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Title: Southern Nuclear Operation Company

Vogtle Electric Plant, Units 3 & 4

Docket Number: 52-025-COL and 52-026-COL

ALSBP Number: 10-903-01-COL-BD02

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4	ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD PANEL
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8	In the Matter of: :
9	SOUTHERN NUCLEAR : Docket Nos. 52-025-COL and
10	OPERATING CO. : 52-026-COL
11	(Vogtle Electric : ASLBP No. 10-903-01-COL-
12	Generating Plant, : BD02
13	Units 3 and 4) :
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17	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
18	Hearing Room T-3 B45
19	11545 Rockville Pike
20	Rockville, Maryland
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22	BEFORE:
23	G. PAUL BOLLWERK, III, Chairman
24	DR. JAMES F. JACKSON, Administrative Judge
25	NICHOLAS G. TRIKOUROS, Administrative Judge

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P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

2 (9:02 a.m.)

CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: Let's go on the record, please.

Good morning. Today we are here to conduct a prehearing conference and oral argument in a combined license or COL proceeding under Part 52 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, also referred to as the CFR.

In accord with the Licensing Board Order issued on October 6, 2010, this prehearing conference has been convened in response to an August 12, 2010 submission by several groups, specifically the Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League, Center for Sustainable Coast, and Georgia Women's Action for New Directions, seeking the admission of what they refer to as a new contention denoted as Contention SAFETY-2.

With that contention, Joint Intervenors, as they denominate themselves, seek to challenge the adequacy of the containment and coating inspection program for the two new advanced passive or AP1000 reactor units that Applicant Southern Nuclear Operating Company, or SNC, proposes to construct and operate at its existing Vogtle Electric Generating Plant site near Waynesboro, Georgia.

By way of background, I would note that previously the three Administrative Judges on this Atomic Safety and Licensing Board were members of a Licensing Board that was created to consider a November 2008 hearing petition filed by several of the organizations that are part of Joint Intervenors, as well as a number of other organizations, in which they proffered three contentions challenging the SNC COL application for proposal of Vogtle Units 3 and 4.

Although that Licensing Board, in March

Although that Licensing Board, in March 2009, admitted one contention, SAFETY-1, which concerned low level radioactive waste storage at the Vogtle facility, in May 2010 that Board granted summary disposition in favor of Applicant SNC regarding that contention.

No petition for review was filed requesting that the Commission examine that Board action, nor did the Commission take sua sponte review of that decision pursuant to 10 CFR Section 2.341(a)(2) or (b)(1). The contested portion of this COL proceeding thus was terminated.

As a consequence, when Joint Intervenors directed their August 12th request to admit new contention SAFETY-2 to the three members of that Licensing Board by memorandum dated August 17, 2010,

that Board sent their submission to the Commission for its consideration and appropriate action.

By order dated August 25, 2010, the Secretary of the Commission referred Joint Intervenors' August 12th request to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel's Chief Administrative Judge who, in turn, appointed the three of us on August 27th as the members of a new Board with the authority to rule on Joint Intervenors' request.

With respect to our conduct of the adjudicatory process relating to Joint Intervenors' August 12th submission, we are three independent Administrative Judges appointed by the Commission as members of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel and designated to serve on a Licensing Board to preside over any hearing regarding any contested matters raised regarding the SNC application.

The Panel's Administrative Judges do not work for or with the NRC staff relative to the staff's license application review. Rather, we are charged with deciding whether the issues proffered by those requesting a hearing, such as Joint Intervenors, are admissible and, for those issues we find litigable, making a determination regarding their substantive validity in terms of the grant conditioning or denial

of the requested COL.

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As was the case with the Board previously designated in this COL proceeding, our decisions on hearing matters generally are subject to review, first by the Commission as the Agency's supreme tribunal, courts including, then by the federal appropriate instances, the United States Court.

Relative to the specific matters before us today in this prehearing conference, both NSC and the NRC staff have raised a challenge to the standing or legal interest of the three groups that jointly submitted the August 12th request challenging the SNC COL application for Vogtle Units 3 and 4.

In addition, Applicant SNC has questioned whether Joint Intervenors' request can fulfill the requirements of Section 2.326 for reopening an otherwise closed adjudicatory record, while SNC and the staff also question whether Joint Intervenors' request complies with the requirements governing nontimely and new contentions under Section 2.309(c)(1) and (f)(2), as well as the Section 2.309(f)(1) contention admission standards.

Finally, SNC has challenged the September 22, 2010, request by Joint Intervenors to

submit out of time their reply to the SNC and staff answers to Joint Intervenors' request to admit a new contention.

This is a mater that arose when, on the day Joint Intervenors' reply pleading was due, the attorney who initially requested Joint -- who initially represented Joint Intervenors withdrew from this proceeding without filing that pleading. The participants will have an opportunity to make oral presentations on these questions this morning.

Before we begin these presentations, I would like to introduce the Board members. To my left is Judge Nicholas Trikouros. Judge Trikouros is a nuclear engineer and a full-time member of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel. Joining us this morning by teleconference is Dr. James Jackson. Judge Jackson, likewise, is a nuclear engineer and a part-time member of the Licensing Board Panel.

My name is Paul Bollwerk. I am an attorney, and I am the Chairman of this Licensing Board.

At this point, I'd like to have counsel for the various participants identify themselves for the record. Why don't we start with the Joint Intervenors, then move to the Applicant, and, finally,

1	to the NRC staff. Gentlemen?
2	MR. RUNKLE: Your Honor, my name is John
3	Runkle. I'm representing the Blue Ridge Environmental
4	Defense League, the Georgia Women's Action for New
5	Directions, and the Center for a Sustainable Coast.
6	With me at counsel table is Louis Zeller, who is the
7	Science Director for Blue Ridge Environmental Defense
8	League. And Mr. Zeller has been involved in a number
9	of matters before this Commission looking at other
10	applications and their early site permits.
11	CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: All right. Thank you,
12	sir. The Applicant, please?
13	MR. BLANTON: Good morning, Your Honors.
14	This is Stan Blanton for Southern Nuclear Operating
15	Committee, the Applicant. With me at counsel table I
16	have Kathryn Sutton, my co-counsel, who is a partner
17	at Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, and also to my left I have
18	Mr. Jason Redd, who is a senior engineer with Southern
19	Nuclear Operating Committee.
20	CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: All right. Thank you.
21	And the NRC staff, please?
22	MS. HODGDON: I am Ann Hodgdon for the NRC
23	staff. Co-counsel, with me to my right is co-counsel
24	Stephanie Liaw, who will present argument on behalf of
25	the staff. And to my left is Ravi Joshi, who is

project manager for the Vogtle -- regarding the Vogtle

-- staff's review of the Vogtle COL application.

CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: All right. Thank you

I would note that we are conducting this proceeding from the Licensing Board Panel's Hearing Room at the NRC headquarters in Rockville, Maryland. But the conference is also available for viewing at a conference room in the NRC's Region II offices in Atlanta, Georgia, via videoconference, for the benefit of those living in the vicinity of the Vogtle facility.

Glad to have all of you with us today.

As my previous comments indicated, during today's conference we will be entertaining presentations from the participants regarding various procedural matters. At some point in the future, however, in accord with Section 2.315(a) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, the Board may issue a notice that, among other things, may indicate that members of the public will be afforded an opportunity to provide, as appropriate, oral limited setting forth their statements appearance concerning any contested matters relative to the proposed COL for the two new Vogtle units.

In that instance, or a subsequent notice,

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very much.

the Board will outline the times, places, and of participation relative conditions any opportunity for oral limited appearance statements. In the interim, as the Board noted in its September 3rd issuance in this case, any member of the public can submit a written limited appearance statement providing his or her views regarding the issues in this proceeding.

Those written statements can be sent at any time by regular mail to the Office of the Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001, Attention: Rulemakings and Adjudication Staff, or by e-mail to hearingdocket -- that's all one word -- at nrc.gov.

A copy of the statement also should be provided to me, as the Chairman of this Licensing Board, by sending it by regular mail to my attention at the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel, Mail Stop T-3F23, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001, or by e-mail to paul.bollwerk@nrc.gov.

And, again, the submission information is provided in the Board's September 3rd issuance, which is available in the electronic hearing docket on the Agency's website, www.nrc.gov.

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1 Finally, as an informational matter, I 2 would note that under the current provisions of the 3 Atomic Energy Act, regardless of the admissibility of 4 any of Joint Petitioners' contentions, the agency must 5 conduct a separate mandatory hearing concerning SNC's COL application for proposed Vogtle Units 3 and 4. 6 7 That hearing, at which SNC and the NRC staff would be the parties, would deal only with 8 9 matters other than those admitted for litigation and would 10 before this Board or the prior Board, provide the basis for required health and safety, 11 environmental, 12 and common defense and security findings associated with the application and the NRC 13 14 staff's Safety and National Environmental Policy 15 Action, or NEPA, reviews of the application. Under current agency policy, the mandatory 16 17 hearing for the Vogtle Units 3 and 4 COL application will be conducted by the Commission itself. 18 19 Returning to the matters before the Board today, with respect to the order of presentation by 20 the participants to this prehearing conference, in our 21 October 6th order we outlined a schedule that affords 22 an opportunity for the participants to address the 23 contested matters now before the Board. 24 In that regard, we'd request that before 25

starting on the issues for which Joint Intervenors have been afforded the opportunity for oral argument and rebuttal, their counsel should indicate how much the Joint Intervenors' total time allocation for that issue he wishes to reserve for rebuttal. The same would be true for Applicant's counsel relative to the agreed allocation of time between SNC and the staff.

Toward the end of the allocated argument time, the Board will provide counsel with notice of the need to finish his or her presentation. In making their arguments, the participants should bear in mind that we have read their pleadings, and, as such, they should focus their presentations on the critical points in controversy, as those have emerged as a result of the various participant filings over the last two months, as well as the questions outlined by the Board in its October 6th scheduling issuance.

Finally, at some juncture we would like to have a brief discussion regarding some of the administrative details involved in this proceeding.

And relative to administrative matters, I would note that this is my cell phone, which I have turned off. I am going to stick it in my pocket, and I am not going to turn it on again until we are in a recess. I would request that everyone else do the

1 same thing with his or her cell phone, or at least put 2 it on vibrate. 3 But if you put your phone on vibrate and 4 it goes off while we're in session, and you wish to 5 answer it, you would need to leave the Hearing Room before you have your conversation. We appreciate very 6 7 much everyone abiding by this protocol at any time this prehearing conference is in session. 8 9 Unless the participants have anything at 10 this point they need to bring to the attention, let's begin with Joint Intervenors' 11 presentation regarding their motion for leave to file 12 their reply pleading out of time, their standing, and 13 14 the timeliness and admissibility of Contention SAFETY-2. 15 So, Mr. Runkle, I will turn to you. 16 17 much time do you wish to reserve for your rebuttal? 18 19 MR. RUNKLE: Chairman, we will reserve 10 minutes for rebuttal. 20 Ten minutes, all 21 CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: right. 22 MR. RUNKLE: And, sir, I seem to be the 23 24 only one hopping up and down, so do you want me to sit down? 25

1	CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: You should certainly
2	sit down. Absolutely. The room is designed for that.
3	It works best that way. Those microphones are
4	actually fairly directional, so it's right. The
5	mics are directional, so make sure you are speaking
6	into the mic. That would help both us and the folks
7	in the audience.
8	MR. RUNKLE: And the mics are on full-time
9	and they're
10	CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: They're on, unless you
11	press the button and the green light goes off. Right.
12	MR. RUNKLE: Thank you. First of all, I
13	want to express my appreciation to the Board, and also
14	to the other parties, for allowing me to go on a
15	family vacation. But if I do sort of mix up Vogtle
16	plants in Georgia with Place des Vosges in Paris, just
17	bear with me on that, because I am still a little
18	behind the time.
19	What we are bringing to the Board this
20	morning is a new proposed contention. We are calling
21	it SAFETY-2. And it is in the original filing, but I
22	think it bears being put into the record in full.
23	It says, "The Southern Nuclear Operating
24	Company's combined operating license application fails
25	to demonstrate that the Vogtle Electric Generating

Plant Units 3 and 4 can be operated safely, because the containment and containment coating inspection being proposed in the final safety analysis report -see the COLA at the pages 6.1-1 to 6.1-4 -- fails to provide assurance against corrosion-caused penetrations for the containment that would lead, in the event of an accident, to leakage the environment of radioactive materials in excess of regulatory requirements."

This contention meets all of the requirements for contentions. It expresses a significant issue that needs to be resolved. It cites directly to both the COLA and the FSAR, and it is supported by an affidavit and report by an expert witness.

This issue came up in front of this Board through an earlier report going back looking at -- by a group called the AP1000 Oversight Group, had looked at the AP1000 designs and had looked at the various COLAs for the different reactors. And when it became apparent that there were corrosion problems at several of the existing nuclear plants -- they had gone back the last couple of years -- that the corrosion was a problem and that the liner, the zinc coatings, and the inspection of those were not adequate, we asked Arnie

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Gundersen, who is the Chief Engineer of the Fairewinds Associates, to look at the problem to see how that kind of problems with the corrosion and the lack of inspection, and just the integrity of the whole containment structure, how that would deal with the AP1000 reactors.

So Mr. Gundersen prepared a report for us pulling from a lot of various places, past inspection reports for several of the other reactors. He had done some work looking at the corrosion problems and the holes and put together an analysis that -- looking at the AP1000 design, that if there was a hole in the containment, and in case of an accident building up pressure within the containment, that the pressurized steam would go out that hole and be vented into the atmosphere.

And, again, this is in terms of an accident, you know, a fairly severe incident. But the design of the AP1000 reactor is open to the environment, and that is part of the design of it.

Now, as that issue became apparent, we brought it to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, who then forwarded it to the ACRS, and Mr. Gundersen and I -- I, in fact, was counsel for that -- presented to the ACRS and discussed Mr. Gundersen's finding of the

AP1000, what the designs were.

And in that discussion, I mean, we -- as part of this record, is Mr. Gundersen's report, that supports his affidavit in this case. And the presentation was I think very important and really focused in on this -- these issues of the need for inspections of containment and the containment coating.

But in the colloquy with -- between Mr. Gundersen and Chairman Harold Ray of the ACRS, it was -- in was -- those questions and answers I think were vitally important to what this Board has to decide. And as Chairman Ray -- and, again, this is the original filing -- while the coating certainly is an important element of this whole system and the points you make about accessibility for inspection are ones that we have yet to look at. So the ACRS hasn't looked at this, and the input that we were providing was helpful in focusing attention.

And it is also important that when some of this, as a design flaw with the AP1000 reactor, goes into the design control documentation, looking at the certification of the AP1000 design, that is a design flaw. But as Chairman Ray pointed out, the actual differences in the coatings and the differences in the

1 inspection regimen proposed at any individual reactor combined operating 2 is part of that 3 application. 4 And this is -- this is -- I mean, this is 5 an expert who has -- is very well familiar with applications, you know, look at the technical aspects. 6 7 ACRS had not looked at this particular problem of the 8 coatings and the inspections. But Chairman Ray was 9 also very clear that, you know, this is a difference 10 here, looking at any particular COLA, and looking at the inspections that they are trying to do, and that 11 kind of thing. 12 So after this discussion, and until the 13 14 actual wording in the transcript came out, the 15 transcript of that whole presentation is 16 important, probably should be part of this record, the groups that were -- had previously intervened in the 17 Vogtle plant said, "Well, this is an important issue 18 that we had not been able to raise before. 19 It is new information." have that information. 20 Putting together all of the --21 CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: Let me just -- can I 22 What is the new information? 23 stop you? The new information is both 24 MR. RUNKLE: the Gundersen's report putting together the analysis 25

1	of looking at the containment flaw and the different
2	holes and whether the inspection regimes will take
3	care of that, and I think as important new information
4	is the expert opinion by Chairman Ray that this is not
5	all just into the design. This is an issue that comes
6	in front of the COLA.
7	CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: Well, if this I
8	mean, I guess one concern I have is that if this was
9	an issue then, why wasn't it an issue when the initial
10	petition was filed?
11	MR. RUNKLE: Because the analysis had not
12	been put together. And I think that the NRC case
13	law
14	CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: Was the information
15	there to put the analysis together?
16	MR. RUNKLE: Bits and pieces of it were,
17	and, I mean, just to as an argument absurdum, I
18	mean, if if there is information about gravity, and
19	Isaac Newton looked at gravity 400 years ago, and
20	anything that has to do with gravity, I mean, the
21	argument is you have to be do the analysis.
22	You have to look at the different reactors
23	that had leaks and cracks with them from the
24	corrosion. You have to put that all together. You
25	have to be able to look at what the different

application has in their COLA. So it's new information here.

JUDGE TRIKOUROS: The reason that one does an inspection is to look for something. The fact that you find something when you do an inspection is a good thing, not a bad thing necessarily. When I have my brakes checked, I expect that there is a likelihood that I am going to be told that the brakes need to be fixed.

So clearly the inspection programs that are conducted in current plants, and will be in the AP1000, are designed to find such things. So why is it that the fact that they found such things is now new information that is indicative of a design flaw in the AP1000?

MR. RUNKLE: Well, in looking at -specifically at the Vogtle plant, and I think that we
need to -- since we are addressing that, we need to
look at a proposed plant in Georgia that is open to
the environment.

And I don't know how much time you all spend in Georgia, but it is -- for significant lengths of time it is very humid. The air inside the outer containment -- in containment is very humid. Water pools up. There are places within the Vogtle plant,

as proposed, that will not be able to be inspected or will be extremely difficult to inspect.

As Mr. Gundersen says in his report, and also in his affidavit, I mean, he supervised 16 inspectors at one of the plants, and knows full well that even -- that there are -- that you cannot inspect a lot of those places where the water would pool up and cause the most corrosion.

And so you need to be -- there are other ways besides the visual inspection. I mean, you stick your head out into a -- you know, into a door in the containment and try to look around. It is very It is something that you don't spend uncomfortable. a lot of time in. A lot of the corrosion is covered In fact, as Mr. Gundersen says, up by the coatings. may cause even more problems in there depending on what kind of coating they do as part of their their operation maintenance and and what inspection.

So this is -- this is the problem. At the Vogtle plant, looking at their COLA and their FSAR, their inspection is just the minimum. It is not going to -- it is not going to discover the kinds of holes and corrosion problems that that particular plant -- well, and probably all of the AP1000 designs will have

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that the existing plants didn't have.

And as the other parties have argued, well, it is a -- you know, it is a thicker steel. Well, if it corrodes in eight years instead of five years, or is -- since it is open to the environment, it may have, you know, considerably more water vapor and condensation inside of it, it may have additional -- it may have additional corrosion problems that other reactors may not have.

JUDGE TRIKOUROS: If we were to compare the AP1000 to current plants, specifically current PWRs, the -- I think one could say the same things about current plants.

Now, for example, the liner of a PWR containment is not inspectable from the concrete side. The entire liner cannot be viewed on that side. I don't know to what extent Mr. Gundersen found that the failures that have occurred have been initiated on that side or not. But the -- but, clearly, one could say that there are areas of containment that are not inspectable.

The other -- and the other point I wanted to make is that -- and I'm looking for you to tell me where this -- where your contention is different, where the AP1000 is different in this regard. The

containment of a current PWR is open to the environment as well, or a substantial portion of it is.

And, clearly, there is a concrete barrier, but the concrete barrier is not credited in the sense that when integrated leak rate tests are conducted they are looking to see if technical specifications are met. And they don't differentiate between liners and concrete, for example.

So I'd like to understand, where are the differences on the AP1000 to that?

MR. RUNKLE: I think my first response is this is the kind of information and testimony that would come out on a hearing, this kind of very technical and looking at experts and analyzing the differences between what is going on with the existing plants and what is going on -- would go on with the proposed Vogtle plant. So this is the matter for hearing.

Now, it is -- I'm pushing my knowledge on this, but the existing plants don't have the annular gap that is unique to the AP1000. So there is actually a gap between the metal and the outside that is open to it, so there is more room on the outside of the containment to allow moisture to get into it.

So you might be able to inspect the 1 2 outside of the steel containment, but there is --3 there are many places in there, such as the hangs that 4 hold the two together at the bottom, where 5 condensation would cause more corrosion problems. And it is the same problem in putting on 6 7 the zinc coating. It would be hard to do on a regular 8 basis, given what they say they are going to do. 9 you fighting problems, or are you just covering them And that seems to be the difference between the 10 existing PWRs and the AP1000. 11 JUDGE TRIKOUROS: 12 So --CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: Let me just stop one 13 14 second here and do a video -- or an audio check. 15 Judge Jackson, are you hearing Mr. Runkle okay? 16 JUDGE JACKSON: Yes, I am. 17 CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: Okay. Apparently, they are having some problems in Region II. So if you 18 19 could push that mic a little bit closer. somewhat softspoken, and we want -- you can't move the 20 mic, but you can probably take the neck and push it 21 closer to your --22 23 All right. MR. RUNKLE: 24 CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: -- mouth. That'll 25 work. Thank you.

MR. RUNKLE: Is that okay?
CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: Appreciate it. That
will work.
MR. RUNKLE: All right.
CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: Go ahead. Sorry.
JUDGE TRIKOUROS: So when you say "design
flaw" in the AP1000, you are referring to the actual
design of the AP1000 making it difficult to inspect?
MR. RUNKLE: Yes, sir.
JUDGE TRIKOUROS: And if there is a hole
of some sort, a through-wall crack in the containment,
that that would to a larger dose offsite.
MR. RUNKLE: Yes, sir. And as looking
at Mr. Gundersen's report, there are diagrams of, you
know, normal operation if there was a if there was
damage to the reactor and there was a release and the
pressurize and how that would go directly out the top
vent. It's an unfiltered vent, and so there would be
a considerable amount of radioactive material.
So whether I mean, whether the AP1000
has a design flaw, which we certainly would allege
that it does, that is something that you know, that
may be in the realm of looking at the you know, the
design control documents. But how those how the

present design is to be inspected, maintained,

operated safely by the Vogtle plant -- at the Vogtle plant I think is a matter of a new contention.

It is a serious matter. It certainly is

-- you know, in looking at -- you know, I have looked

at all of the -- you know, the Part 2 of the 10 CFR,

all the procedural regulations, and they seem to all

overlap to me. There are issues that you have to

bring in a timely manner. I mean, there's timeliness.

I think your first question in your October 6th order about what has happened after the Commission's order in the Bellefonte case is probably the most important question we have before us here today.

There is no -- there is no reference COLA anymore. You know, the Bellefonte has been put in the background. There is -- you know, as a matter of timeliness, we are -- I think we are back to maybe not square one, but certainly on square two in looking at all of the information that goes into the COLA.

You know, a lot of the COLA that would be adopted at the Vogtle plant was coming from Bellefonte. We don't have -- at this point, we don't have a Bellefonte reactor anymore, so as a question of timeliness I -- I mean, I don't think there is any sense of urgency in resolving these issues at the

Vogtle plant.

Now, I mean, certainly nobody wants to delay it any more, if possible, but on one hand you have a -- what they call a certified design, but there are major components of that design, including the inspection and maintenance, that are -- you know, that have not been reviewed, have not been finalized, have not been approved, by the Commission.

So there are -- I mean, it seems to me that, you know, in looking at the COLA there is -- now the COLA that we have in front of us is no longer -- no longer makes any sense, because it was adopting the Bellefonte COLA. So as a matter of timeliness, yes, as soon as we had the information from Mr. Gundersen's analysis, we brought that to the attention of the NRC. We didn't look at it.

And I think this Texas Utilities case of Comanche Peak, looking at the specific analysis of the Vogtle program, is putting together the pieces of the puzzle. And I think that you can't say that, well, all the parts of the information were there until you actually do the analysis and really come up to get an issue that is pretty grave.

Now --

CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: I quess -- I mean, Mr.

1	Gundersen's analysis is dated April of 2010, and I
2	suspect I'm not sure did he do that before the
3	ACRS meeting that was coming up on the AP1000? Is
4	that what caused him
5	MR. RUNKLE: Yes.
6	CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: to do that
7	analysis?
8	MR. RUNKLE: Well, no. We filed it
9	April 21, 2010
LO	CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: Right.
L1	MR. RUNKLE: and asked the ACRS to do
L2	a special investigation of it. And then, we scheduled
L3	at the next available meeting that they had to give
L4	that presentation.
L5	CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: All right.
L6	MR. RUNKLE: And it was at that
L7	presentation that Chairman Ray was saying, "Yes, part
L8	of this is probably, you know, needs to be looked at
L9	at needs to be looked at as part of the you
20	know, the DCD process." But the specific inspection
21	and maintenance and coating that are being proposed at
22	a specific reactor in a COLA is something that should
23	come up through you know, through this process
24	of
25	CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: Right.

1 MR. RUNKLE: -- of having a petition 2 hearing. **BOLLWERK:** What would have 3 CHAIRMAN 4 precluded Mr. Gundersen from doing that analysis and 5 submitting it as part of the November 2008 hearing petition that was originally filed in this case? 6 7 MR. RUNKLE: I don't know that the -- that

anybody was aware of the problem that was before us on The groups hadn't hired Mr. Gundersen at this thing. You know, until the -- you know, there that point. are several times that some of the existing reactors having through holes and problems with were containment holes and breaches, and also with the containment and the coatings.

So this -- the AP1000 oversight group went to the NRC and the ACRS in good faith. assuming that it was a design issue. But when -- you know, when Chairman Ray says there are specific plants, specific programs, that could affect this positively or negatively, that there are inspection programs, both visual -- I mean, what is at the Voqtle plant right now is an, at most, periodic visual inspection with a certain kind of coating on the containment.

> are other kinds of There inspection

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programs that should be able to find more cracks, more holes, and be able to find out the problems before they happen. That is not what they do. The bare minimum is somebody sticks their head out of a door in the containment periodically in a cold, damp, dark place, and tries to find a -- could be a fairly small crack, and especially one that would be covered up with a zinc coating.

And no one I think until actually with the colloquy with the ACRS had any idea what Chairman Ray or the other members of the ACRS would think about this issue. They hadn't considered it before. They thought some of them probably would -- should go to the DCD, but they also thought that there were other issues involved with it.

Well, I would like to JUDGE TRIKOUROS: just understand a couple of things. First of all, what Chairman Ray said was in essence stating the obvious or the known. There wasn't anything new in what he said. Programmatic issues are not dealt with necessarily, itself in the DCD and the COLA specifically.

I much earlier had indicated that the inspection program was going to be handled as part of the COLA, so there wasn't anything -- it might have

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been new to you perhaps. Is that a correct statement, that --

MR. RUNKLE: Well, it certainly was new to the Joint Intervenors that this was a potential problem at the Vogtle plant that raised to the level of being an exceptionally grave issue. I think that is the terminology in one of the rules.

And it certainly -- if -- given 2008 when the original petition came in on -- and raised, you know, a variety of different contentions, I am not sure that this issue could have been raised at that time, because there wasn't enough information on the existing plants in terms of analysis and ongoing problems with the cracks and the holes of the containment.

And, you know, yes, this is a -- at Vogtle it's a wider containment, but it's not that substantially wider. I mean, and so at the corrosion rates that are supported by Dr. Hausler, who reviewed the original report with Mr. Gundersen and looked at the corrosion, yes, it may not be -- it may not be a problem in five years, but in certainly eight or 10 years you can have a crack.

And I think what the concern of that is, if we are looking at nuclear plants who have had their

operating license continued, and we are looking at plants now that are routinely looked at for 60 years, we are going to be guaranteed that there is going to be holes in these reactors. and particularly in the Vogtle reactor because it is, you know, in a Georgia clime. It is looking at the bare -- the minimum amounts of an inspection in the containment.

So I think that is what the difference.

That is what makes it I think, in looking at the -sort of the timeliness. But the other part of the
timeliness is balancing out the significance of the
issue. I mean, I argued a case in front of an
Administrative Law Judge in North Carolina, and the
big issue was what color the fence would be. And that
to me is one end of the -- you know, this continuum.

The important issues are, if there is an accident and, you know, pressurized steam that is radioactive goes through this crack, and vent it out unfiltered to the environment, that is a significant public health and safety issue. So on the scale of what color the fence is to, you know, significant, exceptionally grave issue, I think that is the -- that is the balancing thing.

JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Well, you know, we need to understand the gravity of this and part of -- a

number of our questions are geared in that direction. 1 And help me understand --2 BOLLWERK: Can I ask one 3 CHAIRMAN 4 preliminary question? Recognizing you did not file 5 the initial pleading in this case, I -- that was done 6 by --7 MR. RUNKLE: Yes, sir. CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: -- different counsel. 8 9 There is a question here about the application of the agency's reopening standards. Is it your position 10 those standards do or don't apply to this petition? 11 I mean, the -- those MR. RUNKLE: Yes. 12 rules apply to this petition, and -- but I think that 13 14 the -- whether in the subsequent, you know, petition 15 have to say according to, you know, particular section of the rules, the petition itself 16 17 is, on its face, supported by the affidavit, brings those issues as a -- you know, bring it as 18 19 exceptional grave issue, showing the timeliness and the good cause. 20 So that's -- I mean, whether those --21 whether this is code pleading or not, that you have to 22 have specific, you know, references to the -- you 23 24 know, to the specific regulation, I would have done it

different. You know, counsel relied on what was in

1	the petition and the affidavit and the report.
2	So I think that in I think we can get
3	around that, because because the issue is an
4	exceptionally grave one. If it was an issue that
5	anybody could have brought to you in the original
6	petition, I think that would have been different. But
7	this one was not raised. It has not been looked at by
8	the ACRS. The COLA does you know, looks at the
9	minimal job of inspection and the putting on the
10	coating.
11	So that is I think I mean, we could
12	throw the rest of that out and you just if this is
13	an exceptionally grave issue, it is just not it is
14	not just sufficient to, you know, supplant or fulfill
15	the other requirements. I think you are mandated.
16	You have a requirement to protect public health and
17	safety.
18	JUDGE TRIKOUROS: The exceptional gravity
19	you are associating with the fact that a crack in the
20	AP1000 containment shell would result in an unfiltered
21	release that would exceed the requirements of 52.17
22	MR. RUNKLE: And
23	JUDGE TRIKOUROS: that is your that
24	is the exceptional gravity?
25	MR. RUNKLE: Well, yes, sir.

1 JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Okay. Now, if I were to look at a typical PWR --2 3 MR. RUNKLE: Okay. 4 JUDGE TRIKOUROS: -- and it had a crack in 5 the containment shell, and there were a loss of coolant accident, it, too, would be released to the 6 7 environment without filtration. So where -- so I'm 8 trying to understand where there is an exceptional 9 gravity. 10 Now, in a boiling water reactor -- and, I mean, clearly Mr. Gundersen has interchanged BWRs and 11 PWRs, it seemed to me, but in a boiling water reactor 12 there may -- there would be a secondary containment. 13 14 So I -- certainly that's the case. 15 But, so the exceptional gravity is -- it 16 doesn't appear to me to be there with respect to the AP1000 being significantly different than a current 17 plant PWR. 18 19 MR. RUNKLE: Well, that may be -- that may be a problem that we can't address here today -- if 20 the PWRs are inherently unsafe because they would vent 21 radioactive material to the environment. 22 looking at the AP1000 design, and in particular with 23 24 the way it is designed at Voqtle, there is a syphoning

There is a chimney effect off the top where

1 it -- just the way it's designed that if there is a hole it is going out. 2 3 And, Mr. Gundersen, I don't know what --4 recall what the figure was, but there's -- I mean, the 5 amount of radioactivity that would be syphoned off into the environment with this chimney effect could be 6 7 significant, and significant more than any PWR. 8 And I'm not sure that's the standard that 9 we want to judge on, that if existing designs are --10 you know, might have the same problem, I think a more important question is, is the Vogtle design and the 11 way that Vogtle plant -- Southern Nuclear Operating 12 Company is -- will be operating the Voqtle plant, is 13 14 this going to be a problem there? 15 JUDGE TRIKOUROS: But you have indicated that the -- that your contention is not an attack on 16 17 the design. MR. RUNKLE: Well, it certainly is part of 18 19 I think -- is a question that we brought in front of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. But in front of 20 you, it is not. And to the extent that you think it 21 is, there were -- what was done at the Harris plant 22 was referred to the DCD but keep it open. 23 24 And that probably would -- you know, since 25 the since the design is important to this

1	consideration, you may want to you may want to have
2	a hearing on the inspection and the maintenance of
3	this specific problem, and have the overall design
4	sent through the DCD process. You could do that as an
5	alternative, so you would address specifically what
6	would be proposed at the Vogtle plant. And if there's
7	an overall design flaw of venting out into the
8	atmosphere, then that is something that ought to be
9	resolved, then, through the DCD process.
10	JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Do you if I were to
11	ask you if you believe the COLA the COL application
12	meets all applicable standards and regulations, what
13	would you say?
14	MR. RUNKLE: Well, I have looked at the
15	initial petition and thought several of those should
16	have been addressed. But the previous panel did not
17	find that they were, and the groups declined to send
18	it to the take it up to the Commission. I don't
19	think so.
20	Certainly, in what I have reviewed, and
21	Mr. Zeller and the groups have reviewed, it is in
22	this aspect the COLA is not satisfactory, because it
23	does not deal the inspection and coating is
24	inadequate.

JUDGE TRIKOUROS: The difficulty that at

1	least I'm having is that the your contention is
2	indicating that the or indicates that the
3	inspection program will be inadequate, and I say
4	"will," because the inspection program, as far as I
5	know, doesn't has yet to be developed for the
6	for Vogtle. I believe it won't be developed until
7	prior to fuel loading. I'm not positive of that, but
8	I think so.
9	The report by Mr. Gundersen is indicating
10	that an inspection program that does follow existing
11	NRC rules and regulations and standards is inadequate.
12	So, in essence, you are saying that the NRC
13	regulations are inadequate with respect to existing
14	plants, and you are I'm asking now, I'm not telling
15	you, and you are extending that to the AP1000.
16	CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: That is what it seems
17	DOE is saying.
18	JUDGE TRIKOUROS: That's the way it seems.
19	Is that correct?
20	MR. RUNKLE: Well, in looking at Mr.
21	Gundersen's affidavit, in paragraphs 40 and 41, he
22	I mean, he indicates that coatings can provide some
23	protection when
24	JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Mr. Runkle, could you
25	speak into the microphone?
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MR. RUNKLE: I'm sorry. In looking at paragraph 40 of Mr. Gundersen's affidavit he says, "While coatings can provide some protection when properly applied, there is no assurance that field application can be completely successful."

And then, in paragraph 41, how does this impact -- what is in the Vogtle COLA in Chapter 6 of that that makes any difference on how the coatings are? Because they rely on ASTM and some various numbers of those -- of those procedures. And they have failed in the past, as he indicates in his exhibits.

And given that the containment and attached hangers will be welded in the field, and coatings will also be provided -- applied in the field, the existing coating application inspection regime suggested by the Applicant does not provide an adequate margin of safety in the Vogtle plant.

And so in looking at it -- and this -- I mean, the other parties may disagree with Mr. Gundersen's conclusions. They may disagree with his analysis and with his outcome on this. But those are the very reasons to have a hearing on this matter is to go into the -- how are they inadequate, how is the inspection inadequate, what are they proposing to do

under their present COLA, looking at the inspection regime, looking at the different application bases and those kind of things.

And Mr. Gundersen further, you know, lists specific problems at the Vogtle plant that make visual inspections very difficult. Talking about the access problems at the Vogtle plant, looking at the frequency of inspections, the kind of visual inspection. So it is not just, well, this is just an inspection regime that they need to develop.

In the FSAR, in this Chapter 6, what they are relying on as a basis for their inspection program is not enough. It is -- the visual inspection is not enough, given that plant, given the way that it is proposed to be designed, proposed to be operated, access problems in the cold, dark hole, looking for tiny cracks and holes, is not good enough.

And, you know, in looking at the kind of, you know, zinc coating that is being put on that, when it is put on, when it is being proposed to be placed in -- at the Vogtle plant, and how often, those kind of things that are actually in the Vogtle COLA, don't address the issue properly.

And that's a technical matter. I mean, I have gone way past my expertise on this. I am just

mouthing somebody else's work.

JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Well, it is not a technical matter in the sense that it -- those in fact are all of the existing NRC standards, reference standards. So everything that -- everything that he is referring to is the current regulatory requirement. And he is saying that it is inadequate, and that is really what you have just told me. That is what his report says, as I read it.

He is questioning the current -- the adequacy of the current regulations. And it sounds like that you agree with that -- I mean, that you're saying that.

MR. RUNKLE: Well, the -- I mean, they are relying in the COLA on meeting these ASTM various standards. There are other kinds of inspections that would also meet those standards that they are not doing. I mean, there are certainly electronic kind of -- that you could do fairly frequently and be able to find cracks before they get to the point where they cause this exceptionally grave situation.

And, I mean, and I think -- I think that this exceptionally grave situation is -- I think goes to really the -- really the core of what we have here.

This is your job. I mean, this is why this Licensing

Board was established is to look at these issues.

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And, yes, I guess -- I guess if somebody would have brought them back in -- you know, in this petition in 2008, or if somebody would have done it for Harris or, you know, any one of the other AP1000s, it may have been addressed by now.

But once we in the broad term, in the public groups, discovered that this was a problem, in good faith we brought it to the Commission in the way that we could, went directly to the Chairman, went directly to the ACRS and said, "This is a problem.

How are we going to deal with this?"

We're not -- we didn't wait until, you know, a couple of years down the line when they are still -- when the staff is still reviewing the DCDs and trying to make final approval. As soon as the analysis was done, it was brought in good faith to the NRC.

And in the presentation to the ACRS, Chairman Ray agreed with that. He said some of -this is a serious issue. We haven't addressed it yet. You know, the ACRS will have some more meetings on In the part of the DCD review there would be some more on this. But on looking at, you know, the Vogtle COLA, I think this issue is very relevant.

it raises to the level of being on that one end of the continuum where you all have to address it.

And we have to address it because it is exceptionally grave, and it is -- you know, there are technical aspects to it that in two hours this morning we can't address. Certainly, the other parties haven't put any technical, you know, countervailing arguments. The only technical expert opinion we have in the record in front of us is Mr. Gundersen's report supported by his analysis.

That is -- you know, even given the same design, if there was a different operator or if the same design was being used at other proposed plants, had different operators, different inspection and maintenance regimes, used different zinc coatings, you know, highlighted this issue, I think the same issue probably could be raised at a number of other reactors.

But I think at this point in time the Vogtle reactor is in play. Looking at all of the other AP1000 reactors in the southeast and with the other ones, they are all being put off, they are all Even the reference Bellefonte COLA is being put back. being put back. These issues have to be addressed as soon can address them and get them as we

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1 satisfactorily resolved before the Vogtle plant goes 2 forward. 3 CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: All right. Anything 4 further you have at this point? You have a little bit 5 of time left on your direct if you are --MR. RUNKLE: Let's use it on rebuttal. 6 7 CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: Okay. 8 MR. RUNKLE: Can I do that? 9 CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: Let me ask you one 10 quick -- do you have anything you want to say about the question about the motion for leave to file the 11 reply pleading late that was objected to by the 12 If there is nothing you wish to say at 13 14 this point, you can certainly wait until rebuttal. 15 That's --In looking at the rules, I 16 MR. RUNKLE: 17 mean, there -- there are, you know, on the procedures, and the Chapter 2 procedures of -- I mean, there are 18 19 probably things that another attorney should have had in a proper, timely fashion. 20 But I must go back to this -- no matter, 21 you know, if it's -- if it's procedurally, and we've 22 got a couple of weeks late, or, you know, several days 23 24 late, because it -- the issue is so exceptionally

grave, it is such a potential serious problem and a,

1 you know, significant impact on public health and safety, then I think that is -- that balances out 2 3 everything else and whether things are timeliness or 4 not. And because it appears -- I mean, just in 5 the last couple of weeks it appears that the Vogtle 6 7 COLA may be the new reference COLA, because it may be the only one still in play. It becomes much more 8 9 important to resolve these fundamental issues that 10 have such a significant impact now in the Vogtle as opposed to waiting several years down the line to try 11 to say, "Well, the DCD looked at this, but we didn't 12 really look at how the Voqtle operators were going to 13 14 deal with the matter." 15 CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: All right. 16 MR. RUNKLE: Spend our time on rebuttal if we could. 17 CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: All right. Judge 18 19 Trikouros, do you have anything else? 20 JUDGE TRIKOUROS: I do, but not -- I will bring them up later in the proceeding. 21 CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: All right. 22 Basically, the question is in terms of what we posed on the 23 24 September 6th order. Basically, you have asked him anything you need to ask him about it then. 25

