



**UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**  
REGION III  
2443 WARRENVILLE ROAD, SUITE 210  
LISLE, IL 60532-4352

November 10, 2010

Mr. Timothy J. O'Connor  
Site Vice President  
Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant  
Northern States Power Company, Minnesota  
2807 West County Road 75  
Monticello, MN 55362-9637

**SUBJECT: MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION  
AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000263/2010007**

Dear Mr. O'Connor:

On October 1, 2010, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a Problem Identification and Resolution (PI&R) inspection at your Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant. The enclosed report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on October 1, 2010, with you and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

The inspection concluded that your staff was effective at identifying problems and incorporating them into the corrective action program (CAP). In general, issues were appropriately prioritized, evaluated, and corrected; audits and self-assessments were thorough and probing, and operating experience was appropriately screened and disseminated. Your staff was aware of the importance of having a strong safety-conscious work environment and expressed a willingness to raise safety issues. The inspectors also observed that actions taken to address a declining trend in Human Performance appeared to be effective.

However, your staff was not fully effective in addressing an adverse trend in contractor oversight and in work control and planning, which had begun earlier this year. Although both issues were captured in the CAP program, the underlying causes were not fully understood. This resulted in corrective actions being more reactive, instead of proactive, when responding to related issues. The inspectors were concerned that this adverse trend, if not resolved, would negatively impact the significant number of work activities planned for next year.

T. O'Connor

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No violations or findings were identified during this inspection.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records System (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

**/RA/**

Kenneth Riemer, Chief  
Branch 2  
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket No. 50-263  
License No. DPR-22

Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000263/2010007  
w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServe

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Docket No.	50-263
License No.	DPR-22
Report No:	05000263/2010007
Licensee:	Northern States Power Company, Minnesota
Facility:	Monticello Nuclear Generating Station
Location:	Monticello, MN
Dates:	September 13 – October 1, 2010
Inspectors:	N. Shah, Project Engineer - Team Lead D. Sand, Acting Resident Inspector - Monticello C. Scott, Reactor Engineer G. O'Dwyer, Reactor Engineer M. Phalen, Plant Support Specialist
Approved by:	Kenneth Riemer, Chief Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects

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## SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000263/2010007; 09/13/2010 - 10/01/2010; Monticello Nuclear Generating Station; Biennial Baseline Inspection of the Identification and Resolution of Problems.

This team inspection was performed by four regional inspectors and the resident inspector. No violations or findings were identified.

### Identification and Resolution of Problems

Overall, the Corrective Action Program (CAP) was good. Issues were effectively identified, evaluated and corrected. Nuclear Oversight (NOS) audits and department self-assessments were generally critical and identified issues that were captured in the (CAP). Operating Experience (OE) was well communicated and appropriately evaluated. A strong safety culture was evident, based on interviews with licensee staff and a review of the types of issues captured in the CAP and Employee Concerns Program (ECP).

The inspectors observed that the evaluation of OE in Apparent Cause Evaluations (ACEs) had improved since the 2008 PI&R inspection. Specifically, ACEs now discussed whether the failure to properly evaluate previously identified OE was a potential precursor of the event.

The licensee took proactive efforts to address a declining trend in the Security Department Safety-Conscious Work Environment (SCWE). The inspectors received positive feedback during interviews with Security officers, and noted an increasing trend in the number of issues identified by the Security force.

The licensee's actions to address the previous cross-cutting issues in Human Performance and a potential cross-cutting issue in Issue Evaluation appeared good. The corrective actions appeared appropriate and the inspectors noted improving performance over the last six months in these areas.

However, the inspectors noted that the licensee had recurring problems with managing the CAP backlog and with ensuring that items identified during management observations were captured in the CAP. The inspectors also identified some examples where licensee staff had changed due dates for subtasks without referencing the source CAP report.

The inspectors identified that CAP implementing procedures did not provide good guidance regarding how to evaluate "critical" and "non-critical" component failures. Specifically, some component failures, which could reasonably be considered "critical," (i.e., had significant consequences) could be classified as "non-critical" using the current guidance.

The inspectors observed that there were continuing issues related to work planning and execution and with contractor control. Although both problems were captured in the CAP, the underlying causes were not yet fully understood, resulting in most of the corrective actions being reactive rather than proactive. For example, it was unclear whether the underlying causes that affected site human performance were the same issues that were affecting the contractor performance. In addition, as previously stated, some issues identified through management observations associated with these topics may not be captured in the CAP. Although the station continued to evaluate the issue, it remained an area of concern given the significant outage work planned for the next year.

**A. NRC-Identified and Self-Revealed Findings**

No findings were identified.

**B. Licensee-Identified Violations**

No violations of significance were identified.

## **REPORT DETAILS**

### **4. OTHER ACTIVITIES**

#### **4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution (PI&R) (71152B)**

The activities documented in sections .1 through .4 constituted one biennial sample of PI&R as defined in Inspection Procedure (IP) 71152.

#### **.1 Assessment of the Corrective Action Program (CAP) Effectiveness**

##### **a. Inspection Scope**

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's CAP implementing procedures and attended CAP program meetings to assess the implementation of the CAP by site personnel.

The inspectors reviewed risk and safety significant issues in the licensee's CAP since the last NRC PI&R inspection in November 2008. The issues selected were appropriately varied across the NRC cornerstones, and were identified through routine daily plant activities, licensee audits and self-assessments, industry operating experience reports, and NRC inspection activities. The inspectors also reviewed a selection of apparent, common and root cause evaluations for more significant CAP items.

The inspectors performed a more extensive review of the licensee's efforts to address ongoing issues with human performance and issue evaluation. This review consisted primarily of a five year search of related issues identified in the CAP and discussions with appropriate licensee staff to assess the licensee's corrective actions.

During the reviews, the inspectors evaluated whether the licensee staff's actions were in compliance with the facility's CAP and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B requirements. Specifically, whether licensee personnel were identifying plant issues at the proper threshold, entering the plant issues into the station's CAP in a timely manner, and assigning the appropriate prioritization for resolution of the issues. The inspectors also evaluated the timeliness and effectiveness of corrective actions for selected issue reports, completed investigations, and NRC findings.

All documents reviewed during this inspection were listed in the Attachment to this report.

##### **b. Assessment**

#### **(1) Effectiveness of Problem Identification**

The licensee's implementation of the CAP was generally good. Workers were encouraged to identify issues and were familiar with the various avenues available (NRC, CAP, etc). This was evident by the large number of CAP items generated annually, which were reasonably distributed across the various departments. A shared computerized database was used for creating individual reports and for subsequent management of the processes of issue evaluation and response. This included determining the issue's significance, addressing such matters as regulatory compliance and reporting, and assigning any actions deemed necessary or appropriate.

In reviewing licensee management observations conducted between June and October 2010, the inspectors found several examples of items that were apparently not captured in the CAP. Most of the examples were concerned with industrial safety or work planning issues that should have been captured in the CAP. In one example, a worker observing an industrial safety concern stated that because the worker had not met a management expectation, vice a procedural requirement, the issue wasn't going to be documented in the CAP. The licensee documented the inspectors' concern as CAP item 1251890.

The licensee was also good at identifying and resolving trends. The inspectors noted a large number of trends identified through the "binning" of issues or via the quarterly department roll-up meeting (DRUM) reports.

During the November 2008, PI&R review, the inspectors identified that the licensee's trending program was somewhat limited in that it did not always identify trends with issues affecting the same functional area, but having dissimilar aspects. Subsequently, the licensee initiated an effort to assign cross-cutting criteria (analogous to NRC criteria) to apparent and root cause evaluations, which were then trended. Although the inspectors considered this a positive effort, it was too early to determine its overall effectiveness.

#### Findings

No findings were identified.

#### (2) Effectiveness of Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues

Overall, CAP issues were being properly screened. The majorities of issues were of low level and were either closed to trend or at a level appropriate for a condition evaluation. Licensee staff appropriately challenged CAP items during screening meetings and were cognizant of potential trends. Most issues were closed to a work request or to another CAP item. The inspectors noted that both the parent and daughter documents had the necessary verbiage to document the interrelationship. Although fewer in number, the inspectors did not have any concerns with those issues assigned an apparent cause evaluation (ACE) or root cause evaluation. There were no items in the operations, engineering, or maintenance backlogs that were risk significant, individually or collectively. There were no classifications or immediate operability determinations with which the inspectors disagreed.

Root and apparent cause evaluations were generally of good quality and were well documented. During the 2006 PI&R inspection, the inspectors noted that ACEs did not consider whether the failure to consider industry OE was a precursor to events. Additionally, licensee management did not always address issues with ACE quality that were identified during the evaluation grading process. The inspectors noted that subsequent ACEs now addressed whether OE was properly used prior to the event and that ACE quality issues were communicated to the originating departments.

Station Procedure FP-E-SE-02, "Component Classification," was used by licensee staff to distinguish between a "critical" and "non-critical" component failure. The procedure was written specifically to address equipment reliability, but was referenced in the CAP for use during cause evaluations. Although the stated guidance was adequate for



equipment reliability considerations, it was not appropriate for CAP evaluations. For example, this procedure specifically defines any component failure that results in a significant radiological release as a “non-critical” component failure. From a CAP perspective, any component failure resulting in significant radiological consequences would be “critical.” The inspectors were concerned that this procedure may result in some component failures being treated as less significant under the CAP, then appropriate. The licensee initiated CAP item 1250116 to review this issue.

Since 2006, the licensee has experienced numerous issues in human performance. Initially, these issues were primarily of low significance (i.e., did not result in an NRC finding). However, the issues continued through 2008, with the significance of the findings increasing, until an adverse trend in human performance had become evident.

The licensee’s early efforts to address this trend were largely ineffective, as the licensee originally believed that the human performance issues were limited to specific behaviors or work groups, instead of a more widespread concern involving fundamental human behaviors. Subsequently, the licensee identified that the issues were principally due to a lack of resources and an inappropriate tolerance for risk among workers. Several corrective actions were initiated, including additional training to site workers on configuration control and risk management. The inspectors noted that performance had improved among site workers in the past six months.

However, the licensee was still dealing with an adverse trend in contractor human performance, primarily related to oversight and work planning and execution. Although this issue was captured in the CAP (items 1249158 and 1247197), the underlying causes are not yet fully understood, and many of the corrective actions, to date, have been more reactive than proactive. For example, it is unclear whether the underlying causes that affected site human performance were also affecting the contractor performance. To date, the majority of the issues have been of low significance (i.e., not resulting in an NRC finding); however, the overall trend was similar to the previous issue with site human performance.

## Findings

Introduction: The inspectors identified an Unresolved Item (URI) regarding the High Energy Line Break (HELB) Analyses.

Description: As part of the review of the ACE for an adverse trend in double disc gate valve (DDGV) local leak rate testing (LLRT) performance documented in CAP 1202466, the inspectors noted that the ACE had determined that the valves’ performance degradation did not prevent the valves from performing their safety function. The ACE only addressed the valves’ safety function of providing containment isolation. The inspectors questioned if the safety function of the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI), reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) and reactor water cleanup (RWCU) steam supply valves to close after detection of a HELB should have been considered. The licensee responded that the ACE did not need to consider the effect of the valves’ increased leakage on the HELB analyses because any leakage would not impact the alternate shutdown path. The inspectors reviewed the assumptions and acceptance criteria of the HELB calculations for HPCI, RCIC and RWCU line breaks and identified potential inconsistencies between the calculations’ assumptions with Technical Specifications’ and UFSAR allowed values for valve closure times, incorporation of delay actuations, and isolation initiation signals. The licensee entered the NRC concerns with these

potential inconsistencies into the CAP by initiating CAP 01252363 on October 1, 2010. The licensee stated that the calculations were appropriate and provided the inspectors with some original licensing documents for the HELB analyses; however, additional questions remained. This issue will be tracked as URI 05000263/201007-01 pending further NRC review of the licensee responses and the HELB analyses and determination of the original and current licensing bases.

(3) Effectiveness of Corrective Actions

The inspectors concluded that corrective actions for identified deficiencies were generally timely and adequately implemented, commensurate with their safety significance. Those corrective actions addressing selected NRC documented violations were also generally effective and timely.

The inspectors verified that work orders were in place (and scheduled) for selected, open actions that were two years old or greater.

During interviews, the inspectors noted that some individuals did not refer back to the parent CAP when changing due dates for associated subtasks (such as work requests). The inspectors identified several examples where the revised due dates for subtasks were inconsistent with the parent CAP. Although none of the identified examples were highly significant, the inspectors were concerned that the practice may result in other changes having a greater operational impact. The licensee initiated CAP item 1250089 to evaluate this issue.

