Facility:	SONGS 2 8	<u>8</u> 3N	VRC						Da	ate c	of Ex	am:	10/	/18/10				
						RO 🖡	K/A C	ateg	ory F	ointe	5				SR	O-Only	Points	6
Tier	Group	K 1	K 2	K 3	K 4	K 5	K 6	A 1	A 2	A 3	A 4	G *	Total	Δ	12	G'	e -	Total
1. Emergency	1	2	3	3				3	3			4	18	:	3	3		6
& Abnormal	2	2	1	3				0	2			1	9		4	0		4
Plant Evolutions	Tier Totals	4	4	6				3	5			5	27	-	7	3		10
	1	3	2	2	4	2	2	3	2	2	3	3	28	:	2	3		5
2. Plant Systems	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	10	2	0	1		3
	Tier Totals	4	3	3	5	3	3	3	3	3	4	4	38		4	4		8
3. Generic	Knowledge and	l Abil	ities			1	2	2	3	3	4	1	10	1	2	3	4	_
	Categories				4	2	;	3	3	3		2	10	1	2	2	2	7
3. 4.	Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable K/A category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO-only outlines (i.e., except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only outline, the "Tier Totals" in each K/A category shall not be less than two). The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table. The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by ±1 from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions. The final RO exam must total 75 points and the SRO-only exam must tota 25 points. Systems / evolutions within each group are identified on the associated outline; systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted and justified; operationally important, site-specific systems / evolutions that are not included on the outline should be added. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for guidance regarding the elimination of inappropriate K/A statements. Select topics from as many systems and evolutions as possible; sample every system or evolution in the group before selecting a second topic for any system or evolution.																	
5.	in the group Absent a pla	befc int-s	ore s pecif	elect ic pr	ting iority	a se y, or	conc nly th	d top lose	ic fo K/A	r ang s ha'	y sys ving	stem an ii	or evolu	ution. ce ratir	ng (IR)) of 2.5	or hi	gher
	shall be sele								-						•		pectiv	vely.
6. 7.*	Select SRO The generic the topics m for the applic	(G) ust b	K/As be re	in T leva	iers	1 ai	nd 2	shal	l be	sele	cted	fror	n Sectio	n 2 of t	the K//	A Cata		
8.	On the follow importance r and category equipment is side of Colur and SRO-on	ving ating y. Er s sar mn A	page gs (II nter t nple \2 fo	es, e Rs) f he g d in r Tie	or th roup othe	ne ap o and r tha	oplic d tiei an Ca	able r tota ateg	lice als fo ory <i>A</i>	nse or ea \2 o	level .ch c r G*	, and ateg on tl	d the poi ory in th he SRO-	nt tota e table only e	ls (#) f above xam, e	for eac e; if fue enter it	h sys [:] el han on th	dling e left
9.	For Tier 3, so IRs, and poin	elect	t topi	ics fi	rom	Sect	tion :	2 of	the k	<td>atal</td> <td>00 3</td> <td>and ente</td> <td>r the K</td> <td></td> <td>mhore</td> <td>dosc</td> <td>rintions</td>	atal	00 3	and ente	r the K		mhore	dosc	rintions

E/APE # / Name Safety Function	K1	K2	K3	A1	A2	G	Number	K/A Topic(s)	lmp.	Q#
015/017 / RCP Malfunctions / 4						x	2.2.44	Equipment Control: Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the status and operation of a system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions	4.4	76
007 / Reactor Trip - Stabilization - Recovery / 1					x		EA2.04	Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to a reactor trip: If reactor should have tripped but has not done so, manually trip the reactor and carry out actions in the ATWS EOP	4.6	77
029 / ATWS / 1						x	2.4.6	Emergency Procedures/Plan: Knowledge of EOP mitigation strategies	4.7	78
CE / E06 / Loss of Main Feedwater / 4					x		EA2.1	Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Feedwater: Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations	3.9	79
009 / Small Break LOCA / 3						x	2.4.41	Emergency Procedures/Plan: Knowledge of emergency action level thresholds and classifications	4.6	80
011 Large Break LOCA / 3					x		EA2.03	Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to a Large Break LOCA: Consequences of managing LOCA with loss of CCW	4.2	81
CE / E02 / Reactor Trip - Stabilization - Recovery / 1						x	2.1.31	Conduct of Operations: Ability to locate control room switches, controls, and indications, and to determine that they correctly reflect the desired plant lineup	4.6	39
008 / Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident / 3				x			AA1.08	Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to the Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident: PRT level, pressure, and temperature	3.8	40
009 / Small Break LOCA / 3			х				EK3.22	Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Small Break LOCA: Maintenance of heat sink	4.4	41
011 / Large Break LOCA / 3					х		EA2.11	Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to a Large Break LOCA: Conditions for throttling or stopping HPI	3.9	42

E/APE # / Name Safety Function	K1	K2	K3	A1	A2	G	Number	K/A Topic(s)	lmp.	Q#
015 / 17 / RCP Malfunctions / 4	x						AK1.02	Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to RCP Malfunctions (Loss of RC Flow): Consequences of an RCP failure	3.7	43
025 / Loss of RHR System / 4			x				AK3.01	Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Residual Heat Removal System: Shift to alternate flowpath	3.1	44
022 / Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup / 2						х	2.1.19	Conduct of Operations: Ability to use plant computers to evaluate system or component status	3.9	45
027 / Pressurizer Pressure Control System Malfunction / 3		х					AK2.03	Knowledge of the interrelations between the Pressurizer Pressure Control Malfunctions and the following: Controllers and positioners	2.6	46
CE / E05 / Excess Steam Demand / 4					x		EA2.1	Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Excess Steam Demand: Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations	2.7	47
038 / Steam Generator Tube Rupture / 3	x						EK1.02	Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the Steam Generator Tube Rupture: Leak rate versus pressure drop	3.2	48
CE / E06 / Loss of Feedwater / 4		х					EK2.1	Knowledge of the interrelations between the Loss of Feedwater and the following: Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features	3.3	49
056 / Loss of Offsite Power / 6			x				AK3.02	Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Offsite Power: Actions contained in EOP for loss of offsite power	4.4	50
057 / Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus / 6				х			AA1.05	Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus: Backup instrument indications	3.2	51

E/APE # / Name Safety Function	K1	K2	K3	A1	A2	G	Number	K/A Topic(s)	Imp.	Q#
058 / Loss of DC Power / 6				x			AA1.03	Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of DC power: Vital and battery bus components	3.1	52
062 / Loss of Nuclear Service Water / 4						х	2.4.4	Emergency Procedures/Plan: Ability to recognize abnormal indications for system operating parameters that are entry-level conditions for emergency and abnormal operating procedures	4.5	53
055 / Station Blackout / 6					x		EA2.02	Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Station Blackout: RCS core cooling through natural circulation cooling to SG cooling	4.4	54
077 / Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances / 6		х					AK2.02	Knowledge of the interrelations between Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances and the following: Breakers, relays	3.1	55
029 / ATWS / 1						x	2.1.7	Conduct of Operations: Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation.	4.4	56
K/A Category Point Totals:	2	3	3	3	3 / <mark>3</mark>	4 / <mark>3</mark>	Group Poi	nt Total:		18 / <mark>6</mark>

E/APE # / Name Safety Function	K1	K2	K3	A1	A2	G	Number	K/A Topic(s)	Imp.	Q#
036 / Fuel Handling Accident / 8					x		AA2.02	Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Fuel Handling Incidents: Occurrence of a fuel handling incident	4.1	82
A11 / RCS Overcooling-PTS / 4					x		AA2.2	Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the RCS Overcooling: Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments.	3.4	83
032 / Loss of Source Range NI / 7					x		AA2.01	Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Source Range Nuclear Instrumentation: Normal/abnormal power supply operation	2.9	84
069 / Loss of Containment Integrity / 5					x		AA2.01	Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Containment Integrity: Loss of containment integrity	4.3	85
074 / Inadequate Core Cooling / 4					x		EA2.07	Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to an Inadequate Core Cooling: The difference between a LOCA and inadequate core cooling, from trends and indicators	4.1	57
028 / Pressurizer Level Malfunction / 2			x				AK3.05	Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Pressurizer Level Control Malfunction: Actions contained in EOP for PZR level malfunction	3.7	58
005 / Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod / 1		х					AK2.03	Knowledge of the interrelations between the Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod and the following: Metroscope	3.1	59
036 / Fuel Handling Accident / 8				х			AA1.02	Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to the Fuel Handling Incidents: ARM system	3.1	60
060 / Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Release / 9			x				AK3.02	Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Release: Isolation of the auxiliary building ventilation.	3.3	61
003 / Dropped Control Rod / 1	x						AK1.04	Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the Dropped Control Rod: Effects of power level and control position on flux	3.1	62

E/APE # / Name Safety Function	K1	K2	K3	A1	A2	G	Number		K/A Topic(s)	Imp.	Q#
051 / Loss of Condenser Vacuum / 4			x				AK3.01	responses a Condenser	of the reasons for the following as they apply to the Loss of Vacuum: Loss of steam dump pon loss of condenser vacuum	2.8	63
037 / Steam Generator Tube Leak / 3						x	2.1.7	performanc based on o	Operations: Ability to evaluate plant ee and make operational judgments perating characteristics, reactor nd instrument interpretations	4.4	64
067 / Plant Fire on Site / 8	x						AK1.02	following co	of the operational implications of the oncepts as they apply to the Plant e: Fire fighting	3.1	65
K/A Category Point Totals:	1	1	3	1	2 / <mark>4</mark>	1 / <mark>0</mark>	Group Poi	int Total:			9 / <mark>4</mark>

System #/Name	K1	K2	K3	K4	K5	K6	A1	A2	A3	A4	G	Number	K/A Topics	Imp.	Q#
022 / Containment Cooling											x	2.4.1	Emergency Procedures/Plan: Knowledge of EOP entry conditions and immediate action steps	4.8	86
026 / Containment Spray								x				A2.07	Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CSS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Loss of containment spray pump suction when in recirculation mode, possibly caused by clogged sump screen, pump inlet high temperature exceeded cavitation, voiding, or sump level below cutoff (interlock) limit	3.9	87
061 / Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater											x	2.1.7	Conduct of Operations: Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation	4.7	88
005 / Residual Heat Removal											x	2.2.22	Equipment Control: Knowledge of limiting conditions for operations and safety limits	4.7	89
006 / Emergency Core Cooling								x				A2.10	Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ECCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Low boron concentration in SIS	3.9	90
003 / Reactor Coolant Pump	x											K1.03	Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the RCPS and the following systems: RCP seal system	3.3	1
004 / Chemical and Volume Control				х								K4.03	Knowledge of the CVCS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: Protection of the ion exchangers (high letdown temperature will isolate ion exchangers)	2.8	2
004 / Chemical and Volume Control					x							K5.04	Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the CVCS: Reason for hydrogen cover gas in VCT (oxygen scavenge)	2.8	3

System #/Name	K1	K2	K3	K4	K5	K6	A1	A2	A3	A4	G	Number	K/A Topics	Imp.	Q#
005 / Residual Heat Removal										x		A4.02	Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Heat exchanger bypass flow control	3.4	4
006 / Emergency Core Cooling										х		A4.02	Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Valves	4.0	5
006 / Emergency Core Cooling						х						K6.03	Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the ECCS: Safety Injection Pumps	3.6	6
007 / Pressurizer Relief / Quench Tank			x									K3.01	Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the PRTS will have on the following: Containment	3.3	7
008 / Component Cooling Water				x								K4.07	Knowledge of CCWS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: Operation of the CCW swing bus power supply and its associated breakers and controls	2.6	8
010 / Pressurizer Pressure Control							x					A1.07	Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the PZR PCS controls including: RCS pressure	3.7	9
012 / Reactor Protection						х						K6.06	Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the RPS: Sensors and detectors	2.7	10
012 / Reactor Protection									х			A3.03	Ability to monitor automatic operation of the RPS, including: Power supply	3.4	11
013 / Engineered Safety Features Actuation								x				A2.03	Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ESFAS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Rapid depressurization	4.4	12
022 / Containment Cooling									x			A3.01	Ability to monitor automatic operation of the CCS, including: Initiation of safeguards mode of operation	4.1	13
022 / Containment Cooling											х	2.1.7	Conduct of Operations: Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation	4.4	14

System #/Name	K1	K2	K3	K4	K5	K6	A1	A2	A3	A4	G	Number	K/A Topics	Imp.	Q#
026 / Containment Spray								x				A2.02	Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CSS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Failure of automatic recirculation transfer	4.2	15
026 / Containment Spray				x								K4.07	Knowledge of the CSS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: Adequate level in the containment sump for suction (interlock)	3.8	16
039 / Main and Reheat Steam										х		A4.03	Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: MFW pump turbines	2.8	17
059 / Main Feedwater							x					A1.07	Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the MFW controls, including: Feed Pump speed, including normal control speed for ICS	2.5	18
061 / Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater		х										K2.01	Knowledge of the bus power supplies to the following: AFW system MOVs	3.2	19
062 / AC Electrical Distribution											х	2.1.28	Conduct of Operations: Knowledge of the purpose and function of major system components and controls	4.1	20
062 / AC Electrical Distribution	x											K1.04	Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the AC Electrical Distribution System and the following systems: Offsite power sources	3.7	21
063 / DC Electrical Distribution	x											K1.02	Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the DC Electrical Distribution System and the following systems: AC electrical system	2.7	22
064 / Emergency Diesel Generator		х										K2.01	Knowledge of the bus power supplies to the following: Air compressor	2.7	23
064 / Emergency Diesel Generator			x									K3.03	Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the EDG system will have on the following: EDG (manual loads)	3.6	24

System #/Name	K1	K2	K3	K4	K5	K6	A1	A2	A3	A4	G	Number		K/A Topics	Imp.	Q#
073 / Process Radiation Monitoring					x							K5.03	the following of PRM system:	the operational implications of concepts as they apply to the Relationship between radiation exposure limits	2.9	25
076 / Service Water				x								K4.03	interlock(s) wh Automatic ope	SWS design feature(s) and/or nich provide for the following: ening features associated with valves to CCW heat exchangers	2.9	26
078 / Instrument Air											х	2.2.37		ontrol: Ability to determine d/or availability of safety related	3.6	27
103 / Containment							x					A1.01	parameters (to limits) associa containment c	ict and/or monitor changes in o prevent exceeding design ted with operating the ontrols including: Containment perature, and humidity	3.7	28
K/A Category Point Totals:	3	2	2	4	2	2	3	2 / <mark>2</mark>	2	3	3 / <mark>3</mark>	Group F	Point Total:		•	28 / <mark>5</mark>

System #/Name	K1	K2	K3	K4	K5	K6	A1	A2	A3	A4	G	Number	K/A Topics	lmp.	Q#
068 / Liquid Radwaste								x				A2.02	Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the Liquid Radwaste System; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Lack of tank recirculation prior to release	2.8	91
072 / Area Radiation Monitoring											х	2.2.40	Equipment Control: Ability to apply Technical Specifications for a system	4.7	92
035 / Steam Generator								x				A2.05	Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the SG; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Unbalanced flow to the SGs	3.4	93
027 / Containment Iodine Removal		х										K2.01	Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: Fans	3.1	29
055 / Condenser Air Removal									х			A3.03	Ability to monitor automatic operation of the CARS, including: Automatic diversion of CARS exhaust	2.5	30
086 / Fire Protection					x							K5.04	Knowledge of the operational implication of the following concepts as they apply to the Fire Protection System: Hazards to personnel as a result of fire type and methods of protection	2.9	31
041 / Steam Dump/Turbine Bypass Control										х		A4.06	Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Atmospheric relief valve controllers	2.9	32
014 / Rod Position Indication				х								K4.03	Knowledge of RPIS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: Rod bottom lights	3.2	33
072 / Area Radiation Monitoring											х	2.1.27	Conduct of Operations: Knowledge of system purpose and/or function	3.9	34
035 / Steam Generator						х						K6.01	Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the SGS: MSIVs	3.2	35

