okay. I'm Val Barnes with the Office of Research and I wanted to specifically address that comment about whether there has been research done, quantitative research and the words that behavioral scientists use to describe what you are asking is do we have any evidence that safety culture or these concepts can provide us with predictive validity in terms of different measures of either organizational performance or work unit performance so on and so forth.

And actually there is a very large body of research that is being conducted in a lot of different industries and environments. Of course the measures of what constitutes safety performance vary by industry and setting, but the literature is demonstrating that

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yes, the measures of safety culture are associated with variability in safety performance however that is defined.

And then I'm here speaking on behalf of the work that INPO did but I'm very familiar with it in terms of their validation study because we were requested by OE to independently evaluate how INPO conducted their study.

And the INPO results as well as the independent verification and analyses that the NRC staff did as part of that study didn't provide us with results that support predictive validity of measures of safety culture in terms of predicting reactor performance under the ROP, because we didn't have time to -- it takes time to look into the future and see how measures at one point in time predict outcomes down the road.

But what we did find was that employee, personnel attitudes at different sites and INPO collected data from every site in the U.S. except for two, were associated with differences in performance on a variety of INPO performance indicators as well as NRC performance indicators.

So this is a very long-winded answer to your question but yes, there has been quantitative

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research done in a variety of settings as well as recently here in the reactor world and it's all very interesting and suggests that safety culture is related fairly strongly in social science terms to safety performance in different organizations.

MEMBER POWERS: If we have that quantitative information then why are we relying on expert opinion solicitations?

MS. SIERACKI: I'm going to give you my response to that. This is a policy statement and not regulation and what we are looking for here is to get some of these organizations that haven't begun the process of looking at safety culture from that aspect, from -- this is safety culture and this is what it means -- to move into that arena and start to develop that safety culture in the organization.

So these stakeholders have said this is what it means to us, looking at other groups of characteristics and so on that have been vetted through some of the theory that Val has talked about and I think it is interesting to note that these particular traits were used in that validation study and they do -- the results of that validation study do support these traits as, through the study, that they are good and they are valid.

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66 MEMBER BLEY: Let me relate something to from the subcommittee. I'm sorry you weren't started But two things. They with qualitative approach and did this validation study. On the other hand, as we tried to dig into the detail of the validation study, the details were not available. When Val says in social science terms there's strong correlation, the playing of the results of their factor analysis against some set of which we didn't see, of plant history data from a number of

of their factor analysis against some set of which we didn't see, of plant history data from a number of plants, comes up with correlations on the order of 0.2 to 0.4, which the social scientists tell us they find very strong correlation and in my world I find it fairly weak.

MEMBER POWERS: That's no correlation whatsoever.

MEMBER BLEY: That's the way I find it. We asked to see the studies. Because of some restrictions that I'm not fully cognizant of, we haven't been able to see them.

MEMBER CORRADINI: You couldn't see this quantitative study?

MEMBER BLEY: They didn't bring them and when I asked to have them provided, we were eventually told no, they couldn't be provided to us, so there's a

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bit of a gap there, so we don't -- as the chairman of that subcommittee, my confidence in those results is -

MEMBER POWERS: Is now evaporated.

MEMBER BLEY: is certainly not so strong in the sense I haven't seen the details. But that's basically what they showed us, was those kinds of results.

MR. ZIMMERMAN: I think there may have been proprietary aspects that came into play that precluded them from sharing as much as they would have liked to.

MEMBER POWERS: I wonder then as to how you persuade someone to adopt what you purport to be successful behavior without a -- there's no evidence that says I have -- I probably can't have all these traits, I can probably have some subset of these traits, then I might be a safer organization than if I don't have these traits.

I mean, why would I do that? I would look at this and say I'm not ready to change anything.

MEMBER BROWN: Well if you go back to the previous slide, you flip it back, there's one line that says that rewards and incentives and sanctions are used to reinforce desired positive nuclear safety behaviors.

