Facility:	SONGS 2 8	8 3 N	NRC						Da	ate o	of Ex	am:	10/	/18/10				
						RO 🖡	K/A C	ateg	ory F	oints	6				SR	O-Only	Points	5
Tier	Group	K 1	K 2	K 3	K 4	K 5	K 6	A 1	A 2	A 3	A 4	G *	Total	Δ	2	G*	e -	Total
1. Emergency	1	2	3	3				3	3			4	18	:	3	3		6
& Abnormal Plant	2	2	1	3				0	2			1	9		4	0		4
Evolutions	Tier Totals	4	4	6				3	5			5	27	-	7	3		10
	1	3	2	2	4	2	2	3	2	2	3	3	28	:	2	3		5
2. Plant Systems	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	10	1	0	2		3
-	Tier Totals	4	3	3	5	3	3	3	3	3	4	4	38	;	3	5		8
3. Generic	Knowledge and	l Abil	ities			1	2	2	3	3	4	4	40	1	2	3	4	-
	Categories				1	2	;	3	3	3	2	2	10	1	2	2	2	7
3.	Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable K/A category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO-only outlines (i.e., except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only outline, the "Tier Totals" in each K/A category shall not be less than two). The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table. The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by ±1 from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions. The final RO exam must total 75 points and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points. Systems / evolutions within each group are identified on the associated outline; systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted and justified; operationally important, site-specific systems / evolutions that are not included on the outline should be added. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for guidance regarding the elimination of inappropriate K/A statements. Select topics from as many systems and evolutions as possible; sample every system or evolution																	
4. 5.	in the group Absent a pla	befo	ore s	elect	ting	a se	cond	d top	ic fo	r ang	y sys	stem	or evolu	ution.	-	-		
0.	shall be sele																	
6.	Select SRO	topic	cs fo	r Tie	rs 1	and	2 fr	om t	he sl	hade	ed sy	/ster	ns and k	K/A cat	egorie	S.		
7.*	The generic the topics m for the applic	usť k	be re	leva													•	
8.	On the follow importance r and category equipment is side of Colur and SRO-on	ating /. Er s san mn A	gs (II nter t nple 2 fo	Rs) f he g d in r Tie	or th roup othe	ne ap o and r tha	oplic d tiei an Ca	able r tota ateg	lice als fo ory <i>A</i>	nse or ea \2 o	level .ch c r G*	l, and ateg on tl	d the poi ory in the he SRO-	nt tota e table only e	ls (#) f above xam, e	or eac e; if fue enter it	h sys [:] el han on th	dling e left

E/APE # / Name Safety Function	K1	K2	K3	A1	A2	G	Number	K/A Topic(s)	lmp.	Q#
015/017 / RCP Malfunctions / 4						x	2.2.44	Equipment Control: Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the status and operation of a system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions	4.4	76
065 / Loss of Instrument Air / 8					x		AA2.03	Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Instrument Air: Location and isolation of leaks	2.9	77
029 / ATWS / 1						x	2.4.6	Emergency Procedures/Plan: Knowledge of EOP mitigation strategies	4.7	78
CE / E06 / Loss of Main Feedwater / 4					x		EA2.1	Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Feedwater: Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations	3.9	79
009 / Small Break LOCA / 3						x	2.4.41	Emergency Procedures/Plan: Knowledge of emergency action level thresholds and classifications	4.6	80
011 Large Break LOCA / 3					x		EA2.03	Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to a Large Break LOCA: Consequences of managing LOCA with loss of CCW	4.2	81
CE / E02 / Reactor Trip - Stabilization - Recovery / 1						x	2.1.31	Conduct of Operations: Ability to locate control room switches, controls, and indications, and to determine that they correctly reflect the desired plant lineup	4.6	39
008 / Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident / 3				х			AA1.08	Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to the Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident: PRT level, pressure, and temperature	3.8	40
009 / Small Break LOCA / 3			х				EK3.22	Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Small Break LOCA: Maintenance of heat sink	4.4	41
011 / Large Break LOCA / 3					x		EA2.11	Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to a Large Break LOCA: Conditions for throttling or stopping HPI	3.9	42

E/APE # / Name Safety Function	K1	K2	K3	A1	A2	G	Number	K/A Topic(s)	Imp.	Q#
015 / 17 / RCP Malfunctions / 4	x						AK1.02	Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to RCP Malfunctions (Loss of RC Flow): Consequences of an RCP failure	3.7	43
025 / Loss of RHR System / 4			х				AK3.01	Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Residual Heat Removal System: Shift to alternate flowpath	3.1	44
022 / Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup / 2						x	2.1.19	Conduct of Operations: Ability to use plant computers to evaluate system or component status	3.9	45
027 / Pressurizer Pressure Control System Malfunction / 3		х					AK2.03	Knowledge of the interrelations between the Pressurizer Pressure Control Malfunctions and the following: Controllers and positioners	2.6	46
CE / E05 / Excess Steam Demand / 4					x		EA2.1	Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Excess Steam Demand: Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations	2.7	47
038 / Steam Generator Tube Rupture / 3	x						EK1.02	Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the Steam Generator Tube Rupture: Leak rate versus pressure drop	3.2	48
CE / E06 / Loss of Feedwater / 4		x					EK2.1	Knowledge of the interrelations between the Loss of Feedwater and the following: Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features	3.3	49
056 / Loss of Offsite Power / 6			х				AK3.02	Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Offsite Power: Actions contained in EOP for loss of offsite power	4.4	50
057 / Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus / 6				х			AA1.05	Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus: Backup instrument indications	3.2	51

E/APE # / Name Safety Function	K1	K2	K3	A1	A2	G	Number	K/A Topic(s)	Imp.	Q#
058 / Loss of DC Power / 6				x			AA1.03	Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of DC power: Vital and battery bus components	3.1	52
062 / Loss of Nuclear Service Water / 4						х	2.4.4	Emergency Procedures/Plan: Ability to recognize abnormal indications for system operating parameters that are entry-level conditions for emergency and abnormal operating procedures	4.5	53
055 / Station Blackout / 6					x		EA2.02	Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Station Blackout: RCS core cooling through natural circulation cooling to SG cooling	4.4	54
077 / Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances / 6		х					AK2.02	Knowledge of the interrelations between Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances and the following: Breakers, relays	3.1	55
029 / ATWS / 1						х	2.1.7	Conduct of Operations: Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation.	4.4	56
K/A Category Point Totals:	2	3	3	3	3 / <mark>3</mark>	4 / <mark>3</mark>	Group Poi	nt Total:		18 / <mark>6</mark>