System #/Name	K1	K2	K3	K4	K5	K6	A1	A2	A3	A4	G	Number	K/A Topics Imp.	Q#
017 / Incore Temperature Monitoring								x				A2.01	Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ITM System; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Thermocouple open and short-circuits	36
015 / Nuclear Instrumentation	x											K 1.08	Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the NIS and the following systems: RCS (pump start)2.6	37
045 / Main Turbine Generator			x									K3.01	Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the MTG system will have on the following: Remainder of the plant2.9	38
K/A Category Point Totals:	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1 / <mark>2</mark>	1	1	1 / 1	Group Po	int Total:	10 / <mark>3</mark>

Facility: SONG	S 2 & 3 N	RC Date of Exam: 10/18/2009				
Category	K/A #	Торіс		RO		-Only
			IR	#	IR	#
1.	2.1.5	Ability to use procedures related to shift staffing, such as minimum crew complement, overtime limitations, etc.			3.9	94
Conduct of Operations	2.1.19	Ability to use plant computers to evaluate system or component status	3.9	66		
	2.1.30	Ability to locate and operate components, including local controls	4.4	67		
	Subtotal			2		1
	2.2.23	Ability to track Technical Specification limiting conditions for operations			4.6	95
2. Equipment Control	2.2.7	Knowledge of the process for conducting special or infrequent tests			3.6	96
Control	2.2.22	Knowledge of limiting conditions for operations and safety limits	4.0	68		
	2.2.13	Knowledge of tagging and clearance procedures	4.1	69		
	2.2.2	Ability to manipulate the console controls as required to operate the facility between shutdown and designated power levels	4.6	70		
	Subtotal			3		2
3. Radiation Control	2.3.4	Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal or emergency conditions			3.7	97
	2.3.6	Ability to approve release permits			3.8	98
	2.3.7	Ability to comply with radiation work permit requirements during normal or abnormal conditions		71		
	2.3.15	Knowledge of radiation monitoring systems, such as fixed radiation monitors and alarms, portable survey instruments, personnel monitoring equipment, etc.		72		
	2.3.12	Knowledge of radiological safety principles pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, aligning filters, etc.	3.2	73		
	Subtotal			3		2
4.	2.4.40	Knowledge of SRO responsibilities in emergency plan implementation			4.5	99
Emergency Procedures / Plan	2.4.44	Knowledge of emergency plan protective action recommendations			4.4	100
	2.4.3	Ability to identify post accident instrumentation		74		
	2.4.11	Knowledge of abnormal condition procedures	4.0	75		
	Subtotal			2		2
Tier 3 Point Total 10						7

