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
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1	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
2	NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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4	ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS
5	(ACRS)
6	+ + + +
7	ABWR SUBCOMMITTEE
8	+ + + +
9	TUESDAY, JUNE 8, 2010
10	+ + + +
11	ROCKVILLE, MARYLAND
12	The Subcommittee convened at the Nuclear
13	Regulatory Commission, Two White Flint North, Room
14	T2B1, 11545 Rockville Pike, at 1:00 p.m., Dr. Said
15	Abdel-Khalik, Chairman, presiding.
16	SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:
17	SAID ABDEL-KHALIK, Chair
18	J. SAM ARMIJO
19	DENNIS C. BLEY
20	MARIO V. BONACA
21	MICHAEL CORRADINI
22	HAROLD B. RAY
23	WILLIAM J. SHACK
24	JOHN D. SIEBER
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1	JOHN W. STETKAR	
2		
3	NRC STAFF PRESENT:	
4	MARK TONACCI	
5	GEORGE WUNDER	
6	ED FULLER	
7	ROCKY FOSTER	
8	TODD HILLSMEIER (via teleconference)	
9	JOHN LAI	
10	MARIE POHIDA	
11	LYNN MROWCA	
12	THERON BROWN	
13	ALSO PRESENT:	
14	SCOTT HEAD	
15	BILL STILLWELL	
16	STEVE FRANTZ	
17	RICK SUMMITT	
18	EVANS HEACOCK	
19	COLEY CHAPPELL	
20	BRAD MAURER	
21	TOM DALEY	
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1	P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S
2	(12:59 p.m.)
3	CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: The meeting will now
4	come to order. This is a meeting of the ABWR
5	Subcommittee of the Advisory Committee on Reactor
6	Safeguards. I am Said Abdel-Khalik, chairman of the
7	Subcommittee.
8	ACRS members in attendance today are John
9	Stetkar, Sam Armijo, Dennis Bley, Jack Sieber, Harold
10	Ray and Mario Bonaca. Mike Corradini, Bill Shack and
11	Michael Ryan may join us later.
12	Ms. Maitri Banerjee is the designated
13	federal official for this meeting. The NRC Staff
14	Review of the STP Combined License Application is
15	generating Safety Evaluation Reports with Open Items
16	by chapters.
17	In our last meetings of March 2 and 18,
18	and May 20, we discussed the COLA FSAR and the
19	corresponding SERs with Open Items or Chapters one,
20	four, five, seven, eight, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17 and
21	18.
22	In today's meeting we are scheduled to
23	discuss Chapter 19. We will also discuss the status of
24	several follow-up items from the last three meetings.
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scheduled We have one more ABWR 1 2 Subcommittee meeting for June 23 and 24 that will be 3 followed by a meeting of the full Committee in July. I expect today's discussion to 4 5 be issue-centered, related to the technical issues in the COLA and SER. The rules for participation in 6 7 today's meeting were announced in the Federal Register 8 on May 24, 2010 for an open/closed meeting. 9 Parts of this meeting may need to be 10 closed to the public to protect information proprietary to Toshiba or other parties. I am asking 11 12 the NRC staff and the applicant to identify the need for closing the meeting before we enter into such 13 14 discussion and to verify that only people with the 15 required clearance and need to know are present. We have a telephone bridge line for the 16 17 public and stakeholders to hear the deliberations. 18 This line will not carry any signal from this end 19 during the closed portion of the meeting. Also, to minimize disturbance, the line 20 21 will be kept muted until the last 15 minutes of the 22 meeting. At that time we will provide an opportunity for any member of the public attending this meeting, 23 24 either in this room or through the bridge line to make

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a statement or provide a comment. 1 2 As the meeting is being transcribed, I 3 would request that participants in this meeting use the microphones located throughout this room when 4 5 addressing the subcommittee. Participants should first identify 6 7 themselves and speak with sufficient clarity and volume so that they can be readily heard. 8 9 We will now proceed with the meeting and Mark Tonacci of NRO 10 call on Mr. to begin the presentation. Mark? 11 12 MR. TONACCI: Thank you. We welcome the opportunity to talk with you today and I am going to 13 14 turn it over to George to introduce our speakers. 15 MR. WUNDER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, 16 gentlemen, Maitri. I am George Wunder. I am the lead 17 project manager for the South Texas Project Combined 18 License Review. 19 Today we are presenting on Chapter 19. The 20 staff presentation will be led by Project Manager 21 Rocky Foster and the members of the technical staff 22 presenting are Ed Fuller, John Lai, David Jeng, Marie Pohida and Todd Hillsmeier. I would now like to turn 23 it over to Scott Head to introduce the South Texas 24 **NEAL R. GROSS** 

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2	M	R. HEAD	: Okay,	good a	fternoon.	We
3	appreciate t	he oppor	tunity to	brief	the ACRS	on
4	Chapter 19 to	day and I	will intr	oduce ou	r participa	nts
5	as soon as we	have the	back-up.			

Today we are going to be discussing Chapter 19. That's the only topic and after Chapter 19, if we have time in the afternoon, we do have a number of open items that we will be prepared to brief the staff on.

So our agenda today, pretty much our standard agenda, the introduction, we have the summary and then we will go into details of Chapter 19. There are a couple of interesting topics there for us to discuss.

attendees today 16 And our are 17 Bill Stillwell, who has presented on Chapter 17. We 18 also have, assisting us, Gene Hughes and Ricky Summitt 19 today to help us as necessary. And with that I am 20 going to go ahead and turn the presentation over to 21 Bill Stillwell.