E/APE # / Name Safety Function	K1	K2	K3	A1	A2	G	Number	K/A Topic(s)	Imp.	Q#
036 / Fuel Handling Accident / 8					x		AA2.02	Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Fuel Handling Incidents: Occurrence of a fuel handling incident	4.1	82
A11 / RCS Overcooling-PTS / 4					x		AA2.2	Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the RCS Overcooling: Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments.	3.4	83
032 / Loss of Source Range NI / 7					x		AA2.01	Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Source Range Nuclear Instrumentation: Normal/abnormal power supply operation	2.9	84
069 / Loss of Containment Integrity / 5					x		AA2.01	Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Containment Integrity: Loss of containment integrity	4.3	85
074 / Inadequate Core Cooling / 4					x		EA2.07	Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to an Inadequate Core Cooling: The difference between a LOCA and inadequate core cooling, from trends and indicators	4.1	57
028 / Pressurizer Level Malfunction / 2			x				AK3.05	Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Pressurizer Level Control Malfunction: Actions contained in EOP for PZR level malfunction	3.7	58
005 / Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod / 1		х					AK2.03	Knowledge of the interrelations between the Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod and the following: Metroscope	3.1	59
036 / Fuel Handling Accident / 8				х			AA1.02	Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to the Fuel Handling Incidents: ARM system	3.1	60
060 / Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Release / 9			x				AK3.02	Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Release: Isolation of the auxiliary building ventilation.	3.3	61
003 / Dropped Control Rod / 1	x						AK1.04	Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the Dropped Control Rod: Effects of power level and control position on flux	3.1	62

E/APE # / Name Safety Function	K1	K2	K3	A1	A2	G	Number		K/A Topic(s)	Imp.	Q#
051 / Loss of Condenser Vacuum / 4			x				AK3.01	responses a Condenser	of the reasons for the following as they apply to the Loss of Vacuum: Loss of steam dump pon loss of condenser vacuum	2.8	63
037 / Steam Generator Tube Leak / 3						x	2.1.7	performanc based on o	Operations: Ability to evaluate plant ee and make operational judgments perating characteristics, reactor nd instrument interpretations	4.4	64
067 / Plant Fire on Site / 8	x						AK1.02	following co	of the operational implications of the oncepts as they apply to the Plant e: Fire fighting	3.1	65
K/A Category Point Totals:	1	1	3	1	2 / <mark>4</mark>	1 / <mark>0</mark>	Group Poi	int Total:			9 / <mark>4</mark>

System #/Name	K1	K2	K3	K4	K5	K6	A1	A2	A3	A4	G	Number	K/A Topics	Imp.	Q#
022 / Containment Cooling											x	2.4.1	Emergency Procedures/Plan: Knowledge of EOP entry conditions and immediate action steps	4.8	86
026 / Containment Spray								x				A2.07	Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CSS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Loss of containment spray pump suction when in recirculation mode, possibly caused by clogged sump screen, pump inlet high temperature exceeded cavitation, voiding, or sump level below cutoff (interlock) limit	3.9	87
061 / Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater											x	2.1.7	Conduct of Operations: Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation	4.7	88
005 / Residual Heat Removal											x	2.2.22	Equipment Control: Knowledge of limiting conditions for operations and safety limits	4.7	89
006 / Emergency Core Cooling								x				A2.10	Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ECCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Low boron concentration in SIS	3.9	90
003 / Reactor Coolant Pump	x											K1.03	Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the RCPS and the following systems: RCP seal system	3.3	1
004 / Chemical and Volume Control				х								K4.03	Knowledge of the CVCS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: Protection of the ion exchangers (high letdown temperature will isolate ion exchangers)	2.8	2
004 / Chemical and Volume Control					x							K5.04	Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the CVCS: Reason for hydrogen cover gas in VCT (oxygen scavenge)	2.8	3

System #/Name	K1	K2	K3	K4	K5	K6	A1	A2	A3	A4	G	Number	K/A Topics	Imp.	Q#
005 / Residual Heat Removal										x		A4.02	Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Heat exchanger bypass flow control	3.4	4
006 / Emergency Core Cooling										х		A4.02	Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Valves	4.0	5
006 / Emergency Core Cooling						х						K6.03	Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the ECCS: Safety Injection Pumps	3.6	6
007 / Pressurizer Relief / Quench Tank			x									K3.01	Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the PRTS will have on the following: Containment	3.3	7
008 / Component Cooling Water				x								K4.07	Knowledge of CCWS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: Operation of the CCW swing bus power supply and its associated breakers and controls	2.6	8
010 / Pressurizer Pressure Control							x					A1.07	Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the PZR PCS controls including: RCS pressure	3.7	9
012 / Reactor Protection						х						K6.06	Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the RPS: Sensors and detectors	2.7	10
012 / Reactor Protection									х			A3.03	Ability to monitor automatic operation of the RPS, including: Power supply	3.4	11
013 / Engineered Safety Features Actuation								x				A2.03	Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ESFAS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Rapid depressurization	4.4	12
022 / Containment Cooling									x			A3.01	Ability to monitor automatic operation of the CCS, including: Initiation of safeguards mode of operation	4.1	13
022 / Containment Cooling											х	2.1.7	Conduct of Operations: Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation	4.4	14

System #/Name	K1	K2	K3	K4	K5	K6	A1	A2	A3	A4	G	Number	K/A Topics	Imp.	Q#
026 / Containment Spray								x				A2.02	Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CSS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Failure of automatic recirculation transfer	4.2	15
026 / Containment Spray				x								K4.07	Knowledge of the CSS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: Adequate level in the containment sump for suction (interlock)	3.8	16
039 / Main and Reheat Steam										х		A4.03	Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: MFW pump turbines	2.8	17
059 / Main Feedwater							x					A1.07	Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the MFW controls, including: Feed Pump speed, including normal control speed for ICS	2.5	18
061 / Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater		х										K2.01	Knowledge of the bus power supplies to the following: AFW system MOVs	3.2	19
062 / AC Electrical Distribution											х	2.1.28	Conduct of Operations: Knowledge of the purpose and function of major system components and controls	4.1	20
062 / AC Electrical Distribution	x											K1.04	Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the AC Electrical Distribution System and the following systems: Offsite power sources	3.7	21
063 / DC Electrical Distribution	x											K1.02	Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the DC Electrical Distribution System and the following systems: AC electrical system	2.7	22
064 / Emergency Diesel Generator		х										K2.01	Knowledge of the bus power supplies to the following: Air compressor	2.7	23
064 / Emergency Diesel Generator			x									K3.03	Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the EDG system will have on the following: EDG (manual loads)	3.6	24

