Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc.
Millstone Power Station
Rope Ferry Road
Waterford, CT 06385

Dominion℠

JUL 07 2010

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attention: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Serial No. 10-379
MPS Lic/TGC R0
Docket No. 50-423
License No. NPF-49

DOMINION NUCLEAR CONNECTICUT, INC.
MILLSTONE POWER STATION UNIT 3
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 2008-005-01

This letter forwards Licensee Event Report (LER) 2008-005-01 documenting a condition discovered at Millstone Power Station Unit 3, on November 5, 2008. This LER is being submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), as a condition prohibited by technical specifications and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material. This is a supplement to LER 2008-005-00 to report this condition in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C).

If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Mr. William D. Bartron at (860) 444-4301.

Sincerely,

A. J. Jordan
Site Vice President - Millstone

Attachments: 1

Commitments made in this letter: None

IE22
NRR

cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region I
475 Allendale Road
King of Prussia, PA 19406-1415

C. J. Sanders
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NRC Senior Resident Inspector
Millstone Power Station

ATTACHMENT

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 2008-005-01

MILLSTONE POWER STATION UNIT 3
DOMINION NUCLEAR CONNECTICUT, INC.

NRC FORM 366 (9-2007) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 08/31/2010

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records and FOIA/Privacy Service Branch (T-5 F52), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to infocollects@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET NUMBER	3. PAGE
Millstone Power Station - Unit 3	05000423	1 OF 3

4. TITLE

Containment Penetration Not Fully Closed During Fuel Movement

5. EVENT DATE			6. LER NUMBER			7. REPORT DATE			8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
										05000
11	05	2008	2008	– 005	– 01	06	07	2010	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER 05000

9. OPERATING MODE

6

10. POWER LEVEL

000

11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: *(Check all that apply)*

☐ 20.2201(b)	☐ 20.2203(a)(3)(i)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(vii)
☐ 20.2201(d)	☐ 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
☐ 20.2203(a)(1)	☐ 20.2203(a)(4)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
☐ 20.2203(a)(2)(i)	☐ 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
☐ 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)	☐ 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(x)
☐ 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)	☐ 50.36(c)(2)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)	☐ 73.71(a)(4)
☐ 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)	☐ 50.46(a)(3)(ii)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)	☐ 73.71(a)(5)
☐ 20.2203(a)(2)(v)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)	☒ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)	☐ OTHER
☐ 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)	☒ 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)	Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A

12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER

FACILITY NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)
William D. Bartron, Supervisor Nuclear Station Licensing	860-444-4301

13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANU-FACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANU-FACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX

14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED

☐ YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) ☒ NO

15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE

MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT *(Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)*

With the plant in Mode 6 at 0% power on November 5, 2008, operators discovered that a valve (3FWS*V861) relied upon to be closed to meet technical specification requirements during fuel movement in containment was not fully closed. Plant Technical Specification (TS) 3.9.4.c requires that each penetration providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere be closed by an isolation valve, blind flange, or manual valve or be capable of being closed under administrative control during movement of fuel within the containment building. Valve 3FWS*V861 is a drain line isolation valve off the feedwater line to the "C" steam generator inside containment and was being credited as closed since a pathway to atmosphere outside containment existed due to maintenance activities on associated portions of the main steam system. The subsequent investigation determined that the valve had been in this condition during fuel movement inside containment that occurred from November 1, 2008 at 0430 until November 3, 2008 at 0915.

The cause of this condition was determined to be a combination of mechanical and physical factors making the valve difficult to operate to ensure full closure. The valve was subsequently closed. Maintenance was performed the valve during refueling outage 3R13 (Spring 2010). Proper operation the valves was validated through post maintenance testing

Since the plant was in a configuration not allowed by the technical specifications, this event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B). This is a supplement to LER 2008-005-00 to report this condition in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C).

1. **Event Description:**

With the plant in Mode 6 at 0% power on November 5, 2008, operators discovered that a valve [V] (3FWS*V861) relied upon to be closed to meet technical specification requirements during fuel movement in containment was not fully closed. Plant Technical Specification (TS) 3.9.4.c requires that each penetration providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere be closed by an isolation valve, blind flange, or manual valve or be capable of being closed under administrative control during movement of fuel within the containment building. Valve 3FWS*V861 is a drain line isolation valve off the feedwater [SJ] line to the "C" steam generator [SG] inside containment and was being credited as closed since a pathway to atmosphere outside containment existed due to maintenance activities on associated portions of the main steam system. The subsequent investigation determined that the valve had been in this condition during fuel movement inside containment that occurred from November 1, 2008 at 0430 until November 3, 2008 at 0915.

Since the plant was in a configuration not allowed by the technical specifications, this event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as any operation or condition prohibited by the plant's technical specifications. This is a supplement to LER 2008-005-00 to report this condition in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C).

2. **Cause:**

Subsequent to maintenance activities on the secondary side of the "C" steam generator, operators proceeded to fill the steam generator. Operators identified that containment sump levels were rising and found that valve 3FWS*V861 was the source. Operators attempted to further close the valve and were not initially successful until additional mechanical leverage was applied.

The cause of this condition was determined to be a combination of mechanical and physical factors making the valve difficult to operate to ensure full closure. The packing on this valve was very tight and the valve handle has an extension necessary to clear an interference. The extent of condition review identified that a valve in series with 3FWS*V861 (3FWS*V862) is subject to similar mechanical and design factors and was also not fully closed. (3FWS*V862 was not being credited for compliance with TS 3.9.4.c.)

3. **Assessment of Safety Consequences:**

This condition is judged to be of very low safety significance. The requirements on containment penetration closure and operability ensure that a release of radioactive material within containment to the environment will be minimized. The fuel handling accident analyses assume that during a fuel handling accident some of the fuel that is dropped and some of the fuel impacted upon is damaged. Containment penetrations, including the personnel access hatch doors and equipment access hatch, can be open during the movement of fuel provided that sufficient administrative controls are in place such that any of these containment penetrations can be closed within 30 minutes. Following a Fuel Handling Accident, each penetration, including the equipment access hatch, is closed such that a containment atmosphere boundary can be established. The containment atmosphere boundary is established when any penetration which provides direct access to the outside atmosphere is closed such that at least one barrier between the containment atmosphere and the outside atmosphere is established. The design basis Fuel Handling Accident does not credit closure of containment and assumes all radioactivity released as part of the accident is exhausted directly to the environment within 2 hours. Under design basis conditions, offsite dose and dose to the control room operators are within regulatory limits.

NARRATIVE

In this case, a pathway to atmosphere existed via a hose connected to a 2" valve (3FWS*V861), through the feedwater line to the secondary side of the "C" steam generator, through the main steam line and to atmosphere through an open main steam isolation valve drain standpipe low point drain (3DTM*V117). Since operators were not aware that 3FWS*V861 was not fully closed, no administrative controls were in place to ensure the penetration could be closed within 30 minutes. This condition existed from November 1, 2008 at 0430 until November 3, 2008 at 0915, the period of time in which fuel movement inside containment was underway. There was no fuel handling accident.

4. **Corrective Action:**

Valve 3FWS*V861 and 3FWS*V862 were subsequently closed. Maintenance was performed on both of these valves during refueling outage 3R13 (Spring 2010). Proper operation of both valves was validated through post maintenance testing.

5. **Previous Occurrences:**

No previous similar events/conditions were identified.

Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX].