CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE NO. 1032

APPENDIX B

APPROVED CONTENTS AND DESIGN FEATURES

FOR THE HI-STORM FW MPC STORAGE SYSTEM

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1.0 Definitions

Refer to Appendix A for Definitions.

2.0 APPROVED CONTENTS

2.1 Fuel Specifications and Loading Conditions

2.1.1 Fuel to Be Stored in the HI-STORM FW MPC Storage System

- a. UNDAMAGED FUEL ASSEMBLIES, DAMAGED FUEL ASSEMBLIES, FUEL DEBRIS, and NON-FUEL HARDWARE meeting the limits specified in Table 2.1-1 and other referenced tables may be stored in the HI-STORM FW MPC Storage System.
- b. All BWR fuel assemblies may be stored with or without ZR channels.

2.1.2 Fuel Loading

Figures 2.1-1 and 2.1-2 define the regions for the MPC-37 and MPC-89 models, respectively. Fuel assembly decay heat limits are specified in Section 2.3.1. Fuel assemblies shall meet all other applicable limits specified in Tables 2.1-1 through 2.1-3.

2.2 Violations

If any Fuel Specifications or Loading Conditions of 2.1 are violated, the following actions shall be completed:

- 2.2.1 The affected fuel assemblies shall be placed in a safe condition.
- 2.2.2 Within 24 hours, notify the NRC Operations Center.
- 2.2.3 Within 30 days, submit a special report which describes the cause of the violation, and actions taken to restore compliance and prevent recurrence.

Legend

Region-Cell ID

Figure 2.1-1 MPC-37 Region-Cell Identification

Figure 2.1-2 MPC-89 Region-Cell Identification

I. MPC MODEL: MPC-37

- A. Allowable Contents
	- 1. Uranium oxide PWR UNDAMAGED FUEL ASSEMBLIES, DAMAGED FUEL ASSEMBLIES, and/or FUEL DEBRIS meeting the criteria in Table 2.1-2, with or without NON-FUEL HARDWARE and meeting the following specifications (Note 1):

- I. MPC MODEL: MPC-37 (continued)
	- B. Quantity per MPC: 37 FUEL ASSEMBLIES with up to twelve (12) DAMAGED FUEL ASSEMBLIES or FUEL DEBRIS in DAMAGED FUEL CONTAINERS (DFCs). DFCs may be stored in fuel storage locations 3-1, 3-3 through 3-7, 3-10 through 3-14, and 3-16 (see Figure 2.1-1). The remaining fuel storage locations may be filled with PWR UNDAMAGED FUEL ASSEMBLIES meeting the applicable specifications.
	- C. One (1) Neutron Source Assembly (NSA) is authorized for loading in the MPC-37.
	- D. Up to thirty (30) BRPAs are authorized for loading in the MPC-37.
- Note 1: Fuel assemblies containing BPRAs, TPDs, WABAs, water displacement guide tube plugs, orifice rod assemblies, or vibration suppressor inserts, with or without ITTRs, may be stored in any fuel storage location. Fuel assemblies containing APSRs, RCCAs, CEAs, CRAs, or NSAs may only be loaded in fuel storage Regions 1 and 2 (see Figure 2.1-1).

II. MPC MODEL: MPC-89

- A. Allowable Contents
- 1. Uranium oxide BWR UNDAMAGED FUEL ASSEMBLIES, DAMAGED FUEL ASSEMBLIES, and/or FUEL DEBRIS meeting the criteria in Table 2.1-3, with or without channels and meeting the following specifications:

Table 2.1-1 (page 4 of 4) Fuel Assembly Limits

- II. MPC MODEL: MPC-89 (continued)
	- B. Quantity per MPC: 89 FUEL ASSEMBLIES with up to sixteen (16) DAMAGED FUEL ASSEMBLIES or FUEL DEBRIS in DAMAGED FUEL CONTAINERS (DFCs). DFCs may be stored in fuel storage locations 3-1, 3-3, 3-4, 3-9, 3-10, 3-13, 3-16, 3-19, 3-22, 3-25, 3-28, 3-31, 3-32, 3-37, 3-38, and 3-40 (see Figure 2.1-2). The remaining fuel storage locations may be filled with BWR UNDAMAGED FUEL ASSEMBLIES meeting the applicable specifications.
- Note 1: The lowest allowable enrichment of any fuel assembly, based on fuel array class and fuel classification, is the maximum allowable for all assemblies loaded in each MPC-89.

Notes:

- 1. All dimensions are design nominal values. Maximum and minimum dimensions are specified to bound variations in design nominal values among fuel assemblies within a given array/class.
- 2. Each guide tube replaces four fuel rods.
- 3. Annular fuel pellets are allowed in the top and bottom 12" of the active fuel length.
- 4. One Instrument Tube and eight Guide Bars (Solid ZR)

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NOTES:

- 1. All dimensions are design nominal values. Maximum and minimum dimensions are specified to bound variations in design nominal values among fuel assemblies within a given array/class.
- 2. This assembly is known as "QUAD+." It has four rectangular water cross segments dividing the assembly into four quadrants.
- 3. For the SPC 9x9-5 fuel assembly, each fuel rod must meet either the 9x9E or the 9x9F set of limits or clad O.D., clad I.D., and pellet diameter.
- 4. This assembly class contains 74 total rods; 66 full length rods and 8 partial length rods.
- 5. Square, replacing nine fuel rods.
- 6. Variable.