System #/Name	K1	K2	K3	K4	K5	K6	A1	A2	A3	A4	G	Number		K/A Topics	Imp.	Q#
073 / Process Radiation Monitoring					x							K5.03	the following of PRM system:	the operational implications of concepts as they apply to the Relationship between radiation exposure limits	2.9	25
076 / Service Water				x								K4.03	interlock(s) wh Automatic ope	SWS design feature(s) and/or nich provide for the following: ening features associated with valves to CCW heat exchangers	2.9	26
078 / Instrument Air											х	2.2.37		ontrol: Ability to determine d/or availability of safety related	3.6	27
103 / Containment							x					A1.01	parameters (to limits) associa containment c	ict and/or monitor changes in o prevent exceeding design ted with operating the ontrols including: Containment perature, and humidity	3.7	28
K/A Category Point Totals:	3	2	2	4	2	2	3	2 / <mark>2</mark>	2	3	3 / <mark>3</mark>	Group F	Point Total:		•	28 / <mark>5</mark>

System #/Name	K1	K2	K3	K4	K5	K6	A1	A2	A3	A4	G	Number	K/A Topics	Imp.	Q#
068 / Liquid Radwaste								x				A2.02	Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the Liquid Radwaste System; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Lack of tank recirculation prior to release	2.8	91
072 / Area Radiation Monitoring											Х	2.2.12	Equipment Control: Knowledge of surveillance procedures	4.1	92
086 / Fire Protection											x	2.4.31	Emergency Procedures/Plan: Knowledge of annunciator alarms, indications, or response procedures	4.1	93
027 / Containment Iodine Removal		х										K2.01	Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: Fans	3.1	29
055 / Condenser Air Removal									х			A3.03	Ability to monitor automatic operation of the CARS, including: Automatic diversion of CARS exhaust	2.5	30
086 / Fire Protection					х							K5.04	Knowledge of the operational implication of the following concepts as they apply to the Fire Protection System: Hazards to personnel as a result of fire type and methods of protection	2.9	31
041 / Steam Dump/Turbine Bypass Control										х		A4.06	Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Atmospheric relief valve controllers	2.9	32
014 / Rod Position Indication				х								K4.03	Knowledge of RPIS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: Rod bottom lights	3.2	33
072 / Area Radiation Monitoring											х	2.1.27	Conduct of Operations: Knowledge of system purpose and/or function	3.9	34
035 / Steam Generator						х						K6.01	Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the SGS: MSIVs	3.2	35

System #/Name	K1	K2	K3	K4	K5	K6	A1	A2	A3	A4	G	Number	K/A Topics Imp.	Q#
017 / Incore Temperature Monitoring								x				A2.01	Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ITM System; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Thermocouple open and short-circuits	36
015 / Nuclear Instrumentation	x											K 1.08	Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the NIS and the following systems: RCS (pump start) 2.6	37
045 / Main Turbine Generator			x									K3.01	Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the MTG system will have on the following: Remainder of the plant2.9	38
K/A Category Point Totals:	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1 / 1	1	1	1 / <mark>2</mark>	Group Po	int Total:	10 / <mark>3</mark>

Facility: SONG	S 2 & 3 NI	RC Date of Exam: 10/18/2009				
Category	K/A #	Торіс	R	0	SRO	-Only
			IR	#	IR	#
1.	2.1.5	Ability to use procedures related to shift staffing, such as minimum crew complement, overtime limitations, etc.			3.9	94
Conduct of Operations	2.1.19	Ability to use plant computers to evaluate system or component status	3.9	66		
	2.1.30	Ability to locate and operate components, including local controls	4.4	67		
	Subtotal			2		1
	2.2.23	Ability to track Technical Specification limiting conditions for operations			4.6	95
2. Equipment Control	2.2.7	Knowledge of the process for conducting special or infrequent tests			3.6	96
Control	2.2.22	Knowledge of limiting conditions for operations and safety limits	4.0	68		
	2.2.13	Knowledge of tagging and clearance procedures	4.1	69		
	2.2.2	Ability to manipulate the console controls as required to operate the facility between shutdown and designated power levels	4.6	70		
	Subtotal			3		2
3.	2.3.4	Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal or emergency conditions			3.7	97
Radiation Control	2.3.6	Ability to approve release permits			3.8	98
Control	2.3.7	Ability to comply with radiation work permit requirements during normal or abnormal conditions	3.5	71		
	2.3.15	Knowledge of radiation monitoring systems, such as fixed radiation monitors and alarms, portable survey instruments, personnel monitoring equipment, etc.	2.9	72		
	2.3.12	Knowledge of radiological safety principles pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, aligning filters, etc.	3.2	73		
	Subtotal			3		2
4.	2.4.40	Knowledge of SRO responsibilities in emergency plan implementation			4.5	99
Emergency Procedures / Plan	2.4.44	Knowledge of emergency plan protective action recommendations			4.4	100
	2.4.3	Ability to identify post accident instrumentation	3.7	74		
	2.4.11	Knowledge of abnormal condition procedures	4.0	75		
	Subtotal			2		2
Tier 3 Point Tota				10		7

Tier / Group	Randomly Selected K/A	Reason for Rejection
2/2	016 K5.01	Q #31 – Unable to develop a psychometrically sound question that discriminates at the RO license level. Randomly reselected 086 K5.04.
1 / 1	011 EA2.09	Q #42 – This specific K/A adequately covered by Question #54. Randomly reselected 011 EA2.11.
1/2	074 EA2.05	Q #57 – Unable to develop a psychometrically sound question that discriminates at the RO license level. Reselected 074 EA2.07.
1 / 1	015/017 AA2.07	Q #76 – Unable to develop a psychometrically sound question that discriminates at the SRO license level. Randomly reselected 015/017 G 2.2.44.
1 / 1	011 G 2.4.3	Q #81 – Unable to develop an appropriate SRO level question that discriminates at the SRO license level. Reselected 011 EA2.03.
1/2	001 G 2.4.1	Q #83 – Unable to develop a psychometrically sound question that discriminates at the SRO license level. Automatic Rod Control has been disabled at SONGS. Randomly reselected A11 AA2.2.
1 / 1	077 AK2.03	Q #55 – Unable to develop a psychometrically sound question that is considered important to safety. Randomly reselected 077 AK2.02.
1/2	032 AA2.02	Q #84 – Unable to develop a psychometrically sound question that discriminates at the SRO license level. Reselected 032 AA2.01.
1/2	068 AA2.07	Q #85 – Unable to develop a psychometrically sound question that discriminates at the SRO license level. Reselected 069 AA2.01.
2 / 1	061 A2.07	Q #88 – Unable to develop a psychometrically sound question that discriminates at the SRO license level. Reselected 061 G 2.1.7.
1/2	060 AK3.01	Q #61 – Emergency Plan implementation is considered SRO level knowledge. Randomly reselected 060 AK3.02.
1/2	059 AA2.04	Q #82 – Coverage of radioactive releases deemed adequate per Questions #61, #91, and #98. Reselected 036 AA2.02 to address exam content of 10CFR 55.43(7).
2 / 1	059 A2.12	Q #18 – Unable to develop a psychometrically sound question that discriminates at the RO license level. Reselected 059 A1.07 for skyscraper balance.
2 / 1	004 K5.29	Q #03 – Unable to develop a psychometrically sound question that discriminates at the RO license level. Reselected 004 K5.04.
2 / 1	064 K3.01	Q #24 – Unable to develop a psychometrically sound question that discriminates at the RO license level. No automatic loader information available to the operator. Reselected 064 K3.03.
2/2	072 K3.02	Q #34 – This specific K/A already covered by Q #60. Reselected 072 G 2.1.27 for skyscraper balance.
3/2	G 2.2.25	Q #70 – Assigned K/A G 2.2.2 as it is a better fit for the question and avoids issues with Technical Specification Bases for Reactor Operators.
1 / 1	EO2 G 2.2.3	Q #39 – Substituted K/A G 2.1.31 as the Unit 3 Steam Generator replacement will be underway and negate identified differences between Units.

Tier / Group	Randomly Selected K/A	Reason for Rejection
1 / 1	EO6 EA1.2	Q #49 – Reselected E06 EK2.1 for skyscraper balance.
2 / 1	003 K1.12	Q #01 – This specific K/A already covered by scenario malfunctions. Reselected 003 K1.03.
2 / 1	006 K6.05	Q #06 – Multiple interpretations as to meaning of selected K/A. Assigned a more appropriate K/A to this new question. Selected 006 K6.03.
2 / 1	026 A2.05	Q #15 – Unable to develop a psychometrically sound question that discriminates at the RO license level since there are no Chemical Injection Tanks associated with the Containment Spray System. Reselected 026 A2.02.
1 / 1	008 AA1.05	Q #40 – Unable to develop a psychometrically sound question that discriminates at the RO license level. Reselected 008 AA1.08.
1 / 1	058 AA1.01	Q #52 – Unable to develop a psychometrically sound question that discriminates at the RO license level. Reselected 058 AA1.03.
1/2	067 AA1.09	Q #65 – Unable to develop a psychometrically sound question that discriminates at the RO license level. Fire Computer is frequently OOS in the Control Room because this function is performed by the Site Fire Brigade. Reselected 067 AK1.02.
1/2	003 AK1.07	Q #62 – Unable to develop a psychometrically sound question that discriminates at the RO license level. Reselected 003 AK1.04.
2 / 1	005 A4.01	Q #04 – This specific K/A already covered by JPM S-4. Reselected 005 A4.02.
2 / 1	010 G2.4.9	Q #15 – Unable to develop a psychometrically sound question that discriminates at the RO license. Reselected 012 K6.06 for skyscraper balance.
3 / 4	G2.4.18	Q #75 – Assigned a more appropriate K/A to this question. Selected G2.4.11.
2 / 1	022 K3.02	Q #14 – Assigned a more appropriate K/A to this new question. Selected G2.1.7.
1 / 1	022 G2.4.2	Q #45 – Assigned a more appropriate K/A to this Cycle 16 Plant Modification. Selected G2.1.19.

Facility: SONGS 2 & 3			Date of Examination:	10/18/10				
Examination Level: React	tor Operator		Operating Test Number:	NRC				
Administrative Topic (see Note)	Type Code*		Describe Activity to be Performed					
Conduct of Operations	M, R	2.1.25	Ability to interpret reference graphs, curves, tables, etc.					
	,	JPM:	Determine Boration require MODE 5. (J169A)	d to Cooldown to				
		2.1.19	Ability to use plant compute system or component statu					
Conduct of Operations	N, S	JPM:	Remove a Nuisance Radiation Monitor From Scan on DAS. (New)					
		2.2.12	Knowledge of surveillance	procedures (3.7).				
Equipment Control	N, S	JPM:	Perform QSPDS Administrative Channel Checks. (New)					
Radiation Control	M, R	2.3.7	Ability to comply with radiat requirements during norma conditions (3.5).					
		JPM:	Determine Stay Times / Respond to changing radiological conditions. (J216A)					
Emergency Plan	-							
	<i>'</i>		Os. RO applicants require or ive topics, when all 5 are require	-				
*Type Codes & Criteria:	(C)ontrol ro	om, (S)ii	mulator, or Class(R)oom					
	(D)irect fror	n bank (:	\leq 3 for ROs; \leq for 4 for SROs	s & RO retakes)				
	(N)ew or (M	1)odified	from bank (≥ 1)					
	(P)revious 2	2 exams	(\leq 1; randomly selected)					

- RA1 The applicant will determine the target Boron Concentration required to cool the plant down to MODE 5 per SO23-5-1.5, Plant Shutdown from Hot Standby to Cold Shutdown. The critical steps include determination of the proper value of boron concentration and the required amount to borate using Operations Boration / Dilution Charts. This is a modified bank JPM.
- RA2 The applicant will remove a Radiation Monitor causing nuisance alarms from Scan on the Data Acquisition System per SO23-3-2.36, Radiation Monitor Data Acquisition System, Section 6.4, Bypassing and Restoring RTP Chassis Monitor Alarms. The critical steps include proper monitor selection and removing the Radiation Monitor alarm from Scan. This is a new JPM.
- RA3 The applicant will perform the administrative CHANNEL CHECKS for the Qualified Safety Parameter Display System per SO23-3-2.35, Qualified Safety Parameter Display System, Attachment 3, QSPDS Administrative Channel Checks. The critical steps include collecting data and determining whether each parameter is within tolerance per the Acceptance Criteria. This is a new JPM.
- RA4 The applicant will review a Radiation Entry Permit, select a Survey Map, and determine stay times while hanging a Clearance per SO123-VII-20.9, Radiological Surveys. The critical steps include selecting the appropriate Survey Map and calculating stay time based on the allowable External Dose Equivalent. This is a modified bank JPM.