The station has a recurring problem with managing the backlog. A recent licensee initiative to redefine the items tracked in the backlog has reduced the numbers, but didn't necessarily address the issue. The licensee currently tracks only Corrective Actions, Corrective Actions to Prevent Recurrence, and operability issues. Other items, that used to be part of the backlog, were instead tracked as CAP action items. However, the inspectors noted that there was no formal effort to determine whether the CAP action items were being addressed in a timely fashion (i.e., no performance indicator similar to the formal backlog indicator). Since these action items were corrective actions (albeit of lower significance), the inspectors were concerned that some may not get implemented. Complicating the issue was an apparent mixed message from station management, who expressed the view that the backlog numbers weren't important so long as items were being properly managed. Since this issue was already captured in the CAP, the inspectors' observations were included as part of the ongoing licensee evaluation.

Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Assessment of the Use of Operating Experience (OE)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's implementation of the facility's OE program. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed implementing OE program procedures, attended CAP meetings to observe the use of OE information, completed evaluations of OE issues and events, and selected assessments of the OE composite performance indicators. The inspectors' review was to determine whether the licensee was effectively

integrating OE experience into the performance of daily activities, whether evaluations of issues were proper and conducted by qualified personnel, whether the licensee's program was sufficient to prevent future occurrences of previous industry events, and whether the licensee effectively used the information in developing departmental assessments and facility audits. The inspectors also assessed if corrective actions, as a result of OE experience, were identified and effectively and timely implemented.

Documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment to this report.

b. Assessment

In general, OE was effectively used at the station. The inspectors observed that OE was discussed as part of the daily station planning meetings, at shift turnover meetings, and at maintenance pre-briefings. Also, the inspectors determined that OE was appropriately reviewed during causal evaluations. During interviews, several licensee personnel commented favorably on the use of OE in their daily activities.

The inspectors noted that the OE evaluation for a relay failure that resulted in the inoperability of a safety-related train at Harris (Action Request (AR) 1233871) was somewhat limited in scope. The evaluation identified that similar relays were used at Monticello, but in non-safety related equipment; therefore, no actions were required. However, there was no documented evaluation whether a failure of these relays in the affected equipment could have had any significant operational impact. The licensee documented this issue as CAP item 1252873.

Findings

No findings were identified.

.3 Assessment of Self-Assessments and Audits

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors assessed the licensee staff's ability to identify and enter issues into the CAP program, prioritize and evaluate issues, and implement effective corrective actions, through efforts from departmental assessments and audits.

b. Assessment

The inspectors concluded that self-assessments and audits were typically accurate, thorough, and effective at identifying issues and enhancement opportunities at an appropriate threshold level. The audits and self-assessments were completed by personnel knowledgeable in the subject area, and the quality of the NOS audits was thorough and critical. The self-assessments were acceptable but were not at the same level of quality as the NOS audits. The inspectors observed that CAP items had been initiated for issues identified through the NOS audits and self-assessments.

The inspectors observed selected meetings of the Performance Assessment Review Board and reviewed board meeting minutes over the past six months. The Board provided oversight for the CAP including the self-assessment program. The inspectors identified no issues with the Board's performance during the inspection.

## Findings

No findings were identified.

### .4 Assessment of Safety-Conscious Work Environment (SCWE)

#### a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors assessed the licensee's SCWE through the reviews of the facility's ECP implementing procedures, discussions with ECP coordinators, interviews with personnel from various departments, and reviews of issue reports. The inspectors also reviewed the results of licensee safety culture surveys.

#### b. Assessment

The inspectors determined that the plant staff were aware of the importance of having a strong SCWE and expressed a willingness to raise safety issues. No one interviewed had experienced retaliation for safety issues raised, or knew of anyone who had failed to raise issues. All persons interviewed had an adequate knowledge of the CAP and ECP process. These results were similar to the findings of the licensee's safety culture surveys. Based on these interviews, the inspectors concluded that there was no evidence of an unacceptable SCWE.

The inspectors noted that the licensee had taken proactive efforts to address a declining SCWE trend within the Security force. This trend had been identified through self-assessments and audits conducted in 2009. The number of issues self-identified by the security staff had increased since the corrective actions were implemented. Additionally, during interviews with the inspectors, Security staff commented favorably on the licensee initiatives to improve the SCWE.

The inspectors determined that the ECP process was being effectively implemented. The review of the selected ECP issues indicated that site personnel were appropriately using the CAP and ECP to identify concerns. However, many staff were unaware of the other avenues the licensee had to raise concerns (collectively known as the PEACH process). For example, most staff were unaware of the Differing Professional Opinions (DPO) program for addressing engineering issues. Additionally, some newer staff confused safety culture with industrial safety. Similar issues were identified during the 2008 PI&R inspection. The licensee captured these issues as CAP item 1252870.

## Findings

No findings were identified.

### 4OA6 Management Meetings

#### .1 Exit Meeting Summary

On October 1, 2010, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. O'Connor and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The inspectors confirmed that none of the potential report input discussed was considered proprietary.

ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

## **SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION**

### **KEY POINTS OF CONTACT**

#### Licensee

H. Butterworth, Fleet Operations Standards Director  
P. Byers, Security Manager  
J. Early, Emergency Preparedness Manager  
N. Haskell, Engineering Director  
M. Holmes, Radiation Protection/Chemistry Manager  
K. Jepson, Business Support Manager  
J. Mestad, Employ Concerns Program Manager  
D. Neve, Regulatory Affairs Manager  
J. Ohotto, Design Engineering Manager  
T. O'Connor, Site Vice-President  
S. Porter, System Engineering Manager  
S. Radebaugh, Acting Plant Manager  
S. Sharpe, Operations Manager  
G. Sherwood, Program Engineering Manager  
T. Toglery, Nuclear Oversight Manager  
J. Windchill, Fleet Performance Assessment Manager

#### Nuclear Regulatory Commission

K. Riemer, Chief, Branch 2, Division of Reactor Projects

### **LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED**

#### Opened:

URI 05000263/201007-01      HELB Analysis Potentially Non-Conservative

## LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

The following is a list of documents reviewed during the inspection. Inclusion on this list does not imply that the NRC inspectors reviewed the documents in their entirety, but rather, that selected sections or portions of the documents were evaluated as part of the overall inspection effort. Inclusion of a document on this list does not imply NRC acceptance of the document or any part of it, unless this is stated in the body of the inspection report.

