Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc.
Millstone Power Station
Rope Ferry Road
Waterford, CT 06385

Dominion

JUL 26 2010

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attention: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Serial No. 10-420
NSS&L/WEB R0
Docket No. 50-423
License No. NPF-49

DOMINION NUCLEAR CONNECTICUT, INC.
MILLSTONE POWER STATION UNIT 3
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 2010-003-00

This letter forwards Licensee Event Report (LER) 2010-003-00 documenting a condition discovered at Millstone Power Station Unit 3 on May 27, 2010. This LER is being submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), as a condition prohibited by technical specifications and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material.

If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Mr. William D. Bartron at (860) 444-4301.

Sincerely,

A. J. Jordan
Site Vice President - Millstone

Attachments: 1

Commitments made in this letter: None.

IE22
NRR

cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region I
475 Allendale Road
King of Prussia, PA 19406-1415

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NRC Project Manager
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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NRC Senior Resident Inspector
Millstone Power Station

Serial No. 10-420
Docket No. 50-423

ATTACHMENT

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 2010-003-00

DOMINION NUCLEAR CONNECTICUT, INC.
MILLSTONE POWER STATION UNIT 3

NRC FORM 366 (9-2007) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 08/31/2010

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records and FOIA/Privacy Service Branch (T-5 F52), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to infocollects@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET NUMBER	3. PAGE
Millstone Power Station - Unit 3	05000423	1 OF 3

4. TITLE

Secondary Containment Rendered Inoperable Due to Misaligned Dampers

5. EVENT DATE			6. LER NUMBER			7. REPORT DATE			8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
										05000
05	27	2010	2010	-003-	-00	07	26	2010	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
										05000

9. OPERATING MODE

1

10. POWER LEVEL

100

11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: *(Check all that apply)*

20.2201(b)	20.2203(a)(3)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)
20.2201(d)	20.2203(a)(3)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
20.2203(a)(1)	20.2203(a)(4)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
20.2203(a)(2)(i)	50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
20.2203(a)(2)(ii)	50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)	50.73(a)(2)(x)
20.2203(a)(2)(iii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)	73.71(a)(4)
20.2203(a)(2)(iv)	50.46(a)(3)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)	73.71(a)(5)
20.2203(a)(2)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)	X 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)	OTHER
20.2203(a)(2)(vi)	X 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)	50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)	

Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A

12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER

FACILITY NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)
William D. Bartron, Supervisor Nuclear Station Licensing	860-444-4301

13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANU-FACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANU-FACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX

14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED

☐ YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) ☒ NO

15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT *(Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)*

On May 27, 2010, with Millstone Power Station Unit 3 (MPS3) at 100% power in Mode 1, during a panel walkdown, operators discovered that two sets of auxiliary building tunnel exhaust dampers were misaligned and open at the same time. This configuration created a pathway from the secondary containment to the outside and rendered secondary containment inoperable. The condition was immediately corrected by placing the dampers in their correct position. The correct damper position should have been established prior to entry into Mode 4 on May 13, 2010.

The cause of the misalignment was inadequate communications and instructions for existing procedure status between operating shifts. An apparent cause evaluation was conducted to provide corrective actions, such as revised procedures and log entry requirements in accordance with the corrective action program.

This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as a condition prohibited by plant technical specifications and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material.

NARRATIVE

1. Event Description

On May 27, 2010, with Millstone Power Station Unit 3 (MPS3) at 100% power in Mode 1, during a panel walkdown, operators discovered that two sets of auxiliary building tunnel exhaust dampers, 3HVR-AOD196A/3HVR-AOD197A and 3HVR-AOD196B/3HVR-AOD197B [DMP] were misaligned and open at the same time. This configuration created a pathway from the secondary containment to the outside and rendered secondary containment inoperable. The condition was immediately corrected by placing the dampers in their correct position with one damper set isolated.

With both damper pairs open, the East and West MCC Rod Control areas, which are part of the Supplementary Leak Collection and Release System (SLCRS) boundary, were interconnected via the ventilation exhaust ducts with the North and South Cable Tunnels (auxiliary building cable tunnels), which are not SLCRS boundaries. This configuration constitutes a secondary containment boundary breach and rendered secondary containment inoperable per the requirements of Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.6.2 "Secondary Containment". The SLCRS system, including the fans and filters, remained operable based on completed surveillances.

The correct damper position should have been established prior to entry into Mode 4 on May 13, 2010. Secondary Containment was inoperable from May 13, 2010 until corrected on May 27, 2010. Therefore, this condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as a condition prohibited by plant technical specifications.

Secondary Containment ensures that the release of radioactive materials from the primary containment atmosphere will be restricted to those leakage paths and associated leak rates assumed in the safety analysis. Therefore, this condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function for controlling the release of radioactive material.

2. Cause

The cause of the misalignment was inadequate communications and instructions for existing procedure status between operating shifts.

3. Assessment of Safety Consequences

The safety consequences associated with the breach of secondary containment via the auxiliary building tunnels is considered low. The purpose of secondary containment is to restrict leakage paths and associated leak rates of radioactive materials from the primary containment atmosphere. The Auxiliary Building tunnel exhaust damper misalignment resulted in a secondary containment breach by a pathway to the ventilation exhaust ducts of North and South Cable Tunnels. The limiting scenario associated with this damper misalignment is considered to be a design basis loss of coolant accident. The secondary containment in-leakage associated with this secondary containment breach was assessed. With the secondary containment breach, the ability of one train of SLCRS to draw a sufficient negative pressure in secondary containment could not be assured. However, since both trains of SLCRS were available, adequate SLCRS flow was available to compensate for the increased flow into the secondary containment supplied through the breach of secondary containment.

4. Corrective Action

An apparent cause evaluation was conducted to provide corrective actions, such as revised procedures and log entry requirements in accordance with the corrective action program.

NARRATIVE

5. Previous Occurrences

No previous similar events/conditions were identified.

Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX].