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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Attention: Document Control Desk

Subject: Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC
Oconee Nuclear Station
Docket Numbers 50-269, 270, and 287
Technical Specification Bases (TSB) Change

On August 19, 2009, Station Management approved revisions to TSB 3.8.3, DC Sources-Operating. This revision to the TSB allow one of the two required 230 kV switchyard 125 VDC power sources (batteries) to be inoperable for up to ten days for the purpose of replacing an entire battery bank and performing the required testing.

On September 22, 2009, Station Management approved revisions to TSB 3.6.5, Reactor Building Spray and Cooling System, Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.6.5.8 frequency. This changes the TSB SR frequency from ten years to following activities which could result in nozzle blockage.

Attachment 1 contains the new TSB pages, Attachment 2 contains the marked up version of the TSB pages.

If any additional information is needed, please contact Kent Alter at 864-873-3255.

Sincerely,

T. Gillespie

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Attachment. 1

B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

B 3.8.3 DC Sources – Operating

BASES

BACKGROUND

The 125 VDC Vital I&C electrical power sources provide the AC emergency power system with control power. It also provides both motive power and control power for selected safety related equipment. Additionally, the 125 VDC Vital I&C electrical power sources provide DC electrical power through DC panelboards to the inverters, which in turn supply the AC Vital instrumentation power panelboards.

The 125 VDC Vital I&C electrical power system is a system consisting of six power sources shared by the three Oconee units. Each unit has its own two power sources with backup sources supplied to the unit's 125 VDC Vital Instrumentation distribution system from another unit using a network of isolating diode assemblies. This provides necessary redundancy and independence for the 125 VDC Vital I&C power sources. Each source consists of one 125 VDC battery, the associated battery charger (Normal or Standby) for each battery, the distribution center, the associated control equipment, isolating transfer diodes and interconnecting cabling. Additionally, there is one standby battery charger shared between each unit's batteries, which provides backup service in the event that the preferred (Normal) battery charger is out of service.

The 125 VDC I&C batteries of a unit are physically separated in separate enclosures from batteries of another unit to minimize their exposure to any damage. The battery chargers and associated DC distribution centers and switchgear of a unit are located in separate rooms from the battery chargers and associated DC distribution centers of another unit in the auxiliary building and physical separation is maintained between redundant equipment.

During normal operation, the 125 VDC Vital I&C loads are powered from the battery chargers with the batteries floating on the system. In case of loss of power to a battery charger, the associated DC loads are automatically powered from the 125 VDC Vital I&C battery. Each battery has adequate storage capacity to carry the required load continuously for at least 1 hour.

BASES

BACKGROUND (continued)

Each 125 VDC Vital I&C power source has ample power output capacity for the steady state operation of connected loads required during normal operation, while at the same time maintaining its battery bank fully charged. Each battery charger also has sufficient capacity to restore the battery from the design minimum charge to its fully charged state while supplying normal steady state loads.

The 230 kV switchyard 125 VDC Power System provides power to power circuit breakers, protective and control relays, indicating lights, annunciators, carrier equipment and other switchyard equipment requiring an uninterrupted power source.

The 230 kV switchyard 125 VDC Power System consists of two sources. Each source consists of one 125 VDC battery, the associated battery charger (Normal or Standby) for each battery, distribution panel, and associated control equipment and interconnecting cabling. Redundant batteries are located in separate rooms and redundant chargers, distribution centers and panelboards are located on different walls of the 230 kV switchyard relay house. Additionally, there is one standby battery charger shared between the sources, which provides backup service in the event that the preferred (Normal) battery charger is out of service.

During normal operation, the 230 kV 125 VDC loads are powered from the battery chargers with the batteries floating on the system. In case of loss of power to a battery charger, the associated DC load is automatically powered from the 230 kV 125 VDC battery. Each battery has adequate storage capacity to carry the required load continuously for at least 1 hour. Therefore, the temporary alignment of both battery chargers to the same train of input power for testing or maintenance is allowed provided both batteries meet the requirements for energizing their respective panelboards as stated in the Bases for LCO 3.8.8, "Distribution System – Operating."

Each 230 kV 125 VDC power source has ample power output capacity for the steady state operation of connected loads required during normal operation, while at the same time maintaining its battery bank fully charged. Each battery charger also has sufficient capacity to restore the battery from the design minimum charge to its fully charged state while supplying normal steady state loads.

The 125 VDC Vital I&C power and 230 kV 125 VDC power distribution systems are described in more detail in the Bases for LCO 3.8.8, "Distribution System – Operating," and for LCO 3.8.9, "Distribution Systems – Shutdown."

BASES (continued)

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES The initial conditions of accident and transient analyses in the UFSAR, Chapter 6 (Ref. 1) and Chapter 15 (Ref. 2), assume that Engineered Safeguards (ES) systems are OPERABLE. The 125 VDC Vital I&C electrical power system provides normal and emergency DC electrical power for the emergency auxiliaries, and control and switching during all MODES of operation.

The 230 kV switchyard 125 VDC Power System provides control power for circuit breaker operation in the 230 kV switchyard as well as DC power for degraded grid voltage protection circuits during all MODES of operation.

The OPERABILITY of the DC sources is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and is based upon meeting the design basis of the unit. This includes maintaining the DC sources OPERABLE during accident conditions in the event of:

- a. An assumed loss of all offsite AC power or all onsite AC power; and
- b. A worst-case single failure.

The DC sources satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36 (Ref. 3).

LCO Each required 125 VDC electrical source consisting of one battery, associated battery charger (Normal or Standby), distribution center and the corresponding control equipment and interconnecting cabling supplying power to the associated panelboards is required to be OPERABLE to ensure the availability of the required power to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe condition after an anticipated transient or an accident. The battery chargers are OPERABLE when they are energized or available to be energized during a power source transfer.

For operation of any Oconee unit, three of four 125 VDC Vital I&C Sources capable of supplying the unit's DC distribution system shall be OPERABLE as follows:

- Unit 1: 1CA, 1CB, 2CA, 2CB
- Unit 2: 2CA, 2CB, 3CA, 3CB
- Unit 3: 3CA, 3CB, 1CA, 1CB

and aligned to at least one panelboard provided that a power source is not the only source for two or more of the Unit's panelboards. The three of four requirement ensures that a single failure will not result in a loss of

BASES

LCO
(continued)

power to more than one 125 VDC Vital I&C panelboard. This requirement ensures supported safety functions are not vulnerable to a single failure.

When any other unit is in MODES 1, 2, 3, or 4, two additional 125 VDC Vital I&C Sources are required to be OPERABLE as modified by LCO Note 2. When no other Unit is in MODES 1, 2, 3, or 4, one additional 125 VDC Vital I&C power source is required to be OPERABLE as modified by LCO Notes 2 and 3. These additional requirements ensure sufficient capacity and voltage for supported DC loads assuming a single failure.

The requirement that two 230 kV 125 VDC sources be OPERABLE ensures that supported safety functions are not vulnerable to a single failure.

The LCO is modified by three Notes. Note 1, which applies to Units 2 and 3 only, indicates that no single 125 VDC Vital I&C source shall be the only source for panelboards 1DIC and 1DID. This is necessary since vital I&C panelboards 1DIC and 1DID supply power for SK and SL breaker control, protective relaying for both standby buses, breaker control for both standby breakers for the three Oconee units, and retransfer to startup source logic circuits for the three Oconee units. The requirement that no single 125 VDC source be the only source of power for panelboards 1DIC and 1DID ensures that a single failure will not result in a loss of power to both panelboards. This requirement ensures supported safety functions are not vulnerable to a single failure.

Note 2 indicates that each additional 125 VDC Vital I&C source required by part b or part c of the LCO shall be connected to at least one panelboard associated with the unit where the source is physically located. For example, when applying the LCO requirements to Unit 1, an additional source from Unit 2 must be connected to at least one Unit 2 panelboard and an additional source from Unit 3 must be connected to at least one Unit 3 panelboard. If the additional sources are from Unit 3, each additional source need only be connected to at least one Unit 3 panelboard. Note 3 specifies that the additional 125 VDC Vital I&C power source required by LCO 3.8.3 part c shall not be a power source that is available to meet the three of four requirement of LCO 3.8.3 part a. This ensures that there is one source physically located on each unit not in MODES 1, 2, 3, or 4. For example, when applying the LCO requirements to Unit 1, the additional source cannot be a Unit 1 or Unit 2 power source since these are available to meet the three of four requirement. Therefore, a Unit 3 power source must be OPERABLE. Note 2 and 3 requirements are necessary to assure assumptions in the DC capacity and voltage drop analyses for the operating unit are valid.

BASES (continued)

APPLICABILITY The DC electrical power sources are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 to ensure safe unit operation and to ensure that:

- a. Acceptable fuel design limits and reactor coolant pressure boundary limits are not exceeded as a result of transients and accidents; and
- b. Adequate core cooling is provided, and containment integrity and other vital functions are maintained in the event of a postulated accident.

The DC electrical power requirements for MODES 5 and 6 are addressed in the Bases for LCO 3.8.4, "DC Sources – Shutdown."

ACTIONS

The ACTIONS are modified by a Note indicating that the Completion Times for Required Actions A through D are reduced when in Condition L of LCO 3.8.1. Condition L limits the Completion Time for restoring inoperable power sources to 4 hours when emergency power source(s) or offsite power source(s) are inoperable for extended time periods or for specific reasons.

A.1

With one of the required 125 VDC Vital I&C sources inoperable, the remaining sources are fully capable of providing adequate voltage to the four unit DC panelboards and will assure alignment of power to at least three panelboards. Three panelboards are necessary to shut down the operating unit and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition. However, overall reliability is reduced because an additional failure could result in the minimum required ES functions not being supported. Therefore, the inoperable source must be restored to OPERABLE status within 24 hours. Required Action A.1 is modified by a Note indicating that it is not applicable for up to 72 hours to perform an equalization charge after completion of a performance test or service test. This note allows a maximum Completion Time of 96 hours (24 hours for an inoperable battery due to performing a service test plus 72 hours to perform equalization charge).

The Completion Time for this Required Action is based on engineering judgment, taking into consideration the extent of degradation involved, the likelihood of events or failures which could challenge the system, and the time required to complete the equalization charge.

BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

B.1

In this condition, a single failure of a battery (or its associated equipment) could cause loss of more than one unit panelboard during an accident, so that required safety functions might not be supported. Specifically, if a single source were providing the only power source for panelboards DIA and DIB, single failure of the source would result in failure of both ES digital channels. Vulnerability of the ES digital channels to single failure for 24 hours is considered acceptable due to the limited scope of potential failures. Similarly, if the panelboards are isolated from their backup Unit (e.g., the Unit's DC system is isolated from the other Units), a single failure could result in loss of two or more panelboards so that required safety functions may not be supported. If the panelboards are isolated from their backup Unit when one of that Unit's batteries are inoperable (and the DC buses are cross tied), the remaining battery has the capacity to support all required loads, however, a single failure could result in loss of all four panelboards so that required safety functions may not be supported. Therefore, within 24 hours after such a condition arises, affected equipment shall be restored and aligned such that no single source is the only battery power supply for more than one 125 VDC Vital I&C panelboard for the unit under consideration. The 24 hour Completion Time is based on engineering judgement taking into consideration the time to complete the Required Action and the redundancy available in the 125 VDC Vital I&C System.

C.1

With a single source providing the only power supply for 125 VDC Vital I&C panelboards 1DIC and 1DID, a single failure of a battery (or its associated equipment) could cause loss of both panelboards, so that required automatic EPSL functions for all three units may not be supported. These panelboards provide primary and backup control power for the SK and SL breaker control power, standby bus protective relaying, standby breaker control power and retransfer to startup logic. Therefore, within 24 hours after such a condition arises, affected equipment shall be restored and aligned such that no single source is the only battery power supply for both DC panelboards 1DIC and 1DID.

The Completion Time is based on engineering judgement, provides a reasonable time to complete repairs and considers the redundancy available in the 125 VDC Vital I&C DC System.

This Condition is modified by a Note indicating that this ACTION is only applicable to Units 2 and 3. For Unit 1 the appropriate action is specified in ACTION B.

BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

D.1

With one of the required 230 kV switchyard DC power sources inoperable, the remaining source is fully capable of providing adequate voltage to the associated panelboards and is fully capable of powering the necessary panelboards. However, another failure of a DC source or panelboard could result in failure of the overhead emergency power path. In addition, in the event of grid voltage degradation the station and onsite emergency power sources could fail to separate from the grid. Therefore, the inoperable source must be restored to OPERABLE status within 24 hours. Required Action D.1 is modified by a Note indicating that it is not applicable for up to 72 hours to perform an equalization charge after completion of a performance test or service test. This note allows a maximum Completion Time of 96 hours (24 hours for an inoperable battery due to performing a service test plus 72 hours to perform equalization charge). Required Action D.1 is modified by a second Note indicating that it is not applicable for up to 10 days for replacement of an entire battery bank and the performance of necessary tests to restore the battery to service.

The Completion Time for this Required Action is based on engineering judgment, taking into consideration the extent of degradation involved, the likelihood of events or failures which could challenge the system, and the time required to complete the required actions.

