UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
2443 WARRENVILLE ROAD, SUITE 210
LISLE, IL 60532-4352

November 8, 2010

Mr. Christopher R. Costanzo
Vice President
NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC
3277 DAEC Road
Palo, IA 52324-9785

SUBJECT: DUANE ARNOLD ENERGY CENTER EVALUATION OF CHANGES, TESTS, OR EXPERIMENTS AND PERMANENT PLANT MODIFICATIONS BASELINE INSPECTION REPORT 05000331/2010-007(DRS)

Dear Mr. Costanzo:

On October 1, 2010, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an Evaluations of Changes, Tests, or Experiments and Permanent Plant Modifications inspection at your Duane Arnold Energy Center. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on October 1, 2010, with you and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, one NRC-identified finding of very low safety significance was identified. The finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. However, because of its very low safety significance, and because the issue was entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating the issue as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV) in accordance with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the subject or severity of the NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001, with a copy to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Region III, 2443 Warrenville Road, Suite 210, Lisle, IL 60532-4352; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the Resident Inspector Office at the Duane Arnold Energy Center. In addition, if you disagree with the cross-cutting aspect assigned to any finding in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region III, and the NRC Resident Inspector at Duane Arnold Energy Center.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any), will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records System (PARS) component of NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Robert C. Daley, Chief
Engineering Branch 3
Division of Reactor Safety

Docket No.50-331
License No. DPR-49

Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000331/2010007(DRS)
w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Docket No:	50-331
License No:	DPR-49
Report No:	05000331/2010-007
Licensee:	NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC, Iowa
Facility:	Duane Arnold Energy Center
Location: Palo,	IA
Dates:	September 13 – October 1, 2010
Inspectors:	C. Tilton, Senior Reactor Inspector (Lead) V. Meghani, Reactor Inspector M. Munir, Reactor Inspector
Approved by:	Robert C. Daley, Chief Engineering Branch 3 Division of Reactor Safety

Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Inspection Report (IR) 05000331/2010-007; 09/13/2010 – 10/01/2010; Duane Arnold Energy Center; Evaluations of Changes, Tests, or Experiments and Permanent Plant Modifications.

This report covers a two-week announced baseline inspection on evaluations of changes, tests, or experiments and permanent plant modifications. The inspection was conducted by Region III based engineering inspectors. One Severity Level IV finding was identified by the inspectors. The finding was considered a Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of NRC regulations. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, "Significance Determination Process" (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006.

A. NRC-Identified and Self-Revealed Findings

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

- Green. The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and associated NCV of Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1 for the licensee failing to perform TS Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.8.1.6, which verifies the fuel oil transfer system operates to transfer fuel oil from storage tank to the day tank. Specifically, the licensee failed to perform Inservice Testing (IST) of the diesel fuel transfer pumps as intended by TS SR 3.8.1.6.

  The inspectors determined that failure to perform IST of the diesel fuel transfer pumps as intended by TS SR 3.8.1.6 was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems attribute of Equipment Performance and it adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). The inspectors determined the finding could be evaluated using the SDP in accordance with IMC 0609, "Significance Determination Process," Attachment 0609.04, "Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings," Table 4a for the Mitigation Systems Cornerstone. All four questions on this table were answered "no." Specifically, the licensee had still performed functionality tests of the pumps at the required frequency, and if the pumps had exhibited lower than expected flow during a demand period, the fuel day tanks had adequate margin to compensate to allow for operator action. Therefore, the issue screened as having very low safety significance. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Work Control because the licensee did not appropriately assess the impact of changes to the work scope or activity on the plant and human performance. Specifically, the licensee failed to recognize that deleting the section of STP 3.8.1-11 that pertained to IST testing of the fuel oil transfer pump would delete steps in the procedure that were required by TS SR 3.8.1.6. (IMC 0302 (H.3(b))

B. Licensee-Identified Violations

No violations of significance were identified.

REPORT DETAILS

1. REACT OR SAFETY

Cornerstone: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

1R17 Evaluations of Changes, Tests, or Experiments and Permanent Plant Modifications (71111.17)

.1 Evaluation of Changes, Tests, or Experiments

a. Inspection Scope

From September 13, 2010 through October 1, 2010, the inspectors reviewed eight safety evaluations performed pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59 to determine if the evaluations were adequate and that prior NRC approval was obtained as appropriate. The inspectors also reviewed 17 screenings where licensee personnel had determined that a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation was not necessary. The inspectors reviewed these documents to determine if:

- the changes, tests, or experiments performed were evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59 and that sufficient documentation existed to confirm that a license amendment was not required;
- the safety issue requiring the change, tests, or experiment was resolved;
- the licensee conclusions for evaluations of changes, tests, or experiments were correct and consistent with 10 CFR 50.59; and
- the design and licensing basis documentation was updated to reflect the change.

