

Russell A. Smith Plant Manager November 22, 2010

WO 10-0076

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

> Subject: Docket No. 50-482: Licensee Event Report 2010-010-00, "Inadequate Analysis Results in a Component Cooling Water Train to be Declared Inoperable"

Gentlemen:

The enclosed Licensee Event Report (LER) is being submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) and (D) regarding a condition which caused a train of Component Cooling Water to be declared inoperable.

This letter contains no commitments. If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact me at (620) 364-4156, or Mr. Richard D. Flannigan at (620) 364-4117.

Sincerely,

Russell A. Smith

RAS/rlt

Enclosure:

cc: E. E. Collins Jr (NRC), w/e G. B. Miller (NRC), w/e B. K. Singal (NRC), w/e Senior Resident Inspector (NRC), w/e

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NRC FORM 366 (10-2010)

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| NRC FORM 366A<br>(10-2010)    | U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISS |               |                      |            |         |    |   |
|-------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------|----------------------|------------|---------|----|---|
| LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)   |                                 |               |                      |            |         |    |   |
| 1. FACILITY NAME              | 2. DOCKET                       | 6. LER NUMBER |                      |            | 3. PAGE |    |   |
| WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION | 05000 482                       | YEAR          | SEQUENTIAL<br>NUMBER | REV<br>NO. | 2       | OF | 4 |

2010

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NARRATIVE

PLANT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO EVENT

Mode 1 100% power

#### EVENT DESCRIPTION

The Component Cooling Water (CCW) [EIIS Code: CC] system consists of two trains with two 100 percent capacity pumps per train, each supplying cooling water flow to the independent safety loads and a common service loop. An independent surge tank is connected to the suction of each train via a 4-inch line. The common service loop provides flow to the non-essential or non-safety related loads such as Reactor Coolant Pump [EIIS code: AB-P] motor coolers and is constructed of ASME Section III Class 3 piping except for the portion that supplies cooling water to Radwaste. The Radwaste section of piping is automatically isolated via valves EGHV0069A and EGHV0070A (supply to Radwaste); and valves EGHV0069B and EGHV0070B (return from Radwaste) upon the receipt of a Safety Injection Signal (SIS), high flow indication in the non-safety related piping, or a low CCW surge tank level. The automatic isolation occurs within 10 seconds of receiving the signal. The Radwaste section is also isolated if the service loop. This train has one pump in operation supplying cooling flow to the common service loop and supplying Radwaste. The other three CCW pumps are normally secured.

An issue was brought up by an NRC inspector during the Component Design Basis Inspection (CDBI) at Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation (WCNOC) postulating a pipe break initiated by an external or seismic event in the non-safety related section downstream of automatic isolation valves mentioned above, Radwaste. The original design architect of WCGS analyzed a break in the supply side pipe in 1985 with a determination that the break would be isolated in sufficient time to ensure adequate net positive suction head (NPSH) would be available for the CCW pumps. Upon further review, several nonconservative assumptions were identified in the calculation. The determination at this point is that the CCW surge tanks may not keep up with the break flow rate and water column separation could occur that will jeopardize the required CCW pump NPSH and could result in the system ingesting large volumes of air that could challenge pump operability.

As a result of this issue, the CCW train connected to the service loop portion that supplies cooling water to Radwaste was considered to be inoperable. Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.7 was entered on September 22, 2010 at 1317. The TS was exited on September 23, 2010 at 0241 by isolating the Radwaste from the CCW train using temporary procedure TMP 10-028, "Isolating CCW to Radwaste."

Periodically the common service loop was transferred to the opposite CCW train. During the short period of time for this transfer both CCW trains are aligned to the service loop. If the Radwaste portion of the service loop were inservice, then both CCW trains would be inoperable.

NRC FORM 366A (10-2010)

| NRC FORM  | 366A |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

#### LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

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#### BASIS FOR REPORTABILITY

TS 3.7.7 requires two trains of CCW to be operable in Modes 1 through 4. Since plant startup, one train of CCW has been aligned to the service loop with Radwaste making that train inoperable. The amount of time that the service loop Radwaste portion is aligned to the CCW train exceeds the allowed outage time in TS 3.7.7. Therefore this issue is reportable per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications.

When the service loop, with the Radwaste portion inservice, is transferred to the opposite CCW train, both trains are aligned to the service loop for a short period of time. During this short period of time, both trains of CCW are inoperable. Additionally, when one train of CCW is out of service and the other train is aligned to the service loop, with the Radwaste portion inservice, both trains are inoperable. This condition is reportable per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) and (D) as a safety system functional failure.

This condition is considered an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety and is reportable per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B).

# **ROOT CAUSE**

This is a legacy issue that has existed since plant startup. The original calculation performed to support the Component Cooling Water System Pipe Break had nonconservative assumptions.

# CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

A temporary procedure, TMP 10-028, "Isolating CCW to Radwaste," is in place to provide instructions for isolating and restoring CCW flow to Radwaste. The temporary procedure is an interim action to ensure technical specification compliance.

Long-term resolution of this condition is ongoing.

# SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

The CCW System provides a heat sink for the removal of process and operating heat from safety related components during a Design Basis Accident (DBA) or transient. During normal operation, the CCW System also provides this function for various nonessential components, as well as the spent fuel storage pool. The CCW System serves as a barrier to the release of radioactive byproducts between potentially radioactive systems and the Essential Service Water System, and thus to the environment.

The safety significance for this issue is low. When one train of CCW is aligned to Radwaste, the likelihood is low for an event that would cause a break in Radwaste that would make the CCW train inoperable. In this case, a second train of CCW is available and operable.

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| OPERATING EXPERIENCE/PREVIOUS                                                          | EVENTS                             | <i>6</i> .    |               |           |          |         |   |
| None                                                                                   |                                    |               |               |           |          |         |   |
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