E.1 and E.2

If the inoperable DC electrical power source cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the unit must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 5 within 84 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.3.1

This Surveillance verifies that the distribution centers are functioning properly, with the correct circuit breaker alignment to the isolating transfer diodes. The correct breaker alignment ensures the appropriate separation and independence is maintained, and the appropriate voltage is available to each required isolating transfer diode. The verification of

BASES

**SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS**

SR 3.8.3.1 (continued)

proper voltage availability on the distribution centers ensures that the required voltage is readily available for isolating transfer diodes connected to these distribution centers. The 7 day Frequency takes into account the redundant capability of the DC electrical power distribution systems, and other indications available in the control room that alert the operator to system malfunctions.

SR 3.8.3.2

Verifying battery terminal voltage while on float charge for the batteries helps to ensure the effectiveness of the charging system and the ability of the batteries to perform their intended function. Float charge is the condition in which the charger is supplying the continuous charge required to overcome the internal losses of a battery (or battery cell) and maintain the battery (or a battery cell) in a fully charged state. The voltage requirements are based on the nominal design voltage of the battery and are consistent with the initial voltages assumed in the battery sizing calculations. The 7 day Frequency is consistent with manufacturer recommendations and IEEE-450 (Ref. 5).

SR 3.8.3.3

Visual inspection of the battery cells, cell plates, and battery racks provides an indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration that could potentially degrade battery performance. The presence of physical damage or deterioration does not necessarily represent a failure of this SR, provided an evaluation determines that the physical damage or deterioration does not affect the OPERABILITY of the battery (its ability to perform its design function).

The 12 month Frequency for this SR is consistent with IEEE-450 (Ref. 5), which recommends detailed visual inspection of cell condition and rack integrity on a yearly basis.

SR 3.8.3.4

Visual inspection of inter-cell, inter-rack, inter-tier, and terminal connections provide an indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration that could indicate degraded battery condition. The

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.3.4 (continued)

anticorrosion material is used to help ensure good electrical connections and to reduce terminal deterioration. The visual inspection for corrosion is not intended to require removal of and inspection under each terminal connection.

The Surveillance Frequencies of 12 months are consistent with IEEE-450 (Ref. 5), which recommends cell to cell and terminal connection visual inspection on a yearly basis.

SR 3.8.3.5

A battery service test is a special test of the battery capability, as found, to satisfy the design requirements (battery duty cycle) of the DC electrical power system. The discharge rate and test length should correspond to the design duty cycle requirements as specified in Reference 4.

The Surveillance Frequency of 12 months is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.32 (Ref. 6) and Regulatory Guide 1.129 (Ref. 7), which state that the battery service test should be performed during refueling operations, or at some other outage, with intervals between tests not to exceed 18 months.

SR 3.8.3.6

This SR requires battery capacity be verified in accordance with the Battery Discharge Testing Program. A battery performance discharge test is a test of constant current capacity of a battery, normally done in the as found condition, after having been in service, to detect any change in the capacity determined by the acceptance test.

The test is intended to determine overall battery degradation due to age and usage.

The Surveillance Frequencies for this test are in accordance with the Battery Discharge Testing Program and are consistent with the recommendations in IEEE-450 (Ref. 5). These periodic frequencies are based on the outcome of the previous battery capacity test.

BASES (continued)

- REFERENCES
1. UFSAR, Chapter 6.
 2. UFSAR, Chapter 15.
 3. 10 CFR 50.36.
 4. UFSAR, Chapter 8.
 5. IEEE-450-1987.
 6. Regulatory Guide 1.32, February 1977.
 7. Regulatory Guide 1.129, December 1974.
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B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

B 3.6.5 Reactor Building Spray and Cooling Systems

BASES

BACKGROUND

The Reactor Building Spray and Reactor Building Cooling systems provide containment atmosphere cooling to limit post accident pressure and temperature in containment to less than the design values. Reduction of containment pressure and the iodine removal capability of the spray reduces the release of fission product radioactivity from containment to the environment, in the event of an accident, to within limits. The Reactor Building Spray and Reactor Building Cooling systems are designed to meet ONS Design Criteria (Ref. 1).

The Reactor Building Cooling System and Reactor Building Spray System are Engineered Safeguards (ES) systems. They are designed to ensure that the heat removal capability required during the post accident period can be attained. The Reactor Building Spray System and Reactor Building Cooling System provide containment heat removal operation. The Reactor Building Spray System and Reactor Building Cooling System provide methods to limit and maintain post accident conditions to less than the containment design values.

Reactor Building Spray System

The Reactor Building Spray System consists of two separate trains of equal capacity, each capable of meeting the design basis. Each train includes a reactor building spray pump, spray headers, nozzles, valves, piping and a flow indicator. Each train is powered from a separate ES bus. The borated water storage tank (BWST) supplies borated water to the Reactor Building Spray System during the injection phase of operation. In the recirculation mode of operation, Reactor Building Spray System pump suction is manually transferred to the reactor building sump.

BASES

BACKGROUND

Reactor Building Spray System (continued)

The Reactor Building Spray System provides a spray of relatively cold borated water into the upper regions of containment to reduce the containment pressure and temperature and to reduce the concentration of fission products in the containment atmosphere during an accident. In the recirculation mode of operation, heat is removed from the reactor building sump water by the decay heat removal coolers. Each train of the Reactor Building Spray System provides adequate spray coverage to meet the system design requirements for containment heat removal.

The Reactor Building Spray System is actuated automatically by a containment High-High pressure signal. An automatic actuation opens the Reactor Building Spray System pump discharge valves and starts the two Reactor Building Spray System pumps.

Reactor Building Cooling System

The Reactor Building Cooling System consists of three reactor building cooling trains. Each cooling train is equipped with cooling coils, and an axial vane flow fan driven by a two speed electric motor.

During normal unit operation, typically two reactor building cooling trains with two fans operating at low speed or high speed, serve to cool the containment atmosphere. Low speed cooling fan operation is available during periods of lower containment heat load. The third unit is usually on standby. Upon receipt of an emergency signal, the operating cooling fans running at low speed or high speed will automatically trip, then restart in low speed after a 3 minute delay, and any idle unit is energized in low speed after a 3 minute delay. The fans are operated at the lower speed during accident conditions to prevent motor overload from the higher density atmosphere.

For Unit(s) with the LPSW RB Waterhammer Prevention modification installed, the common LPSW return header will split into two new headers downstream of the Reactor Building Cooling Units (RBCUs). Each header will contain two pneumatic discharge isolation valves and will be capable of full LPSW flow. The headers will be rejoined downstream of the discharge isolation valves into a common return.

APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES

The Reactor Building Spray System and Reactor Building Cooling System reduce the temperature and pressure following an accident. The limiting accidents considered are the loss of coolant accident (LOCA) and the steam line break. The postulated accidents are analyzed, with regard to containment ES systems, assuming the loss of one ES bus. This is the

BASES

**APPLICABLE
SAFETY ANALYSES
(continued)**

worst-case single active failure, resulting in one train of the Reactor Building Spray System and one train of the Reactor Building Cooling System being inoperable.

The analysis and evaluation show that, under the worst-case scenario (LOCA with worst-case single active failure), the highest peak containment pressure is 57.75 psig. The analysis shows that the peak containment temperature is 283.1°F. Both results are less than the design values. The analyses and evaluations assume a power level of 2619 MWt, one reactor building spray train and two reactor building cooling trains operating, and initial (pre-accident) conditions of 80°F and 15.9 psia. The analyses also assume a delayed initiation to provide conservative peak calculated containment pressure and temperature responses.

The Reactor Building Spray System total delay time of approximately 142 seconds includes Keowee Hydro Unit startup (for loss of offsite power), reactor building spray pump startup, and spray line filling (Ref. 2).

Reactor building cooling train performance for post accident conditions is given in Reference 2. The result of the analysis is that any combination of two trains can provide 100% of the required cooling capacity during the post accident condition. The train post accident cooling capacity under varying containment ambient conditions is also shown in Reference 2.

Reactor Building Cooling System total delay time of 3 minutes includes KHU startup (for loss of offsite power) and allows all ES equipment to start before the Reactor Building Cooling Unit on the associated train is started. This improves voltages at the 600V and 208V levels for starting loads (Ref. 2).

The Reactor Building Spray System and the Reactor Building Cooling System satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36 (Ref. 3).

LCO

During an accident, a minimum of two reactor building cooling trains and one reactor building spray train are required to maintain the containment pressure and temperature following a LOCA. Additionally, one reactor building spray train is required to remove iodine from the containment atmosphere and maintain concentrations below those assumed in the safety analysis. To ensure that these requirements are met, two reactor building spray trains and three reactor building cooling trains must be OPERABLE in MODES 1 and 2. In MODES 3 or 4, one reactor building spray train and two reactor building cooling trains are required to be OPERABLE. The LCO is provided with a note that clarifies this requirement. Therefore, in the event of an accident, the minimum requirements are met, assuming the worst-case single active failure occurs.