### PLANT PROCEDURES

<b><u>Number</u></b>	<b><u>Description or Title</u></b>	<b><u>Date or Revision</u></b>
FP-PA-ARP-01	CAP Action Request Process	Revision 27
FG-PA-CAE-01	Corrective Action Effectiveness Review Manual	Revision 6
FG-PA-ACE-01	Apparent Cause Evaluation Manual	Revision 17
FG-PA-RCE-01	Root Cause Evaluation Manual	Revision 17
FG-PA-CTC-01	CAP Trend Code Manual	Revision 12
FP-PA-OE-01	Operating Experience Program	Revision 14
FG-PA-KPI-01	Performance Indicator Data Reporting	Revision 0
FP-E-SE-02	Component Classification	Revision 4
EWI-05.02.01	Maintenance Rule Program Document	Revision 16
B.5.12	System Basis Document: Area Radiation Monitor	Revision 3
B.7.1	System Basis Document: Liquid Radwaste	Revision 2

### CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM DOCUMENTS

<b><u>Number</u></b>	<b><u>Description or Title</u></b>	<b><u>Date or Revision</u></b>
AR 114145-13	Incorrect Grounding Trucks Installed in 4KV Cubicles	9/8/2008
AR 1150968	Continuing Issues With FME Control on Turbine Floor	8/20/2009
AR 1168344-01	TS Action for CREF Exited Prior to all PMTs Being Completed	3/8/2009
AR 1166773-01	Adverse Trend in Rigor of Implementing SOER Recommendations	2/26/2009
AR 1170876	Lack of Safety Related Material Control/Traceability	9/14/2009
AR 1167946-01	Level A and B CAs Closed to Actions Outside the CAP	3/21/2009
AR 1205719-02	ARM S&C Refurb Not Performed IAW Tech Manual	12/4/2009
AR 1211312	NOS Finding: Configuration Control Performance Issues	3/3/2010
AR 1226594	Work Tasks Authorized Without Proper C/O C/L Hung	6/18/2010
AR 1228190	NOS Finding—Weak Barriers in Work Management	5/25/2010
AR 1237891	Failed Bellows Spring in Positioned Removed from CV-1242	6/28/2010
AR 1158526	Adverse Trend In Work Package Quality	12/10/2008

## CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM DOCUMENTS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
AR 01167235	Potential Trend WM ID'd in Ops 4 <sup>th</sup> Qtr 2008 DRUM	1/29/2009
AR 01167240	Potential Trend JP&P ID'd in Ops 4 <sup>th</sup> Qtr 2008 DRUM	1/29/2009
AR 01173666	Adverse Trend in FME issues	3/18/2009
AR 01155107	Ops CSE ID's AFI in Objective 3	10/13/2008
AR 01184941	Adverse Trend: work plan changes made w/o review & approval	6/09/2009
AR 01167237	Potential trend DP ID'd in Ops 4 <sup>th</sup> Qtr 2008 DRUM	1/29/2009
AR 01139421	Adverse Trend in Program Management Issues	9/07/2010
AR 01160675	AFI Independent FSA Monti Human Performance	11/26/2008
AR 01143116	Adverse Trend in OSHA reportable injuries	8/5/2008
AR 01232720	Recirc riser relay did not respond to de-energize position during IST	5/13/2010
AR 01158536	LOR Annual Operating Exam Issues	11/7/2008
AR 01157274	Proposed NRC Violation – Reactor Level Control – 9/11 Scram	3/26/2009
AR 01150364	HPCI failed to trip when Rx level rose to 48"	9/21/2008
AR 01151413	Rx Low Low Water Level signal received during CRD pump start	9/21/2008
AR 01213390	Voltage of cell 116 in #17 battery is at 2.07 Volts	1/12/2010
AR 01211101	Not all Tech Specs were entered	12/17/2009
AR 01190071	2009 Ops CSE – AFI Objective 5 AFI 5.1	7/20/2009
AR 01189968	A SBTG Flow Not Within Band	7/20/2009
AR 01188955	Assessment AFI ID'd for licensed operator medicals	7/10/2009
AR 01187271	B SBTG failed to operate as expected	6/28/2009
AR 01177444	Adverse Trend – Procedure performed without OPS Auth.	4/9/2009
AR 00826605	GE Part 21 (SC05-03) Potential to exceed low pressure limit	3/30/2005
AR 01083164	Main Steam Line plugs interfere with separator removal	3/20/2007
AR 01151933	SPDS Disp 710 showing incorrect configuration of circuit breaker	9/24/2008
AR 01154270	NRC Commitments in procedures not meeting requirements	10/8/2008
AR 01153455	Station challenged by projects interface/alignment issues	10/2/2008
AR 01116586	Unplanned rise in Offgas Radiation and Stack WGRM's	10/31/2007
AR 01136919	Loss of motor cooling to Div II RHRSW Pumps	5/6/2008
AR 0123272	LPCI Select Interlock Channel Functional Test Failure	6/25/2010
AR 01182625	Adverse Trend; Inadequate maintenance of QA reports	5/19/2009
AR 01196988	Adverse Trend; Badge control by site personnel	9/9/2009
AR 01194357	Door-18, Condenser room flood door found closed	8/20/2009

## CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM DOCUMENTS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
AR 01178894	FME – Drier Measurement Platform Wheel	4/20/2009
AR 01159084	Inadequate shutdown margin during EOC-23 core alterations	11/13/2008
AR 01150362	Reactor Scram Number 121 occurred on Sept 11 <sup>th</sup> , 2008	9/12/2008
AR 01151075	Ops Trng CSE identifies AFI's in Objective 1-4	9/18/2008
AR 01216130	Performance gaps to industry standards not recognized	1/30/2010
AR 01144214-02	Trend—RCE Grades Low in 2 Areas	7/2008
AR 01173245	Actions to Address Equipment Problems are Shortsighted	4/15/2009
AR 01186832	Core Spray Pump Quarterly Test Terminated Due to No Flow	6/25/2009
AR 1191812	Adverse Trend in Failure Rates to ACEs Assigned to Projects	7/31/2009
AR 01216127	PI.2-2 ACEs Do Not Always Address Org or Prgrm Contributors	1/30/2010
AR 01174411	PRNMS: Ineffective Condition Evaluation CE01162340-02	3/23/2009
AR 01187909	Accountability in Meeting CAP Action Due Dates Tracking	7/2/2009
AR 01238254	PI&R FSA AFI: Rigor in Resolving NRC Violations Not Consistent	6/22/2010
AR 1222439	MNGP EPU Mod 3 Surveillance	3/12/2010
AR 01208801	Three NRC X-Cutting Findings in One Aspect	12/1/2009
AR 01216516	Station hs Three Potential Findings in One NRC Xcut Aspect	2/2/2010
AR 01215513	Potential Adverse Trend Recent Events/Near Misses	1/27/2010
AR 01170720	Inconsistent CAP Problem Statements CA Quality ACE Quality	2/25/2009
AR 01232886	Adverse Trend—Corrective Action Backlog Exceeding Goal	5/14/2010
AR 01150601	Ops Tng CSE Identifies Ineffective Closure of CA	9/15/2008
AR 01157287	Red KPI—NRC Cross Cutting Aspects (H.4.c.) Oversight	10/29/2008
AR 1226438	Site Received Fourth P.1.c Cross Cutting Aspect from NRC	4/8/2010
AR 01147103	Adv Trnd in Organization Perf. Leads to Near Miss Events	8/9/2008
AR 01137245	Station KPI for NRC Cross-Cutting Issue—Potential Red	5/9/2008
AR 01184816	Evaluation of Project Dept Clock Resets During 2009 Outage	6/8/2009
AR 01163396	Adverse Trend in HU Identified in 3 Quarter 2008 Site DRUM	12/22/2008



## CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM DOCUMENTS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
AR 01135426	CAPRs From RCEs Non Institutionalized	4/23/2008
AR 01138493	Adverse Trend in Human Performance	5/22/2008
AR 01158802	Potential Adverse Trend—Station Cross Cutting Issues PI&R	11/11/2008
AR 1161531	Reoccurring Qualification Issues at Monticello	12/05/2008
AR 1199160	Unexpected AR-10 Discharges on the Range	12/01/2010
AR 1140153	Adverse Trend in Refueling Floor Activities	12/17/2009
AR 1169027	High Radiation Controls Violation	06/01/2010
AR 1170636	Security Human Performance Adverse Trend	03/24/2009
AR 1161679	Potential Adverse Trend – Security Weapons / Ammo Handling	01/16/2009
AR 1210338	Adverse Trend – BRE Issues	12/30/2010
AR 1150642	Incomplete Information Sent to NRC on an Operator's License Renewal Application	09/15/2008
AR 1136955	Adverse Trend in Service Water Radiation Monitor Flow	05/07/2008
AR 1177731	Adverse Trend in LLRT Radiation Exposure	04/10/2009
AR 1164409	Increased Trend in Badge Control Issues	03/02/2009
AR 1135335	Adverse Trend in Emergency Planning Drill / Exercise Report Timeliness	08/21/2008
AR 1215924	EP Department Performance Has Declined	03/12/2010
AR 1174197	Lengthy Out Of Service Time for EP Equipment	07/31/2009
AR 1216118	EP 1-1 ERO personnel Make Knowledge Based Errors	09/03/2010
AR 1215924	Site EP Precursors to Further Declining Performance	10/29/2010
AR 1188771	Follow-up PAR Development Inaccurate / Untimely	11/17/2009
AR 1135335	Adverse Trend in Emergency Planning Drill / Exercise Report Timeliness	08/21/2008
AR 1215924	EP Department Performance Has Declined	03/12/2010
AR 1217199	Security Officer Failed to Perform a Security Patrol	08/31/2010
AR 1168195	Rx Water Soluble Co-60 No Longer Trending Down	02/05/2009
AR 1207385	SGI Package Not Properly Marked	03/31/2010
AR 1204338	New Security Door to Intake Tunnel Found Closed	04/23/2010
AR 1156598	Security Force on Force Exercises	08/21/2009
AR 1238171	Unexpected Dose rates Encountered During RWCW BW	06/21/2010
AR 1164240	Movement of Radioactive material Not in Accordance with AWI	01/02/2009
AR 1196952	Low level of Tritium in Monitoring Well (MW-9)	09/09/2009
AR 1207960	Unexpected Change in DW CAM Particulate Activity	12/10/2009
AR 01214941	Inadequate Documentation of Design Inputs	02/22/2010

## CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM DOCUMENTS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
AR 01222023	P-109C, 13 RHRSW Pump D/P in Alert Range	04/06/2010
AR 01214814	Adverse Trend in Bearing Failures on 11 CRD Pump	03/31/2010
AR 01197923	CBDI FOF Mod Did Not Assess Impact to T-44 Tank	11/02/2009
AR 01228141	SRV Lift Test Surveillance Interval Potentially Missed	05/14/2010
AR 01176068	Thin Pipe Identified During MIC Exam On 18 A RHRSW	03/31/2009
AR 01179388	Appendix J Programmatic Deficiencies	04/23/2009
AR 01194527	Post-Modification Testing Issues	11/13/2009
AR 01195119	Adverse Trend in Engineering Department HP Clock Resets	09/25/2009
AR 01197202	CDBI- Calculation Quality- Adverse Trend	11/11/2009
AR 01171823	EPU-Wiring Discrepancy Discovered in Field	03/04/2009
AR 01174949	Adverse Trend in Feedwater Heater Level Transmitter Replacement	10/25/2009
AR 01227229	1AR XFMR Lockout Caused By 1N^ Ground Fault	04/14/2010
AR 01166312	Declining Trend-Engineering Work Process-Work Control Mgmt	02/19/2009
AR 01170967	Adverse Trend Control of Engineering MTE	05/29/2009
AR 01088210	Part of Head Vent Line Not Insulated	09/21/2010
AR 01139415	D10 125VDC Div 1 Battery Charger Unavailability Exceeds MR Goal	09/29/2010
AR 01137297	D10 Exhibits Erratic Voltage Output During Surveillance	05/09/2008
AR 01209649-01	Clearance and Tagging Issues	02/04/2010
AR 01065983	Degraded HELB Flow Path Over The SLAE Room	01/05/2007
AR 1088210-01	Missing Instillation On The Head Vent Valve	04/20/2007
AR 01181868	Manifold Equalizing Valve Failure Causes 'B' Main Steam Line Flow Isolation Instrument to Become Inoperable	05/12/2009
AR 01192130	Work Performed Without Adequate Tag-Out Protection	08/03/2009
AR 01190129	Failure to Promptly Identify Failed SBGT Surveillance	08/21/2009
AR 01120865	Failures of V-AC-4 (B4305) and V-AC-5 (B3305)	05/22/2009
AR 01166314	Adverse Trend for Engineering Non-Mod EC Backlog	01/22/2009 09/19/2007
AR 01107707	Failures of V-AC-4	01/01/2009
AR 01166308	Declining Trend for Engineering- Process Failure Mode-RR1	10/14/2008
AR 01155275	Increasing Trend for System Health Assessment KPI	

