

LaSalle Operating Test Comments

There were no NRC comments on the outline submitted by the facility.

Item	Comment	Action
Admin JPM a RO	Step 2 has actions to notify two separate people. Separate the step into 2 steps.	Revised per recommendation.
	Step 3 standard does not specify "level" of individual to be notified.	Added Field Supervisor or WEC SRO.
	Terminating cue needs to be more specific.	Revised terminating cue to "when the Nursing Supervisor at the hospital is notified."
Admin JPM a SRO	Steps #2 and #3 are not critical steps.	Changed steps #2 and #3 to non-critical. Changed step #4 to critical.
	The JPM doesn't require the applicant to document anything in order to pass the JPM. The applicant "notes" the hours discrepancy, "determines" that 40 hours are not met, and then does not sign the form. There is no requirement or place for the applicant to document any discrepancies.	The applicant is required to find the discrepancy and reject the form. The applicant's verbal response that the time is incomplete is enough for acceptance. If the applicant signs the document, this documents an unsatisfactory performance. No change made to the JPM.
Admin JPM b RO	It doesn't appear the JPM requires the applicant to document anything in order to pass the JPM. The critical steps involve only "determining" and nothing must be written down.	The applicant's identification of the work hours is the critical task. No change made.
Admin JPM b SRO	It doesn't appear to require the applicant to document anything in order to pass the JPM. The critical steps involve only "determining" and so nothing is documented.	The applicant's identification of the work hours is the critical task. The applicant's verbal response identifying the work hour rules is adequate to verify correct knowledge. No change made.
Admin JPM c SRO	Two valves are not critical for identification.	Revised JPM to omit unnecessary valves.
	If the applicant finds the need for any isolation valves in addition to those provided, would that be considered failure criteria?	Identification of additional valves beyond the isolation valves identified in the JPM is evidence of unsatisfactory knowledge.
	Why is securing the Diesel Fire Pump required here and NOT in the RO version?	Securing the pump is a tech spec action and is the portion of the JPM that makes this JPM SRO knowledge level.
Admin JPM d RO/SRO	Initiating cue has redundant statements.	Revised initiating cue to eliminate redundancy.
	There is nothing in this JPM that discriminates a good operator from a bad operator because these are RP responsibilities, not "on-shift licensed operator" responsibilities as the task referenced at the beginning of the JPM states.	A good operator must recognize the requirements to enter a locked high radiation area and know which map can be used and which RP brief to expect when entering a locked high rad area. No change to the JPM.
Admin JPM e SRO	Revise to evaluate knowledge of time completion and notification during an	Revised as requested.

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	upgrade classification.	
CR JPM a	Initial condition procedure step needs revised.	Initial condition revised to current procedure revision.
	Step 23 no specific enough for "minimum" position.	Revised to state "approximately 20%.
CR JPM c	Questioned overlap with scenario event.	Scenario had an RWCU leak with unsuccessful isolation leading to a depressurization. This JPM will allow the applicant to successfully isolate the leak. JPM left as is.
CR JPM d	Initial condition should identify the JPM as "time critical"	Revised initial condition to state the JPM is time critical.
CR JPM f	The JPM is not alternate path.	Left as is. the JPM required action via the "response not obtained" portion of the procedure.
	Step 4 of the JPM should mention the examinee may try to initiate SGBT via the Arm and Depress push button.	Added not to warn examiner.
CR JPM h	Setup of JPM had a required piece of equipment out of service due to modified setup since validation.	Revised JPM setup initial conditions.
CR JPM g	No cue to state examinee has obtained proper safety equipment and screwdriver.	Added cue to state examinee has obtained proper safety equipment and screwdriver.
	LFP-100-1, Att. D states to install an Equipment Status Tag on 1H13-P603 panel apron W/D (withdraw block light. This light no longer exists.	Placed cue in the JPM stating someone else will follow through with the placement of the tag and procedure deviation. Wrote PCR for procedure change. Release after exam completion.
IP JPM k	EPN for "C" vacuum brkr not listed in step 3.	Added EPN to step 3.
	Step 3 standard does not state correct direction to close the vacuum breaker.	Added "counter-clockwise" direction to the standard.
	Climbing a ladder required for accessing an isolation valve.	Added a step that when identified, cue the examinee with the EPN of the identified valve.
Scenario 1	Event 4, "A" IRM INOP is labeled as a TS call when no required actions are entered.	Removed as a TS call.
	Actions for event 1 included action to attempt re-coupling 4 times. Not required when below LPSP.	Removed actions to attempt to re-couple 4 times.
	During event 2 annunciator 1PM06J-B407 (PRI CONT 1B EXP TANK LVL HI/LO) energized.	Overwrote the alarm so it will not energize during the exam.
	Event 3 WRGM Lo range trip referred to TRM 3.3.d.	Removed reference to TRM 3.3.d.