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Tier / Group	Randomly Selected K/A	Reason for Rejection	
2/2	016 K5.01	Q #31 – Unable to develop a psychometrically sound question that discriminates at the RO license level. Randomly reselected 086 K5.04.	
1 / 1	011 EA2.09	Q #42 – This specific K/A adequately covered by Question #54. Randomly reselected 011 EA2.11.	
1/2	074 EA2.05	Q #57 – Unable to develop a psychometrically sound question that discriminates at the RO license level. Reselected 074 EA2.07.	
1 / 1	015/017 AA2.07	Q #76 – Unable to develop a psychometrically sound question that discriminates at the SRO license level. Randomly reselected 015/017 G 2.2.44.	
1 / 1	011 G 2.4.3	Q #81 – Unable to develop an appropriate SRO level question that discriminates at the SRO license level. Reselected 011 EA2.03.	
1/2	001 G 2.4.1	Q #83 – Unable to develop a psychometrically sound question that discriminates at the SRO license level. Automatic Rod Control has been disabled at SONGS. Randomly reselected A11 AA2.2.	
1 / 1	077 AK2.03	Q #55 – Unable to develop a psychometrically sound question that is considered important to safety. Randomly reselected 077 AK2.02.	
1/2	032 AA2.02	Q #84 – Unable to develop a psychometrically sound question that discriminates at the SRO license level. Reselected 032 AA2.01.	
1/2	068 AA2.07	Q #85 – Unable to develop a psychometrically sound question that discriminates at the SRO license level. Reselected 069 AA2.01.	
2 / 1	061 A2.07	Q #88 – Unable to develop a psychometrically sound question that discriminates at the SRO license level. Reselected 061 G 2.1.7.	
1/2	060 AK3.01	Q #61 – Emergency Plan implementation is considered SRO level knowledge. Randomly reselected 060 AK3.02.	
1/2	059 AA2.04	Q #82 – Coverage of radioactive releases deemed adequate per Questions #61, #91, and #98. Reselected 036 AA2.02 to address exam content of 10CFR 55.43(7).	
2 / 1	059 A2.12	Q #18 – Unable to develop a psychometrically sound question that discriminates at the RO license level. Reselected 059 A1.07 for skyscraper balance.	
2 / 1	004 K5.29	Q #03 – Unable to develop a psychometrically sound question that discriminates at the RO license level. Reselected 004 K5.04.	
2 / 1	064 K3.01	Q #24 – Unable to develop a psychometrically sound question that discriminates at the RO license level. No automatic loader information available to the operator. Reselected 064 K3.03.	
2/2	072 K3.02	Q #34 – This specific K/A already covered by Q #60. Reselected 072 G 2.1.27 for skyscraper balance.	
3/2	G 2.2.25	Q #70 – Assigned K/A G 2.2.2 as it is a better fit for the question and avoids issues with Technical Specification Bases for Reactor Operators.	
1 / 1	EO2 G 2.2.3	Q #39 – Substituted K/A G 2.1.31 as the Unit 3 Steam Generator replacement will be underway and negate identified differences between Units.	

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Tier / Group	Randomly Selected K/A	Reason for Rejection		
1 / 1	EO6 EA1.2	Q #49 – Reselected E06 EK2.1 for skyscraper balance.		
2 / 1	003 K1.12	Q #01 – This specific K/A already covered by scenario malfunctions. Reselected 003 K1.03.		
2 / 1	006 K6.05	Q #06 – Multiple interpretations as to meaning of selected K/A. Assigned a more appropriate K/A to this new question. Selected 006 K6.03.		
2 / 1	026 A2.05	Q #15 – Unable to develop a psychometrically sound question that discriminates at the RO license level since there are no Chemical Injection Tanks associated with the Containment Spray System. Reselected 026 A2.02.		
1 / 1	008 AA1.05	Q #40 – Unable to develop a psychometrically sound question that discriminates at the RO license level. Reselected 008 AA1.08.		
1 / 1	058 AA1.01	Q #52 – Unable to develop a psychometrically sound question that discriminates at the RO license level. Reselected 058 AA1.03.		
1/2	067 AA1.09	Q #65 – Unable to develop a psychometrically sound question that discriminates at the RO license level. Fire Computer is frequently OOS in the Control Room because this function is performed by the Site Fire Brigade. Reselected 067 AK1.02.		
1/2	003 AK1.07	Q #62 – Unable to develop a psychometrically sound question that discriminates at the RO license level. Reselected 003 AK1.04.		
2 / 1	005 A4.01	Q #04 – This specific K/A already covered by JPM S-4. Reselected 005 A4.02.		
2 / 1	010 G2.4.9	Q #15 – Unable to develop a psychometrically sound question that discriminates at the RO license. Reselected 012 K6.06 for skyscraper balance		
3 / 4	G2.4.18	Q #75 – Assigned a more appropriate K/A to this question. Selected G2.4.11.		
2 / 1	022 K3.02	Q #14 – Assigned a more appropriate K/A to this new question. Selected G2.1.7.		
1 / 1	022 G2.4.2	Q #45 – Assigned a more appropriate K/A to this Cycle 16 Plant Modification. Selected G2.1.19.		
1 / 1	065 AA2.03	Q #77 – Replaced question per Chief Examiner request. Reselected 007 EA2.04.		
2/2	072 G2.2.12	Q #92 – Assigned a more appropriate K/A to this new question per Chief Examiner request. Selected G2.2.40.		
2/2	086 G2.4.31	Q #93 – Replaced question per Chief Examiner request. Reselected 035 A2.05.		

