








A.6.10 Case 10: Double-Ended Cold Leg Break LOCA, No HHSI, One LHSI, and No ACC
















A.6.11 Case 11: 4-Inch Break LOCA, One HHSI, No LHSI, and No ACC

















A.6.12 Case 12: 4-Inch Break LOCA, No HHSI, One LHSI, and No ACC












A.6.13 Case 13: 4-Inch Break LOCA, No HHSI, One LHSI, and One ACC
















A.6.14 Case 14: 4-Inch Break LOCA, No HHSI, One LHSI, and Two ACC
















A.6.15 Case 15: 2-Inch Break LOCA, No HHSI, One LHSI, and Two ACC
















A.6.16 Case 16: 6-Inch Break LOCA, One HHSI, One LHSI, and No ACC, without Auxiliary Feedwater
















A.6.17 Case 17: 6-Inch Break LOCA, One HHSI, No LHSI, and One ACC, without Auxiliary Feedwater
















A.6.18 Case 18: 8-Inch Break LOCA, One HHSI, No LHSI, and One ACC
















A.6.19 Case 19: 10-Inch Break LOCA, One HHSI, No LHSI, and One ACC
















A.6.20 Case 20: 2-Inch Break LOCA, One HHSI, No LHSI, and One ACC
















A.6.21 Case 21: 2-Inch Break LOCA, One HHSI, One LHSI, and No ACC
















A.6.22 Case 22: 4-Inch Break LOCA, One HHSI, No LHSI, and One ACC
















A.6.23 Case 23: 8-Inch Break LOCA, No HHSI, One LHSI, and One ACC
















A.6.24 Case 24: 10-Inch Break LOCA, No HHSI, One LHSI, and One ACC
















A.6.25 Case 25: 4-Inch Break LOCA, One HHSI, One LHSI, No ACC, without Auxiliary Feedwater
















A.6.26 Case 26: 6-Inch Break LOCA, No HHSI, One LHSI, and One ACC, without Auxiliary Feedwater
















A.6.27 Case 27: 2-Inch Break LOCA, One HHSI, No LHSI, and One ACC, without Auxiliary Feedwater
















A.6.28 Case 28: 4-Inch Break LOCA, One HHSI, No LHSI, and One ACC, without Auxiliary Feedwater
















A.6.29 Case 29: 2-Inch Break LOCA, One HHSI, One LHSI, and No ACC, without Auxiliary Feedwater









A.7 REFERENCES

- [NRC, 2003] U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Virginia Electric and Power Company Docket No. 50-280 Surry Power Station, Unit No. 1 Renewed Facility Operating License," March 2003. Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML0529103580.

APPENDIX B
PEACH BOTTOM MELCOR ANALYSES

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ac	alternating current	LPCS	low-pressure core spray
ADS	automatic depressurization system	m	meter
BAF	bottom of active fuel	min	minute
C	Celsius	MPa	megapascal
CRD	control rod drive injection	MSIV	main steam isolation valve
CST	condensate storage tank	NPSH	net positive suction head
dc	direct current	psig	pounds per square inch gage
DC	downcomer	RCIC	reactor core isolation cooling
DW	drywell	RPV	reactor pressure vessel
F	Fahrenheit	sec	seconds
ft	feet	SP	suppression pool
FW	feedwater	SPC	suppression pool cooling
HCTL	heat capacity temperature limit	SRV	safety relief valve
HPCI	high-pressure core injection	SV	safety valve
hr	hour	TAF	top of active fuel
JP	jet pump	TCL	cladding temperature
K	Kelvin	TFU	fuel temperature
kg/s	kilograms per second	TLIQ	liquid temperature
LPCI	low-pressure core injection	TSAT	saturation temperature
		TVAP	vapor temperature
		WW	wetwell

B.1 Inadvertent Open Relief Valve Success Criteria

Analysis Summary

Table 1 and Table 2 below provide results for this portion of the analysis.

