

Stephen E. Quinn  
Vice President

Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.  
Indian Point Station  
Broadway & Bleakley Avenue  
Buchanan, NY 10511  
Telephone (914) 734-5340

March 13, 1997

Re: Indian Point Unit No. 2  
Docket No. 50-247

Mr. Hubert J. Miller  
Regional Administrator - Region I  
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
475 Allendale Road  
King of Prussia, PA 19406

SUBJECT: Special Report on March 12, 1997 Inoperability of a Portion  
of the High-Pressure Water Fire Protection System Due to  
Isolation of Fire Hydrant

Pursuant to our Fire Protection Program requirements for Indian Point Unit No. 2, this letter confirms the telephone notification made to you on March 12, 1997 concerning the temporary inoperability of the high-pressure water fire protection system due to a broken fire hydrant. In addition, with the information provided below, this letter satisfies our program requirement to submit within 14 days following the event a special report which outlines the action taken, the cause of the inoperability, and the plans and schedule for restoring the system to operable status.

Requirement 2.a.3) of Addendum I of Station Administrative Order (SAO) 703, "Fire Protection Impairment Criteria and Surveillance", requires that the high-pressure water fire protection system shall have all piping and valves necessary for proper functioning of any portion of the system required for protection of safe shutdown systems operable. There are no permissive modification provisions for this requirement. With the high-pressure water fire protection system inoperable in a manner other than permitted by Requirement 2.a.3), Required Action 2.b.1. states that an alternate fire protection system shall be established within 24 hours; the NRC Region I Office shall be notified within 24 hours of identification; and a special report outlining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability, and the plans and schedule for restoring the system to operable status shall be submitted to the NRC within 14 days following the event.

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


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In order to isolate the broken fire hydrant in a portion of the high-pressure water fire protection system that protects the Auxiliary Feedwater Building and the Electrical Tunnel, which contain safe shutdown systems and equipment, it was necessary to temporarily isolate that portion of the header from the motor-driven fire pumps and the diesel-driven fire pump. This rendered piping and valves necessary for proper functioning of a portion of the system required for the protection of a safe shutdown system inoperable, thus, Required Action 2.b.1. was applicable. The isolation was effected on March 12, 1997, commencing at 1110 hours and ending at 1350 hours, well within the 24 hour allowed outage time before an alternate system is required to be established. Compensatory measures (fire hoses routed to the affected areas) required by SAO-703 were also instituted during the time the portion of the header was isolated for the inoperable Electrical Tunnel spray system and the hydrant that provides protection for the Auxiliary Feedwater Building. These compensatory measures are no longer required since the system has been restored to operable status.

Should you or your staff have any questions, please contact Mr. Charles W. Jackson, Manager, Nuclear Safety & Licensing.

Very truly yours,

Handwritten signature of Charles W. Jackson, with the initials "CS&L" written below it.

cc: Document Control Desk  
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Mail Station P1-137  
Washington, DC 20555

Mr. Jefferey F. Harold, Project Manager  
Project Directorate I-1  
Division of Reactor Projects I/II  
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Mail Stop 14B-2  
Washington, DC 20555

Senior Resident Inspector  
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
PO Box 38  
Bachanan, NY 10511