7. This assembly contains 92 total fuel rods; 78 full length rods and 14 partial length rods.

- 8. This assembly class contains 91 total fuel rods; 83 full length rods and 8 partial length rods.
- 9. One diamond-shaped water rod replacing the four center fuel rods and four rectangular water rods dividing the assembly into four quadrants.
- 10. These rods may also be sealed at both ends and contain ZR material in lieu of water.
- 113. Not used.
- 124. Fuel assemblies classified as DAMAGED FUEL are limited to 4.0 wt.% U-235.
- 135. Fuel assemblies classified as DAMAGED FUEL are limited to 4.6 wt.% U-235.

2.3 Decay Heat Limits

This section provides the limits on fuel assembly decay heat for storage in the HI-STORM FW System. The method to verify compliance, including examples, is provided in Chapter 13 of the HI-STORM FW FSAR.

2.3.1 Fuel Loading Decay Heat Limits

Table 2.3-1 provides the maximum allowable decay heat per fuel storage location for MPC-37. Table 2.3-2 provides the maximum allowable decay heat per fuel storage location for MPC-89. The limits in these tables are applicable when using FHD to dry moderate or high burnup fuel and when using VDS to dry moderate burnup fuel only. Tables 2.3-3 and 2.3-4 provide the maximum allowable decay heat per fuel storage location for MPC-37 and MPC-89, respectively, when using VDS to dry high burnup fuel.

2.3.2 When complying with the maximum fuel storage location decay heat limits, users must account for the decay heat from both the fuel assembly and any NON-FUEL HARDWARE, as applicable for the particular fuel storage location, to ensure the decay heat emitted by all contents in a storage location does not exceed the limit.

3.0 DESIGN FEATURES

3.1 Site

3.1.1 Site Location

The HI-STORM FW Cask System is authorized for general use by 10 CFR Part 50 license holders at various site locations under the provisions of 10 CFR 72, Subpart K.

3.2 Design Features Important for Criticality Control

3.2.1 MPC-37

- 1. Basket cell ID: 8.92 in. (nom.)
- 2. Basket cell wall thickness: 0.57 in. (nom.)
- 3. B₄C in the Metamic-HT: 10.0 wt % (min.)
- 3.2.2 MPC-89
	- 1. Basket cell ID: 5.99 in. (nom.)
	- 2. Basket cell wall thickness: 0.38 in. (nom.)
	- 3. B4C in the Metamic-HT: 10.0 wt % (min.)
- 3.2.3 Neutron Absorber Tests

Section 10.1.67.3 of the HI-STORM FW FSAR is hereby incorporated by reference into the HI-STORM FW CoC.

3.3 Codes and Standards

The American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (ASME Code), 2007 Edition, is the governing Code for the HI-STORM FW System MPC as clarified in Specification 3.3.1 below, except for Code Sections V and IX. The ASME Code paragraphs applicable to the HI-STORM FW OVERPACK and TRANSFER CASK are listed in Table 3-2. The latest effective editions of ASME Code Sections V and IX, including addenda, may be used for activities governed by those sections, provided a written reconciliation of the later edition against the 2007 Edition, including any addenda, is performed by the certificate holder. American Concrete Institute (ACI) 349- 85 is the governing Code for plain concrete as clarified in Appendix 1.D of the Final Safety Analysis Report for the HI-STORM 100 Cask System.

3.3.1 Alternatives to Codes, Standards, and Criteria

Table 3-1 lists approved alternatives to the ASME Code for the design of the MPCs of the HI-STORM FW Cask System.

3.3.2 Construction/Fabrication Alternatives to Codes, Standards, and Criteria

Proposed alternatives to the ASME Code, Section III, 2007 Edition, including modifications to the alternatives allowed by Specification 3.3.1 may be used on a case-specific basis when authorized by the Director of the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards or designee. The request for such alternative should demonstrate that:

- 1. The proposed alternatives would provide an acceptable level of quality and safety, or
- 2. Compliance with the specified requirements of the ASME Code, Section III, 2007 Edition, would result in hardship or unusual difficulty without a compensating increase in the level of quality and safety.

Requests for alternatives shall be submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 72.4.

(continued)

3.0 DESIGN FEATURES (continued)

NF-5530 † All references to the ASME Code refer to applicable sections of the 2007 edition.

3.0 DESIGN FEATURES (continued)

3.4 Site-Specific Parameters and Analyses

Site-specific parameters and analyses that will require verification by the system user are, as a minimum, as follows:

- 1. The temperature of 80° F is the maximum average yearly temperature.
- 2. The allowed temperature extremes, averaged over a 3-day period, shall be greater than -40 $^{\circ}$ F and less than 125 $^{\circ}$ F.
- 3. a. The resultant horizontal acceleration (vectorial sum of two horizontal Zero Period Accelerations (ZPAs) at a three-dimensional seismic site), a_H , and vertical ZPA, a_V , on the top surface of the ISFSI pad, expressed as fractions of a, shall satisfy the following inequalities:

$$
a_H \leq f (1 - a_V), \text{ and}
$$

 $a_H \le r (1 - a_V) / h$

where f is the Coulomb friction coefficient for the cask/ISFSI pad interface, r is the radius of the cask, and h is the height of the cask center-of-gravity above the ISFSI pad surface. Unless demonstrated by appropriate testing that a higher coefficient of friction value is appropriate for a specific ISFSI, the value used shall be 0.53. If acceleration time-histories on the ISFSI pad surface are available, a_H and a_V may be the coincident values of the instantaneous net horizontal and vertical accelerations. If instantaneous accelerations are used, the inequalities shall be evaluated at each time step in the acceleration time history over the total duration of the seismic event.

If this static equilibrium based inequality cannot be met, a dynamic analysis of the cask/ISFSI pad assemblage with appropriate recognition of soil/structure interaction effects shall be performed to ensure that the casks will not tip over or undergo excessive sliding under the site's Design Basis Earthquake.

- b. Under environmental conditions that may degrade the pad/cask interface friction (such as due to icing) the response of the casks under the site's Design Basis Earthquake shall be established using the best estimate of the friction coefficient in an appropriate analysis model. The analysis should demonstrate that the earthquake will not result in cask tipover or cause a cask to slide. In addition, impact between casks should be precluded, or should be considered an accident for which the maximum g-load experienced by the stored fuel shall be limited to the maximum deceleration under the nonmechanistic tipover event in the FSAR.
- 4. The maximum permitted depth of submergence under water shall not exceed 125 feet.
- 5. The maximum permissible velocity of floodwater, V, for a flood of height, h, shall be the lesser of V_1 or V_2 , where:

 $V_1 = (1.876 W^*)^{1/2}/h$ V_2 = (1.876 f W*/ D h)^{1/2}

 and W* is the apparent (buoyant weight) of the loaded overpack (in pounds force), D is the diameter of the overpack (in feet), and f is the interface coefficient of friction between the ISFSI pad and the overpack, as used in step 3.a above. Use the height of the overpack, H, if h>H.

- 6. The potential for fire and explosion while handling a loaded OVERPACK or TRANSFER CASK shall be addressed, based on site-specific considerations. The user shall demonstrate that the site-specific potential for fire is bounded by the fire conditions analyzed by the Certificate Holder, or an analysis of the site-specific fire considerations shall be performed.
- 7. The user shall demonstrate that the ISFSI pad parameters used in the non-mechanistic tipover analysis are bounding for the site or a site specific non-mechanistic tipover analysis shall be performed using the dynamic model described in FSAR Section 3.4. The maximum total deflection, d, in the active fuel region of the basket panels shall be limited by the following inequality: $d \leq 0.005$ l, where l is basket cell inside dimension.
- 8. In cases where engineered features (i.e., berms and shield walls) are used to ensure that the requirements of 10CFR72.104(a) are met, such features are to be considered important-to-safety and must be evaluated to determine the applicable quality assurance category.
- 9. LOADING OPERATIONS, TRANSPORT OPERATIONS, and UNLOADING OPERATIONS shall only be conducted with working area ambient temperatures $\geq 0^{\circ}$ F.
- 10. For those users whose site-specific design basis includes an event or events (e.g., flood) that result in the blockage of any OVERPACK inlet or

outlet air ducts for an extended period of time (i.e, longer than the total Completion Time of LCO 3.1.2), an analysis or evaluation may be performed to demonstrate adequate heat removal is available for the duration of the event. Adequate heat removal is defined as fuel cladding temperatures remaining below the short term temperature limit. If the analysis or evaluation is not performed, or if fuel cladding temperature limits are unable to be demonstrated by analysis or evaluation to remain below the short term temperature limit for the duration of the event, provisions shall be established to provide alternate means of cooling to accomplish this objective.

- 11. Users shall establish procedural and/or mechanical barriers to ensure that during LOADING OPERATIONS and UNLOADING OPERATIONS, either the fuel cladding is covered by water, or the MPC is filled with an inert gas.
- 12. The entire haul route shall be evaluated to ensure that the route can support the weight of the loaded system and its conveyance.
- 13. The loaded system and its conveyance shall be evaluated to ensure under the site specific Design Basis Earthquake the system does not tipover or slide off the haul route.
- 14. The HI-STORM FW/HI-TRAC VW stack which occurs during MPC TRANSFER shall be evaluated to ensure under the site specific Design Basis Earthquake the system does not tipover. A probabilistic risk assessment cannot be used to rule out the occurrence of the earthquake during MPC TRANSFER.

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3.0 DESIGN FEATURES (continued)

3.5 Combustible Gas Monitoring During MPC Lid Welding and Cutting

During MPC lid-to-shell welding and cutting operations, combustible gas monitoring of the space under the MPC lid is required, to ensure that there is no combustible mixture present.