Facility: SONGS 2 & 3			Date of Examination:	10/18/10			
Examination Level: Senic	r Reactor Op	erator	Operating Test Number:	NRC			
Administrative Topic (see Note)	Type Code*		Describe Activity to be Pe	erformed			
Conduct of Operations	M, R	2.1.23	Ability to perform specific sintegrated plant procedures of plant operation (4.4).				
		JPM:	Perform DNBR Margin Lim (J271A)	it Verification.			
Conduct of Operations	M, R	2.1.25	Ability to interpret referenc graphs, curves, tables, etc.				
		JPM:	Perform Monthly Surveillance to Update Power Maneuvering Guidelines. (J255A)				
Equipment Control	N, S	2.2.37	Ability to determine operability and/or availability of safety related equipment (4.6).				
	Ν, Ο	JPM:	Evaluate Reactor Trip Breaker Operability. (New)				
Radiation Control	N, R	2.3.15	Knowledge of radiation mo such as fixed radiation mor portable survey instrument monitoring equipment, etc.	nitors and alarms, s, personnel			
		JPM:	Determine Change in Stea Leakage. (New)	m Generator Tube			
Emergency Plan	M, S	2.4.38	Ability to take actions called emergency plan, including acting as emergency coord (4.4).	supporting or			
		JPM:	Perform Actions for an Airc Event. (J281A)	craft Attack Security			
NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when all 5 are required.							

Administrative Topics Outline Task Summary

*Type Codes & Criteria:	(C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom
	(D)irect from bank (\leq 3 for ROs; \leq for 4 for SROs & RO retakes)
	(N)ew or (M)odified from bank (\geq 1)
	(P)revious 2 exams (\leq 1; randomly selected)

- SA1 The applicant will perform a Departure from Nucleate Boiling Ratio Margin Limit verification per SO23-3-3.06, COLSS Out of Service Surveillance. The critical steps include properly identifying the margins and determining if the margin Acceptance Criteria is met. This is a modified bank JPM.
- SA2 The applicant will perform the monthly surveillance to update the Power Maneuvering Guidelines per SO23-5-1.7, Power Operations. The critical steps include correctly determining each boration requirement within specified tolerances and correctly updating the Operating Thumbrules. This is a modified bank JPM.
- SA3 The applicant will evaluate the operability of a Reactor Trip Breaker and perform actions required based on the evaluation per SO23-3-3.5, CEA / Reactor Trip Circuit Breaker OPERABILITY Testing, Attachment 3, Reactor Trip Circuit Breaker Monthly Test - MODES 1 and 2. The critical steps include properly identifying OPERABILITY and determining affected Technical Specifications when the surveillance fails to meet Acceptance Criteria. This is a new JPM.
- SA4 The applicant will determine the change in leakrate during a Steam Generator Tube Leak based on the change in µci/sec as read on RE-7870, Condenser Air Ejector Wide Range Gas Monitor. The critical steps include calculating the change in leakrate based on RE-7870, per SO23-13-14, Reactor Coolant Leak, Attachment 1, RE-7870 Steam Generator Radiation and Leakage Readings, and determining the required action per SO23-13-14, Step 4s. This is a new JPM.
- SA5 The applicant will perform an NRC notification and other actions for an aircraft attack per SO23-13-25, Operator Actions During Security Events, Attachment 5, Aircraft Attack Threat. The critical steps include notifying the NRC and initiating a train of Toxic Gas Isolation Signal (TGIS). This is a modified bank JPM.

Control Room / In-Plant Systems Outline

Form ES-301-2

Facilit	ty:	SONGS	Units 2 and 3	3	Date of I	Examination:	10/18/10				
Exam	Level:	RO 🗆	SRO(I)	SRO (U) 🗌	Operatin	ig Test No.:	NRC				
Contro	Control Room Systems [@] (8 for RO; 7 for SRO-I; 2 or 3 for SRO-U, including 1 ESF)										
System / JPM Title Type Code* Safety											
S-1			Drive System (A, M, S	1				
S-2		gineered S SIAS and C	-	e Actuation Syste	m (J069S)	D, EN, S	2				
S-3			ressure Contro n Pressurizer S	ol System (J254FS Spray Valve)	A, D, S	3				
S-4			•	/stem (J152FS) utdown Cooling		A, D, L, S	4P				
S-5	059 – Main Feedwater System (J034S) (RO Only) Transfer from Main Feedwater to Auxiliary Feedwater					M, S	4S				
S-6		• •	iesel Generato s EDG with Re	ors (J286S) serve Auxiliary Tra	nsformer	D, S	6				
S-7				ion System (New) S Control Panels)	A, N, S	7				
S-8			Purge System ling Accident i	(New) n Containment		A, EN, N, S	8				
In-Plai	nt Systems	[@] (3 for R0	D; 3 for SRO-I;	3 or 2 for SRO-U)							
P-1	-		ool Cooling S ool Makeup fi	System (New) rom the RWST		E, N, R	8				
P-2				ystems (J022) ve to Remote Ope	eration	D	4S				
P-3			l Volume Conti Irging Pump Bi		D, E	2					

@ All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.									
* Type Codes	Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U								
(A)Iternate path	4-6 / 4-6 / 2-3								
(C)ontrol room									
(D)irect from bank	\leq 9 / \leq 8 / \leq 4								
(E)mergency or abnormal in-plant	\geq 1 / \geq 1 / \geq 1								
(EN)gineered safety feature	- / - / \geq 1 (control room system)								
(L)ow Power / Shutdown	\geq 1 / \geq 1 / \geq 1								
(N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A)	\geq 2 / \geq 2 / \geq 1								
(P)revious 2 exams	\leq 3 / \leq 3 / \leq 2 (randomly selected)								
(R)CA	$\geq 1 / \geq 1 / \geq 1$								
(S)imulator									

NRC JPM Examination Summary Description

- S-1 The applicant will exercise an individual Control Element Assembly (CEA) after I&C Maintenance per SO23-3-2.19, Control Element Drive Mechanism Control System. The alternate path occurs when two (2) CEAs drop into the Core requiring the actions of SO23-13-13, Misaligned or Immovable Control Element Assembly. This is a time critical, modified bank JPM under the Control Rod Drive System - Reactivity Control Safety Function. This is a PRA significant action.
- S-2 The applicant will perform a reset of the Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS) and Containment Cooling Actuation Signal (CCAS) per SO23-3-2.22, Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Operation, Attachment 5, SIAS / CCAS and CIAS Reset. This is a bank JPM under the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System – Reactor Coolant System Inventory Control Safety Function.
- S-3 The applicant will respond to an open Pressurizer Spray Valve per SO23-13-27, Pressurizer Pressure and Level Malfunction. The alternate path includes tripping the Reactor and associated Reactor Coolant Pumps for the affected Pressurizer Spray Valve, when it is determined that the Spray Valve will not close. This is a bank JPM under the Pressurizer Pressure and Level Control System - Reactor Pressure Control Safety Function. This is a PRA significant action.
- S-4 The applicant will perform the actions for a Loss of Shutdown Cooling (SDC) per SO23-13-15, Loss of Shutdown Cooling, during a Loss of Offsite Power while in a Reduced Inventory Condition. The alternate path occurs when the SDC Pump starts to cavitate and actions must be taken to refill the Reactor Coolant System using High Pressure Safety Injection. This is a bank JPM under the Residual Heat Removal System -Heat Removal from Reactor Core Safety Function. This is a PRA significant action.

- S-5 The applicant will shift from the Main Feedwater System to the Auxiliary Feedwater System during a plant shutdown per SO23-9-6, Feedwater Control System Operation, Attachment 6, Feedwater Control System Operation - Unit Shutdown. This is a modified bank JPM under the Main Feedwater System - Secondary System Heat Removal from the Reactor Core Safety Function.
- S-6 The applicant will synchronize the Emergency Diesel Generator operating in the Isochronous Mode with the Reserve Auxiliary Transformer per SO23-02-13, Diesel Generator Operation, Attachment 2, Section 2.6, Paralleling a Diesel Supplied Isochronous Bus to the RAT, and Section 2.8, Unloading the Diesel Generator. This is a bank JPM under the Emergency Diesel Generator System - Electrical Safety Function.
- S-7 The applicant will be directed to reduce Turbine load per SO23-5-1.7, Power Operations, Section 6.3, Turbine Load Change Using Setpoint Adjustment. The alternate path occurs when power to both Turbine DCS Control Panels and the Ovation Keyboard is lost requiring action to place an alternate control screen in service and stop the Turbine load change. This is a new JPM under the Non-Nuclear Instrumentation System -Instrumentation Safety Function.
- S-8 The applicant will respond to a Fuel Handling Accident in Containment during MODE 6 operations per SO23-13-20, Fuel Handling Accidents. The alternate path occurs when the Containment Purge System fails to isolate and must be manually isolated per SO23-3-2.22, Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Operation, Attachment 20, CPIS Actuation Verification. This is a new JPM under the Containment Purge System Plant Service System Safety Function.
- P-1 The applicant will respond to a loss of Spent Fuel Pool inventory per SO23-13-23, Loss of Spent Fuel Pool Cooling, by locally aligning makeup from the Refueling Water Storage Tank per SO23-3-2.11.1, Spent Fuel Pool Level Change and Purification Crosstie Operations, Attachment 3, SFP Makeup Using the RWST and SFP Pump P-009. This is a new JPM under the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System - Plant Service System Safety Function.
- P-2 The applicant will restore remote operation of a Unit 2 Atmospheric Dump Valve per SO23-3-2.18.1, Atmospheric Dump Valve Operation, Attachment 4, Local Manual Operation of HV-8419 Atmospheric Dump Valve, Section 2.2, Restoration from HV-8419 Local Manual Operation <u>or</u> Attachment 5, Local Manual Operation of HV-8421 Atmospheric Dump Valve, Section 2.2, Restoration from HV-8421 Operation. This is a bank JPM under the Main and Reheat Steam System Secondary System Heat Removal from Reactor Core Safety Function.
- P-3 The applicant will locally close a Charging Pump Breaker per SO23-13-2, Shutdown From Outside the Control Room, Attachment 21, Circuit Breaker Abnormal Operation. This is a bank JPM under the Chemical and Volume Control System Reactor Coolant Inventory Control Safety Function. This is a PRA significant action.

Facility:	SONG	GS 2 a	nd 3			Date	e of Ex	am:	10/18	3/10	Operating Test Number: 1							
	E								SCENA	RIOS								
A P P	V E N	S	ONGS ;	¥1	S	ONGS #	¥2	s	ONGS #	# 4								
L I C	т т		CREW OSITIC	N	P	CREW OSITIO	N	Р	CREW		Р	CREW		т О Т	MI	NIMUN	A(*)	
A N	Y P	S R	A T	B O	S R	A T	B O	S R	A T	B O	S R	A T	B O	A L	R	I	U	
Т	E	0	С	Р	0	С	Р	0	С	Р	0	С	Р					
	RX NOR	- 4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-				0	1	1	0	
SROU-1	I/C	1,2,3, 5	-	-	1,2,3, 4,5	-	-	-	-	-				9	4	4	2	
	MAJ	6	-	-	6,8	-	-	-	-	-				3	2	2	1	
	TS	1,5	-	-	1,2	-	-	-	-	-				4	0	2	2	
	RX	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-				0	1	1	0	
	NOR	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1,5				3	1	1	1	
SROI-1	I/C	1,2,3, 5	-	-	-	1,2,4, 5,9	-	-	-	8				10	4	4	2	
	MAJ	6	-	-	-	6,8	-	-	-	6				4	2	2	1	
	TS	1,5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-			[2	0	2	2	
	RX	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-				1	1	1	0	
	NOR	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	-	-				1	1	1	1	
SROI-2	I/C	-	2,5	-	1,2,3, 4,5	-	-	2,3,4	-	-				10	4	4	2	
	MAJ	-	6	-	6,8	-	-	6	-	-				4	2	2	1	
	TS	-	-	-	1,2	-	-	2,3	-	-				4	0	2	2	
	RX	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-				0	1	1	0	
SROI-3	NOR I/C	4 1,2,3,	-	-	-	1,2,4,	-	-	-	1,5 8				3 10	4	4	1 2	
	MAJ	5 6	-	_	-	5,9 6,8	_	-	-	6				4	2	2	1	
	TS	1,5	-	-	-	- 0,0	-	_	-	-				2	0	2	2	
	RX	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-				1	1	1	0	
	NOR	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	-	-				1	1	1	1	
SROI-4	I/C	-	2,5	-	1,2,3, 4,5	-	-	2,3,4	-	-				10	4	4	2	
	MAJ	-	6	-	6,8	-	-	6	-	-				4	2	2	1	
	TS	-	-	-	1,2	-	-	2,3	-	-				4	0	2	2	
	RX NOR	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-				1 0	1 1	1	0 1	
RO-1	I/C	-	- 2,5	-	-	-	1,3,7	-	-	-				5	4	4	2	
	MAJ	-	6	-	-	-	6,8	-	-	-				3	2	2	1	
	TS	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-				0	0	2	2	
	RX	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	-				1	1	1	0	
	NOR	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	-				1	1	1	1	
RO-2	I/C	-	-	1,8,9	-	-	1,3,7	-	2,4,7	-				9	4	4	2	
	MAJ	-	-	6	-	-	6,8	-	6	-				4	2	2	1	
	TS	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-				0	0	2	2	