## ROOT, APPARENT AND COMMON CAUSE EVALUATIONS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
AR 1140145	Incorrect Grounding Trucks Installed in 4KV Cubicles	6/6/2008
EFR 1140145-24	Effectiveness Review of CAP 1140145-05 Truck Installation Procedure	11/6/2009
EFR 114145-25	Effectiveness Review of Grounding Truck Installation	11/6/2009
AR 1150968	JLG Lift Basket Contacts 115 KV	9/17/2008
EFR 1150968-10	Effectiveness Review for AR CAP 1150968 Lift Contacts 115 KV	9/30/2009
PCR 1152979	Revise FP-SC-GEN-08 Revision 2	9/30/2008
AR 1158526	Adverse Trend in Work Package Quality	11/7/2008
AR 1166773	Adverse Trend in Rigor of Implementing SOER Recommendations	1/26/2009
AR 1167946	Mid Cycle FSA AFI 11-CAs Closed to Actions Outside the CAP	2/3/2009
AR 1168344	TS Action for CREF Exited Prior to all PMTs Being Completed	2/5/2009
AR 1170876	Lack of Safety Related Material Control/Traceability	2/25/2009
AR 1183728	Continuing Issues with FME Control on Turbine Floor	5/29/2009
AR 1183728	Continuing Issues with FME Control on Turbine Floor	5/29/2009
AR 1166773-01	Adverse Trend in Rigor of Implementing SOER Recommendations	1/26/2009
AR 1167946-01	Level A and B CAs Closed to Actions Outside the CAP	2/3/2009
AR 1168344	TS Action for CREF Exited Prior to All PMTs Being Completed	2/5/2009
AR 1202466	Adverse Trend in Double Disc Gate Valve LLRT Performance	10/14/2009
AR 1205719	ARM S&C Refurb not Performed IAW Tech Manual	11/4/2009
AR 1211312	NOS Finding: Configuration Control Performance Issues	12/18/2009
AR 1226594	Work Tasks Authorized Without Proper C/O C/L Hung	4/9/2010
AR 1228190	NOS Finding—Weak Barriers in Work Management	4/20/2010
AR 1237891	Failed Bellows Spring In Positioned Removed from CV-1242	6/18/2010
AR 1095181	PRA Compliance With Regulatory Guide 1.200	6/5/2007
AR 1121269	SOER 07-02 on Intake Cooling Water Blockage	12/14/2007
AR 01237478	PI&R FSA; All req's for CAP 01189206 not performed	6/16/2010
AR 01237558	PI&R FSA; Trend in security trng team used for shift needs	6/16/2010

## CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM DOCUMENTS

<b><u>Number</u></b>	<b><u>Description or Title</u></b>	<b><u>Date or Revision</u></b>
AR 01237585	PI&R FSA; CAP closed out to action in GAR	6/16/2010
AR 01237702	PI&R FSA; Documenting Completion of actions unclear in 2 FBMs	6/17/2010
AR 01237779	PI&R FSA; No CAP tracking completion of Top Ten Eqp. Items	6/17/2010
AR 01237802	PI&R FSA; No action to track completion of work under B CAP	6/17/2010
AR 01237820	CAP extension documentation missing, found during PI&R FSA	6/18/2010
AR 01237838	PI&R FSA – CAPR process not followed for form revision	6/18/2010
AR 01237839	PI&R FSA: Typos and dated info in Ops Burden Report	6/18/2010
AR 01237876	PI&R OE evaluation uploaded in sharepoint is not correct	6/18/2010
AR 01237905	PI&R FSA – overdue operating experience actions	6/18/2010
AR 01237917	2010 PI&R FSA: Lack of documentation for level of effort	6/18/2010
AR 01237928	2010 PI&R FSA: CAP not written for identified issue	6/18/2010
AR 01238082	PI&R FSA CAPs – INPO AFIs don't consistently meet standards	6/21/2010
AR 01238284	PI&R FSA AFI: Root Cause Statements – CA Line of Sight	6/22/2010
AR 01238292	PI&R FSA AFI: Independent workers applying own standards on CAP initially	6/22/2010
AR 01243250	PI&R FSA – Ops Status Notes Not Sustainable for Fire Pump	7/28/2010
AR 01243411	PI&R FSA Review ACE to CE for 01174955	7/29/2010
AR 01243430	PI&R FSA corrective action for AR 1199936	7/29/2010
AR 01243485	PI&R FSA – CAP Improperly closed to no action	7/29/2010
AR 01243644	PI&R FSA – CAP 01141018 Screening Notes are incorrect	7/30/2010
AR 01243728	PI&R FSA – EFR assignment CAP 01165741 had no goal stated	7/30/2010
AR 01244435	PI&R Inspection self assessment identified 4kv rooms issue	8/5/2010
AR 01139415	D10 125VDC Battery Charger Unavailability exceeds MR goal	5/30/2008
AR 01155593	Inability to attract personnel due to Industry Competition	10/15/2008
AR 01158868	RF 24 MS 38 for preoutage work in jeopardy	11/11/2008
AR 01159308	IR24 MS 13 for work order planning above control band	11/15/2008

## CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM DOCUMENTS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
AR 01167860	Mid cycle FSA AFI 3 – Insufficient operations staffing plan	2/3/2009
AR 01179605	Greater than 1 yr will be needed to qualify a SM candidate	4/25/2009
AR 01180220	Quality issues found on Isophase Bus Cooling System	4/30/2009
AR 01200192	Emergent Contractor Trng request diverts Maint Training resource	9/29/2009
AR 01217990	EP Drill – Not enough controllers in the Plant during drill	2/12/2010
AR 01227941	RWCU restoration time discrepancy	4/19/2010
AR 01230850	EM&P Resource Availability impacts scheduled work	5/3/2010
AR 01233699	Operations unable to support system walkdown	5/20/2010
AR 01237487	Personnel removed from Training to cover Shift staffing need	6/15/2010
AR 01240903	Supervisor pulled from training to meet staffing needs	7/9/2010
AR 01227056	One Live Ammo Round at STF Mixed with Training Rounds	4/13/2010
AR 01225619	Unable to Obtain Definitive Reading of TS Required Parameter	4/2/2010
AR 01181388	“B” Safety Relief Valve Leaking	5/8/2009
AR 01243585	Program Deficiencies From PHC Not Incorporated into CAP	7/30/2010
AR 01181249	HPCI Governor Valve Failed to Open During Overspeed Test	5/7/2009
AR 01083169	Crack Like Indication on Steam Dryer Found in 2007 RFO	3/20/2007
AR 01070668	Rx Bldg RR Doors Switched in HELB Gothic Model	1/8/2007
AR 01206949	Incorrect Severity Assigned to CAP 01184369-02	11/16/2009
AR 01243568	PI&R FSA Potential AR 1150849 Screening	7/30/2010
AR 01225682	1AR Transformer Pad Has Sunk about 1 inch since Install	4/4/2010
AR 01225762	#12 RHRSW Pump has Excessive Packing Leakage	4/5/2010
AR 01225888	11 SW Pump Inducing Vibrations on 13 ESW Pump	4/6/2010
AR 01225997	CAP Closure Review—“B” Action Closure Quality Issues	4/6/2010
AR 01226060	12 RFP L.O. Cooler Piping Rusting Through Upstream of TI-1555	4/6/2010
AR 01135291	Internal Threads on WDW7 Look Bad	4/22/2008
AR 01135409	Questionable Off-Gas Sample	4/23/2008
AR 01136879	Oil Flush on 11 Service Water Motor Ineffective	5/6/2008

## CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM DOCUMENTS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
AR 01137901	The Site Lacks a Single Tracking Mechanism for Failed PMTs	5/15/2008
AR 01138283	CAP 1102406 Trending Closed to "B" ACE With No Reference	5/20/2008
AR 01138824	Battery Chargers Maintenance Rule Status Declining	5/27/2008
AR 01178034	Employee Exceeded Work Hours	4/13/2009
AR 01179554	SBLC Tank Level is Lower After Draining and Refilling	4/25/2009
AR 01179701	Lack of Alternative Access Increases Operator Response Time	4/27/2009
AR 01216080	Snowmelt Causes Possible EOP Entry Alarm	1/29/2010
AR 01217767	RR-4902 Has Incorrect Chart paper During Test 0289-A	2/11/2010
AR 01219159	Alt N2 Train Pressures at Low End of Allowed Operating Band	2/19/2010
AR 01212202	RCIC is Conservatively Declared Inoperable	12/31/2009
AR 01212209	Both LPCI Subsystems Declared Inoperable During Venting	12/31/2009
AR 0119936	Voltage Drop Evaluation for RHR and RHRSW ASCO Sol. Valves	9/28/2009
AR 01197431	CDBI-Undocumented Assumption in Calculation 06-104	9/12/2009
AR 01200723	CDBI P-111B Calculated Starter Voltage Lower Than Expected	10/2/2009
AR 01210817	NRC Feedback on Reportability of SBGTS Event	12/15/2009
AR 01150773	Some Station Log Entries Were Not Made During SCRAM 121	9/16/2008
AR 01151413	Rx Low Low Water Level Signal Received During CRD Pump Start	9/21/2008
AR 01200304	AO-2945 Failed to Open During 0253-01 "A" SBT QTRLY Test	9/29/2009
AR 01220488	NRC Violation for Failure to Make 10CFR50.72 Notification	3/1/2010
AR 01175537	NDE Examiner Procedure Non-Compliance	3/29/2009
AR 01216894	Loss of Offsite Power 10CFR50.72 Reporting Reqs.	2/4/2010
AR 01082564	Reactor Core Water Level Recorder Found Failed Upscale	3/16/2007
AR 01131103	ITS 125V DC Charger SR 3.8.4.2—Option 2 Unachievable	3/14/2008
AR 01106816	Charcoal Filter Iodine Loading Calcs Non-Conservative	8/14/2007
AR 01143954	11/12 CT Pump Operation Safety Enhancement Opportunity	07/13/2008

## CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM DOCUMENTS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
AR 01243644	PI&R FSA- CAP 01141018 Screening N Notes are Incorrect	07/30/2010
AR 01237813	Buried Pipe Health Report Issues/ Exemplary Rating Questioned	06/18/2010
AR 01158314	11 Air Compressor PM Deleted But Has NRC Commitment	11/05/2008
AR 01184683	Adverse Trend-DW Floor and Equipment Drain Sump Issues	06/05/2009
AR 01184683-03	EFR- Effectiveness of Potentiometers DWEDS,DWFDS	07/31/2010
AR 01197773	Revise ISP-RHR-0558-01 as Interim Action for RCE 1181868	11/09/2009
AR 01197769	Revise 0056 as Interim Corrective Action For RCE 1181868	12/11/2009
AR 01181868	Leaking Manifold Valve for DPIS-2-117A B Strm Line Flow	05/13/2009
AR 01093089	Non-Conservative Input to AST Post- Local pH	06/15/2009
AR 01064602	Shortcomings in Cross Referencing CAPS and WRs	06/10/2008
AR 01087740	Pipe Downstream of PCV-1242 is Significantly Thinned	06/05/2009
AR 01070668	RX Bldg RR Doors Switched in HELB Gothic Model	01/16/2009
AR 01127660	Surveillance 1467 Extended Twice	03/29/2008
AR 01119232	Abandoned Limit Swithces in Second Floor EFT Building	03/27/2008
AR 01107610	3 Inch Movement on Moisture Sep. to 14B Htr Pipe	07/15/2009
AR 01105975	Guidance for Use of Third RBCCW Heat Exchanger Inadequate	09/30/2008
AR 01130761	CV-1729 Not Controlling at 7000gpm, Results in Unplanned LCO	03/12/2008
AR 01149748	Loss of Level Indication C MSDT Dump Controller LC-1003	09/05/2008
AR 01243477	Question Regarding the Control of Radiograpers	07/29/2010
AR 01129677	Area for Improvement	03/03/2008
AR 01243430	PI&R FSA Corrective Action for AR 1199936	07/29/2009
01150085	Possible Inconsistency Between MPR Setpoint and Calc Input	09/10/2008
01149441	Results of MET CSP Assessment Concluded Further Migration	09/03/2008
01079705	LAR Required for Use of Tormis Code Methodology	02/28/2007
01197771	Revise ISP-RHR-0552-01 as interim action for RCE1181868	09/15/2009
011977701	Revise 0060 As Interim Corrective Action for RCE1181868	09/15/2009

**CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM DOCUMENTS**

<b><u>Number</u></b>	<b><u>Description or Title</u></b>	<b><u>Date or Revision</u></b>
01197768	Revise 0060 As Interim Corrective Action for RCE1181868	10/10/2010
01197774	Revise ISP-RHR-0558-02 As Interim Action for RCE 1181868	09/16/2010
01252368	NRC-PI&R-Question on Classification of DW Sumps	10/04/2010
01250089	NRC PI&R- CA's Not Created for Interim RCE Actions	11/20/2008
02149351	Several NRC Findings had Improper AR Assignments per ARP-01	
01159968	IPB Mod Design Issues with Service Water Valves	

**OPERATING EXPERIENCE**

<b><u>Number</u></b>	<b><u>Description or Title</u></b>	<b><u>Date or Revision</u></b>
OE 31215	Jet Pump Wedge Wear	5/25/2010
01175420	NRC IN 2009-03: Solid State Protection System Card Failure Results in Spurious Safety Injection Actuation and Reactor Trip	6/11/2009
01137557	Station OE Evaluation of Industry Documents	5/13/2008
01143701	Station OE Evaluation of OE 26794	7/10/2008
OE 31105	Water Detected in a Cable Pit Beneath a MCC which Contained Safety-Related Cables (Cook Plant)	5/7/2010
01245020	Station OE Evaluation of OE 31283	8/10/2010
01149696	Fisher Information Notice 1997-01, Supplement 1	9/5/2008
01193202	MNGP OE Evaluation of PINGP AR 01192430	8/11/2009
01126257	Part 21: GE Fuel Rod Thermal-Mechanical Methodology	02/05/2008
	Weekly OE Screening Minutes	06/10/2010
01180269	Fleet OE Evaluation of INPO OE28618	
01142237	OE26962 Flux Map Gaps Ginna	12/02/2009
01145374	Station OE Screen Team Review of OE for Week 07/18/2008	09/23/2008
01142952	Westinghouse Detached P-Grid Dimples	01/09/2009
01149492	Station OE Screen Team Review of OE For Week of 08/29/2008	10/31/2008
01157701	Station OE Evaluation of EO for Week of 10/31/2008	09/30/2009



**AUDITS, ASSESSMENTS AND SELF-ASSESSMENTS**

<b><u>Number</u></b>	<b><u>Description or Title</u></b>	<b><u>Date or Revision</u></b>
01121234	FASA of XCELS Energy's MNGP EPU Outage Project Readiness	12/17/2008
1205004	EPU Outage Readiness Assessment	6/10/2010
2010-02-014	Corrective Action Program	5/14/2010
2010-01-029	Corrective Action Program	3/12/2010
SAR 01205025	PI&R Readiness	9/9/2010
SAR 01249160	Site Roll-up Meeting Results	1 <sup>st</sup> and 2 <sup>nd</sup> Quarter 2010
SAR01116710	Component Design Bases Inspection Focused Self-Assessments	11/17/2008
	NOS 1 <sup>st</sup> Quarter 2010 Assessment Report	05/14/2010
	NOS 4th Quarter 2009 Assessment Report	03/01/2010
QF-0426	Focused Self-Assessment MNGP Dry Cask Loading Readiness	Revision 2
QF-0402	Fleet Focused Self Assessment Report: Reportability SAR 01117506	Revision 3
1133118	Exposure Monitoring and Dose Control	11/06/2008

**CONDITION REPORTS GENERATED DURING INSPECTION**

<b><u>Number</u></b>	<b><u>Description or Title</u></b>	<b><u>Date or Revision</u></b>
AR 1250188	NRC PI&R Process Control for WO from CA Process	
AR 1250127	NRC PI&R: Closure Documentation for 1150601-06 Inadequate	9/17/2010
AR 1250089	NRC PI&R: CAs Not Created for Interim RCE Actions	9/16/2010
AR 1249923	NRC PI&R: NRC is Questioning Status of 125V DC	9/15/2010
AR 1251890	PI&R: Inconsistencies in Observation Program	9/29/2010
AR 1249158	Contactor Oversight Insufficient to Prevent Performance Issues	10/11/2010
AR 1243583	Incorrect CAP Severity Determination	9/24/2010
AR 1252870	NRC PI&R: PEACH Process Not Well Understood	10/5/2010
AR 1252873	OE Not Well Evaluated Beyond the Event	10/5/2010

**MISCELLANEOUS**

<b><u>Number</u></b>	<b><u>Description or Title</u></b>	<b><u>Date or Revision</u></b>
3784	A(1) Action/Performance Improvement Plant NSPM CAP Screening Package Performance Assessment Review Board Package	Revision 0 9/16/2010 9/14/2010
	Alignment Teamwork and Oversight Meeting	9/15/2010
WO 384150	IC-RHR, ISP-RHR-0552-01 RX Recirc Loop DP-LPCI INTR FUNCT T	01/27/2010
WO 00388188	IC-RCI, 0060 RCIC High Steam Flow Sensor Test	2/18/2010

## LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

ACE	Apparent Cause Evaluation
ADAMS	Agencywide Document Access Management System
AR	Action Request
CAP	Corrective Action Program
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
CAQ	Condition Adverse to Quality
DPO	Differing Professional Opinion
DRP	Division of Reactor Projects
DRUM	Department roll-up meeting
ECP	Employee Concerns Program
GAR	General Action Request
HELB	High Energy Line Break
HPCI	High Pressure Coolant Injection
IMC	Inspection Manual Chapter
IN	Information Notices
IP	Inspection Procedure
IST	In-service test
LER	Licensee Event Report
MNGP	Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant
MPFF	Maintenance Preventable Functional Failure
NCV	Non-Cited Violation
NOS	Nuclear Oversight
NRC	U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
OE	Operating Experience
PARS	Publicly Available Records System
PM	Preventive Maintenance
PI&R	Problem Identification & Resolution
RCIC	Reactor Core Isolation Cooling
RHR	Residual Heat Removal
RHRSW	Residual Heat Removal Service Water
RPS	Radiation Protection Specialist
RPS	Reactor Protection System
SCAQ	Significant Condition Adverse to Quality
SCWE	Safety-Conscious Work Environment
SDP	Significance Determination Process
SFP	Spent Fuel Pool
USAR	Updated Safety Analysis Report
WO	Work Order

T. O'Connor

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No violations or findings were identified during this inspection.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records System (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

**/RA/**

Kenneth Riemer, Chief  
Branch 2  
Division of Reactor Projects

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Letter to T. O'Connor from K. Riemer dated November 10, 2010

SUBJECT: MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION  
AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000263/2010007

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