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68 You might take a look at that and say what does that mean. Don't go to sleep on watch and you'll get a candy bar? I'm being a little facetious with that. MEMBER POWERS: But it's a legitimate question to ask. MEMBER BROWN: The thought process is how in the world do you reward or sanction people to have the desired thought process --MEMBER ARMIJO: Well, you can fire people. MEMBER BROWN: That's what we used to do. It'd be really great if we didn't get fired. MEMBER ARMIJO: I don't want to counsel them, I want them out the door. I think these are great, okay? I think these are great where you look at the leadership of an organization and if you have that

MEMBER ARMIJO: I don't want to counsel them, I want them out the door. I think these are great, okay? I think these are great where you look at the leadership of an organization and if you have that kind of leadership, then I'm starting to feel much better about that organization, I think they are — the safety culture traits you could take off the safety and put quality culture, running a factory, it's the same things to turn out a quality product.

So these are kind of soft things, kind of hard to quantify but I think they're valuable.

MEMBER REMPE: How come you don't have leadership accountability? They have personal

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accountability and group accountability but leadership accountability.

MS. SIERACKI: It probably was on the list. Like I said there were several. I can answer that in a moment.

MR. SOLORIO: Mr. Brown while she is doing that I just want to point out the question that you had about rewards and incentives. That was actually a remark that we received from a subcommittee that remember that when you are -- when a licensee is trying to encourage high capacity factor at a reactor site, there's a negative consequence to that, which might be that people would put that over safety.

So the message we got and we are taking to heart is -- provides some guidance, some clarity around you can't use rewards to the detriment of safety and that's why we were highlighting that.

MEMBER BLEY: I would like to make one comment. After I told you the problems we had trying to figure out the basis of the analysis, after lots of time studying lots of incidents in nuclear and other places, the items on this list, or many of them, often crop up as underlying causes or driving forces so my personal opinion is it's a pretty good darned list.

MR. ZIMMERMAN: I think it was put together

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by individuals that have of many, many years experience in various aspects of the industry. Whether we are dead on or not, maybe there is one that needs to be tweaked, maybe there's ones that is missing, maybe there is one that will get replaced. But we think we have a very good starting spot and as I mentioned earlier, we are going to be doing case studies to be looking at instances where problems and if there's a need to refine this list then we will consider that.

MEMBER POWERS: Roy, of the bia one problems with your database is that you are drawing these always from root cause analysis of incidents that occurred, by and large, and what you are not doing is going to plants or the institution or the facility that has not had an incident and seeing ah, do these guys have these characteristics or do we have the Sam Armijo school of thought, where they don't respect other people's opinion, they resolve conflicts by firing people and --

MEMBER ARMIJO: I didn't say -(Simultaneous speakers.)

MEMBER POWERS: Or whatever else it is that you do.

MEMBER ARMIJO: I didn't say we don't

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resolve conflicts, we do not tolerate people who are causing safety problems in the shop.

MEMBER POWERS: Well, my point is that if you don't have a database, if a plant doesn't have an incident, you guys don't look, and so you don't know that in fact they may violate every single one of these and they still just don't have an incident.

So you don't know that this --

MR. ZIMMERMAN: Well, the industry has their program that they are rolling out to do self assessments. We are looking at it in the ROP. So there are some early indicators that we are taking credit for and I don't want to underestimate the tier 3 items, that these are very high level areas like pretty much around the table, there's alignment that there's benefits of varying degrees to these items.

But when they build their tier 3 items and they mold them to what works for the chemistry of their organization, they will turn these a little bit and they have that right to be able to do that, because they know their organization and their leaders should have the right instincts to be able to pull from these to develop the set. So a set at one power plant will not be the exact same set at another power plant because it will be tailored to the chemistry of

that work force and based on their history as well.

MEMBER BLEY: Roy, I'd like to see if because we are running out of time, move ahead and talking more about the tier 3. I mean, we've got an umbrella that might be pretty good but we have very little in terms of implementation and we would like to see where it's headed and --

MR. ZIMMERMAN: Yes. Sure.

MEMBER BLEY: and that's going to be the key to whether this is useful or not in the long term.

MS. SIERACKI: And again they were supported by the study and they are general enough so it will allow the different licensees to tailor those traits as they move through the implementation phase.

The next slide is simply the wording on the preamble that I talked about previously related to security, and you can see that we recognize that there are primary pillars of the NRC's regulatory mission and that there should be consideration of both, commensurate with their significance as you are moving through this statement of policy.