1 JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Not right now. CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: Okay. Judge Jackson, 2 3 do you have anything further? JUDGE JACKSON: Yes, I would like to ask 4 5 a question. 6 CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: Yes, sir. 7 JUDGE JACKSON: It relates to the issue of 8 graveness. And I'm trying to understand the basis for some of the information that was in the contention and 9 10 the supporting documents. On the fifth page of the contention it states that, "Mr. Gundersen's 11 declaration demonstrates that inadequacies in SNC's 12 proposed inspection regime pose a high likelihood of 13 14 causing a release well in excess of the regulatory threshold." 15 So in this -- in the contention it refers 16 17 basically to Mr. Gundersen's declaration. And in reading the declaration, it in turn refers to the 18 19 Fairewinds report, and we had a series of references without real page/section citations. So I wasn't sure 20 exactly what the basis for the statement was, but I 21 looked in the Fairewinds report and could perhaps ask 22 a couple of questions as to what was done. 23 24 I'm not trying to discuss the merits, just

trying to understand what was done in the analysis

1	that is behind the statement that there is a high
2	likelihood that releases following an accident could
3	exceed the regulatory threshold. An example
4	CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: Judge Jackson, you're
5	breaking up a little bit. Could you pick up your
6	headset maybe, your handset rather?
7	JUDGE JACKSON: Okay. Is this better?
8	CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: A little bit I think,
9	yes.
LO	JUDGE JACKSON: All right. If you have
L1	trouble hearing me, please let me know and I'll
L2	CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: Okay.
L3	JUDGE JACKSON: try to repeat my
L4	question. If we look at, say, pages page 18 of the
L5	Fairewinds report, that is Section 327, if people
L6	could find that or would like to, it says, "Based upon
L7	my experience in integrated leak-based testing, the
L8	industry expectation is that a quarter-inch hole in
L9	the containment will produce leakage in excess of 100
20	standard cubic feet per hour, resulting in an offsite
21	exposure of approximately 25 rem at the low population
22	zone."
23	To help me understand the basis for this,
24	were any of the basically, let me ask it this way.
25	What radiological source term and post-accident in-

1 vessel pressure history was used to get this 25 rem evaluation? What accident pipe was it? 2 3 actually use AP1000 data in terms of the source term 4 and pressure history for any of the accidents? 5 question. Judge Jackson, this is John 6 MR. RUNKLE: 7 Runkle for the Joint Intervenors. My understanding is that Mr. Gundersen did look at the source term -- at 8 9 the proposed -- well, the AP1000 reactors, and looking at how much -- what kind of pressure buildup would be 10 within the containment and given the size of 11 through-hole in the containment how much radioactivity 12 would be vented out unfiltered into the atmosphere. 13 14 I don't have his work notes on that, so I 15 can't tell you what actually -- what those figures 16 were, but that's my understanding of what he -- he 17 looked at the AP1000 design. Okay. Could you tell me JUDGE JACKSON: 18 19 in his submission where it discusses that? MR. RUNKLE: Sir, I -- Judge Jackson, in 20 looking at Mr. Gundersen's report, looking at page 26, 21 he talks about the scenarios of if there was a -- if 22 there was a severe accident and different kinds of 23 24 things. And I don't see the specific information that

you are requesting. Again, my understanding was in

1 the work notes that this was done with the AP1000, but I don't have them in front of me. 2 JUDGE JACKSON: All right. 3 Thank you. 4 guess in a similar vein, in pages 11 through 13, it 5 refers to some work reported from another source. I had a similar question. It was not clear to me that 6 7 in that source as well that they had used any design 8 other information from the AP1000 accident 9 Do you know if the references in pages 11 analyses. 10 and 13 -- 11 through 13 considered specific AP1000 information or not? 11 Sir, my understanding is that MR. RUNKLE: 12 the -- Dr. Petrangeli's study did not look 13 14 specifically at the AP1000, but was generally looking 15 at both the BWRs and the PWRs. But that was as part of Mr. Gundersen's analysis that he -- he looked at, 16 you know, those kinds of pressure buildups for those 17 kind of reactors and used that to make his conclusion. 18 19 I don't think there is -- I don't think there is anything that -- you know, as specific as you 20 need to have it in his report. 21 All right. 22 JUDGE JACKSON: Thank you, Mr. Runkle. 23 24 MR. RUNKLE: Thank you, sir. Judge Trikouros 25 CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: Yes.

1 has a question. JUDGE JACKSON: Those are my questions for 2 3 now. 4 JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Since we started down 5 this path, I will ask a question that I was going to ask later, because it is important to understand the 6 7 gravity issue. Again, the -- in the ACRS 8 presentation, which Mr. Gundersen, and I believe, Mr. 9 Runkle, you were also --MR. RUNKLE: Yes, sir. 10 JUDGE TRIKOUROS: -- there as well, 11 Slide 23 of that presentation which you provided as 12 exhibit -- one of the exhibits with your contention, 13 14 it was -- you concluded in that slide that the AP1000 15 SAMDA analysis does not assume a containment breach concurrent with the initiating LOCA. 16 I looked at that and I tried to understand 17 I mean, clearly that says that when you do a 18 19 LOCA analysis you don't assume a breach, which is correct. But the analyses in the SAMDA are severe 20 accidents, not normal LOCAs. If you look at the --21 the SAMDA is in Appendix 1B of the DCD. 22 I believe it's -- I got that reference from one of your 23 24 documents. CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: Can we define the word 25

1 "SAMDA," I mean, the acronym? Severe Accident 2 Mitigation Design Alternatives. JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Right, right. 3 4 MR. RUNKLE: Yes, sir. 5 JUDGE TRIKOUROS: And Appendix 1B of the DCD references the release categories that are in 6 7 Chapter 45 of the AP1000 PRA. The doses for that I 8 believe are in Chapter 49 of the PRA, AP1000 PRA. 9 basically all of And the release categories -- and I think I could say that the word 10 "all" applies. They either assume a complete 11 containment failure or a release into the auxiliary 12 building which does have secondary containment, 13 14 because, contrary to what you have indicated, the 15 AP1000 does in fact have secondary containment control 16 for certain portions of it. And that would involve 17 the penetration areas going into the auxiliary building, or it would be a release by virtue of full 18 19 containment venting. Now, containment failure, containment 20 venting, is basically bypassing the containment. 21 one-inch hole in the containment is not 22 significant with respect to bypassing the containment. 23

So I didn't understand why one could say that, or even

imply, that the SAMDA would be worse if there were a

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one-inch hole in the containment when in fact all of 1 2 the release categories assume a total containment 3 It is just simply not there, in essence. 4 So, and again, you use the argument to 5 explain the gravity of the situation. I don't see the gravity there. I see a drop in the ocean, so to 6 7 So maybe you can explain that or --8 MR. RUNKLE: In his report and affidavit, 9 and in the presentation to ACRS, Mr. Gundersen was arguing that, given the AP1000 design, this kind of 10 event should be a design basis event. It probably 11 would be likely enough that it should be dealt with 12 directly and not under the full SAMDA. 13 14 Certainly, he thinks that, you know, under the SAMDA analysis, you know, it should be -- this is 15 a strong possibility that could happen. 16 design basis for the AP1000, that is the real concern. 17 And under -- I think under design basis 18 19 event, the Applicant would need to deal with that directly and be able to, you know, show that they are 20 -- that their inspection regime and the amount of 21 coatings that they use and be able to deal with that 22 is something that, you know, is dealt with, rather 23 24 than looking at just the ultimate accident

everything being released, just --

1 JUDGE TRIKOUROS: With respect to the 2 design basis -- and, again, I'm not trying to -- to 3 provide very difficult technical questions, I think. 4 I'm trying to give sort of cursory technical level. 5 The design basis analysis for the plant, while it is true that it does not assume a hole in the containment 6 7 of any particular size, it does assume that half a percent of the total weight of material inside the 8 9 containment gets released every day. 10 Now, I offhand could not correlate that to a particular size hole, but clearly it would be a hole 11 of some sort of a failure of the containment, and that 12 is the assumption. 13 14 aqain, trying to understand the 15 gravity of this, a one-inch hole that might have been 16 discovered in some plant somewhere, for all I know 17 that one-inch hole under design basis LOCA conditions, while it might -- it might be worse than the design 18 19 basis results, the COLA design basis results, I don't know that it is exceptionally grave by any stretch. 20 So that is the problem that I'm having. 21 I understand that. 22 MR. RUNKLE: I mean, I can only go back to what Mr. Gundersen has said in 23 24 his presentation and in his affidavit and his support

His analysis showed that Westinghouse

for that.

considers an intact containment to be within the design basis of the containment.

So they are not looking at, you know, the many different kind of scenarios where there could be -- where the containment would not be intact. And whether that is -- you know, I think the SAMDA analysis is such -- to such an extreme where everything dumps out. I think that it's a much more frequent occurrence that, you know, looking at this as a design flaw.

Now, this may be a -- you know, this flaw may be pernicious, and it may be something that is, you know, such a design flaw that the -- we need to deal with everything in the DCD process. But looking at -- I think we just need to go back to how -- how the applicants at Vogtle are going to handle this.

JUDGE TRIKOUROS: But I will say, again, the definition of an intact containment means that if the applicant performed an integrated leak rate test it would result in a release of -- at pressure now, it would result in a release of less than -- I believe the technical specifications for the AP1000 are half a percent of the containment by weight, the material in the containment by weight per day.

That is the definition of an intact

1 containment. It's not containment that is, you know, totally and completely, you know, tight. 2 3 doses associated with that assume that, so --4 CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: All right. Anything 5 Judge Jackson, anything further? I have just one small 6 JUDGE JACKSON: 7 followup question that relates to the discussion that 8 was just taking place. An example would be on page 7 9 of the report, Fairewinds report that was submitted. 10 Near the top of that page, in referring to a report that looked at corrosion in containment, the report, 11 therefore, also uncovered complete containment system 12 failures of either the liner or the steel containment 13 14 shell. 15 I'd like to ask, what constitutes 16 complete containment system failure? Would a small 17 crack or a small hole be a complete containment system failure? 18 19 MR. RUNKLE: Judge Jackson, John Runkle. You know, I can't answer that question. 20 I mean, I have in front of me what the conclusions of that --21 the table are. In looking at detection of aging 22 nuclear powerplant structures, it doesn't -- in Mr. 23 24 Gundersen's report, it doesn't say whether that is -what a complete containment system failure is, whether 25

it's a through-hole crack or whether it is complete venting of all radioactive material within it. So it is not clear from that -- you know, that citation what that actually means.

Okay. JUDGE JACKSON: It seems to me that small crack or а small hole still considerable resistance to the flow of material out of the containment structure in а post-accident environment. So I didn't know if in this -- in this report that would be termed a complete containment system failure or not.

MR. RUNKLE: Well, in terms of a throughhole in the containment, because of the pressurized
and the chimney effect of the AP1000 design, that is
-- that is how Mr. Gundersen came up with the numbers
of how much radioactivity was being released into the
environment.

And so it was based probably on a certain size crack that was found at the other reactors, whatever the pressurized pressure would be and how much would be released. So it is -- in terms of, you know, it is not a complete -- the containment for that crack and hole is -- that would be a containment failure.

JUDGE JACKSON: Are you saying that a

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1	small crack or a small hole would be a complete
2	containment failure?
3	MR. RUNKLE: Again, I'm not sure what the
4	definition used in that in that table was, whether
5	it's a complete system failure. But it certainly is
6	it raises above the half a percent of total mass
7	per day that was that is used under an intact
8	containment.
9	JUDGE JACKSON: Okay. Thank you.
10	CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: All right. Anything
11	further, Judge Jackson? Judge Trikouros?
12	JUDGE JACKSON: That's it for now.
13	CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: All right. All right.
14	We have been going over I think that concludes your
15	direct presentation?
16	MR. RUNKLE: Yes, sir.
17	CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: All right. We have
18	been going a little over an hour and a half, well,
19	nearly an hour and a half now. Let's go ahead and
20	take a break before we start with the staff and the
21	Applicant responses. And let's come back at about
22	10:30, please, and start again.
23	Thank you.
24	(Whereupon, the proceedings in the
25	foregoing matter went off the record at

1 10:21 a.m. and went back on the record at 10:33 a.m.) 2 CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: Let's go ahead and go 3 4 back on the record, please. We've had a break, and 5 we're back to begin the presentations by the Applicant and the Staff. 6 7 Let me just mention one procedural point. We did say at the beginning that were going to have 8 9 argument by one counsel, and Mr. Zeller provided some 10 information to us. Nobody objected. Generally, we do want to have one person speaking. Having said that, 11 don't think there was anything that was 12 irreparable to the record, or to the procedures we set 13 14 out. So, we got the information we need, and we appreciate the information from Mr. Zeller. And if 15 any one of the other parties needs some latitude in 16 that regard, we'll do the same thing for them. 17 MR. BLANTON: Your Honor, I'm not sure I 18 19 remember what the information Mr. Zeller provided was. CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: He answered several 20 questions that Judge Jackson had. 21 22 MR. BLANTON: Okay. CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: All right. But, again, 23 24 I didn't hear any objections from anybody, so we --MR. BLANTON: We don't have an objection. 25

CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: Right. Okay. All right. Let's turn to, I guess does the Applicant want to make a presentation first?

MR. BLANTON: Yes, Your Honor. I think the Applicant and the Staff have agreed to split our hour 30 minutes apiece.

CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: All right.

MR. BLANTON: As the discussion over the last hour indicates, there are a number of fatal problems with this contention that prevent its admission, none of which have anything to do with the Applicant's or the Staff's disagreement with the merits of the contention.

To begin with, Judge Bollwerk, as you pointed out in your opening comments, this proceeding was -- the contested part of this proceeding was closed and terminated last May, and certainly in June when the time for appeal of the Board's order on the Low-Level Rad Waste contention past, which means as the proposed Intervenors seem to agree, that the reopening standards of 2.326 apply. Those have been described by the Commission as extremely strict, demanding standards that are not to be brushed aside. And, frankly, the Joint Intervenors failed to even address them in their initial motion, and address them

in only the most perfunctory way in their reply. And while we, in answer to one of the Board's questions, will go into that in more detail, particularly with respect to the Dominion Millstone case, we think as an initial matter, the Intervenors have failed to satisfy those 2.326 standards.

One of the main reasons they failed to satisfy those standards, that this contention is clearly untimely. The ACRS, I think as Judge Trikouros has already pointed out, the ACRS does not define the scope of this COLA proceeding, or the DCD The statement that Chairman Ray of the proceeding. AP1000 Subcommittee made that the Intervenors, proposed Intervenors say their timeliness argument hinges on, and that's the word in their brief, that it hinges on Chairman Ray's statement. Well, simply an observation that inspection programs are province of the COLA, and design issues are province of the DCD. And he said nothing more, or nothing less, and that was not new information. Anybody who had read the COLA as it is proposed Intervenors burden to do back in 2008 when it was submitted would have known that containment coatings inspection programs were a COLA issue. And this contention could have been brought at that time, but was not.

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Next, as we've both pointed out, the -and as we just briefly addressed in the Intervenors arqument, opening because this proceeding terminated, the proposed Intervenors have the burden of demonstrating their standing again. We recognize that they were found to have standing in the prior proceeding. This is a new proceeding. And NRC case makes clear they are required to establish standing again. And as the cases, the more recent cases that the Board has pointed out in its series of questions show, and we'll talk about that in a little more detail in a second, that is not a -- just a formality. They are required to provide information from the people, the organization seeks to represent, just an affidavit from the organization to demonstrate that they have a protectable interest in this proceeding.

Next, this is, and I think as also the previous discussion emphasizes, fundamentally a design-related contention. The Intervenors' problem is with the inspectability of the AP1000 design, not the inspection program described in the COLA. And the discussion we've just had emphasizes that with the amount of discussion we had on the accessibility of the design. That's a DCD issue.

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To the extent the Intervenors have tried to shoehorn a COLA issue into this contention, they've done so by attacking an NRC regulation, as Judge Trikouros has observed. The ASME Section 11
Containment Inspection Standards are required by 10
CFR 50.55A, and there's a very clear statement in Mr.
Gundersen's affidavit purporting to support the contention that that standard is inadequate. And that is the basis of their challenge to the inspection program proposed in the COLA.

They can't challenge an NRC regulation in this proceeding. There's no relief that can be granted to them in an individual licensing proceeding for a disagreement with the extent of NRC requirements or standards.

The only criticism of the coatings inspections, and they are, again, described in the COLA, are that the ASTN standards are inadequate without really saying why they're inadequate. Those ASTN standards, again, have been adopted in Reg Guide 1.54, and are applicable to operating reactors, and to the AP1000, and have been cited in the DCD. So, even then the design of the DCD is based on its inspectability under that Reg Guide 1.54 standard.

Now, to get to the Board's specific

questions, I think we can make just about all the points that we need to make in the course of answering the Board's questions. Briefly, the reply was clearly filed out of time. They moved for permission to file the reply out of time. The Bellefonte case that the Board cites in its questions emphasizes that those kind of motions should only be granted in extraordinary circumstances, and we don't feel like that the proposed Intervenors have shown what the circumstances were, much less that extraordinary.

We all know that the original counsel withdrew on the day that the reply was due. We don't know why. We don't if the Intervenors supported the lawyer's needs for information with respect to filing a reply, but we do know that even the affidavits that trying they have filed in connection with demonstrate standing are all dated a day or two before their motion for leave to file a reply was dated. None of them were completed as of the day the original reply was due. We think under those circumstances they have failed to satisfy the extraordinary circumstances requirement in the Bellefonte case.

CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: Doesn't that suggest, the scenario you just laid out, that, in fact, the

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Intervenors were surprised by the fact their counsel hadn't done anything, essentially, and kind of left them in the lurch, as it were?

MR. BLANTON: Judge, I don't know. I assume that's a plausible explanation, but we just don't know, I mean, because nothing they've filed has told us that.

With respect to standing, certainly, the cases cited in the Board's questions support SNC's argument regarding standing. Each case demonstrates in different ways that the requirement to demonstrate standing is more than just a formality that can be satisfied with a form affidavit from the Executive Director of the organization seeking to represent others. The individuals being represented need to show that the organization represents that person. I think if you look at the SCANA Summer case, it stands for that proposition.

The affidavits from the Executive Director don't demonstrate that the affidavits filed in the previous proceeding still apply, because you would need affidavits from those -- something from those individuals that they still live in the area, that they are still interested in this proceeding, something other than just a form affidavit from the

Executive Director.

referred to suggests that the addition of the affidavits to the reply brief, when standing was not even addressed in the initial motion, make those affidavits outside the scope of the reply, because the SCANA case talks about the ability to, I guess, refine or fill-in the gaps, maybe, in an affidavit that was submitted originally to demonstrate standing in an original petition, but not to address standing in the first instance in the reply brief.

CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: I take it you're saying then that in a certification by an organization that nothing has changed relative to what they filed earlier isn't sufficient.

MR. BLANTON: That's what I'm saying, Your Honor.

CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: Okay.

MR. BLANTON: The Board's third question deals with the reopening standards of 2.326, and, particularly, the relevance of the Dominion Millstone case. The Intervenors, or proposed Intervenors have agreed that those standards apply, but I do want to address that case for just a second, because in many ways, that case is very similar to this case. In both

cases, the Intervenors had had a petition denied in that case, but this case they didn't appeal it. In that case, it was pending appeal when the new untimely contention was filed. And in both cases, the proposed Intervenors failed to address the 2.326 standards, which has certainly happened, or at least in the initial motion here.

The Board in the Millstone case addressed the timeliness question, and that contention, which involved a power uprate application, and the contention was that temperature spikes in the hot leg of the reactor created a safety issue that was relevant to the power uprate decision.

The Board addressed the reopening standards in that decision, excuse me, the Commission addressed the reopening standards, notwithstanding the proposed Intervenors' failure to do so, and found that because the information in question was in the COLA, and the COLA had been submitted, excuse me, the power uprate application, because the power uprate application had been submitted months or years in the past, that the contention, or the motion to reopen and the contention was untimely. And that, therefore, the Intervenor failed to satisfy the timeliness requirement in 2.326.

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It also addressed the exceptionally grave circumstances exception to the timeliness requirement in 2.326, and said that nothing in the application, or nothing in the contention, and nothing in the showing that the Intervenor made demonstrated any exceptionally grave circumstance. And I need to stop -- pause there for a minute, and talk a little bit about what is an exceptionally grave circumstance.

In the rulemaking adopting 2.326, the Commission stated in issuing, or creating exception that it anticipated that this exception will be granted rarely, and only in truly extraordinary As we see in the Dominion case, the circumstances. issue of temperature spikes in the hot leg of the which certainly creates reactor, the threat imminent harm to a greater extent than the proposed Intervenors in this case concerns about a containment inspection program was not an exceptionally grave circumstances.

Other cases that the Commission has decided, and that are cited in our answer show that in order for a circumstance to be "exceptionally grave," and remember, we're not talking about grave, we're not talking about a safety significant issue, we're talking about an exceptionally grave circumstance,

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that there must be some threat of imminent harm or 1 And that's just not even proposed or alleged 2 3 in this case. What we're talking about is a long-term 4 inspection and maintenance issue that is -- and the 5 support for their contention is a list of anecdotal 6 examples of plants that have discovered some degree or another of containment corrosion, and are managing 7 8 that, and continuing to operate. So, the idea that 9 exceptionally grave what we have here is an 10 circumstance just is far off the mark. 11 CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: Let me interpose a question here. 12 MR. BLANTON: Yes, sir. 13 14 CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: We raised a question in 15 that exceptionally regard about whether 16 circumstances, if it is found to be that case, really 17 trumps all the other timeliness filings that are required under 309(c) and (f)(2), 309 (f)(2). 18 19 Anything you want to say about that? That's the only standard that seems to talk about grave circumstances, 20 and it seems to say if it's really grave, then you 21 need to look at it. 22 MR. BLANTON: There's nothing in 2.309(c) 23 in 2.309(f)(2) that even discusses the 24

exceptionally grave circumstances requirement, and we

would suggest that that exception does not apply to those provisions. In fact, you'll notice in, I think it's 2.309, I'm terrible at quoting subsections of --but 2.326(d) sends you to 309(c) on a motion to reopen that involves a new contention without any discussion of exceptionally grave circumstances. So, although --now, we recognize that the 2.309(c) standard is a good cause standard, not expressly a timeliness standard, so if the Board wanted to include a consideration of the seriousness of the contention in its consideration of good cause, I suppose it could. There's certainly nothing in the regulation, either in 2.326, or in 2.309(c) that would suggest that that's an exception to the timeliness requirement.

And all of the cases that address good cause under 2.309(c), as Judge Bollwerk -- I mean, we've had this conversation before, all talk about when the information became available to the proposed Intervenor to file the contention. It is, essentially, a timeliness requirement, which strangely enough brings me to the Board's fourth question, which involves timeliness. And, in particular, the Prairie Island case, which is brand new, and very apt, because in that case, the proposed Intervenor claimed that the FSAR collected, summarized, brought together various

extraneous bits of information that all existed, and were available for review in other sources, other places, but that the collection of those various pieces of information in the FSER prepared by the Staff was "new information," because now it's all in one place. And I now understand it, the lightbulb went off, so now I can file my contention.

Well, the Board in the Prairie Island case admitted that contention, and the Commission sua sponte reversed that decision, and said that the collection of that information that was previously available in the FSER did not create any information upon which a new contention, or a late filed contention could be based. It didn't satisfy the standards of 2.309(c). And the reason it said that was because all of that information was available somewhere else, and that the proposed Intervenor has the burden of reviewing the application, and any other publicly available information, and bringing contention they have to the Board in a reasonable There couldn't be a more applicable timely manner. case to this situation, where what we have here is an argument on timeliness that says well, yes, we understand that the containment inspection program was described in the FSAR. We understand that the FSAR

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were included, but until Chairman Ray told us this was 2 3 a COLA issue, we didn't know it was a COLA issue. 4 Well, Chairman, as I said in my opening 5 comments, Chairman Ray did not define, or redefine, or change the scope of this COLA proceeding. 6 7 inspection programs involving the containment and 8 coatings have always been a COLA issue. They've never 9 been a DCD issue. And Chairman Ray's observation that 10 that was the case is not new information, and it doesn't matter, and Prairie Island makes very clear, 11 it doesn't matter that this - whether or not it was 12 "new information" to the Intervenor. The question is 13 14 whether it's new information, period. And the fact 15 that the Intervenor just discovered it is irrelevant. 16 CHAIRMAN **BOLLWERK:** Τf t.he 17 Intervenors had filed the Gundersen report along with this contention at the same time they made the 18 19 submission to the ACRS, would that have been timely? MR. BLANTON: Let me decompose that one a 20 minute, Judge Bollwerk. You mean in June? 21 CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: In June of 2010 22 well, the report is dated April. Let's assume in the 23 24 April-May time frame, they had filed this contention with the Board the same time they were dealing with 25

was amended back in 2009, and all these ASTM standards

the ACRS, would it have been a timely contention at that point?

MR. BLANTON: I think it would have been untimely, because, first of all, the inspection program has been specified in the FSAR since 2008. And the ASME Chapter 11, which is really their only point of contention with our inspection program, has been in the regulations since 2001. And even then, even if you take the amendment to the COLA in 2009, or the revision to the COLA in 2009, a contention, in my judgment, in May of `10 challenging that COLA contention in -- that COLA revision in 2009 would have been untimely.

And I guess I ought to make one other point, that there seems to have been a lot of discussion by the proposed Intervenors that didn't have Mr. Gundersen's affidavit, or his report until April. Well, all of the information that's in Mr. Gundersen's report existed somewhere before Gundersen wrote his report. I mean, the containment corrosion issues that he points to are not -- were not They were in the public domain. a secret. In fact, he points to several other reports talking about those very same issues. And the Prairie Island case makes very clear that a proposed Intervenor can't sit and

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wait with all of his -- with a lot of publicly available information, and then file the contention whenever they want to, and claim well, until we had the affidavit supporting the contention, the information didn't exist. The information upon which the affidavit is based is what's relevant, and all that existed, and was publicly available before Mr. Gundersen wrote his affidavit, certainly before they filed this contention, and certainly the information that's in the COLA relative to the containment and coatings inspection program has been available at least since December of `09.

JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Mr. Blanton, this question of whether this subject is a matter of the DCD or the COLA isn't clear. I discussed it some extent earlier with the Joint Intervenors. In your answer to the petition, I believe it's on page 11, you indicate that "The proposed new contention challenges issues that will be resolved in the AP1000 DCD." It's not clear to me what you meant by that, but I know that you meant that it is not a COLA issue. It sounds to me like you're saying it's a DCD issue.

MR. BLANTON: Well, there are several things mentioned in the contention and the affidavit, some of which I think are allegations that the design

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is deficient in some fashion, some of which are allegations that the NRC's inspection requirements are There is nothing that says the COLA not adequate. fails to satisfy the NRC's inspection requirements. to that extent, I think they fall -- the allegations in the contention fall in one of two buckets, one is that this design is not inspectable, or is not sufficiently accessible, or that it fails to satisfy general design criterion, which is one of the things that the contention says we fail to meet, or that it -- they take issue with the site boundary dose, which is a calculation, as you pointed out earlier, Judge Trikouros, is in the DCD. falls in that bucket, or it falls in the bucket that because of those aspects of the design, the NRC's inspection standards are inadequate.

Well, neither of those support any allegation that the COLA is deficient. And neither of those allegations support a contention that is admissible in this proceeding, especially when you consider the timeliness issue.

Now, we do have the Harris case, I'm well aware of the Harris case, and we've argued about that one before in here, too, that a otherwise admissible design contention can be admitted in the COLA

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proceeding, and held in abeyance, and then resolved, after it's resolved in the design certification proceeding. That resolution would have finality in the COLA proceeding. I'm well aware of that, and that's still the law, and I agree with that. But the otherwise admissible part of the design-related contention is what's lacking here.

I mean, the contention would still have to be admissible. It would still have to be supported by an affidavit that is more than some vague, general allegation that the design is inadequate. And here, we don't have that here.

So, I hope I'm answering your question,
Judge. I don't think it's a COLA contention. I think
it's either a design contention in some aspects, or a
challenge to NRC rules and other aspects, neither of
which are an admissible COLA contention.

JUDGE TRIKOUROS: What did you mean by "will be resolved in the DCD?"

MR. BLANTON: Well, I think that the DCD, the Design Certification review is still ongoing. So, they're having ACRS meetings almost as we speak. The rulemaking, the proposed rulemaking will be out early next year. I better not start trying to remember dates, but it'll be out early next year. There will

be a final rulemaking later on in 2011, hopefully. Late September 2011 was the last date I've heard. When that rulemaking comes out, all design-related issues involving the AP1000 will be decided and final for the purpose of this proceeding.

JUDGE TRIKOUROS: But the truth is that the inspection program that you indicate was available in 2008 in the COLA, or the discussion of the inspection program that was available in the COLA in 2008, is really nothing more than a statement that there will be an inspection program, and that inspection program will be available, I believe the words are "prior to fuel load," as I mentioned earlier. So, there is no inspection program to review. The DCD will be issued in advance of that time when there will be an inspection program. So, where does that put us?

MR. BLANTON: Well, the COLA -- the FSAR requirement is for the Applicant to describe the inspection program. There is a description, there's a commitment, Chapter 6 of the COLA, that there will be a containment and coatings inspection program. It describes the standards that that program will comply with. And it stands for the proposition, but you'll forgive me for that, including ASME Chapter 11, which is an extremely prescriptive chapter for containment

inspections. It tells you what to do, and when to do it. And to say that my containment Section 11 of the ASME code, saying that you're going to comply with Section 11 of the ASME code provides a fairly thorough description of the inspection program that you are going to pursue. It also says it's going to comply with these ASTM standards that are in Reg Guide 1.54, so I think the description of that program from a functional standpoint and purpose, and the purpose of the program is in the FSAR in compliance with the rules.

As you know, and we'll get to that in a -or we can get to it now, if you want to. As you know,
in the early part of this decade, 2002 and 2004, the
Commission issued a couple of SRMs regarding ITAAC for
programs, and the degree to which programs need to be
described in the COLA in order to satisfy regulatory
requirements. And in both of those cases, the
Commission said other than for emergency planning,
ITAAC for in-service inspection programs are not
appropriate, that ITAACs should be focused on the asbuilt construction of the plant. So, when the Staff
came back after that initial rejection for a
programmatic ITAAC by the Commission, they came back
and said okay, we need to have certain programs

1 described at a procedural level. And the Commission 2 said no to that, also, and that's in SRM 04-32, I do 3 believe, if memory serves. SRM 04-32, the Commission 4 said you have to describe the program functionally, 5 but you're not required to -- the Applicant is not required to describe the program at a procedural 6 7 I think if we did any more than what we're 8 doing, what we've done, that's where we would be, is 9 trying to describe the program at a procedural level. JUDGE TRIKOUROS: A bit of a dilemma, but 10 program, itself, clearly, just 11 the because an Applicant says they're going to meet 15 standards 12 doesn't mean that when they write the inspection 13 14 program, that it will meet the 15 standards. I mean, 15 clearly --16 MR. BLANTON: There's no question that's 17 correct, Your Honor, but you also have the NRC's inspection and enforcement program to rely on to 18 19 insure that that program does meet those standards, and that's what the Commission relies on in order to 20 operational satisfy 21 insure that programs NRC 22 requirements. JUDGE TRIKOUROS: And the Joint Intervenors 23 24 would have no place in that decision making review

area?

1	MR. BLANTON: Not in the inspection and
2	enforcement space. I suppose they could file a 2.206
3	petition if they thought we were violating an NRC
4	regulation.
5	JUDGE TRIKOUROS: So, you're saying that
6	the inspection program available prior to fuel loading
7	falls under the inspection and enforcement aspect?
8	MR. BLANTON: Yes, sir.
9	JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Not the licensing
10	MR. BLANTON: Correct.
11	JUDGE TRIKOUROS: The basis for that is?
12	MR. BLANTON: Is this SRM I referred to,
13	SRM 04-32.
14	CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: All right. You can ask
15	the Staff about it when we get there.
16	MR. BLANTON: All right. Just to continue,
17	I'm not sure how I stand on time, Judge Bollwerk.
18	CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: You're getting pretty
19	close.
20	MR. BLANTON: I'm going to
21	CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: We've asked you a lot
22	of questions, so we'll give you a little latitude
23	here.
24	MR. BLANTON: I'm going to go into rapid
25	talk mode.

82 1 CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: Okay. MR. BLANTON: If I get going too fast, tell 2 3 me. 4 CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: I also want to give 5 Jackson a chance, in case he's got any questions. 6 7 MR. BLANTON: Question Five deals with the 8 issue of the anecdotal instances the proposed 9 Intervenors have cited, and their relevance to the 10 Obviously, all those plants have different designs, different materials, different coatings. 11 I think, as Judge Trikouros has correctly observed, 12 questionable applicability of the AP1000. 13 14 I did want to point out one other thing about those, though, and that is that just about, if 15 not all, of those instances involved plants that had 16 been operating for years, if not decades, before the 17 NRC amended its rules back in 2001 to require ASME 18 19 Section 11 inspection standards. Prior to that, that requirement didn't exist. So, we don't know whether 20 in the early years of those plants' operation, and 21 really over decades of some of them's operation, what 22 kind of inspection requirements they have. 23 24 certainly nothing in Mr. Gundersen's affidavit --

CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: One second.

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Judge

1	Jackson, are you still there? I think we may have
2	lost Judge Jackson.
3	JUDGE JACKSON: I'm still here. I can hear
4	something else.
5	CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: You're hearing
6	something else. All right. That may be something
7	coming from another source.
8	MR. BLANTON: Did we lose Atlanta?
9	CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: That may be the case,
10	too. Let's check that, one second. Is the Atlanta
11	video conference still on?
12	ATLANTA: This is Atlanta. We're still
13	here.
14	CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: All right. We're
15	getting some kind of additional I think it stopped.
16	Why don't you go ahead, and if we need to stop, then
17	we will.
18	MR. BLANTON: All right, sir.
19	CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: Sorry.
20	MR. BLANTON: As I noted, just to rewind a
21	minute, ASME Chapter 11 was only or 10 CFR 50.55A
22	was amended in 2001 to add the requirement that
23	containment inspection programs follow ASME Section
24	11. Prior to that, that requirement didn't exist.
25	There's nothing in the affidavit submitted by the
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proposed Intervenors to suggest what the inspection programs were for these other instances of containment corrosion prior to that time; whereas, for the AP1000, and particularly for Plant Vogtle, these ASME Section 11 standards will apply from day one. So, there's every reason to think for that reason, if not any other, that the examples cited by the proposed Intervenors just aren't applicable to the AP1000.

We've discussed, I think, the Board's Question Six, which was whether this is a design or a COL contention. The Board has already had an extended discussion with the proposed Intervenor about the regulatory basis for the fission product release allegation in the contention.

I would only add to that, that Reg Guide 1.183 provides what the design basis containment leak rate is for a test of site boundary dose. It appears to us that the assumptions made in the affidavit are significantly in excess of that leak rate. And, also, with respect to the question of whether or not this allegation satisfies the extremely grave circumstance requirement, we agree that the analysis in the DCD bounds the leak rate that Mr. Gundersen has alleged, the SAMDA analysis. And I think we've talked about the programmatic ITAAC issue, as well.

1	The last question is what other forum the
2	proposed Intervenors might raise the concerns that
3	they've raised here, and I would say that based on
4	what their real concern, as far as the COLA seems to
5	be, which is that NRC standards are not adequate, that
6	the appropriate venue for that kind of issue would be
7	a petition for rulemaking to change the standards.
8	It's not appropriate to try to litigate the
9	appropriateness of NRC's requirements in this COLA
10	proceeding.
11	CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: That about wraps it up
12	for you, I think.
13	MR. BLANTON: I'll be happy to answer any
14	questions.
15	CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: All right. Let me see.
16	Judge Trikouros, any questions?
17	JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Not right now.
18	CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: All right. Judge
19	Jackson, do you have any questions?
20	JUDGE JACKSON: I have no questions.
21	CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: All right. At this
22	point, I don't, as well, so we thank you, sir, for
23	your presentation.
24	MR. BLANTON: Thank you, Your Honor.
25	CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: And let's turn then to

the NRC Staff.

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MS. LIAW: Yes, Your Honors. The Staff iust like to note that this petition inexcusably untimely, and it fails to meet the requirements of 2.309(c). There is nothing new in either the petition, or in the reply, or their supporting documents that constitutes new and material information about the COLA to support their late They should have, and could have raised their filing. challenges in 2008, when the application was initially filed. And any misunderstanding they had about the scope of this proceeding does not give them good cause for their late filing. Thus, this petition must be dismissed.

With respect to all other issues, the Staff stands by its answer, and is happy to answer any questions the Board may have.

JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Okay. In your answer to the petition on page 15, you say that the issue -- that the contention raises issues that were resolved in the certified design, were.

MS. LIAW: Yes. That's right, Your Honor.

JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Can you explain that?

MS. LIAW: Yes, Your Honor. When we stated that in our pleading, we were referring to the fact

1	that all the containment issues that the petitioners
2	raise in their pleadings were resolved in Revision 15
3	of the AP1000 certified design, which is codified in
4	our regulations, Your Honor.
5	JUDGE TRIKOUROS: So, these issues came up
6	in the Rev 15 rulemaking process. Is that what you're
7	saying?
8	MS. LIAW: Yes, Your Honor, and were
9	resolved in that certified design; and, thus, have
10	finality under 52.63(a)(5).
11	JUDGE TRIKOUROS: And can you give me any
12	specifics? I mean, is that where a requirement for a
13	containment coating program came out of, is that where
14	was the containment made thicker? Was there some
15	do you remember how they were resolved?
16	MS. LIAW: May I have a moment to just
17	consult with the Staff on that issue?
18	JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Yes.
19	JUDGE JACKSON: This is Judge Jackson. Is
20	the Staff is talking among themselves, you haven't
21	lost us?
22	CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: Yes.
23	JUDGE JACKSON: Thank you.
24	MS. LIAW: Forgive me, Your Honors. The
25	Staff has just informed me that the issues surrounding

1	the containment structure were addressed in
2	JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Ms. Liaw, can you speak
3	directly into the microphone?
4	MS. LIAW: Oh. Can you hear me now? Okay
5	The Staff has just informed me that the issues
6	surrounding the containment structure were addressed
7	in Chapter 3 of Revision 15 of the DCD.
8	JUDGE TRIKOUROS: You don't remember how
9	they were addressed. They were just addressed in
10	Chapter 3 of the of what?
11	MS. LIAW: The general issues surrounding
12	the containment, Your Honor, were addressed in the
13	DCD.
14	JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Is this the SER, Chapter
15	3 of the SER?
16	MS. LIAW: Yes, Your Honor, SER.
17	JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Okay. With respect to
18	this question that we've been discussing regarding the
19	inspection program, which will really not be available
20	until sometime later, specifically, prior to fuel
21	load, how does that fit into this, sort of this big
22	picture that we're painting here regarding the issues
23	that the Joint Intervenors are raising? I guess Mr.
24	Blanton is indicating that that is not part of the

licensing process, that it's part of the subsequent

1	inspection and enforcement process. Can you address
2	that?
3	MS. LIAW: Well, Staff believes that the
4	petitioners in looking at the application when it was
5	initially filed in 2008 had an obligation to raise any
6	issues that they had with the proposed inspection
7	program at that point, and not any later. They're
8	required to follow the timeliness standards in our
9	regulations, Your Honors, and they did not do so.
10	Their recourse here would be to file a
11	petition for rulemaking, since most of their
12	challenges are, in essence, to the certified design,
13	Your Honor.
14	JUDGE TRIKOUROS: But the inspection
15	program it's difficult to question a document that
16	doesn't exist, or that exists in the form of I'm going
17	to do a great job.
18	CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: We'll comply with the
19	regulations.
20	JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Right. Yes. We're going
21	to do a great job.
22	CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: In theory, they will
23	comply with the regulations, but that isn't quite the
24	way the thing is written.
25	MS. LIAW: Well, under our contention, the

admissibility standards, Your Honor, they must present a genuine dispute with the application at issue here. They haven't presented any genuine dispute with the application, as far as the inspection programs are concerned, and that is their regulatory burden, Your Honors, and they have not met that in their petition, or in their replies.

JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Well, I mean, they have expressed a concern about the inspection program. That's the whole basis of the contention. The issue is whether or not the inspection program meets the NRC Since it doesn't exist, all we have is regulations. a statement that it will meet the NRC regulations. Ιf inspection program existed this moment, or Intervenors Joint earlier, the would have an opportunity to review the inspection program, identify areas that they feel it doesn't meet the standards and requirements, and that would be a contention, or many contentions. So, the situation as it exists right now is not that way. The inspection program will be developed later, but they have -with the they're expressing problems inspection right now, and I'm just interested program understanding how that all works. I know there's not a lot of experience with such things.

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MS. LIAW: Yes, Your Honor. The petitioners have not explained how the FSAR is inadequate in meeting the regulatory standards under 52.79, nor have they sufficiently stated, as they're required to do, why the COLA is deficient in meeting any other regulations, or how these proposed programs are incapable of preventing or finding a hole in the containment structure, Your Honor.

JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Well, I mean, they have said things. They've said, number one, that the program is resulting in a number of existing containment failures, so from their point of view, it has problems with existing plants. But they're going further and saying that the AP1000 has some specific features that would test the limits of the current inspection program standards, and they're basing that the Gundersen report. And Mr. Runkle did on specifically indicate that there are more than one way to meet the standards in the sense that one could write an inspection report that looks -- that you could get three different inspection reports and meet and they're not exactly the same standards, inspection report, so to speak. So, will that inspection, when it comes out, is that -- is there any availability for someone to review that at that point?

