

**Mendiola, Doris**

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**From:** Morris, Victoria (morrisvr) [MORRISVR@UCMAIL.UC.EDU]  
**Sent:** Friday, October 15, 2010 5:28 PM  
**To:** Rulemaking Comments  
**Subject:** Docket NRC-2010-0282  
**Attachments:** ltr-safety culture.doc

Attached are the University of Cincinnati's comments to the referenced docket and the NRC's draft Safety Culture Policy Statement.

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October 15, 2010

Secretary  
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington DC 20555-0001  
Attn: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff  
Sent by email: [rulemaking.comments@nrc.gov](mailto:rulemaking.comments@nrc.gov)

Subject: Docket: NRC-2010-0282  
Comments on Revised Draft Safety Culture Policy Statement

Dear Sir/Madam:

The University of Cincinnati appreciates this opportunity to provide comments on the above referenced draft policy statement. In its request for comments, the NRC specifically requested comment on five questions. The University of Cincinnati respectively submits comments to these questions and also proposes consideration of an additional safety culture trait.

Question (1)

*"The revised definition of Nuclear Safety Culture is 'Nuclear Safety Culture is the core values of behaviors resulting from a collective commitment by leaders and individuals to emphasize safety over competing goals to ensure protection of people and the environment.' Should this be retrained as written, or should it be revised?"*

The University of Cincinnati supports this statement with the understanding that the "safety" to be emphasized is all types of safety and not simply nuclear safety.

Question (2)

*"Does including the safety culture traits in the SOP itself clarify your understanding of what the Commission means by a positive safety culture? If not, what additional guidance do you think is needed?"*

The University of Cincinnati believes including the traits helps clarify the understanding of nuclear safety culture; however, the University of Cincinnati believes additional information is needed regarding how the traits are expected to be applied. In the federal register notice the NRC provided examples of licensee's not operating under a nuclear safety culture. The NRC identified root causes as inadequate management and profits over safety. The University of Cincinnati agrees these are indicators of a lack of a nuclear safety culture. However, the example of

operators sleeping on the job may or may not be an indicator of a lack of nuclear safety culture. If sleeping on the job is being condoned or ignored by supervisors and/or management, then the University of Cincinnati does believe the situation indicates a lack of nuclear safety culture exists. However, if management is appropriately handling the situation by applying progressive discipline in accordance with institutional rules then the situation likely is not an example of lack of nuclear safety culture. All licensees must deal with poor and/or rogue employees. Licensees must follow state and federal laws and, when applicable, labor contracts, when handling these employees.

#### Question (3)

*"Does the revised draft SOP provide a clear statement of the NRC's expectations that the regulated community should maintain a safety culture that includes balanced consideration of safety and security? If not, what changes or additions should be made?"*

Yes, the Statement of Policy published in the federal register clearly states the NRC considers "nuclear safety and nuclear security issues to be equally important to a positive safety culture" and the expectation includes both safety and security personnel balancing and having "an appreciation for the importance of each" to "optimize protection."

#### Question (4)

*"Should a discussion regarding complacency be added to the SOP and/or to the traits that describe areas important to safety?"*

Adding a discussion of complacency may be helpful. One issue that needs to be considered is the probable differences on nuclear safety culture between individual complacency versus management complacency versus institutional complacency.

#### Question (5)

*"In late August 2010, the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) completed a validation study to assess the extent to which the factors that emerged from analyzing responses to a safety culture survey match the traits that were identified during the February 2010 workshop. ... Four of these are consistent with the eight traits developed by the workshop participants. ... Willingness to Raise Safety Concerns relates to Environment of Raising Safety Concerns;"*

In regards to the raising safety concerns comparison, the University of Cincinnati respectively disagrees that the two traits are always related. An individual may be personally reluctant to raise safety concerns even when there is an environment in which "personnel feel free to raise safety concerns without fear of retaliation, intimidation, harassment or discrimination." Occasionally individuals do not raise safety concerns simply because they do not want to get involved.

#### Additional safety culture trait

The University of Cincinnati proposes consideration of an additional safety culture trait of "regulatory assistance." The University of Cincinnati's Radiation Control and Safety Program (RCSP) contains a component not currently included in the NRC's safety culture traits. This is the trait of regulatory assistance. Each time a noncompliance to a regulation or RCSP requirement is observed, the Radiation Safety Office staff provides assistance in correcting the

immediate deficiency, recommends solutions to prevent reoccurrence, works to achieve an understanding of why the deficiency is a problem, and strives to ensure both the deficiency and associated corrective action are well communicated. The University believes this strong service component by regulatory overseers is an essential part of any safety culture and recommends that it be included in the NRC's safety culture policy statement and be made applicable to onsite regulatory overseers (e.g., the Radiation Safety Office staff) up through the NRC itself.

If you have any questions or want to discuss any of the comments, do not hesitate to contact me.

Sincerely,

*Vicki Morris*

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