Next slide. The proposed draft final safety culture policy statement and the Commission paper which you have, does have a definition in traits that you just previously saw and they are included in

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the statement of policy.

Questioning Attitude was added as the ninth, you just saw the preamble that addresses security. Regulated community needs to be mindful of needs to be potential negative effects and that was an issue that had been expressed by the ACRS subcommittee as well and we actually have wording in the policy statement now to that effect, that some monetary incentive or other award programs could work against making a safe decision, or current training programs may not adequately address safety culture and its traits or how those traits apply to day to day work activities.

And the identification of both strengths and weaknesses related to safety culture in the regulated community will be helpful in evaluating implementation strategies.

So it's right there in the policy statement and our program offices will be working with the stakeholders as they move through to help them to get into that implementation phase.

Next steps. We will be providing this Final Statement of Policy to the Commission in early January. There is a briefing scheduled with them on January 24.

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We will then wait for Commission direction and then the implementation phase starts. We will have stakeholder involvement and OE, as Roy mentioned earlier, will continue to support those activities and provide some coordination.

Let me give you just a flavor of some implementation on the part of some of the program offices. NRR will continue to engage their stakeholders within the ROP self-assessment construct and you heard just a little bit about the industry doing an initiative on their own as well.

Incorporate safety culture guidance into the test reactors inspection process, where applicable. NRO, our construction side, will be assessing the need for changes in their manual, chapter 0613 and 2505. 0613 is the construction and test inspections. 2505 is the period assessment of construction inspection program results.

And they'll coordinate NRO actions with the ROP changes so I'm guessing you will see some of the same types of programs related to the construction reactors as well.

NMSS will address safety culture in broader oversight process evaluations for fuel cycle facilities, ISFSIs, and cask vendors. Outreach to

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stakeholders as part of any oversight process revisions and FSME for the material side, medical et cetera, will evaluate ways to incorporate safety culture into on-going NUREG-1556 and manual chapter MC 1246 updates.

The 1246 is their formal qualification programs for NMSS.

MEMBER BLEY: Is there any overall guidance or control on how the individual groups are going to try to pursue this or are you going to wait and see what happens?

MS. SIERACKI: We are going to wait for the direction from the Commission but the stakeholders will be involved so each program officer is going to continue to engage those stakeholders like we did before for workshops, those types of things, review processes, so that we can get that input and we can help to guide them.

Roy had mentioned doing some of the case studies as well with the Metro et cetera, some of the events that have happened in other industries. We are going to assess those, we are going to put those case studies together around the traits so that we can use those as training materials to show people how, if this trait, if in place, could have potentially

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1	affected this area, those types of things.
2	MR. ZIMMERMAN: I think we have said it
3	before but we don't expect that implementation will
4	occur at the same speed with our licensees and
5	certificate holders. Some that have made major strides
6	are much further along. Others are going to need to
7	have considerably more training and Q&A sessions to
8	really understand what it is we are asking them to do.
9	So for some facilities, it may be a multi-year rollout
10	activity.
11	MEMBER BLEY: Are you coordinating the
12	training that they will get or is that some other
13	is it up to them to get it?
14	MR. ZIMMERMAN: It's going to switch over
15	to the program offices where NMSS and FSME, NRR, NRO
16	will know what they feel is needed and then we will
17	offer our resources, Diane and others, to be able to
18	assist with some of that work if the offices would
19	like that assistance.
20	CHAIRMAN ABDEL-KHALIK: Where is OE on this
21	list?
22	MR. ZIMMERMAN: OE?
23	MEMBER BLEY: Yes.
24	MEMBER ARMIJO: What are you guys doing on
25	that?

MS. SIERACKI: It's actually on the --

MR. SOLORIO: I guess we should have showed you Roy's performance plan which basically has OE as the lead coordinating office for the agency to ensure that we have a coordinated rollout of these activities.