The inspectors used, in part, Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 96-07, "Guidelines for 10 CFR 50.59 Implementation," Revision 1, to determine acceptability of the completed evaluations and screenings. The NEI document was endorsed by the NRC in Regulatory Guide 1.187, "Guidance for Implementation of 10 CFR 50.59, Changes, Tests, and Experiments," dated November 2000. The inspectors also consulted Part 9900 of the NRC Inspection Manual, "10 CFR Guidance for 10 CFR 50.59, Changes, Tests, and Experiments."

This inspection constituted eight samples of evaluations and 17 samples of changes as defined in IP 71111.17-04.

b. Findings

Failure to Perform Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.8.1.6

Introduction: A finding of very low safety significance and associated Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of Technical Specifications (TS) was identified by the inspectors for the licensee failing to perform Surveillance Requirement SR 3.8.1.6 which states: "Verify the fuel oil transfer system operates to transfer fuel oil from storage tanks to the day tank."

Description: To comply with Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1, "AC Sources - Operating," the licensee is required to verify the diesel fuel oil transfer system operates to transfer fuel oil from storage tank to the day tank. This verification constitutes technical specification surveillance requirement SR 3.8.1.6. The TS Bases for this surveillance requirement states: "This Surveillance demonstrates that each required fuel oil transfer pump operates and transfers fuel oil from its associated storage tank to its associated day tank. It is required to support continuous operation of standby power sources. This Surveillance provides assurance that the fuel oil transfer pump is OPERABLE, the fuel oil piping system is intact, the fuel delivery piping is not obstructed, and the controls and control system for manual fuel transfer systems are OPERABLE. Additional assurance of fuel oil transfer pump OPERABILITY is provided by meeting the testing requirements for pumps that are contained in the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI. Such testing is performed on a quarterly basis."

While reviewing screening SCRN023681, the inspectors noted that the licensee deleted steps in surveillance test procedure STP 3.8.1-11, "Standby Diesel Generator Air Compressor, Air Start Check Valve and Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Tests." These steps performed the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI, "Inservice Testing," program requirements for the diesel fuel oil transfer pumps. This testing was deleted, because the licensee determined that the fuel oil transfer pumps did not have to be tested in accordance with IST testing requirements, since the pumps were not Code Class 1, 2, or 3 components. However, even though the pumps may not have needed to be tested as per IST requirements, the IST testing still needed to be performed, because it was an integral part of TS SR 3.8.1.6, as described in its associated TS Bases.

Screening SCRN023681 was performed on November 14, 2007. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as AR 00583647. The licensee used the provisions in SR 3.0.3 for missed surveillances, allowing them to schedule the surveillance testing within its specified frequency on November 30, 2010, (Train 'B') and December 6, 2010, (Train 'A') with the previously deleted IST requirements included. As per SR 3.0.3, the licensee performed a risk evaluation showing that performing the fuel transfer pump surveillance testing at these dates was of low risk-significance.

Analysis: The inspectors determined that the failure to perform the IST for the diesel fuel oil transfer pumps was contrary to the requirements of TS SR 3.8.1.6, "Verify the fuel oil transfer system operates to transfer fuel oil from storage tank to the day tank" and was performance deficiency.

The finding was determined to be more than minor because the finding was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of Equipment Performance and it adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). Specifically, by not performing the IST portion of SR 3.8.1.6 for the diesel fuel oil transfer pumps, the licensee had not adequately ensured that these pumps would perform their safety related functions during an accident.

The inspectors determined the finding could be evaluated using the SDP in accordance with IMC 0609, "Significance Determination Process," Attachment 0609.04,

"Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings," Table 4a for the Mitigation Systems Cornerstone. All four questions on this table were answered "no." Specifically, the licensee had still performed functionality tests of the pumps at the required frequency, and if the pumps had exhibited lower than expected flow during a demand period, the fuel day tanks had adequate margin to compensate to allow for operator action. Therefore, the issue screened as Green.

This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Work Control because the licensee did not appropriately assess the impact of changes to the work scope or activity on the plant and human performance. Specifically, the licensee failed to recognize that deleting the section of STP 3.8.1-11 that pertained to IST testing of the fuel oil transfer pump would delete steps in the procedure that were required by TS SR 3.8.1.6. (IMC 0305 (H.3(b))

Enforcement: Technical Specification 3.8.1, "AC Sources - Operating," requires the licensee to verify the diesel fuel oil transfer system operates to transfer fuel oil from storage tank to the day tank. This verification includes performing IST of the diesel fuel oil transfer pumps.

Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to perform the IST requirements of the diesel fuel oil transfer pumps. Specifically, on November 14, 2007, a screening removed several steps on procedure STP 3.8.1-11, "Standby Diesel Generator Air Compressor, Air Start Check Valve and Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Tests," which performed the IST requirements of these components. Since November 14, 2007, these requirements have not been met. The licensee's corrective actions included reinstatement of the IST program requirements to the steps on the procedure and the scheduling of surveillances for November 30, 2010, (Train 'B') and December 6, 2010, (Train 'A'). Because this violation was of very low safety significance and it was entered into the licensee's Corrective Action Program as AR 00583647, this violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (NCV 05000331/2010007-01 - Failure to Perform Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.8.1.6)

.2 Permanent Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

From September 13, 2010 through October 1, 2010, the inspectors reviewed ten permanent plant modifications. This review included in-plant walkdowns for portions of the modified HPCI suction line, two added supports within the RCIC piping inside the reactor building and a river water modification of wall penetrations.

The modifications were selected based upon risk-significance, safety-significance, and complexity. The inspectors reviewed the modifications selected to determine if:

- the supporting design and licensing basis documentation was updated;
- the changes were in accordance with the specified design requirements;
- the procedures and training plans affected by the modification have been adequately updated;

- the test documentation as required by the applicable test programs has been updated; and

- post-modification testing adequately verified system operability and/or functionality.

The inspectors also used applicable industry standards to evaluate acceptability of the modifications. The list of modifications and other documents reviewed by the inspectors is included as an attachment to this report.

This inspection constituted ten permanent plant modification samples as defined in IP 71111.17-04.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

.1 Routine Review of Condition Reports

a. Inspection Scope

From September 13, 2010 through October 1, 2010, the inspectors reviewed 15 corrective action process documents that identified or were related to 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations and permanent plant modifications. The inspectors reviewed these documents to evaluate the effectiveness of corrective actions related to permanent pant modifications and evaluations for changes, tests, or experiments issues. In addition, corrective action documents written on issues identified during the inspection were reviewed to verify adequate problem identification and incorporation of the problems into the corrective action system. The specific corrective action documents that were sampled and reviewed by the inspectors are listed in the attachment to this report.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA6 Meetings

.1 Exit Meeting Summary

On October 1, 2010, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Kleinheinz and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee personnel acknowledged the inspection results presented and did not identify any proprietary content. The inspectors confirmed that all proprietary material reviewed during the inspection was returned to the licensee staff.

ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee

K. Kleinheinz, Engineering Director
M. Lingenfelter, Design Engineering Manager
G. Young, Nuclear Oversight Manager
R. Murrell, Licensing Engineer
L. Swenzinski, Licensing Engineer

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

R. Daley, Chief, Engineering Branch 3, Division of Reactor Safety
L. Haeg, Senior Resident Inspector
R. Murray, Resident Inspector

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED

Opened and Closed

05000331/2010007-01	NCV	Failure to Perform Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.8.1.6

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

The following is a list of documents reviewed during the inspection. Inclusion on this list does not imply that the NRC inspectors reviewed the documents in their entirety, but rather, that selected sections of portions of the documents were evaluated as part of the overall inspection effort. Inclusion of a document on this list does not imply NRC acceptance of the document or any part of it, unless this is stated in the body of the inspection report.

10 CFR 50.59 SCREENINGS

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
SCRN022735	TSCR-097	October 8, 2007
SCRN023254	OTH021051	October 29, 2007
SCRN023314	EMA A77678	November 6, 2007
SCRN023557	EMA A1141175 Relay being Replaced Due Age Related Degradation	November 13, 2007
SCRN023681	PWR 40018	November 14, 2007
SCRN024119	CA046702, Reactor Building Door 231 in UFSAR is Not Correct	December 13, 2007
SCRN024151	Modification ECP 1846 Change the Standby Transformer Tap to Setting No. 4	December 10, 2007
SCRN025223	EDG Excitation System Upgrade to Prevent Voltage Dips Below 75 percent	February 8, 2008
SCRN025579	ECP 1845, River Water Supply Support Modifications	May 30, 2008
SCRN026566	ECP 1769 Main Transformer Replacement Project	March 10, 2008
SCRN026699	ECP1834 Replace Main Steam Line Drain Valve MO4423	February 22, 2009
SCRN027209	FSAR 23204 Design Basis for Reactor Water Level – Low Scram SetPoint Clarification	March 27, 2008
SCRN028163	ECP 1778 Remove and Replace the Reactor Building Upper Roof	Revision 2
SCRN030906	ECP – 1844 – Additional Supports to the RCIC Pump Suction Piping	August 19, 2008
SCRN034978	TM-08-018 Removal of 1A3 4160 VAC Bus from Service During RF021 for an Inspection	February 3, 2009
SCRN038195	Modify Steps of Section 6.6 in OI 324 Paralleling the “B” SBDG System to Essential Bus 1A4	October 16, 2009
SCRN046015	AOP 304 (Grid Instability) Clarify OI324A10, SBDG Standby/Readiness Condition Checklist	February 16, 2010

10 CFR 50.59 EVALUATIONS

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
00-009	Installation of New Containment Oxygen Analyzer	July 25, 2000
06-002	ECP 1748 Replacement of SBDG Governors	February 7, 2006
07-002	Incorporate Analysis to Support Cycle-Specific Divom Curve	January 29, 2007
028746	Reactor High Pressure Scram Pressure Switch Replacement	May 20, 2008
033022	Increased Core Flow	January 29, 2009
034202	Reactor Building Vent Shaft and Control Building Air Intake Radiation Monitors Replacement	December 11, 2008
036196	ECP 1830 Replacement of Obsolete Bailey Equipment	February 23, 2009
048254	SLDS Riley Module Replacement	December 18, 2007

MODIFICATIONS

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
A77725	Engineered Maintenance Action, Replace A Cooling Tower Breaker House Roof	Revision 0
ECP1778	Remove and Replace the Reactor Building Upper Roofing	Revision 4
ECP1825	HPCI Suction Swap Addition of Valves	Revision 1
ECP1835	SBDG Voltage Regulator Upgrade	Revision 1
ECP1844	Additional Supports to RCIC Pump Suction Piping	Revision 1
ECP 1845	River Water Supply Support Modifications	Revision 3
ECP1858	Isolated Phase Bus Upgrades	Revision 0
ECP1883	1P032 Control Logic Modification	Revision 0
EMA75934	RCIC Flow Orifice MO2045 Drain Line	Revision 0
EMA84019	Increase Space Heater Size From 200-240 Watts	Revision 1

CALCULATIONS

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
CAL-E95-006	4.16 kV Essential Bus Degraded Voltage Setpoint Calculation	Revision 4
CAL-M07-026	Evaluation of Modified RCIS Suction Piping for Insulation Weight	Revision 2

CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
CAP043913	Pipe Flanges are not Accounted for in the Piping Analysis for V29-0005	August 29, 2006
CA046702	Reactor Building Door 231 in UFSAR is Not Correct	July 9, 2007
CAP049280	AOP 902 Flood Procedure Has Some Discrepancies	April 24, 2007
CAP050433	Error Found in CAL-082-301 for RCIC Suction Piping	June 14, 2007
CAP050471	Location of Pipe Support HCC-8-H-1 Differs from Plant Design documents	June 15, 2007
CAP050784	CAQ- Reactor Building Door 231 in UFSAR is Not Correct	June 29, 2007
CAP050407	Administrative Errors in TS Bases and UFSAR on ASME Vessel Overpressure Analysis	June 14, 2007
CAP051968	CAQ-Piping Stress Does Not Meet its Code Allowable Limits	August 22, 2007
CAP052420	CAQ-Newly Installed RWS Check Valve Weight is Greater Than the Weight Consid. in OPR	September 13, 2007
CAP052640	CAQ-Drawing discrepancy on M119AC-06144, B RWS Supply Piping in the Pumphouse	September 20, 2007
CAP052780	NCAQ-Inconsistencies in The Stated Purpose for The Level 3 Reactor Lo Level Trip	September 26, 2007
CE005754	NCAQ-Inconsistencies in The Stated Purpose for The Level 3 Reactor Lo Level Trip	September 28, 2007
CAP054037	CAQ Standby Transformer Voltage Concerns	November 30, 2007
CAP054182	CAQ-Degraded Voltage Relay Req. Calibration Band is Narrower than TS Allowable	December 09, 2007
CAP056625	NCAQ-Unsealed Electric Boxes on Reactor Building Ceiling	March 27, 2008

CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM DOCUMENTS GENERATED

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
AR 00579852	NRC Mod Insp- ISO-HCC-008-03H Not Revised Under ECP 1844	September 15, 2010
AR 00580565	AOP 304 and SD 304 Has Ref. Higher Degraded Voltage	September 17, 2010
AR 00582864	Ref [12] in OPR365 Is Incorrect	September 28, 2010
AR 00583088	Concerns with ECP1845	September 28, 2010

CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM DOCUMENTS GENERATED

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
AR 00583282	Enhance Drawing BECH-A070 <1> and <2>	September 29, 2010
AR 00583601	EMA77725; Typographical Error – Incorrect Drawing Cited	September 30, 2010
AR 00583625	Typo On Drawing Title of BECH-E103, Sheet 4, Revision 9	September 30, 2010
AR 00583647	TS Bases and STP Change Conflict	September 30, 2010
AR 00583681	As-Built Main Transformer Impedance Not Evaluated	September 30, 2010
AR 00583989	SBDG Fuel Transfer Pump Missed Surveillance	October 1, 2010

DRAWINGS

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
BECH-E001, SH 1	Single Line Diagram Station Connections	Revision 31
BECH-E001, SH 1	Single Line Diagram Station Connections	Revision 32
BECH-E103, SH 4	Main, Aux. Power, Startup, Standby Transf, and Isolated Phase Bus	Revision 9
BECH-E108, SH 13	Steam and Condensate Systems	Revision 9
BECH-E108, SH 13	Steam and Condensate Systems	Revision 10
BECH-E121, 054A	Reactor Core Cooling Systems	Revision 5
BECH-M124	Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System (Steam Side)	Revision 59
E005-049	Connection Diagram Isophase Bus Cooling Unit	Revision 0
FSK-05107	H.P.C.I. System Torus Level Instruments	Revision 1

PROCEDURES

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
AOP 304	Abnormal Operating Procedure Grid Instability	Revision 23
IPOI 3	Power Operations (35 percent-100 percent Rated Power)	Revision 120
NS640101	Core Flow Instrumentation Calibration	Revision 14
OI 324	Operating Instruction Standby Diesel Generator System	Revision 93
STP 3.3.1.1.-34	Recirculation Flow Unit Calibration	Revision 21
STP 3.3.8.1-02B	1A4 4 Kv Emergency Bus Degraded Voltage Calibration	Revision 3
STP 3.8.1-07B	Standby Diesel Generator B LOOP-LOCA TEST	Revision 4
STP 3.8.1-04A	A Standby Diesel Generator Operability Test (Slow Start From Norm Start Air)	Revision 6
STP 3.8.1-05A	A Standby Diesel Generator Operability Test (Slow Start from Emer Start Air)	Revision 6

PROCEDURES

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
STP 3.8.1-06A	A Standby Diesel Generator Operability Test (Fast Start)	Revision 6
STP 3.8.1-11	Standby Diesel Generator Air Compressor, Air Start Check Valve and Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Tests	Revision 12

OTHER DOCUMENTS

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
ECP 1835A	Modification Acceptance Test A SBDG Voltage Regulator Upgrade	February 20, 2009
OPR 341	Operability Recommendation, CAP 43913	September 1, 2006
OPR 358	Operability Recommendation, CAP 50433. 50471	June 16, 2007
OPR 364	Operability recommendation, CAP 52420	September 14, 2007
OPR 383	Water Leakage into the Reactor Building during roof replacement	September 4, 2008

Work Orders

Number	Description or Title	Date or Revision
WO 1143077	Recalibrate Degraded Voltage Relays 127-A1, A2, B1, B2 Buses 1 and 2 and Change 1X004 Tap Setting from 3 to 4	December 12, 2007
WO S012189	High-Pressure Coolant Injection	March 4, 2008
WO S014290	STP 3.8.1-07A Standby Diesel Generator A LOOP-LOCA TEST	February 19, 2009
WO S014856	STP 3.8.1-06A Standby Diesel Generator Operability Test	February 19, 2009

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

ADAMS Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
AR Action Request
ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers

CFR Code of Federal Regulations
DRP Division of Reactor Projects
DRS Division of Reactor Safety
IMC Inspection Manual Chapter
IST Inservice Testing
NCV Non-Cited Violation
NEI Nuclear Energy Institute
NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
PARS Public Available Records System
SDP Significance Determination Process
SR Surveillance Requirement
STP Surveillance Test Procedure
TS Technical Specification

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any), will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records System (PARS) component of NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

Robert C. Daley, Chief
Engineering Branch 3
Division of Reactor Safety

Docket No.50-331
License No. DPR-49

Enclosure: Inspe ction Report 05000331/2010007(DRS)
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