

10 CFR 50.73

RA10-072

September 23, 2010

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
ATTN: Document Control Desk  
Washington, D.C. 20555

LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2  
Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-11 and NPF-18  
NRC Docket Nos. 50-373 and 50-374

Subject: Licensee Event Report 2010-002-00

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), Exelon Generation Company (EGC), LLC, is submitting Licensee Event Report Number 2010-002-00.

There are no regulatory commitments in this report. Should you have any questions concerning this report, please contact Mr. Terrence W. Simpkin, Regulatory Assurance Manager at (815) 415-2800.

Respectfully,



Peter J. Karaba  
Plant Manager  
LaSalle County Station

Enclosure: Licensee Event Report

Cc: Regional Administrator – NRC Region III  
NRC Senior Resident Inspector – LaSalle County Station

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)**

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records and FOIA/Privacy Service Branch (T-5 F52), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to infocollects@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

<b>1. FACILITY NAME</b> LaSalle County Station, Unit 1	<b>2. DOCKET NUMBER</b> 05000373	<b>3. PAGE</b> 1 OF 3
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**4. TITLE**  
Division 1 Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pump Trip and Auto Re-Start Due to Shutdown Attempt with Remote Automatic Start Signal Present

5. EVENT DATE			6. LER NUMBER			7. REPORT DATE			8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
07	26	2010	2010	- 002 -	00	09	24	2010	LaSalle County Station, Unit 2	05000374
									FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
									N/A	N/A

<b>9. OPERATING MODE</b>  1	<b>11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §:</b> (Check all that apply)			
<b>10. POWER LEVEL</b>  100	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2201(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(3)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2201(d)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(4)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(x)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(a)(4)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.46(a)(3)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(a)(5)
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)	<input type="checkbox"/> OTHER
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)	

Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A

**12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER**

FACILITY NAME Jeffery C. Williams	TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) (815) 415-2204
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**13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT**

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANU-FACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANU-FACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX
N/A					N/A				

<b>14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED</b> <input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO	<b>15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE</b>	MONTH N/A	DAY	YEAR
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**ABSTRACT** (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)

On July 26, 2010, at 1819 CDST, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 (Power Operation), the Division 1 Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pump (DGCWP) unexpectedly restarted after being secured. The DGCWP provides the cooling water to its associated Diesel Generator (DG) and ECCS cubicle area coolers, and the Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS) pump motor cooler.

The Division 1 DGCWP was being shutdown following completion of required surveillances on related supported systems. The DGCWP was secured using the main control room pump control switch. When the switch was returned to the standby position, the DGCWP breaker received an automatic lock-out. The automatic lock-out occurred as a result of the circuit being designed to preclude continuous breaker cycling (anti-pumping). When the operator reset the breaker by placing the control switch momentarily to stop and back to standby, the DGCWP automatically restarted. This was because the LPCS/Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) corner room cooling fan was still running following the completed surveillances, and when the fan is running, an automatic start signal is provided to the DGCWP. The operator was unaware that the LPCS/RCIC corner room cooling fan was still running.

The cause of this event was a latent procedure error in that the steps being performed failed to require verification that all of the remote components that send start signals to the DGCWP were secured. Procedure revisions have been initiated for procedures that direct securing DGCWPs to ensure that all remote components that provide an automatic start signal to the DGCWP have been secured.

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)  
CONTINUATION SHEET**

1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET	6. LER NUMBER			3. PAGE
LaSalle County Station, Unit 1	05000373	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.	2 OF 3
		2010	- 002	- 00	

**NARRATIVE**

LaSalle County Station Unit 1 is a General Electric Company Boiling Water Reactor. At the time of the event, the maximum licensed reactor core thermal power level was 3489 megawatts thermal. On September 16, 2010, the NRC issued a license amendment to increase the maximum licensed reactor core thermal power level to 3546 megawatts thermal.

**A. CONDITION PRIOR TO EVENT:**

Unit(s): 1                      Event Date: July 26, 2010                      Event Time: 1819 CDST  
 Reactor Mode(s): 1          Power Level: 100 percent  
 Mode(s) Name: Power Operation

**B. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:**

On July 26, 2010, at 1819 CDST, following completion of required surveillances on related supported systems, the Division 1 Diesel Generator Cooling Water (DG) [LB] Pump (DGCWP) [P] was shutdown using the corresponding main control room pump control switch. When the switch was returned to the standby position, the DGCWP breaker received an automatic lock-out. The automatic lock-out occurred as a result of the circuit being designed to preclude continuous breaker cycling (anti-pumping). When the operator reset the breaker by placing the control switch momentarily to stop and back to standby, the DGCWP automatically restarted. This was because the Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS) (LP) [BN]/ Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) (RI) [BN] corner room cooling fan was still running following the completed surveillances, and when the fan is running, an automatic start signal is provided to the DGCWP. The operator was unaware that the LPCS/RCIC corner room cooling fan was still running.

The lock-out of the Division 1 DGCWP placed both units in an unplanned 72-hour Technical Specification (TS) Required Action to restore the DGCWP to standby. When the DGCWP was restarted twenty minutes later, the 72-hour Required Action was exited. The restart was originally considered an invalid actuation and reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). The event was reported to the NRC Operations Center at 1342 (ET) on September 1, 2010.

**C. CAUSE OF EVENT:**

The cause of this event was a latent procedure error in that the steps being performed failed to require verification that all of the remote components that send start signals to the DGCWP were secured. In addition, less than adequate communications and pre-job briefing were contributors to the event.

**D. SAFETY ANALYSIS:**

The safety significance of this event was minimal. There were no equipment or component failures associated with this event. This start signal from the Division 1 DGCWP breaker being reset resulted in the automatic actuation of the Division 1 DGCWP. The lock-out of the DGCWP placed both units in a 72-hour TS Required Action to restore the pump to standby condition. The Unit 1 Division 1 ECCS was declared inoperable but available. The basis for continued availability is that contingency actions were in place for restoration of the Unit 1 DGCWP to running status. The DGCWP was restarted 20 minutes later. The Division 1 DGCWP responded satisfactorily.

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LaSalle County Station, Unit 1	05000373	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.	3 OF 3	
		2010	- 002	- 00		

**NARRATIVE**

**E. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:**

- Procedure revisions have been initiated for procedures which direct securing DGCWPs. This will ensure all remote components that provide an automatic start signal to the DGCWP have been secured.
- Enhancements in communications and pre-job briefings are being made through reinforcement, training, observations, and case study presentation to operations personnel.

**F. PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES:**

On March 3, 2003, at 0311 hours, with Unit 2 in Mode 1, the Division 1 DGCWP automatically started during the performance of a Unit 2 RHR corner room fan breaker inspection. The apparent cause was an inadequate review of the electrical prints during the inspection, which led the technicians to mate auxiliary contacts consequently initiating the start of the Division 1 DGCWP. This actuation of the auxiliary contacts provided a signal that satisfied the start logic for the Division 1 DGCWP to logically believe the 2A RHR pump room cooling fan was running, thereby generating an auto start signal.

**G. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA:**

There were no equipment or component failures associated with this event.