MS. SIERACKI: Since we don't work directly with the regulated community, our role is different. The program offices do that. We will though maintain a coordination and a support role because we still want to make sure that, for instance if NRO is going out to do a conferencing, they are going to talk to their folks and NRR wants to do something, perhaps we can coordinate these two. We will keep all the records if you will, kind of the coordination --

MR. ZIMMERMAN: What we have working for us is we have been working so closely together through the Working Group and the Steering Committee, that there is great alignment internally in what we are doing, so now it just shifts where the lead is and we move into a support role for the other offices.

MS. SIERACKI: Okay, so our key messages today are that we have a two year plus effort with considerable outreach, a safety culture definition and traits that you have seen are supported widely by our

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stakeholders. Our stakeholders will remain involved in the implementation phase and we are requesting a letter of recommendation from this group to the Commission. There are some acronyms on the following slides. So we are open to additional questions. MEMBER BLEY: Thank you. Any questions from the Committee? Further issues? If not I guess it's back to you. CHAIRMAN ABDEL-KHALIK: Thank you. At this time our schedule calls for a break so we will take a 15-minute break and we will reconvene at 10:15. At that time we will be off the record.

(Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went off the record at 9:59 a.m.)

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# Proposed Final Safety Culture Policy Statement

Diane Sieracki
Sr. Safety Culture Program Manager
Office of Enforcement

ACRS Full Committee December 3, 2010

## Objectives

- Outline development of the safety culture policy statement (SCPS)
  - Background and Commission Direction
  - Outreach Activities
  - Final SCPS and Commission Paper

## Background

- 2008 Commission Direction COMGBJ-08-0001
  - Review reactor process (ROP); include materials areas and Agreement States; consider security (one policy statement or two separate policy statements)
- 2009 Commission Paper SECY 09-0075
  - One policy statement incorporating both safety and security
  - ROP is effective; strategy for including materials areas and Agreement States
- 2009 Commission Direction SRM 09-0075
  - Publish one policy statement in FRN; consider vendors/suppliers;
     comport terminology; engage broad range of stakeholders

## **Outreach Activities**

- November 2009 FRN based on Commission Direction – 120-day comment period
  - Public comments: 52 comments having three main issues:
    - Clarify policy statement implementation
    - Don't include "security" in SC definition or traits
    - Implications of a policy statement vs. a regulation
- February 2010 Safety Culture Workshop 3 days; panel of broad range of stakeholders

# Additional Outreach May - August, 2010

- NRC staff presented SCPS information at various forums:
  - Health Physics Society; Fuel Cycle Information Exchange; Institute of Nuclear Materials Management; National Conference on Radiation Control; NRC workshop on Vendor Oversight, etc.
- Conference call with February workshop panelists and members of the public in July 2010
  - Review results of public comments on the November 2009
     FRN
  - Discuss inclusion of security
  - Received continued endorsement of workshop definition and traits

## Additional Outreach (continued)

- September 2010 FRN, Revised Draft SCPS 30-day comment period
  - Included February 2010 workshop SC definition and staff revised workshop traits with the traits included in the Statement of Policy (SOP); "Security" not included in SC definition or traits--did include preamble to address security
  - Indicated applicability to vendors and suppliers of safety-related components
  - Included Commission's expectation that Agreement States support a positive SC within their regulated communities
  - Asked whether the INPO Validation Study results should be considered

## Additional Outreach (continued)

- September 2010 FRN, Revised Draft SCPS
  - Public comments 23 comments having two main issues:
    - Distinction should be made between different types of licensees in the policy statement, and credit given to those with existing SC practices
    - Stakeholders requested continued involvement, through workshops and other outreach methods, during implementation (Tier 3) of the SCPS
- Final one-day Public Meeting held on September 28, 2010

## Safety Culture Workshop February 2010

- Panel of 16 stakeholders with various affiliations (e.g., reactors, OAS, medical facilities, fuel cycle facilities, gauge manufacturers, and members of the public)
- Panelists worked together, in breakout sessions with other attendees, and reached alignment on a definition and 8 traits of a positive SC
- Definition and traits use common terminology

## Safety Culture Definition

Nuclear Safety Culture is the core values and behaviors resulting from a collective commitment by leaders and individuals to emphasize safety over competing goals to ensure protection of people and the environment.