А	E V								SCENA	RIOS									
P P	E N	S	ONGS #	¥1	S	ONGS #	¥2	S	ONGS #	#4									
L I C	т т		CREW OSITIO		P	CREW POSITIO	N	Р	CREW OSITIO		Р	CREW		T O T	IVII	MINIMUM(*)			
A N T	Y P E	S R O	A T C	B O P	S R O	A T C	B O P	S R O	A T C	B O P	S R O	A T C	B O P	A L	R	I	U		
	RX	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	-				1	1	1	0		
	NOR	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	-				1	1	1	1		
RO-3	I/C	-	-	1,8,9	-	-	1,3,7	-	2,4,7	-				9	4	4	2		
	MAJ	-	-	6	-	-	6,8	-	6	-				4	2	2	1		
	TS	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-			0	0	2	2		
	RX	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-				1	1	1	0		
	NOR	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-				0	1	1	1		
RO-4	I/C	-	2,5	-	-	-	1,3,7	-	-	-				5	4	4	2		
	MAJ	-	6	-	-	-	6,8	-	-	-				3	2	2	1		
	TS	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-			0	0	2	2		
	RX	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-				0	1	1	0		
	NOR	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	-				1	1	1	1		
RO-5	I/C	-	-	1,8,9	-	1,2,4, 5,9	-	-	-	-				8	4	4	2		
	MAJ	-	-	6	-	6,8	-	-	-	-				3	2	2	1		
	TS	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-				0	0	2	2		
	RX	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-				0	1	1	0		
	NOR	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	-				1	1	1	1		
RO-6	I/C	-	-	1,8,9	-	1,2,4, 5,9	-	-	-	-				8	4	4	2		
	MAJ	-	-	6	-	6,8	-	-	-	-				3	2	2	1		
	TS	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-				0	0	2	2		

Instr	Instructions:								
1.	Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the "at-the-controls (ATC)" and "balance-of-plant (BOP)" positions; Instant SROs must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an Instant SRO <i>additionally</i> serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.								
2.	Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or <i>controlled</i> abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a 1-for-1 basis.								
3.	Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicant's competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicant's license level in the right-hand columns.								

Appendix	D		Operator Action		Form ES-D-1
Operating To Event Descr	iption: Stea		1 Event # ntainment / Loss of Offsite Po Steam Isolation Signal Actua	ower / Loss of SDG&	age <u>1</u> of <u>1</u> E Switchyard / Train B
Time	Position		Applicant's Action		
Facility: Examiners		S 2 and 3	Scenario No.: 1 Operators:	Op Test No.:	October 2010 NRC
Initial Conc	litions: •		- RCS Boron is 989 ppm		
	•	Charging Pump (P Channel X Pressu	it Cooling Water Pump (P -191) aligned to 480 Volt I rizer Pressure and Level in Pump (P-174) OOS for s	Bus 2B04. n service.	
Turnover:	Μ	laintain steady-state p	ower level.		
Critical Tas	• ks:		ure Following Loss of Hears		
Event No.	Malf. No.	Event Type*		Event Description	
1 +10 min	SG03G	I (BOP, CRS) TS (CRS)	Steam Generator (E-089 Low.) Pressure Transm	itter (PT-1013-3) Fails
2 +20 min	RC15A	I (RO, CRS)	Pressurizer Pressure Co	ntrol Channel X (P	T-0100X) Fails High.
3 +25 min	CW05A		Circulating Water Pump	(P-115) Overcurrer	nt Trip.
4 +50 min		R (RO) N (BOP, CRS)	Rapid Power Reduction t Pump (P-115) per Direct		
5 +55 min	CV17B	C (RO, CRS) TS (CRS)	Boric Acid Makeup Pump	o (P-175) Trips Dur	ing Boration.
6 +60 min	MS03B	M (RO, BOP, CRS)	Steam Generator (E-089 Containment.) Main Steam Line	Break Inside
7 +60 min	PG24 PG57		Loss of Offsite Power (30 Loss of SDG&E Switchya		
8 +60 min	EG16B	C (BOP)	Train B Emergency Dies Automatically Close.	el Generator (2G00	03) Breaker Fails to
9 +65 min	MSIS LP	I (BOP)	Main Steam Isolation Sig	nal Fails to Autom	atically Actuate.
* (N)	ormal (R)	eactivity (I)nstrumen	t (C)omponent (M)ajor	(TS)Technical S	pecifications