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MS. LIAW: Well, Staff wouldn't want speculate on whether a contention could come in if an inspection report were in the future filed on the proposed inspection programs. Regardless, what we have before us here is the petition that we have filed for us by petitioners, and they haven't presented a genuine dispute with the COL application, Your Honor. They haven't shown any dispute as to whether -- they haven't shown why incidents at operating reactors have anything to do with the deficiency or sufficiency of the COLA at this proposed reactor. 12 CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: Okay. MS. LIAW: Furthermore, inspection reports are publicly available documents, and petitioners are bound under the Commission case law to inspect all publicly available documents, and to contentions on those documents. So, if something were to be issued in the future, they could attempt to file a contention at that point. JUDGE TRIKOUROS: The production of the containment coating inspection report, let's say, is not a license condition, nor an ITAAC. 22 Correct? MS. LIAW: That's correct, Your Honor. CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: Just so I'm clear, what

is the timing of that? I mean, is it -- have we ever

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1	and I'll take that answer from either party at this
2	point. There will be something else issued, I take
3	it, that's going to describe the inspection program.
4	Right, or not? I mean, I
5	JUDGE TRIKOUROS: From what
6	MR. BLANTON: Yes, Your Honor. I think
7	that's right. During the construction, there will be
8	one inspection program, and then for commercial
9	operation there'll be another inspection program. And
10	that program will be developed by the licensee, and
11	subject to inspection by NRC staff.
12	CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: But I'm hearing as
13	I understand what you're saying then, that both of
14	those programs actually will not be issued or made
15	available, publicly available until after the COL is
16	issued or granted?
17	MR. BLANTON: That's correct.
18	CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: You say under the
19	current regime, as you described it.
20	MR. BLANTON: Yes sir.
21	CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: And the Staff agrees
22	with that?
23	MS. LIAW: Yes, Your Honor.
24	JUDGE TRIKOUROS: And, Mr. Blanton, you
25	agree that neither ITAACS or license conditions are

1 totally outside of the licensing --2 MR. BLANTON: Yes, sir. 3 JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Okay. 4 CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: And is that something 5 Staff agrees with, as well? I mean, if there -- as 6 MR. BLANTON: Yes. 7 I said earlier, if there's -- if a member of the public believes there's a problem with the inspection 8 9 program, and it does not satisfy NRC regulations, they have 2.206 available, just like they do any other 10 failure to comply with a regulation in a nuclear power 11 And if the Staff thinks it doesn't comply with 12 plant. NRC regulations, it brings an enforcement action. 13 14 CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: All right. Let me just Staff 15 with Mr. Blanton's ask, does the agree representation about the lack of ITAACs and/or license 16 conditions relative to this, in terms of their 17 appropriateness? Let me put it that way. 18 19 MS. LIAW: Yes, Your Honor, we agree. we would just like to point out, also, that the 20 regulatory requirements are for the Applicant to 21 provide a description of the proposed program in the 22 FSAR, and petitioners have not shown how the FSAR is 23 24 deficient in meeting those NRC requirements, Your And that requirement is under 52.79(a)(11), 25 Honor.

Your Honor.

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CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: All right. I think we're going to get into а loop here, but the petitioners argument, as Ι understand it, Intervenors argument, Joint Intervenors argument is that the program says it will -- they have every reason to believe it will say nothing about the kind of inspections they want done; therefore, they don't say something now, it's not going to happen.

MR. BLANTON: Can I respond to that, Your Honor?

CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: Surely.

MR. BLANTON: What the petitioners, if that's what we call them, have said, is that the program, if it complies with NRC regulations will be inadequate. They don't contend it will not comply with NRC regulations. They say even if it does, it's inadequate. That's why it's not admissible.

CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: All right. Anything the Staff wants to say in that regard?

MS. LIAW: Oh, that's true, Your Honor. And, also, the fact that the petitioners' true dispute is with the design in this proceeding, as apparent in their requested relief, which is for inspections beyond what the NRC regulations require, their expert

even proposes a design change to the AP1000 on page 8 of his declaration. So, clearly, if you look at what they're asking for, Your Honors, their true challenges are to 50.55A, as well as the certified design, and not to the COL application.

CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: Let me ask the Staff a couple of questions about some other procedural matters. You did not file an objection to the late filed -- or the motion for leave to file late. You think there were extraordinary circumstances here?

MS. LIAW: That's true that the Staff did not object to the petitioners' motion, Your Honor, and we stand by that position. The Board could rely on Bellefonte in rejecting petitioners' failure to file for an extension of time in a timely fashion; although, the Staff would not object to the Board considering the circumstances presented here as rising to the level of extraordinary circumstances. But we leave it to the Board to determine whether they're proffered reasons rise to that standard.

CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: Go ahead.

JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Just one more -- well, another question. Do you believe that the petition for intervention applies to the COLA, or to the DCD? It is a legitimate COLA issue, or is it a DCD issue?

MS. LIAW: Their challenge is to the DCD, Your Honor, to the Certified Design Revision 15.

CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: Another procedural question. On the standing issue, Mr. Blanton indicated he felt that what the Intervenors have submitted in their reply is inappropriate under the Commission cases that deal with supplementation of petitions relative to standing issues. What is the Staff's position on that?

LIAW: The Staff also agrees petitioners have not met their standing requirements Under Bell Bend, the petitioner here, Your Honor. must show substantial and regular contacts within the site vicinity. Here, petitioners failed to address standing in their initial petition. And in their reply, all they submitted were affidavits from the organizational representative asserting that they had previously filed declarations from residents within the site vicinity, and that they continue to represent individuals. But petitioners failed to those establish who those members are, if they still reside in that same vicinity. Under Bell Bend, they're required to do so. And they do not clarify or cure their defects in their reply brief, Your Honor, petitioners have not fulfilled the requirements to

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show standing in this proceeding.

CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: So, do you agree that the fact that they didn't say anything in this -- I think I understood Mr. Blanton to say, the fact they didn't say anything in their initial petition, they can't really come back in their reply and say anything about standing, and still have it fall within the Agency's, or the Commission's precedent relative to replies, and supplementing standing showings.

MS. LIAW: Well, Staff believes the Board need not reach that specific issue. But, regardless, petitioners did not cure their standing in their reply brief in a sufficient fashion, so they have not demonstrated standing in this proceeding.

CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: And why isn't it sufficient for an organization to come in and simply certify that absolutely nothing has changed relative to the initial filings that they made on standing?

MS. LIAW: Under Comanche Peak, COI 93-04, the petitioner there tried to do the same thing and rely on a prior demonstration of standing in a previously contested portion of that same proceeding, and the Commission held there that they would need to reestablish that they still had standing, despite having demonstrated standing in the prior portion of

1 that proceeding. And in the circumstances before us, we have a very similar situation, where petitioners 2 3 are attempting to rely on their standing demonstrated 4 in the prior portion of this contested proceeding, 5 Your Honor, and they cannot do that. They have to show fresh demonstration of standing in each portion 6 7 of the proceeding. 8 CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: All right. Judge 9 Trikouros? 10 JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Yes. Now, with respect the subject graveness, 11 to graveness, of the Intervenors are saying that this identified issue is 12 a grave issue, possibly exceptionally grave issue. 13 14 The Southern Nuclear has stated that this is nothing 15 more than, I can almost quote them here, "Long-term 16 maintenance issue that does not pose any immediate 17 threat or harm." What is the Commission's, or the Staff's position on that? 18 19 LIAW: The Staff does not believe have presented sufficient 20 petitioners facts demonstrate that an exceptionally grave issue exists 21 in the application, Your Honors. 22 JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Do you agree that this is 23 24 nothing more than a long-term maintenance issue, or

that there's something more here?

1	MS. LIAW: Well, what the Staff thinks is
2	that petitioners had a burden, if they thought that
3	there was an exceptionally grave issue, to address the
4	reopening standards under 2.326, and to demonstrate
5	with sufficient facts in an expert affidavit that
6	there is, actually, an exceptionally grave issue
7	presented here, and they have not met those
8	requirements, Your Honor. They have not demonstrated
9	that there exists such an exceptionally grave issue.
10	CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: I believe Mr. Runkle
11	indicated that he felt you could find that in the
12	initial affidavit that was filed. Are you saying that
13	because they didn't denote what was didn't use
14	those particular words, or didn't cite that standard,
15	or are you saying it's just not in there?
16	MS. LIAW: We're saying, Your Honors, that
17	even if you look at the declaration, Staff thinks that
18	the facts presented in that do not present an issue
19	that is sufficiently grave, exceptionally grave,
20	sorry, Your Honors, under 2.326.
21	CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: All right. Judge
22	Trikouros, do you have any other questions?
23	JUDGE TRIKOUROS: No.
24	CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: Let me check with Judge
25	Jackson. Judge Jackson, do you have any questions for
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1	the Staff?
2	JUDGE JACKSON: I would like to ask two
3	quick questions.
4	CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: Are you holding your
5	handset, because you're still fading in and out a
6	little bit.
7	JUDGE JACKSON: All right. Can you hear me?
8	CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: That's a little better.
9	Thank you.
10	JUDGE JACKSON: I'd like to ask the Staff
11	a couple of quick questions. And a good reference
12	point for these questions would be Mr. Gundersen's
13	declaration. And the first question is from a
14	statement on page 5. It is Topic 23 at the top of the
15	page. It states, "The NRC Staff's response to these
16	through-wall penetrations of the steel containment is
17	that "secondary containment system" would have
18	protected public health and safety by preventing any
19	outside leakage of radioactive material." I'd like to
20	ask the Staff, does it consider the concrete portion
21	of a typical current generation PWR containment
22	structure to be a "secondary containment system?"
23	MS. LIAW: No, Your Honor.
24	JUDGE JACKSON: Does the Staff allow credit
25	to be taken for the presence of the concrete in terms

1 of inhibiting the release of radioactive materials following an accident? 2 3 MS. LIAW: No, Your Honor. JUDGE JACKSON: Thank you. My second 4 5 question is on page 7, Note 34 at the bottom of page It says, "Neither the NRC, nor the Applicant, SNC, 6 7 have evaluated the likelihood of through-wall 8 containment leak at Vogtle that could lead to greater 9 than design-basis isotopic leakage in the event of an accident." My question is, is an evaluation of the 10 likelihood of through-wall containment leakage that 11 could lead to greater than design-basis isotopic 12 leakage required by current NRC regulations? 13 14 MS. LIAW: May I take one moment to consult with the Staff, Your Honor? 15 16 JUDGE JACKSON: Yes. 17 CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: Just as a procedural matter, while they're speaking, we'll go ahead and 18 19 take a brief break so that you all can have a couple of minutes before you go on to your rebuttal, if 20 that's acceptable to you. All right. 21 MS. LIAW: Forgive me, Your Honors. 22 Staff is not entirely clear what Your Honor 23 24 asking, but Staff would note that the Applicant must satisfy the dose requirements under Part 100, assuming 25

1 a technical specification leakage rate given under I'm not sure if I was understanding your 2 Appendix J. question correctly, Your Honor. 3 4 JUDGE JACKSON: My question, was it clear 5 related to Topic 34 in the declaration? Another way to ask the question would be whether or 6 7 not you concur with the statement in Topic 34 of the 8 declaration. MS. LIAW: Well, the Staff would point out 9 that the petitioners have not specified how Statement 10 34 is true, Your Honor, and, therefore, does not meet 11 our contention admissibility standards under 2.309. 12 They have not sufficiently stated how this statement 13 14 is actually true, Your Honor, or how the FSAR fails to 15 meet this requirement. 16 JUDGE JACKSON: So, your contention is that 17 the application, the FSAR meets the regulatory requirements. 18 19 LIAW: Well, our position is petitioners haven't shown how the FSAR does not meet 20 the regulatory requirements, Your Honor, as they are 21 -- their burden is to show that in a contention that 22 there is a sufficient dispute with the application. 23 24 They have not done so with this statement in their

declaration.

JUDGE JACKSON: All right. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: Judge Trikouros, you had another question, I think?

JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Yes. Before I ask it, so I think it's fair to say that the purpose of the inspection program is to provide reasonable assurance that there isn't a breach of containment at the time that a design-basis accident occurs that would result in a failure to meet the regulations for offsite dose. Right?

MS. LIAW: That's correct, Your Honor.

petitioners are saying that the inspection program is not adequate to do that. The -- on page 15 of your answer, you say that, "Although petitioners present a facial challenge to the adequacy of Southern's containment coatings inspection programs, the basis for these claims is that the reactor design, itself, is flawed, and that the vessel thus needs additional inspection beyond what Southern has planned." And you elaborate on that further, on subsequent pages. The question is, shouldn't the nature of an inspection program be aligned or coordinated in some manner with the design of the plant without, necessarily, that meaning that the plant design is flawed? So, when the

1 inspection program is developed, it would take into account the design of the plant. I mean, the 2 inspection program for Vogtle Units 3 and 4 would not 3 4 look identical to the inspection program for Units 1 5 and 2. Is that correct? MS. LIAW: Yes, Your Honor. 6 7 JUDGE TRIKOUROS: So, one could challenge 8 the COLA in a sense, without that meaning that the 9 design is flawed. 10 MS. LIAW: Theoretically, a petitioner could challenge the inspection program itself in the 11 COLA, but here, petitioners have not sufficiently 12 stated that there is a material dispute with the COLA 13 14 at issue. JUDGE TRIKOUROS: I understand what your 15 16 position is, but you do agree that the inspection 17 program should be aligned with the design of the containment. Not every containment is the same. 18 19 MS. LIAW: This is true, Your Honor. JUDGE TRIKOUROS: The question really -- I 20 could move the question forward and say, clearly, 21 somebody could propose a reactor design that is such 22 that the current regulations do not apply to it. 23 24 has not yet happened. I think the Intervenors are

saying that that has happened with respect to the

1	AP1000. But, nonetheless, the regulations are the
2	regulations, and they do not account for that. Would
3	you agree with that?
4	MS. LIAW: That's true, Your Honor.
5	CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: All right. Anything
6	further? Judge Trikouros, anything further? No?
7	Judge Jackson, do you have anything further for the
8	Staff?
9	JUDGE JACKSON: Nothing further.
10	CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: All right. At this
11	point then, would you like to take a brief break, or
12	are you ready to proceed?
13	MR. RUNKLE: We're ready to proceed, Your
14	Honor.
15	CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: All right.
16	MR. RUNKLE: We'll be fairly brief on this.
17	CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: Okay.
18	MR. RUNKLE: Starting with the last point
19	that counsel for the Staff made, that in Paragraph 34
20	that the Intervenors somehow did not prove that their
21	statement was true. It's a statement that neither the
22	NRC, nor the Applicant can invalidate the likelihood
23	of a through-wall containment leak. It's sworn to be
24	the expert. I don't know what else you can say,
25	whether it's true or not. I mean, in looking at the

other parts of 34.1, 34.2, and so on, it gives support for that statement. And I think it's an incredible burden that the Staff is asking the Intervenors to show beyond a question of doubt that a statement that is certified to by an expert, that somehow that there's another showing of truth that needs to be made here.