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	Event 6 – Feedwater break needs more response actions listed.	Added additional actions taken and valves that will be closed.
	Event 7 – Loss of Coolant, requested to add possible actions based on conditions.	Added additional steps that “may” be performed by applicants.
	Event 5 – TBCCW pressure low, the crew stated the PPC display did not indicate the SAC running.	Wrote simulator work request. Will issue upon completion of the exam.
Scenario 2	Turbine lube oil was 93°F at the beginning of the scenario.	SWR written to fix TLO temperature in the IC.
	On initial run, did not receive Event 2 due to typo in cae.	Removed the typo, ran event to ensure actuation and proper response.
Scenario 3	Validation crew stated leaving the Main Turbine bypass valve failed open following the scram masked the MS leak, causing depressurization.	Added role play and ation to isolate the failed open bypass valve prior to the scram.
	Preventing HPCS, LPCS and LPCI injection during an ATWS was not a critical tsk.	Added ECCS prevention during an ATWS as a critical task.
	Critical task requires initiation of SBLC at >3% but does not mention control rod insertion.	Added “and/or insert control rods” to critical task.
	Event 5 had only one manual action.	Changed event to include additional manual actions.
	Event 3 had only one manual action.	Changed event to include additional manual actions.
	Per the level leg of LGA-010, applicants are to rapidly lower ractor level to -60 inches. Based on power level, -60” may not be reached rapidly.	Added comment in the guide that this action is met if feedwater injection is minimized.
Scenario 4	Erratic pump amps on LPCS pump start.	Written simulator work request to be released after exam concludes.
	Forced trip of ‘A’ TDRFP trip before alarm for TDRFP low bearing oil pressure came in.	Revised “role play” to report lube oil leak after alarm (TDRFP low bearing oil pressure) energizes.
	Scenario guide does not list many actions of LOP-RT-02 (RWCU start up).	Provided copy of LOP-RT-02 for examiner reference.
	Scenario guide listed to “report indication of a RR line break” during event 9 and 10. A RR line break was not included in the scenario.	The statement was removed.
	The crew had difficulty realizing why they had alarm 1H13-P603-A402 energized after the MDRFP started.	Added statement to role play that if the applicants ask for guidance from engineering that the alarm is part of the expected response during startup.
	The crew manually isolated the Off Gas outlet valve after receiving ‘A’ Off Gas Post Treatment Rad High. The auto isolation requires both ‘A’ and ‘B’ post treatment signals (hi/downscale or Inop).	The ‘A’ Off Gas Post Treatment Hi malfunction was replaced with an ‘A’ Off Gas Post Treatment “downscale” malfunction and will alarm a different annunciator (1N62-B208 “Off Gas Post

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	The LOR 1N62-P600-B207 states the "Auto Actions" are the 1N62-F057 will isolate and to verify the auto actions. The wording lead the crew to believe the 2N62-F057 should have auto isolated.	Treatment or Panel 0PL99J Rad Trouble"). This LOR states that both 'A' and 'B' Off as Post Treatment malfunctions are required for automatic action. Wrote PCR to address clarification that both monitors needed for auto action.
	Some RO tasks were performed by the BOP.	During evaluation examiner may need to inject a cue to allow the other operator to take the required actions.
Scenario 5	Event 3 only had one action.	Reduce the ramp rate of the failure. This will not allow time to have the RO place the feed pump min flow controller in manual before it opens, requiring the applicant to place the controller in manual and open the valve.
	Event 5 has only one action.	Leave as-is – spare scenario.
	Event 6 has a slow decrease in vacuum.	Leave as is, a rapidly decreasing vacuum may drive the applicants to scram the reactor before desired.