Appendix	opendix D Operator Action			Form ES-D-1				
Operating T		RC Scenario #	2 Event		6, 7, 8, & 9	Page	1 of 1	
Event Descr	Event Description: Steam Line Break Outside Containment / Reactor Coolant System Leak / Fuel Failure / Turbine Trip Failure / Containment Spray Pump Start Failure							
Time								
1								
Facility:	SONGS	S 2 and 3	Scenario No.:	2	Op Test No.:	Octo	ber 2010 NRC	
Examiners: Operators:								
			_					
			_	_				
			-	_				
Initial Conc	Initial Conditions: • 70% power MOC - RCS Boron is 1070 ppm (by sample).							
	•	Train A Component	t Cooling Water Pur	mp (F	-025) in service	ə.		
	٠	Charging Pump (P-	192) running with (P-191	I) aligned to 48	0 Volt Bu	s 2B04.	
	•	Train A Auxiliary Fe	edwater Pump (P-	141) (OOS for oil cha	nge.		
	•	Channel X Pressuri	izer Pressure and L	.evel i	in service.			
Turnover:	Ma	aintain steady-state co	nditions following r	eturn	of Main Feedw	ater Pum	p to service.	
Critical Tas	sks: •	Restore Componen	t Cooling Water Flo	ow du	e to Loss of CO	CW Pump).	
	•	Manually Trip Reac	tor Due to Reactor	Prote	ection System F	ailure.		
	•	Isolate the Faulted	Steam Generator	During	Excess Steam	Demano	d Event.	
Event No.	Malf. No.	Event Type*			Event Descrip	otion		
1 +15 min	RC17B	I (RO, BOP, CRS) TS (CRS)	Pressurizer Press Low.	ure V	Vide Range Tra	nsmitter	(PT-0102-2) Fails	
2 +25 min	CV22C	C (RO, CRS) TS (CRS)	Charging Pump (P-192) Overcurrent Trip.					
3 +30 min	CC06B	C (BOP, CRS)	Train A Compone	nt Co	oling Water Pu	mp (P-02	5) Trip.	
4 +32 min	OBE with RC07A	C (RO, CRS)	Seismic Event wit (60 second time d			ump (P-0	001) Seized Shaft	
5 +32 min	RP15	I (RO)	Reactor Fails to A	utom	atically Trip.			
6 +35 min	MS05A	M (RO, BOP, CRS)	Steam Generator Steam Isolation V		38) Main Steam	Leak Up	stream of Main	
7 +35 min	TU07	I (BOP)	Turbine Trip Failu	re on	Reactor Trip.			
8 +35 min	RC03 RC19	M (RO, BOP, CRS)	Reactor Coolant S Failed Fuel due to					
9 +40 min	RP01M	C (RO)	Containment Spra	ay Pu	mp (P-012) Aut	o Start Fa	ailure.	
* (N)ormal (R)eactivity (I)nstrument (C)omponent (M)ajor (TS)Technical Specifications								

Appendix D			Operator Action				Form ES-D-1	
Operating Te Event Descr	iption: Two S	RC Scenario # Stuck Control Element A		-		Page <u>1</u> S Start Failures	of	1
Time	Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior							
Facility:		3 2 and 3	Scenario No		Op Test No.:	: October 2	2010 NR	C
Examiners:	:		0	perators:				
			_					
			-					
Initial Conditions: • 1.5% power MOC - RCS Boron is 1415 ppm (by sample).								
	•	Train A Component	t Cooling Wa	ater Pump (P-025) in service	e.		
	•	Channel Y Pressuri	zer Pressure	e and Level	in service.			
	•	Steam Bypass Con	trol System i	in operatior	۱.			
Turnover:	Se	cure Auxiliary Feedwa	ater System	and Raise I	Power to 18%.			
Critical Tas	sks: •	Trip Any Reactor C	oolant Pump	Not Satisf	ying Operating L	_imits.		
	•	Initiate Emergency	Boration for	Two (2) Stu	uck Control Elen	nent Assembli	es.	
Event No.	Malf. No.	Event Type*	Event Description					
1 +15 min		N (BOP)	Place Auxiliary Feedwater System in Standby.					
2 +30 min		R (RO) N (BOP, CRS)	Power incre	ease to 18%	% power.			
3 +40 min	СН0ЗА	TS (CRS)	Containment Pressure Transmitter (PT-0351-1) Fails High.					
4 +70 min	ED07B	C (RO, BOP, CRS) TS (CRS)	Loss of Vita	al AC Instru	ument Bus (Y-02	<u>'</u>).		
5 +72 min	RP23B	M (RO, BOP, CRS)	Train A & B Inadvertent Containment Isolation Actuation Signal (CIAS) Actuation.				nal	
6 +72 min	RD0102 RD0202	C (RO)	Two (2) Stuck CEAs (#1 & #2) upon Reactor Trip. Emergency Boration Required.				су	
7 +78 min	RP010 RP01P	C (BOP)	Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps (P-141 & P-504) Fail to Start on Emergency Feedwater Actuation Signal.					
* (N)ormal (R)eactivity (I)nstrument (C)omponent (M)ajor (TS)Technical Specifications								

Appendix D Operator Action Form E							
	Operating Test : NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 6, 7, & 8 Page 1 0 Event Description: Steam Generator Tube Rupture / Anticipated Transient without Scram / Non-1E Bus Failure Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior						
Facility: Examiners:		S 2 and 3	Scenario No.: 4 Op Test No.: Operators:	October 2010 NRC			
Initial Cond	litions: •		RCS Boron is 1070 ppm (by sample).				
 Train A Component Cooling Water Pump (P-025) in service. Charging Pump (P-191) aligned to 480 Volt Bus 2B04. Train A Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (P-141) OOS for oil change. Channel X Pressurizer Pressure and Level in service. 							
Turnover: Transfer Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) 6900 V Bus 2A01 from UAT to RAT. Critical Tasks: • Manually Trip the Reactor due to Reactor Protection System Failure. • Reduce Reactor Coolant System T _{HOT} to less than 530°F.							
	•	Isolate the Rupture	ed Steam Generator.				
Event No.	Malf. No.	Event Type*	Event Description				
1 +10 min		N (BOP)	Transfer Reactor Coolant Pump 6900 Volt Auxiliary Transformer to Reserve Auxiliary				
2 +20 min	RC16A	I (RO, CRS) TS (CRS)	Pressurizer Level Control Channel X (LT-07	110-1) Fails High.			
3 +30 min	CS05B	TS (CRS)	Refueling Water Storage Tank Level Trans	mitter (LT-0305-2) Fails			
4 +35 min	SG01A	C (RO, CRS)	Steam Generator (E-088) Tube Leak Great	er Than 150 GPD.			
5 +50 min		R (RO) N (BOP, CRS)	Rapid Power Reduction for Steam Generat	or (E-088) Tube Leak.			
6 +55 min	SG01A	M (RO, BOP, CRS)	Steam Generator (E-088) Tube Rupture at ramp).	300 GPM (5 minute			
7 +55 min	RP02A RP02B	I (RO)	All Reactor Trip Pushbuttons Disabled / Antwithout Scram.	ticipated Transient			
8 +60 min	2A03 LP	C (BOP)	Non-1E 4160 Volt Bus 2A03 Fails to Auto T	Fransfer on Reactor Trip.			
* (N)ormal (R)eactivity (I)nstrument (C)omponent (M)ajor (TS)Technical Specifications							