BASES

LCO
(continued)

Each reactor building spray train shall include a spray pump, spray headers, nozzles, valves, piping, instruments, and controls to ensure an OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the BWST (via the LPI System) upon an Engineered Safeguards Protective System signal and manually transferring suction to the reactor building sump. The OPERABILITY of RBS train flow instrumentation is not required for OPERABILITY of the corresponding RBS train because system resistance hydraulically maintains adequate NPSH to the RBS pumps and manual throttling of RBS flow is not required. During an event, LPI train flow must be monitored and controlled to support the RBS train pumps to ensure that the NPSH requirements for the RBS pumps are not exceeded. If the flow instrumentation or the capability to control the flow in a LPI train is unavailable then the associated RBS train's OPERABILITY is affected until such time as the LPI train is restored or the associated LPI pump is placed in a secured state to prevent actuation during an event.

Each reactor building cooling train shall include cooling coils, fusible dropout plates or duct openings, an axial vane flow fan, instruments, valves, and controls to ensure an OPERABLE flow path. For Unit(s) with the LPSW RB Waterhammer modification installed, two headers of the LPSW RB Waterhammer Prevention Discharge Isolation Valves are required to support flowpath OPERABILITY or one header of LPSW RB Waterhammer Prevention Discharge Isolation Valves shall be manually opened (remote or local) to prevent automatic closure. Valve LPSW-108 shall be locked open to support system OPERABILITY.

APPLICABILITY

In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, an accident could cause a release of radioactive material to containment and an increase in containment pressure and temperature, requiring the operation of the reactor building spray trains and reactor building cooling trains.

In MODES 5 and 6, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Thus, the Reactor Building Spray System and the Reactor Building Cooling System are not required to be OPERABLE in MODES 5 and 6.

ACTIONS

The Actions are modified by a Note indicating that the provisions of LCO 3.0.4 do not apply for Unit 2 only. As a result, this allows entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with the LCO not met after performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability of entering the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability, and

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ACTIONS
(continued)

establishment of risk management actions, if appropriate. The risk assessment may use quantitative, qualitative, or blended approaches and the risk assessment will be conducted using the plant program, procedures, and criteria in place to implement 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4), which requires that risk impacts of maintenance activities to be assessed and managed. The risk assessment must take into account all inoperable Technical Specifications equipment regardless of whether the equipment is included in the normal 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) risk assessment scope. The risk assessments will be conducted using the procedures and guidance endorsed by Regulatory Guide 1.182, "Assessing and Managing Risk Before Maintenance Activities at Nuclear Power Plants." Regulatory Guide 1.182 endorses the guidance in Section 11 of NUMARC 93-01, "Industry Guideline for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants." These documents address general guidance for conduct of the risk assessment, quantitative and qualitative guidelines for establishing risk management actions, and example risk management actions. These include actions to plan and conduct other activities in a manner that controls overall risk, increased risk awareness by shift and management personnel, actions to reduce the duration of the condition, actions to minimize the magnitude of risk increases (establishment of backup success paths or compensatory measures), and determination that the proposed MODE change is acceptable. Consideration should also be given to the probability of completing restoration such that the requirements of the LCO would be met prior to the expiration of ACTIONS Completion Times that would require exiting the Applicability. The risk assessment does not have to be documented.

There is a small subset of systems and components that have been determined (Ref: B&W owners group generic qualitative risk assessments- attachment to TSTF-359, Rev. 9, "B&W owners group Qualitative Risk Assessment for Increased Flexibility in MODE Restraints," Framatome Technologies BAW-2383, October 2001.) to be of higher risk significance for which an LCO 3.0.4 exemption would not be allowed. For Oconee these are the Decay Heat Removal System (DHR) entering MODES, 5 and 4; Keowee Hydro Units entering MODES 1-5; and the emergency feedwater system (EFW) entering MODE 1. The Reactor Spray and Cooling System is not one of the higher risk significant systems noted.

The provisions of this Note should not be interpreted as endorsing the failure to exercise the good practice of restoring systems or components to OPERABLE status before entering an associated MODE or other specified Condition in the Applicability.

BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

A.1

With one reactor building spray train inoperable in MODE 1 or 2, the inoperable reactor building spray train must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE spray and cooling trains are adequate to perform the iodine removal and containment cooling functions. The 7 day Completion Time takes into account the redundant heat removal capability afforded by the OPERABLE reactor building spray train, reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of an accident occurring during this period.