Secondly, the other statement the Staff made that I think is intentionally misleading is that these issues have been resolved in Revision 15 of the DCD process. Now, we're up to Revision 18, and looking at Revision 18 of the AP1000 design, there are a number of issues on the face that have not been specifically reviewed, or finalized, or approved in that design. And one of the -- on the face of it, it's the containment. Control room setup, seismic qualifications, fire areas, heat removal, there's a long list of these Tier 1 and Tier 2 components to the design that the Staff has not finished their review. And we won't know what the actual containment will look like until all this review is conducted.

Mr. Blanton also said that under -- that this process will be, hopefully, by the end of next year, come to some kind of conclusion. Well, that's just not going to happen. I mean, Westinghouse has

already blown their last deadline by several months, and so to say that there's any kind of resolution of these containment issues, I think is intentionally misleading.

We have one -- that we have one in front of us now at the Vogtle plant that hasn't been resolved, and it's not -- we don't know what -- if these kind of things will be resolved. We do know that in the COLA for the Vogtle plant, the specific coating of the containment, and their inspection is not there. So, we don't know what those are, we don't know if they're going to be Revision 18, or Revision whatever, will be addressing these issues.

Thirdly, Ι think there's been some confusion about what is new information, and what is new analysis. And information may be out there, but until somebody puts it together into some coherent form to do the analysis of what this all means, I think that's the difference in these latest cases. was when the NRC Staff came out with their final environmental report, had all this information out well, somebody said there. and then all information, we'll do a new analysis. information maybe out there, but until an expert actually looks at all the ramifications of it using

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the latest up-to-date information, I think it would be very difficult to have anybody file petitions, that then it contained information that had been out there before.

And going back to the original petition, the original contentions, and new contentions, new filed contentions all have a requirement of having an expert affidavit, or an expert opinion that supports it. Well, any kind of expert opinion is going to rely on information that's out there. So, I think it's an unachievable standard to say just because different facts are maybe present, to say that that's not enough, that's not that kind of analysis. So, until Mr. Gundersen did his report, until he did his evaluation of the Vogtle design, we did not have -- there may have been information out there, but this was not the new analysis.

And on this point, I think Chairman Ray of the ACRS was not wrong. And he was addressing those issues that were specifically relevant to a COLA that up until that point, until -- that the ACRS, and the other NRC Staff had not addressed until Mr. Gundersen put the information together in an affidavit and a report, that there was no new information under the rules. And this conclusion was after a lengthy

1 discussion of all the issues, and I think that the ACRS is addressing this again in subsequent meetings 2 We don't know what will 3 after Mr. Gundersen's report. 4 come out of the DCD on the AP1000. At this point, we 5 don't know if they'll address any of these issues. CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: Let's assume that the 6 7 Intervenors could have hired Mr. Gundersen back in the 8 summer of 2008 as part of their review of the original 9 COL application. Could Mr. Gundersen have prepared the 10 kind of report he prepared for the ACRS at that point, something like it? 11 MR. RUNKLE: Well, I think that the --12 CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: I know they didn't, but 13 14 what if they had, what if they could have? 15 MR. RUNKLE: There were -- subsequent to 16 several major problems were 17 containment. In fact, the -- one of the things that the ACRS looked at is June 18th, 2010, which was an 18 19 NRC Information Notice 2010-12, Containment Lining Corrosion. And until June 2010, even the NRC had not 20 began to put the puzzle together to look at how across 21 the lines, how many the containment liner corrosion. 22 Beaver Valley, April 2009, the Brunswick 23 24 is in late 2008 during refueling, Salem was October 2009, and trying to put together the different bits 25

and pieces to be able to say this is a problem of the containment liner that's being corroded. So, I don't think it would have been possible. I'm sure Mr. Gundersen could have addressed parts of the problem, but, certainly, not to the extent that needed to be done for a valid contention. And, certainly, I think part of the NRC Information Notice was in response to Mr. Gundersen's report, bringing it up as a new analysis, new information.

CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: So, what was the item, the event that brought this whole thing into focus, so that -- something Mr. Gundersen, must have made him write that report for some reason?

MR. RUNKLE: Well, it was because after the Beaver Valley, and Salem, and the Brunswick reactors that were showing corrosion, and looking at some of the other reports that he cites in his reports and other analysis. This was looking at the AP1000 in the design flaw with the containment. But subsequent to the presentation to the ACRS, when Chairman Ray said, you know, a good bit of this could be part of a COLA, forward brought when it was as contention. So, at some point, Mr. Gundersen does his report, he does the analysis of AP1000, he does his specific analysis of what is in the Vogtle COLA.

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1 don't know at what date he could have brought something together earlier. And as soon as we got the 2 3 information, in good faith we brought it to the NRC at 4 timely as we could. 5 CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: All right. MR. RUNKLE: Lastly, Judge Trikouros, there 6 7 was something you said in our colloquy earlier on that 8 I just need to follow-up. And I'm not sure that you 9 want to answer this question, or not. You had talked 10 about as an in-tact containment being one-half percent release per day, and I missed your citation on that. 11 JUDGE TRIKOUROS: I was referring to the 12 specification limits associated 13 with 14 The integrated leak rate test that's release. 15 performed three times in 10 years, something like 16 that, has to show that the technical specification 17 requirements are met. And I believe that number is on the order -- it may actually be half a percent per day 18 19 of the containment atmosphere by weight. MR. RUNKLE: 20 So, t.he containment atmosphere, as opposed to total radioactivity release. 21 22 JUDGE TRIKOUROS: No. The assumption is that the entire weight, if you looked at the entire 23 24 weight of the containment atmosphere, one half of a

percent of that would get released.

1	MR. RUNKLE: Okay.
2	JUDGE TRIKOUROS: That's the specification
3	Now, again, I'm going from memory, so please don't
4	you could look up the tech spec yourself.
5	MR. RUNKLE: Yes. I had just missed the
6	citation on it. And I wasn't quite sure from your
7	question whether it was atmosphere, or total one
8	half a percent of the radioactivity in containment.
9	JUDGE TRIKOUROS: It ends up being,
10	basically, that. I mean, it's a tenth it is a half
11	a percent of the total atmosphere by weight.
12	MR. RUNKLE: Okay. I have no further
13	things. I'll be glad to answer questions, if we can.
14	CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: Let me just raise one
15	issue with you. Both the Staff and the Applicant have
16	indicated that we really that the filings that you
17	made, or the reply filing you made relative to the
18	standing issue just isn't going to cut it, because it
19	came too late. Do you want to say anything about
20	that? That came in your reply, there was no mention
21	of it in the original petition, recognizing, again,
22	you did not draft the original petition.
23	MR. RUNKLE: Yes. In drafting the original
24	petition it seemed to me that you would put

affidavits, and certainly affidavits that were

submitted subsequently were adequate. I mean, if you have standing in 2008, and somebody who knows intimately is familiar with organization, say nothing has changed, that seems to me an adequate response. If you need to have every member who has affidavits from earlier to submit those, I think that's not required. And in the original petition, there was a fairly substantial number of declarants showing that they were within the 50 miles. And I don't even thing it was challenged at that time. It's just the 50-mile limit is so inconclusive that in most of these cases, nobody even challenges standing. So, having the Executive Director say nothing substantially has changed seems to me certainly to fit any kind of requirement.

CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: All right. Judge Trikouros?

JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Yes. Just one more item. You had indicated earlier that you considered the containment flawed, the containment design flawed. You heard me ask the question of the Staff Counsel regarding could you have an inadequate inspection program, or could the current standards not be applicable to a certain design, but that does not mean the design is flawed. Do you still believe that

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1 having heard all that, do you still contend that the 2 AP1000 design is flawed? Is that still your position? 3 MR. RUNKLE: Yes, it's a flaw in flaw. 4 mean, the containment design itself is flawed, and the 5 inspection and coating program is also flawed. sure you could have a hypothetical plant that may not 6 7 have a flawed design, and you could have an inadequate 8 inspection program. But in this case, I mean, the 9 design is what it is, and the inspection and the 10 coating programs are inadequate to find potential significant, let's go back to our excessively grave --11 exceptionally grave standard. 12 JUDGE TRIKOUROS: But you would say the 13 14 same thing, I believe, with present day reactors, that 15 the inspection program is inadequate. MR. RUNKLE: I have no basis for saying one 16 17 way or the other on that. I've not looked at the different inspection programs for existing reactors, 18 19 as opposed to what's in the COLA for the Vogtle. JUDGE TRIKOUROS: Well, the vast majority 20 of Mr. Gundersen's information in the exhibits 21 provided us, basically, applies to existing plants. 22 I would say pretty much all of it are discussions 23 24 regarding existing plants, data regarding existing

I don't believe that you're saying that

plants.

And

I believe

that Mr. Gundersen is saying that the inspection 2 program is inadequate. 3 MR. RUNKLE: And I think in looking at the 4 5 affidavit and report by Mr. Gundersen, he bases that on some of the NRC investigations where they actually 6 7 make the conclusion that there are significant defects 8 in the containment, or potential defects in the 9 containment of the AP1000, based on their analysis of 10 the existing PWRs and BWR programs. So, it's not that -- I mean, since you have the possible through-holes 11 in the containment in the existing reactors, I think 12 you can draw a conclusion that's going to happen at 13 14 the Vogtle reactor, also, as one part of putting the 15 puzzle together to reach that conclusion. 16 CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: All right. Anything 17 further? Judge Jackson, do you have anything further for Mr. Runkle? 18 19 JUDGE JACKSON: Nothing further. CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: All right. Then I think 20 at this point the Board has concluded its questions, 21 and the parties have made their presentations. 22 mention a couple of -- I should mention, first of all, 23 24 that we appreciated very much the presentations that you all made. I certainly found them, I know Judge 25

the design of existing plants is flawed.

Trikouros did, to be very useful and helpful in terms of helping us to decide this case.

In terms of the admissibility of the contention, under the Commission's rules, 2.309(i), I believe, we would be required either to decide this by I believe the 8th of November, if I've got the right date, which is 45 days after the reply, or to advise the parties and the Commission that we won't make that date, and we will do one or the other. So, you will be hearing from us one way or the other on it by the 8th of November on that issue.

I should just mention, also, a couple of other items. If the contention were to be admitted, in setting a schedule under Section 2.332(d), the Board will need to make an assessment about whether a merits determination based on an evidentiary hearing would need to await issuance of the Staff FSER, which is currently scheduled, I believe, for April of 2011, if I'm reading the website right. That appears to be right, or could proceed based on the advanced SER with no open items, which is scheduled for issuance, I think, the beginning of next week, if that's -- again, is there an update on that date?

MR. JOSHI: Ravindra Joshi, Project
Manager. The Advanced FSER with no open items are

1 currently scheduled -- are estimated to be completed by the end of the year. 2 3 CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: The end of the year. 4 Okay. 5 JOSHI: That's the current estimate right now. 6 7 CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: Okay. In any event, 8 given the advanced stage that the Staff or you in this 9 pre-hearing conference proceeding, а regarding 10 schedule is likely to convene fairly promptly followed by any Board determination to admit the contention. 11 So, obviously, we're aware of where the proceeding is, 12 and we'll have to proceed promptly, if the contention 13 14 were to be admitted. That's just a heads-up for the 15 parties. Assuming possibly the contention were to 16 17 be admitted, the parties should be aware that general discovery provisions under 2.336, including the need 18 19 for the NRC Staff to provide a hearing file would be activated regardless of whether there's any Board 20 order or party discovery request. Also, relative to 21 general discovery, the parties may wish to discuss 22 whether they want to prepare and provide privilege 23 24 logs of waive such logs as we've done in the prior

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proceeding. So, again, just a heads-up for folks in case -- in the event the contention were to be admitted.

At this point, I think all we need to do before we adjourn is to give some thank yous to some folks who have been involved, to Felicia Rogers and the folks out in Region II that helped coordinate the video conference from the NRC's Atlanta office, very much appreciate their efforts. Also, the ASLBP IT Specialist, Andy Wilke, Matt Kutchen, and Joe Doiker who helped us with setting this proceeding up, as well, as well as the folks from Via, the contractor that helps us run our audio system and video system here. And, also, Wen Bu, which is a name some of you may remember. She's actually now our former law She's actually moved on to bigger and better things in private practice. And Jonathan Eser, who is our current law clerk, and also to Matina Solovakos from the ASLBP staff who helped us set this up. So, again, we appreciate their efforts.

At this point -- yes, sir?

MR. RUNKLE: Yes. Excuse me, sir. Is there a timetable on the limited appearance statements?

You're looking at a November 8th deadline.

CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: Right.

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1 MR. RUNKLE: Is there a time period -- I know there were some folks that weren't part of the 2 Intervenors that would like to make some statements. 3 4 CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: I would suspect that it 5 would be a good idea for them, assuming they want to get something in, to get it in by the 8th of November. 6 7 or thereabouts. 8 MR. RUNKLE: Okay. We'll give them like a November 1st deadline. 9 10 CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: That would be a good idea, I think, to get it all on the record as promptly 11 as possible. 12 MR. RUNKLE: All right. 13 14 CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: All right. Anything 15 else any of the counsel have? 16 MR. BLANTON: No, sir. CHAIRMAN BOLLWERK: All right. And, again, 17 we appreciate it. Thank you. Mr. Runkle, you had some 18 19 interesting circumstances under which you've been before us, and we appreciate your efforts. I'm sure 20 Mr. Zeller certainly appreciates that you kind of came 21 into the breach to help him out, and we do appreciate 22 your efforts in being able to make yourself available, 23 24 and to provide the pleadings for the 20 Intervenors in

this case. Again, thank you to the Staff and the

1	Applicant Counsel for your presentations, as well.
2	And at this point, we stand adjourned. Thank you.
3	(Whereupon, the proceedings went off the
4	record at 12:07 p.m.)
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