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August 20, 2010



Docket Nos.: 50-348

NL-10-1547

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555-0001

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant – Unit 1 Licensee Event Report 2010-002-01 Two Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Inoperable

Ladies and Gentlemen:

In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) is submitting the enclosed Licensee Event Report Revision. This revision provides additional information received by SNC since the report was initially submitted on April 2, 2010.

This letter contains no NRC commitments. If you have any questions, please contact Mr. Doug McKinney at (205) 992-5982.

Sincerely, anoe R. Johnson

Vice President – Farley

JRJ/WDO/EGA

Enclosure: Unit 1 Licensee Event Report 2010-002-01

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NL-10-1547 Page 2

cc: <u>Southern Nuclear Operating Company</u> Mr. J. T. Gasser, Executive Vice President Mr. J. R. Johnson, Vice President – Farley Ms. P. M. Marino, Vice President – Engineering RTYPE: CFA04.054

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mr. L. A. Reyes, Regional Administrator Mr. R. E. Martin, NRR Project Manager – Farley Mr. E. L. Crowe, Senior Resident Inspector – Farley Mr. P. Boyle, NRR Project Manager Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant – Unit 1 Licensee Event Report 2010-002-01 Two Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Inoperable

Enclosure

Unit 1 Licensee Event Report 2010-002-01

NRC FC	RM 366			U.S. NUCLE	AR R	EGULATO	RY COMM	ISSION	APPROV	ED BY OM	B: NO. 3150	-0104	EXPIRES	6: 08/31/2010	
(9-2007) Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records and FOIA/Privacy Service Branch (T-5 F52), U.S Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 2055-0001, or by interne example to information and product to the Deck Officer, Office of Information															
and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.															
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Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant – Unit 1 05000 348 YEAR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER REVISION NUMBER 2 of VARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17) 2 of 2 of VARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17) Westinghouse Pressurized Water Reactor Energy Industry Identification Codes are identified in the text as [XX] Description of Event 2 0 On February 2, 2010 at 1615, the Unit 1 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (TDAFW) Pump w declared inoperable due to a high temperature identified on an electrical cable in the TDAFW Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) [UA]. The 1B Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) had previously been removed from service for scheduled maintenance. As required by Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1, "AC Sources – Operating," Required Action Statement, the Unit 1 B-Tr Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (MDAFW) Pump was declared inoperable at 2015 on Februa 2010 due to the combination of its inoperable emergency power supply and inoperable redunda equipment. This resulted in two of three trains of Auxiliary Feed Water (AFW) being inoperable Because two out of the three trains of AFW are required to meet flow requirements for limiting design basis accidents (DBA), this represents a condition that could have prevented the fulfillmu of a safety function. Repairs to the electrical cable were immediately initiated. At 2216 on February 2, 2010, the Unit TDAFW and 1B MDAFW Pumps were returned to operable status restoring the safety function. Further analysis of the UPS cable high temperature indicates that t			RNUMBER	6.	2. DOCKET	1. FACILITY NAME
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 TDAFW UPS secured for repairs at 1750 on February 2, 2010 B-Train MDAFW pump would have been inoperable at 2150 on February 2, 2010 TDAFW and 1B MDAFW pumps were returned to operable status at 2216 on February 2 2010 Reporting is still necessary because repair activities removed the TDAFW UPS from service rendering two of three AFW trains inoperable for approximately 26 minutes. Cause of Event Evaluation of the crimped connection revealed an inadequate crimp at the connection of the lug the end of the wire. This inadequate crimp compression did not allow the lug and wire to fasten the proper compression to create the lowest resistance possible. This was discovered when a routine preventive maintenance (PM) thermography scan of plant equipment was scheduled due the planned outage period for EDG 1B. During this routine PM, a high temperature spot was identified in the Unit 1 TDAFW UPS at one connection. 	W al B-Train pruary 2, indant able. ng iillment Unit 1 ion. would r low: ary 2, ary 2, e sten at n a I during	in the TDAF or (EDG) had d by Technic to the Unit 1 2015 on Fel operable redu- being inoper- tents for limiti- ented the fulf 2, 2010, the e safety function of service for indicated be ry 2, 2010 216 on Februar 5 from service nection of the and wire to fas covered when as scheduled	ctrical ca esel Gene As required on Stater noperable upply and vater (AF) ow required have p on Febru restoring the TDAF removed reduced 010 0 on Febru restoring the TDAF removed reduced 010 0 on Febru restatus at FDAFW L minutes.	Auxilian d on an argency aintenar quired A declare y powe ary Feed to mee on that c d. At 22 able stat cates the erable u inction v oruary 2 able at 2 o opera hoved the imately quate cri n of plan	tor dentified in the t 1 Turbine Driv perature identif UA]. The 1B En- e for scheduled – Operating," F DAFW) Pump w perable emerge ee trains of Aux AFW are requisi- presents a cond mediately initia e returned to op n temperature in was therefore of ne of lost safety ins at 1750 on F nave been inopo- to were returne epair activities r perable for appr revealed an ina- simp compress owest resistant hermography s 5. During this returned to op	 Westinghouse Pressurized Water React Energy Industry Identification Codes are in Description of Event On February 2, 2010 at 1615, the Unit declared inoperable due to a high tem Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) [U previously been removed from service Specification (TS) 3.8.1, "AC Sources Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (MD 2010 due to the combination of its inopequipment. This resulted in two of thre Because two out of the three trains of design basis accidents (DBA), this rep of a safety function. Repairs to the electrical cable were im TDAFW and 1B MDAFW Pumps were Further analysis of the UPS cable high not have been adversely affected and repairs. Based on this analysis the time - TDAFW UPS secured for repair B-Train MDAFW pump would from TDAFW and 1B MDAFW pump 2010 Reporting is still necessary because reprendering two of three AFW trains inoperation of the wire. This inadequate c the proper compression to create the known of the planned outage period for EDG 1B