The 14 day portion of the Completion Time for Required Action A.1 is based upon engineering judgment. It takes into account the low probability of coincident entry into two Conditions in this LCO coupled with the low probability of an accident occurring during this time. Refer to Section 1.3, Completion Times, for a more detailed discussion of the purpose of the "from discovery of failure to meet the LCO" portion of the Completion Time.

B.1

With one of the reactor building cooling trains inoperable in MODE 1 or 2, the inoperable reactor building cooling train must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days. The components in this degraded condition provide iodine removal capabilities and are capable of providing at least 100% of the heat removal needs after an accident. The 7 day Completion Time was developed taking into account the redundant heat removal capabilities afforded by combinations of the Reactor Building Spray System and Reactor Building Cooling System and the low probability of an accident occurring during this period.

The 14 day portion of the Completion Time for Required Action B.1 is based upon engineering judgment. It takes into account the low probability of coincident entry into two Conditions in this LCO coupled with the low probability of an accident occurring during this time. Refer to Section 1.3 for a more detailed discussion of the purpose of the "from discovery of failure to meet the LCO" portion of the Completion Time.

C.1

With one reactor building spray train and one reactor building cooling train inoperable in MODE 1 or 2, at least one of the inoperable trains must be restored to OPERABLE status within 24 hours. In this Condition, the remaining OPERABLE spray and cooling trains are adequate to provide iodine removal capabilities and are capable of providing at least 100% of the heat removal needs after an accident. The 24 hour Completion Time

BASES

ACTIONS

C.1 (continued)

takes into account the heat removal capability afforded by the remaining OPERABLE spray train and cooling trains, reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of an accident occurring during this period.

D.1

If the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A, B or C are not met, the unit must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO, as modified by the Note, does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours. The allowed Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

E.1

With one of the required reactor building cooling trains inoperable in MODE 3 or 4, the required reactor building cooling train must be restored to OPERABLE status within 24 hours.

The 24 hour Completion Time is reasonable based on engineering judgement taking into account the iodine and heat removal capabilities of the remaining required train of reactor building spray and cooling.

F.1

With one required reactor building spray train inoperable in MODE 3 or 4, the required reactor building spray train must be restored to OPERABLE status within 24 hours. The 24 hour Completion Time is reasonable based on engineering judgement taking into account the heat removal capabilities of the remaining required trains of reactor building cooling.

G.1

If the Required Actions and associated Completion Times of Condition E or F of this LCO are not met, the unit must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be brought to MODE 5 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit

BASES

ACTIONS

G.1 (continued)

conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

H.1

With two reactor building spray trains, two reactor building cooling trains or any combination of three or more reactor building spray and reactor building cooling trains inoperable in MODE 1 or 2, the unit is in a condition outside the accident analysis. Therefore, LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately.

With any combination of two or more required reactor building spray and reactor building cooling trains inoperable in MODE 3 or 4, the unit is in a condition outside the accident analysis. Therefore, LCO 3.0.3 must be entered immediately.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.5.1

Verifying the correct alignment for manual and non-automatic power operated valves in the reactor building spray and cooling flow path provides assurance that the proper flow paths will exist for Reactor Building Spray and Cooling System operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, since these were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. Similarly, this SR does not apply to automatic valves since automatic valves actuate to their required position upon an accident signal. This SR also does not apply to valves that cannot be inadvertently misaligned, such as check valves. This SR does not require any testing or valve manipulation. Rather, it involves verification, through a system walkdown, that those valves outside containment and capable of potentially being mispositioned are in the correct position.

SR 3.6.5.1 is modified by a note that states the SR is applicable for Reactor Building Cooling system following completion of the LPSW RB Waterhammer Modification on the respective Unit.

SR 3.6.5.2

Operating each required reactor building cooling train fan unit for ≥ 15 minutes ensures that all trains are OPERABLE and that all associated controls are functioning properly. It also ensures that blockage, fan or motor failure, or excessive vibration can be detected for corrective action.

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.5.2 (continued)

The 31 day Frequency was developed considering the known reliability of the fan units and controls, the three train redundancy available, and the low probability of a significant degradation of the reactor building cooling trains occurring between surveillances and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience.

SR 3.6.5.3

Verifying that each required Reactor Building Spray pump's developed head at the flow test point is greater than or equal to the required developed head ensures that spray pump performance has not degraded during the cycle. Flow and differential pressure are normal tests of centrifugal pump performance required by Section XI of the ASME Code (Ref. 4). Since the Reactor Building Spray System pumps cannot be tested with flow through the spray headers, they are tested on recirculation flow. This test confirms one point on the pump design curve and is indicative of overall performance. Such inservice tests confirm component OPERABILITY, trend performance, and may detect incipient failures by indicating abnormal performance. The Frequency of this SR is in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program.