Appendix D So		cenario Outline	Form ES-D-1		
Facility: SONGS Examiners:		2 and 3	Scenario No.: 2 Operators: -	Op Test No.: October 2010 NRC	
Initial Conditions: •			RCS Boron is 1070 ppn Cooling Water Pump (
 Charging Pump (P-192) running with (P-191) aligned to 480 Volt Bus 2B04. Train A Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (P-141) OOS for oil change. Channel X Pressurizer Pressure and Level in service. 					
Turnover:	Ma	intain steady-state co	nditions following return	of Main Feedwater Pump to service.	
 Critical Tasks: Restore Component Cooling Water Flow due to Loss of CCW Pump. Manually Trip Reactor Due to Reactor Protection System Failure. Isolate the Faulted Steam Generator During Excess Steam Demand Event. 			ction System Failure.		
Event No.	Malf. No.	Event Type*		Event Description	
1 +15 min	RC17B	I (RO, BOP, CRS) TS (CRS)	Pressurizer Pressure Low.	Wide Range Transmitter (PT-0102-2) Fails	
2 +25 min	CV22C	C (RO, CRS) TS (CRS)	Charging Pump (P-19)	2) Overcurrent Trip.	
3 +30 min	CC06B	C (BOP, CRS)	Train A Component Co	ooling Water Pump (P-025) Trip.	
4 +32 min	OBE with RC07A	C (RO, CRS)	Seismic Event with Re (60 second time delay	eactor Coolant Pump (P-001) Seized Shaft).	
5 +32 min	RP15	I (RO)	Reactor Fails to Auton	natically Trip.	
6 +35 min	MS05A	M (RO, BOP, CRS)	Steam Generator (E-0 Steam Isolation Valve	88) Main Steam Leak Upstream of Main	
7 +35 min	TU07	I (BOP)	Turbine Trip Failure or	n Reactor Trip.	
8 +35 min	RC03 RC19	M (RO, BOP, CRS)		em Leakage at 500 GPM. P Seized Shaft Exceeding DNBR & LPD.	
9 +40 min	RP01M	C (RO)	Containment Spray Pump (P-012) Auto Start Failure.		
* (N)ormal (R)eactivity (I)nstrument (C)omponent (M)ajor (TS)Technical Specifications					