Table 1 Peach Bottom Inadvertent Open SRV Results

Case	RCIC	HPCI	CRD	LPCI	LPCS	ac/dc	FW, SPC, ADS	Core Uncovery (hr)	Core Damage (hr)
1	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	ac/dc	No	No	No
2	No	Yes						No	No
3		No	1 at t = 0 and 2 at t = 10 min					0.41	No
4			1 at t = 0 and 2 at t = 20 min					0.37	No
4a ¹			0.29					No	
5			No	0.32	No				



¹ For this case, the reactor was allowed to scram based on a reactor protection system trip signal, rather than at time t = 0.



Table 2 Peach Bottom Inadvertent Open SRV Key Timings (Cases 1–5)



Event	Case 1 (hr)	Case 2 (hr)	Case 3 (hr)	Case 4 (hr)	Case 4a (hr)	Case 5 (hr)
SRV 1 open	0	0	0	0	0	0
Reactor trip	0	0	0	0	< 0.01 ¹	0
Downcomer level first reaches L2	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.03	0.07
RCIC/HPCI first started (CST injection mode)	0.08	0.08	-	-	-	-
2 nd CRD pump started	-	-	0.17	0.33	0.33	-
Downcomer level reaches L1	0.37	8.93	0.32	0.32	0.24	0.26
Downcomer level below TAF	0.37	8.93	0.35	0.33	0.25	0.28
LPCI first started	0.51	8.93	0.59	0.58	0.53	0.57
RCIC/HPCI pump isolation: low steamline pressure < 0.52 MPa (75 psig)	0.82	5.59	-	-	-	-
Maximum cladding temperature timing (max temperature)	No heatup	No heatup	0.78 (786 K)	0.76 (830 K)	0.67 (941 K)	0.75 (1,212 K)



¹ Reactor trips at 8 seconds on low RPV level.


B.1.1 Case 1: Safety Relief Valve Opening and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling




















B.1.2 Case 2: Safety Relief Valve Opening and High-Pressure Core Injection




















B.1.3 Case 3: Safety Relief Valve Opening and CRD 2 at 10 Minutes




















B.1.4 Case 4: Safety Relief Valve Opening and CRD 2 at 20 Minutes


















B.1.4.1 Case 4a: Safety Relief Valve Opening, CRD 2 at 20 Minutes, and No Reactor Trip at $t = 0$


















B.1.5 Case 5: Safety Relief Valve Opening











B.2 Boiling-Water Reactor Station Blackout

Analysis Summary

Table 3 through Table 6 below provide results for this portion of the analysis.

Table 3 Peach Bottom Station Blackout Results

Case	RCIC	HPCI	ac/dc	SRV Sticks Open?	HCTL Depress?	Core Uncovery (hr)	Core Damage (hr)
1	No	No	-	No ¹	No	0.5	1.2
1a			ac recovery at 1.2 hr	No		0.5	1.2 ²
2			-	At t = 0		0.3	0.8
3	Yes	No	Infinite dc	No	Yes	6.0	7.2
4			2 hr of dc		No	3.3	4.3
5			Infinite dc	At 187 lifts	No	6.0	7.2
6				No	17.5	19.3	
7	No	Yes	Infinite dc	No	Yes	9.3	10.8
8					2 hr of dc	No	3.8
9			Infinite dc	At 187 lifts	No	9.2	10.7
10							

¹ For this case, the SRV does not stick open until after core damage, so this assumption does not affect the outcome.

² Recovery of injection upon reaching 2,200 degrees F (1,204 degrees C) quickly arrests further heatup.

Table 4 Peach Bottom Station Blackout Key Timings (Cases 1, 1a, and 2)

Event	Case 1 (hr)	Case 1a (hr)	Case 2 (hr)
Reactor trip, MSIV closure	0	0	0
Downcomer level reaches L2	0.16	0.16	0.16
Downcomer level reaches L1	0.50	0.50	0.27
Downcomer level below TAF	0.50	0.50	0.27
Gap release: 900 °C (1,652 °F)	1.02	1.02	0.69
Core damage: max temp > 1204 °C (2,200 °F)	1.17	1.17	0.79
HPCI, RCIC, CRD Injection start	-	1.17	-
ADS actuated	-	1.24	-
Downcomer level recovers above TAF	-	1.27	-
SRV sticks open due to high # of cycles	1.75	-	-



Table 5 Peach Bottom Station Blackout Key Timings (Cases 3–6)



Event	Case 3 (hr)	Case 4 (hr)	Case 5 (hr)	Case 6 (hr)
Reactor trip, MSIV closure	0	0	0	0
Downcomer level first reaches L2	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16
RCIC started (CST injection mode)	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17
RCIC fails due to loss of dc	-	-	2.00	-
HCTL limit reached	2.46 (no action taken)	2.46	2.46 (no action taken)	2.46 (no action taken)
SRV sticks open due to high # of cycles	-	-	-	2.47
RCIC NPSH limit exceeded	11.57	-	-	-
RCIC pump isolation: low steam line pressure < 0.52 MPa (75 psig)	-	3.90	-	3.92
RCIC injection ends due to CST level < 5 ft (1.5 m)	14.43	-	-	-
Downcomer level reaches L1	17.68	5.61	3.25	5.62
Downcomer level below TAF	17.68	5.61	3.25	5.62
Gap release: 900 °C (1,652 °F)	19.06	6.99	4.04	7.00
Core damage max temp > 1,204 °C (2,200 °F)	19.42	7.17	4.25	7.18
Exhaust pressure exceeded: 0.35 MPa (50 psig)	20.14	-	-	-



Table 6 Peach Bottom Station Blackout Key Timings (Cases 7–10)



Event	Case 7 (hr)	Case 8 (hr)	Case 9 (hr)	Case 10 (hr)
Reactor trip, MSIV closure	0	0	0	0
Downcomer level first reaches L2	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16
HPCI started (CST injection mode)	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17
HPCI fails due to loss of dc	-	-	2.00	-
SRV sticks open due to high # of cycles	-	-	-	2.53
HCTL limit reached	2.67 (no action taken)	2.67	2.67 (no action taken)	2.67 (no action taken)
HPCI NPSH limit exceeded	12.07	-	-	-
HPCI pump isolation: low steam line pressure < 0.52 MPa (75 psig)	-	5.72	-	5.61
HPCI injection ends due to CST level < 5 ft (1.5 m)	16.05	-	-	-
Downcomer level reaches L1	17.53	8.97	3.82	8.94
Downcomer level below TAF	17.53	9.06	3.82	8.94
Gap release: 900 °C (1,652 °F)	18.96	10.59	4.63	10.46
Core damage max temp > 1,204 °C (2,200 °F)	19.31	10.8	4.85	10.68
Exhaust pressure exceeded: 1.04 MPa (150 psig)	-	-	-	-

B.2.1 Case 1: Station Blackout with No Injection

















B.2.1.1 Case 1a: Station Blackout with No Injection and Power Recovery at Core Damage


















B.2.2 Case 2: Station Blackout and Safety Relief Valve Open at t = 0


















B.2.3 Case 3: Station Blackout and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling


Note: By the time reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) injection stops from condensate storage tank (CST) at 14.43 hours, the RCIC pump net positive suction head (NPSH) limit has already been exceeded, at 11.57 hours.




















B.2.4 Case 4: Station Blackout and RCIC and HCTL Depressurization



















B.2.5 Case 5: Station Blackout and RCIC and 2-Hour Direct Current

















B.2.6

Case 6: Station Blackout and RCIC and SRV Stuck Open

















B.2.7 Case 7: Station Blackout and High-Pressure Core Injection

Note: By the time high-pressure core injection (HPCI) injection stops from CST at 16.05 hours, the HPCI pump NPSH limit has already been exceeded at 12.07 hours.

















B.2.8


Case 8: Station Blackout and HPCI and HCTL Depressurization



















B.2.9

Case 9: Station Blackout and HPCI and 2-Hour Direct Current

















B.2.10 Case 10: Station Blackout and HPCI and SRV Stuck Open









APPENDIX C

EVENT TREE MODELS FOR SURRY AND PEACH BOTTOM

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C.2 Peach Bottom Event Trees	C-11

C.1 Surry Event Trees

This section provides the relevant event trees from the Surry (v3.52) Standardized Plant Analysis Risk model, dated November 2009. These event trees show the sequences described in the main report.

SMALL LOCA	REACTOR TRIP	AUXILIARY FEEDWATER	HIGH PRESSURE INJECTION	FEED AND BLEED	SECONDARY COOLING RECOVERED	COOLDOWN (PRIMARY & SECONDARY)	LOW PRESSURE INJECTION	RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL	HIGH PRESSURE RECIRC	LOW PRESSURE RECIRC	CONTAINMENT SPRAY RECIRC	#	END-STATE	FREQUENCY
IE-SLOCA	RPS	AFW	HPI	FAB	SSCR	SSC	LPI	RHR	HPR	LPR	CSR			
												1	OK	
												2	OK	
												3	CD	
												4	OK	
												5	CD	
												6	CD	
												7	OK	
												8	CD	
												9	CD	
												10	OK	
												11	OK	
												12	CD	
												13	CD	
												14	CD	
												15	CD	
												16	OK	
												17	OK	
												18	CD	
												19	OK	
												20	CD	
												21	CD	
												22	OK	
												23	CD	
												24	CD	
												25	OK	
												26	CD	
												27	CD	
												28	CD	
												29	CD	

SLOCA - SURRY 1 & 2 SMALL LOSS-OF-COOLANT ACCIDENT

2009/07/09

LOSS OF MAIN FEEDWATER	REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM	AUXILIARY FEEDWATER	PORVs ARE CLOSED	RCP SEAL COOLING MAINTAINED	HIGH PRESSURE INJECTION	FEED AND BLEED	SECONDARY COOLING RECOVERED	COOLDOWN (PRIMARY & SECONDARY)	RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL	CONTAINMENT SPRAY RECIRC	HIGH PRESSURE RECIRC	LOW PRESSURE RECIRC				
IE-LOMFW	RPS	AFW	PORV	LOSC	HPI	FAB	SSCR	SSC	RHR	CSR	HPR	LPR	#	END-STATE	FREQUENCY	
													1	OK		
													2	T	RCPSL	
													3	OK		
													4	OK		
													5	OK		
													6	CD		
													7	CD		
													8	OK		
													9	CD		
													10	CD		
													11	CD		
													12	OK		
													13	OK		
													14	CD		
													15	CD		
													16	CD		
													17	T	ATWS	

LOMFW - SURRY 1 & 2 LOSS OF MAIN FEEDWATER

2008/12/11

STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE	REACTOR TRIP	FEEDWATER AVAILABLE (AFW or MFW)	HIGH PRESSURE INJECTION	FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION	COOLDOWN (PRIMARY & SECONDARY)	TERMINATE OR CONTROL SAFETY INJECTION	FEED AND BLEED	RWST REFILL	CONTAINMENT SPRAY RECIRC	HIGH PRESSURE RECIRC	LOW PRESSURE INJECTION	RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL	LONG TERM HEAT REMOVAL (ECA-3.13.2)	#	END-STATE
E-SGTR	RPS	FW	HPI	SGI	SSC	CSI	FAB	REFILL	CSR	HPR	LPI	RHR	ECA		
														1	OK
														2	OK
												CST-REFILL		3	CD
														4	OK
														5	OK
														6	CD
														7	OK
								RFL1						8	OK
														9	CD
								RFL1						10	OK
														11	OK
														12	CD
														13	OK
														14	CD
														15	CD
					SSC1									16	CD
														17	CD
														18	OK
														19	CD
														20	CD
														21	CD
														22	CD
														23	CD
														24	CD

