

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 628-4866 REVISION 2

9/7/2010

US-APWR Design Certification

Mitsubishi Heavy Industries

Docket No. 52-021

SRP Section: 19.01 - Determining the Technical Adequacy of Probabilistic Risk Assessment Results for
Risk-Informed
Application Section: 19

QUESTIONS for PRA and Severe Accidents Branch (SPRA)

19.01-8

The staff has reviewed MHI's response to RAI 4482. In the response to RAI 4482, MHI acknowledged that the interlock for abnormal mid-loop water level decrease is risk-important and proposed changes to TS 3.4.8 and associated bases in accordance with Criterion 4 of 10 CFR 50.36 (c)(2)(ii). The staff noted that mid-loop operations span both Modes 5 and 6, and the proposed changes to TS 3.4.8 cover only the Mode 5 portion. TS 3.9.6 covers the Mode 6 portion. MHI's position is that operability of the related mid-loop water level instrumentation can be indirectly covered by the operability of the low-pressure letdown isolation valve in TS 3.4.8 and is not required to be listed in TS 3.3.1. However, the setpoints for the mid-loop level instrumentation should be documented in TS 3.3.1, because the instrumentation needs to have the requisite channel checks, calibrations, etc. and assurance that the limits are adequately described in the technical specifications. The staff also believes changes should be made to Chapter 7 to capture design features for this mid-loop water level instrumentation. Therefore, the staff requests MHI to provide further clarifications and changes to the APWR DCD or justifications if MHI decides that no further changes will be necessary.