TELEPHONE CONFERENCE CALL SUMMARY WITH AREVA-RICHLAND TO DISCUSS APPARENT CHANGE IN ELECTRICAL CONFIGURATION OF CARBON DIOXIDE AND LOSS OF HEATING, VENTILATION AND AIR CONDITIONING CAPABILITY
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During this conference call, AREVA clarified that the electrical configuration of the subject alarms remained consistent with the discussions between the NRC and AREVA during the NRC's site visit on December 2008. Specifically, the source of normal power and emergency power in the ammonium diuranate building serves both alarms and the horns associated with the criticality accident alarm system. As part of this conference call, AREVA provided a flowchart illustrating the electrical configuration of the Carbon Dioxide (CO_2) and loss of Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) alarms. Both alarms have been identified as items relied on for safety (IROFS) in the proposed CO_2 process. AREVA clarified that the uninterrupted power supply (UPS) panel for the CO_2 alarm is independent from the UPS panel for the loss of HVAC alarm. In addition, AREVA stated that the CO_2 UPS panel is within the boundary of the CO_2 alarm IROFS. Likewise, the UPS panel for the loss of HVAC alarm is within the boundary of this IROFS. The NRC staff inquired about the sensitivity of the CO_2 alarm sensor/detector. AREVA stated that if the sensor stops working or malfunctions, the alarm will be activated, just like it would if there was an actual CO_2 release.

Since the CO_2 and loss of HVAC alarms are local, they would only be heard by personnel working in the CO_2 system and the adjacent rooms. The NRC staff asked how emergency personnel would be notified if the alarms go off. AREVA indicated that operators will follow a procedure that instructs them to leave the area and notify the immediate supervisor and a health and safety technician. The immediate supervisor will follow the emergency response protocols depending on the situation. AREVA explained that re-entry to the affected area needs to be authorized by a manager in the environmental, health, and safety organization.

Finally, the NRC staff asked AREVA to revise the flowchart to include the key points mentioned in the first paragraph and resubmit it so it could be docketed. AREVA agreed to such request and provided the revised document which can be accessed through the Agencywide Documents Access and Management System using Accession Number ML101880672.

Enclosure