SGTR - SURRY 1 & 2 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE

2009/06/24

LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER	REACTOR TRIP	EMERGENCY POWER	AUXILIARY FEEDWATER	PORVS ARE CLOSED	RCP SEAL COOLING MAINTAINED	HIGH PRESSURE INJECTION	FEED AND BLEED	OFFSITE POWER RECOVERY IN 6 HRS	CONTAINMENT SPRAY RECIRC	HIGH PRESSURE RECIRC			
IE-LOOP	RPS-L	EPS	AFW	PORV	LOSC	HPI	FAB	OPR-06H	CSR	HPR	#	END-STATE	FREQUENCY
											1	OK	
											2	T LOOP-1	
											3	OK	
											4	CD	
											5	CD	
											6	OK	
											7	CD	
											8	CD	
											9	CD	
											10	OK	
											11	CD	
											12	CD	
											13	OK	
											14	CD	
											15	CD	
											16	CD	
											17	T SBO	
											18	T ATWS	
											19	CD	

LOOPAV - SURRY 1 & 2 LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER: Average Value

2009/07/01

EMERGENCY POWER (FAILED)	AUXILIARY FEEDWATER	PORVs ARE CLOSED	RAPID SECONDARY DEPRESS	RCP SEAL STAGE 1 INTEGRITY	RCP SEAL STAGE 1 INTEGRITY	RCP SEAL STAGE 2 INTEGRITY	RCP SEAL STAGE 2 INTEGRITY	OFF-SITE POWER RECOVERY (IN 4 HR)	DIESEL GENERATOR RECOVERY (IN 4 HR)				
EPS	AFW-B	PORV	RSD	BP1	O1	BP2	O2	OPR-04H	DGR-04H	#	END-STATE	NOTES	
										1	OK		
										2	OK		
							21 gpm/rcp			3	T	SBO-4	25-hour-Tcu
							182 gpm/rcp			4	T	SBO-1	
										5	OK		
							76 gpm/rcp			6		CD	4-hour-Tcu
										7	T	SBO-1	
							480 gpm/rcp			8	OK		
										9	T	SBO-4	8-hour-Tcu
										10	T	SBO-1	
								OPR-02H	DGR-02H	11	OK		
							21 gpm/rcp			12		CD	2-hour-Tcu
										13	T	SBO-2	
										14	OK		
							172 gpm/rcp			15	T	SBO-4	15-hour-Tcu
										16	T	SBO-2	
								OPR-03H	DGR-03H	17	OK		
							182 gpm/rcp			18		CD	3-hour-Tcu
										19	T	SBO-2	
								OPR-03H	DGR-03H	20	OK		
							81 gpm/rcp			21		CD	3-hour-Tcu
										22	T	SBO-2	
										23	OK		
							300 gpm/rcp			24	T	SBO-4	7-hour-Tcu
										25	T	SBO-2	
								OPR-02H	DGR-02H	26	OK		
							300 gpm/rcp			27		CD	2-hour-Tcu
										28	T	SBO-2	
								OPR-02H	DGR-02H	29	OK		
										30		CD	2-hour-Tcu
							76 gpm/rcp			31	T	SBO-2	
										32	OK		
							300 gpm/rcp			33	T	SBO-4	6-hour-Tcu
										34	T	SBO-2	
								OPR-02H	DGR-02H	35	OK		
							480 gpm/rcp			36		CD	2-hour-Tcu
										37	T	SBO-2	
								OPR-02H	DGR-02H	38	OK		
										39		CD	2-hour-Tcu
										40	T	SBO-2	
								OPR-01H	DGR-01H	41	OK		
										42		CD	30-min-Tcu
										43	T	SBO-3	
								OPR-01H	DGR-01H	44	OK		
										45		CD	30-min-Tcu

SBO - SURRY 1 & 2 STATION BLACKOUT

2008/11/09

POWER RECOVERY FAILED	MANUAL CONTROL AFW	CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK REFILL LONG-TERM	DEPRESSURIZE SGs	LATE POWER RECOVERY			
OPR	AFW-MAN	CST-REFILL-LT	SG-DEP-LT	PWR-REC	#	END-STATE	FREQUENCY
					1	OK	
					2	CD	
					3	OK	
					4	CD	
					5	OK	
					6	OK	
					7	CD	
					8	OK	
					9	CD	
					10	CD	

SBO-4 - SURRY 1 & 2 STATION BLACKOUT - CONTINUED

2008/12/19

MEDIUM LOCA	REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM	HIGH PRESSURE INJECTION	ACCUMULATOR 3-OF-3	AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM	SECONDARY SIDE COOLDOWN (POST-LOCA)	LOW PRESSURE INJECTION	HIGH PRESSURE RECIRC	LOW PRESSURE RECIRC	CONTAINMENT SPRAY RECIRC		STATE	NOTES
IE-MLOCA	RPS	HPI	ACC	AFW	SSC1	LPI	HPR	LPR	CSR	#		
										1	OK	
										2	CD	
										3	CD	
										4	OK	
										5	CD	
										6	CD	
										7	OK	
										8	CD	
										9	CD	
										10	OK	
										11	CD	
										12	CD	
										13	CD	
										14	CD	
										15	CD	
										16	CD	
										17	CD	

MLOCA - SURRY 1 & 2 MEDIUM LOSS-OF-COOLANT ACCIDENT

2009/07/12


LARGE LOCA	ACCUMULATORS	LOW PRESSURE INJECTION	CONTAINMENT SPRAY	CONTAINMENT SPRAY RECIRC	OUTSIDE RECIRC SPRAY	LOW PRESSURE RECIRC			
IE-LLOCA	ACC	LPI	CSS	CSR	CSR-OSR	LPR	#	END-STATE	FREQUENCY
							1	OK	
							2	CD	
							3	CD	
							4	OK	
							5	CD	
							6	CD	
							7	CD	
							8	CD	

LLOCA - SURRY 1 & 2 LARGE LOSS-OF-COOLANT ACCIDENT

2009/07/08


C.2 Peach Bottom Event Trees

This section provides the relevant event trees from the Peach Bottom (v3.50) Standardized Plant Analysis Risk model, dated October 2009. These event trees show the sequences described in the main report.




INT-IORV - PEACH BOTTOM INADVERTENT OPEN RELIEF VALVE (IORV)

2009/07/01



INT-LOOP - PEACH BOTTOM LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER

2009/07/02



INT-SBO - PEACH BOTTOM STATION BLACKOUT

2009/07/02

ONE STUCK OPEN SRV	HIGH PRESSURE INJECTION	OFFSITE POWER RECOVERY IN 2 HRS	DIESEL GENERATOR RECOVERY IN 2 HRS	EMERGENCY POWER CROSS TIE IN 2 HRS	CONOWINGO TIE LINE SET UP IN 2 HRS			
P1	HPI	OPR-02H	DGR-02H	EPX-02H	CWG-02H	#	END-STATE	
						1	OK	
						2	OK	
						3	OK	
						4	T	INT-SBO-CD
						5		OK
						6	T	INT-SBO-CD
						7	T	INT-SBO-CD
INT-SBO-1 - PEACH BOTTOM ONE STUCK OPEN SAFETY/RELIEF VALVE							2009/07/01	

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(See instructions on the reverse)

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10. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

11. ABSTRACT (200 words or less)

This report describes MELCOR analyses performed to augment the technical basis for supporting or modifying specific success criteria for the Surry and Peach Bottom Standardized Plant Analysis Risk models. First, the report provides a basis for using a core damage surrogate of 2,220 degree Fahrenheit (1,204 degrees Celsius) peak cladding temperature, based on MELCOR analyses for representative sequences and a consideration of historical core damage surrogates. Following this are descriptions of the major plant characteristics for the two plants used for this analysis (Surry Power Station and Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station) and of the MELCOR models used to represent these plants. Finally, the report presents the results of many MELCOR calculations and translates these results into specific candidate SPAR model upgrades for Surry and Peach Bottom.

12. KEY WORDS/DESCRIPTORS (List words or phrases that will assist researchers in locating the report.)

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loss of main feedwater
steam generator tube rupture
station blackout
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