Appendix D Sc		cenario Outline	Form ES-D-1	
Facility: SONGS Examiners:		3 2 and 3	Scenario No.: 3 Operators: -	Op Test No.: October 2010 NRC
Initial Conditions: 1.5% power MOC - RCS Boron is 1415 ppm (by sample). • Train A Component Cooling Water Pump (P-025) in service. • Channel Y Pressurizer Pressure and Level in service. • Steam Bypass Control System in operation.				
Turnover:	Se	cure Auxiliary Feedwa	ater System and Raise F	Power to 18%.
 Critical Tasks: Trip Any Reactor Coolant Pump Not Satisfying Operating Limits. Initiate Emergency Boration for Two (2) Stuck Control Element Assemblies. Restore Feedwater Flow to at Least One Steam Generator. 				uck Control Element Assemblies.
Event No.	Malf. No.	Event Type*		Event Description
1 +15 min		N (BOP)	Place Auxiliary Feedw	ater System in Standby.
2 +30 min		R (RO) N (BOP, CRS)	Power increase to 18%	6 power.
3 +40 min	CH03A	TS (CRS), I (CRS, RO)	Containment Pressure	e Transmitter (PT-0351-1) Fails High.
4 +70 min	ED07B	C (RO, BOP, CRS) TS (CRS)	Loss of Vital AC Instru	ment Bus (Y-02).
5 +72 min	RP23B	C, M (RO, BOP, CRS)	Train A & B Inadvertent Containment Isolation Actuation Signal (CIAS) Actuation.	
6 +72 min	RD0102 RD0202	C, M (RO)	Two (2) Stuck CEAs (# Boration Required.	#1 & #2) upon Reactor Trip. Emergency
7 +78 min	RP01O RP01P	C (BOP)	Auxiliary Feedwater P Emergency Feedwate	umps (P-141 & P-504) Fail to Start on r Actuation Signal.
8 +78 min	FW25	C (BOP)		ry Feedwater Pumps (P-140) Overspeed edwater Actuation Signal.
* (N)ormal (R)eactivity (I)nstrument (C)omponent (M)ajor (TS)Technical Specifications				

Appendix D

Scenario Outline

Form ES-D-1

Appendix D Sc			Scenario Outline	Form ES-D-1	
Facility: Examiners:	,		Scenario No.: 4 Operators:	Op Test No.: October 2010 NRC	
Initial Cond	litions: •	70% power MOC -	RCS Boron is 1070 ppn	n (by sample).	
	•	Train A Componer	nt Cooling Water Pump (P-025) in service.		
	•	Charging Pump (P	-191) aligned to 480 Vol	t Bus 2B04.	
	•	Train A Auxiliary F	eedwater Pump (P-141)	OOS for oil change.	
	•	Channel X Pressur	rizer Pressure and Level	in service.	
Turnover:	Tr	ansfer Reactor Coola	nt Pump (RCP) 6900 V E	Bus 2A01 from UAT to RAT.	
Critical Tas	ks: •	Manually Trip the F	Reactor due to Reactor F	Protection System Failure.	
	•	Reduce Reactor C	coolant System T _{HOT} to le	ss than 530⁰F.	
	•	Isolate the Rupture	ed Steam Generator.		
Event No.	Malf. No.	Event Type*		Event Description	
1 +10 min		N (BOP)		ant Pump 6900 Volt Bus 2A01 from Unit o Reserve Auxiliary Transformer.	
2 +20 min	RC16A	I (RO, CRS) TS (CRS)	Pressurizer Level Contr	rol Channel X (LT-0110-1) Fails High.	
3 +30 min	CS05B	TS (CRS)	Refueling Water Storag Low.	ge Tank Level Transmitter (LT-0305-2) Fails	
4 +35 min	SG01A	C (RO, CRS)	Steam Generator (E-08	88) Tube Leak Greater Than 150 GPD.	
5 +50 min		R (RO) N (BOP, CRS)	Rapid Power Reduction	n for Steam Generator (E-088) Tube Leak.	
6 +55 min	SG01A	M (RO, BOP, CRS)	Steam Generator (E-08 ramp).	88) Tube Rupture at 300 GPM (5 minute	
7 +55 min	RP02A RP02B	I (RO)	All Reactor Trip Pushbu without Scram.	uttons Disabled / Anticipated Transient	
8 +60 min	2A03 LP	C (BOP)	Non-1E 4160 Volt Bus 2	2A03 Fails to Auto Transfer on Reactor Trip.	
* (N)ormal (R)eactivity (I)nstrument (C)omponent (M)ajor (TS)Technical Specifications					