## Safety Culture Traits

- Leadership Safety Values and Actions
- Personal Accountability
- Work Processes
- Continuous Learning
- Problem Identification and Resolution
- Environment for Raising Concerns
- Effective Safety Communication
- Respectful Work Environment
- Questioning Attitude

# Tiers for Development and Implementation of the SCPS

Tier 1

#### **SC** Definition

Overarching definition that applies to all of the nuclear industry

- Easy to understand
- Timeless
- Inclusive

Tier 2

#### **Traits**

Set of high level descriptions of what constitutes a strong safety culture

- Applies to everyone who engages in NRC licensed activities
- Speak to all levels of the organization

Current activities: **Definition and Traits** 

**Application** 

Tier 3

Illustrates how the high level descriptions are translated to lower level descriptions that are implemented in different environments

- Describes programs, processes, procedures, practices, behaviors, etc.
- Details may vary depending on licensee type and environment (potential for different sets)

Next step: Implementation

# February 2010 Workshop "Tier 3" Exercise Example of "Leadership" Activities

- Management is in the field enforcing standards
- Commitment to maintaining equipment
- Resolves conflict
- Rewards safe behavior
- Rewards (incentives) and sanctions used to reinforce desired positive nuclear safety behaviors
- Respects differing opinions
- Actions match words
- Schedules are realistic and do not challenge safety standards

## Why These Traits?

- Benchmarked domestic and international terminology/standards – used as a starting point
- Revised/modified with stakeholder input through workshops and public meetings
- Supported by independent (INPO) validation study
- General language allows for tailoring for specific licensees in implementation phase

## Preamble

Experience has shown that certain personal and organizational traits are present in a positive safety culture. A trait, in this case, is a pattern of thinking, feeling, and behaving that emphasizes safety, particularly in goal conflict situations, e.g., production vs. safety, schedule vs. safety, and cost of the effort vs. safety. It should be noted that although the term "security" is not expressly included in these traits, safety and security are the primary pillars of the NRC's regulatory mission. Consequently, consideration of both safety and security issues, commensurate with their significance, is an underlying principle of this Statement of Policy.

## Proposed Final Draft SCPS/SECY

- Definition and traits of positive SC included in Statement of Policy
- "Questioning Attitude" added as 9th trait to address complacency
- Preamble addresses security
- Regulated community needs to be mindful of potential negative effects certain programs (i.e., incentive programs) can have on safety
- Recognition of diversity of regulated entities
- Applicable to vendors and suppliers of safety-related components
- Implementation is not directly addressed

## Next Steps

- Provide proposed Final Statement of Policy to Commission with Commission Briefing scheduled for January 24, 2011
- Commission Direction
- Implementation Phase
  - Stakeholder involvement with program offices for "Tier 3"
  - OE will continue to work with program offices and support activities during implementation phase

## NRC SCPS Implementation (Projected)

### NRR

- Engage stakeholders within ROP self-assessment construct
- Incorporate SC guidance into RTR inspection process, where applicable

### NRO

- Assess need for changes in IMC 0613 and IMC 2505
- Coordinate NRO actions with ROP changes

### NMSS

- Address safety culture in broader oversight process evaluations for FC facilities, ISFSIs, cask vendors
- Outreach to stakeholders as part of any oversight process revisions

## FSME

- Evaluate ways to incorporate SC into on-going NUREG-1556 and IMC 1246 updates
- Work with Agreement States to leverage their best practices

## Key Messages

- Two year effort with considerable outreach
- SC definition and traits supported by stakeholders
- Stakeholders to remain involved in implementation phase
- Requesting a letter of recommendation from ACRS to the Commission

## List of Acronyms

- FC Fuel Cycle
- FRN Federal Register Notice
- INPO Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
- IMC 0613 Documenting 10 CFRPart52 Construction and Test Inspections
- IMC 1246 Formal Qualification Programs in the Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards Area
- IMC 2505 Periodic Assessment of Construction Inspection Program Results

## List of Acronyms (continued)

- ISFSI Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation
- NUREG-1556 Consolidated Guidance about Materials Licensees
- ROP Reactor Oversight Process
- RTR Research and Test Reactor
- SC Safety Culture
- SCPS Safety Culture Policy Statement
- SECY Synonymous with Commission Paper
- SOP Statement of Policy