SR 3.6.5.4

Verifying the containment heat removal capability provides assurance that the containment heat removal systems are capable of maintaining containment temperature below design limits following an accident. This test verifies the heat removal capability of the Low Pressure Injection (LPI) Coolers and Reactor Building Cooling Units. The 18 month Frequency was developed considering the known reliability of the low pressure service water, reactor building spray and reactor building cooling systems and other testing performed at shorter intervals that is intended to identify the possible loss of heat removal capability.

BASES

**SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS**
(continued)

SR 3.6.5.5 and 3.6.5.6

These SRs require verification that each automatic reactor building spray and cooling valve actuates to its correct position and that each reactor building spray pump starts upon receipt of an actual or simulated actuation signal. The test will be considered satisfactory if visual observation and control board indication verifies that all components have responded to the actuation signal properly; the appropriate pump breakers have closed, and all valves have completed their travel. This SR is not required for valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position under administrative controls. The 18 month Frequency is based on the need to perform these Surveillances under the conditions that apply during a unit outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillances were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillances when performed at the 18 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

SR 3.6.5.5 is modified by a note that states the SR is applicable for Reactor Building Cooling system following completion of the LPSW RB Waterhammer Modification on the respective Unit.

SR 3.6.5.7

This SR requires verification that each required reactor building cooling train actuates upon receipt of an actual or simulated actuation signal. The test will be considered satisfactory if control board indication verifies that all components have responded to the actuation signal properly, the appropriate valves have completed their travel, and fans are running at half speed. The 18 month Frequency is based on engineering judgment and has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience. See SR 3.6.5.5 and SR 3.6.5.6, above, for further discussion of the basis for the 18 month Frequency.

BASES

**SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS**

SR 3.6.5.8

With the reactor building spray header isolated and drained of any solution, station compressed air is introduced into the spray headers. This SR requires verification that each spray nozzle is unobstructed following activities which could cause nozzle blockage. Normal plant operation and activities are not expected to initiate this SR. However, activities such as inadvertent spray actuation that causes fluid flow through the nozzles, major configuration change, or a loss of foreign material control when working within the respective system boundary may require surveillance performance.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 3.1.
 2. UFSAR, Section 6.2.
 3. 10 CFR 50.36.
 4. ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI.
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Attachment 2

BASES

ACTIONS
(continued)

Required Action D.1 is modified by a Second Note indicating that it is not applicable for up to 10 days for replacement of an entire battery bank and the performance of necessary tests to restore the battery to service.

D.1

With one of the required 230 kV switchyard DC power sources inoperable, the remaining source is fully capable of providing adequate voltage to the associated panelboards and is fully capable of powering the necessary panelboards. However, another failure of a DC source or panelboard could result in failure of the overhead emergency power path. In addition, in the event of grid voltage degradation the station and onsite emergency power sources could fail to separate from the grid. Therefore, the inoperable source must be restored to OPERABLE status within 24 hours. Required Action D.1 is modified by a Note indicating that it is not applicable for up to 72 hours to perform an equalization charge after completion of a performance test or service test. This note allows a maximum Completion Time of 96 hours (24 hours for an inoperable battery due to performing a service test plus 72 hours to perform equalization charge).

The Completion Time for this Required Action is based on engineering judgment, taking into consideration the extent of degradation involved, the likelihood of events or failures which could challenge the system, and the time required to complete the required actions.

E.1 and E.2

If the inoperable DC electrical power source cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the unit must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours and to MODE 5 within 84 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.3.1

This Surveillance verifies that the distribution centers are functioning properly, with the correct circuit breaker alignment to the isolating transfer diodes. The correct breaker alignment ensures the appropriate separation and independence is maintained, and the appropriate voltage is available to each required isolating transfer diode. The verification of

BASES

SURVEILLANCE
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.6.5.8

With the reactor building spray header isolated and drained of any solution, station compressed air is introduced into the spray headers. This SR requires verification that each spray nozzle is unobstructed following activities which could cause nozzle blockage. Normal plant operation and activities are not expected to initiate this SR. However activities such as inadvertent spray actuation that causes fluid flow through the nozzles, major configuration change, or a loss of foreign material control when working within the respective system boundary may require surveillance performance.

REFERENCES

1. UFSAR, Section 3.1.
 2. UFSAR, Section 6.2.
 3. 10 CFR 50.36.
 4. ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI.
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