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NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

Safety Assessment

The Farley onsite standby power source is provided from four EDGs (1-2A, 1B, 2B, and 1C). The continuous service rating of 1C EDG is 2,850 kW and 4,075 kW for EDGs 1-2A, 1B, and 2B. EDG 1-2A and 1-C are A-Train and EDGs 1B and 2B are B-Train. Farley also has a fifth diesel generator (2C) that serves as a station blackout diesel which can be manually aligned to supply B-Train power to either unit and power Loss of Site Power (LOSP) loads. The diesel generator 2C can provide backup power to the buses supplied by 1B EDG. Procedures are in place and operators are trained on starting the 2C diesel generator for alignment to the B-Train emergency buses.

The AFW System consists of two motor driven AFW pumps and one steam turbine driven pump configured into three trains. The pumps are equipped with recirculation lines to prevent pump operation against a closed system. Each motor driven AFW pump is powered from an independent Class 1E power supply and feeds all steam generators through a common header. The steam turbine driven AFW pump receives steam from two main steam lines upstream of the main steam isolation valves. The turbine driven AFW pump supplies a common header capable of feeding all steam generators via Direct Current (DC) solenoid air operated control valves actuated by the Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS). Thus, the requirement for diversity in motive power sources for the AFW System is met. Two of the three AFW pumps are required to ensure the flow demand for the most limiting DBAs and transients is satisfied.

During the short period of time the TDAFW Pump and the 1B MDAFW Pump were inoperable no work was performed on the A-Train Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) or the class 1E electrical systems that could have threatened the A-Train equipment. No adverse weather conditions existed that threatened FNP's offsite power systems. No events occurred to adversely affect the operations of Unit 1 during this short period of time. At no point was the safety and health of the public challenged. The B-Train MDAFW Pump was available at all times. Therefore, the safety and health of the public was not adversely affected during the limited time the TDAFW and B-Train AFW pumps were declared inoperable.

Corrective Action

The heat affected wire and lug were replaced. The Unit 1 TDAFW Pump was returned to operable status at 2216 on February 2, 2010.

Thermography scan of Unit 2 TDAFW UPS was completed with no indications of adverse wiring connections being noted.

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Additional Information	on							
Similar Events:								
LER 2009-002-00	May 26, 2009	Turbine D Flooding (V Pump Inop	erable Du	ie to Ir	nternal	
LER 2008-002-00	June 11, 2008	TS 3.0.3 E Removal S		to Inoperabilit	y of Resid	ual He	at	
LER 2008-003-00	September 15, 2	Emergenc Exchange		Generator 1-	2A Lube (Dil Hea	at	
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