22 MR. STILLWELL: Good afternoon. My name is 23 Bill Stillwell. I am the supervisor for PRA for STP 24 units 3 and 4. Prior to that, I was the supervisor for

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STP units 1 and 2 and a supervisor, I probably led the greater quality assurance risk-informed application, U.S.-managed technical specifications risk-informed application, 119-day diesel generator extended allowed outage time.

Prior to that I guess I got my start in 6 PRA with some friends over here. When we did the 7 8 original Zion and Indian Point probabilistic safety 9 study, shortly after the show-cause order after TMI, I 10 was also involved in the Seabrook full scope Level 3 PRA work with Pickard, Lowe & Garrick. So I guess I 11 12 could say I've been doing this for a while. That doesn't mean anything. 13

14 Okay what we are going to talk about is 15 Chapter 19, the Probabilistic Risk Assessment for the ABWR as modified to support the licensing of STP 3 and 16 17 I thought I would start with a little bit of 4. 18 background and summary of the ABWR PRA, just so 19 everyone is starting on the right page.

Chapter 19 was developed as part of the original certification effort to support the licensing and certification of the ABWR design. The effort was primarily performed in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. Those that perform PRAs, who have been in the

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industry for a while, realize that all of the operating class for performing plant examinations in response to the Generic Letter 88-20 in the same time frame.

So if you think of the ABWR PRA as an IPE, individual plant examination, with external events, sort of modified. It was actually a little bit better than most of the IPEEEs that were being produced in the late 80s and early 90s.

10 The certification PRA is а Level 2 11 internal events PRA with generic consequence 12 evaluations. For external hazards analysis, they looked at fire hazards analysis and performed a fire 13 14 screening assessment using EPRI's methodology for fire-induced vulnerability evaluation. 15

They also did seismic margins assessment 16 for the seismic part of the PRA so there is not an 17 18 actual quantification for fires and seismic events. 19 What they did was, I guess, state of the art in the 20 early 90s fire-screening and seismic margins assessment screening. 21

They did do a shutdown analysis, sort of. It's not what I would call a low-power shutdown PRA but they did evaluate shutdown sequences for the

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initiating events: loss of residual heat 1 dominant 2 removal, loss of offsite power, loss of support 3 systems and compared those against the goal of 10 to the minus five per shutdown -- it may have been a 10 4 5 to the minus five per hour initiating event frequency -- and showed for the dominant sequences everything 6 7 was less than that shutdown screening criteria and 8 made a conclusion that shutdown risk would be a small 9 or insignificant fraction of the total core damage 10 frequency that they were calculating for internal 11 events.

And the NRC staff in their review, as documented in the final Safety Evaluation Report, agreed with that conclusion.

15 MEMBER ARMIJO: Before you go on, Ι am having a little bit of problem when you say they did 16 17 this and they did that. Now that was certainly not a -18 - that was at that time it was GE that prepared that 19 PRA and I'm just trying to understand, is this PRA 20 that you are referring to and that you are updating, is that a public domain document that says this 21 22 belongs -- anybody who wants to update that PRA can go ahead and just grab it and do that. 23

MR. STILLWELL: Let me see if I can

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explain.

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MEMBER ARMIJO: I just want to know what we are building on.

MR. STILLWELL: If I can explain it, before 5 I start to go astray, I'm sure somebody is going to itself, the public leap The PRA 6 come up, up. 7 documentation of the PRA, that's the Design Control 8 Document. If you have looked at Chapter 19, the DCD, 9 there's no numbers in there. And in fact there's no 10 documentation of fault trees or event trees in there.

MEMBER ARMIJO: That was my concern.

12 MR. STILLWELL: There was a decision made and this is where I would Steve Frantz to help me, 13 14 during certification there was a decision made to take 15 the standard Safety Analysis Report that was reviewed to support certification and modify that for Chapter 16 17 to remove a lot of material, fault trees, the 19 18 details you need to recreate a PRA out of the DCD.

19 The NRC have reviewed it and documented 20 their review in the Final Safety Analysis Report but the DCD itself is just basically words. 21

22 MEMBER ARMIJO: Are you basically building from scratch using the -- I don't know, 23 а PRA 24 structure of the original PRA?

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MR. STILLWELL: Not really. We had the safety analysis report that GE developed to support certification and we just started with the Safety Analysis Report and we'll get to the slides in a minute. But we basically recreated that PRA and validated that we were getting results, similar results within certain error bands.

8 MEMBER ARMIJO: Okay I won't take any more 9 of your time but you might want -- one of my 10 colleagues will need to address some of that.

MR. STILLWELL: The next slide will be
 addressing that. Steve Frantz.

13 MR. FRANTZ: Yes, my name is Steve Frantz. 14 I am regulatory counsel for South Texas. I was also 15 regulatory counsel for GE during the design 16 certification of the ABWR. What Bill has described is 17 really a two-part process for certification.

Initially as part of their application, GE submitted what was called the SSAR, the Standard Safety Analysis Report. That, as far as I know, was on the docket. It was a publicly available document, still is, I believe, a publicly available document. There may be portions which are proprietary or SUNCI but in general I believe it's publicly available,

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including the fault trees and event trees and the various CDFs.

As part of developing the Design Control Document, the DCD, for the rule itself, that information was excised because of concerns regarding the change process in 50.59.

7 If you recall, 50.59 at that point in time said any increase in probability of an accident would 8 9 require an NRC amendment. We were concerned at that 10 point in time, back in the 1990s, that if there was a change in an accident sequence that went from, say, 10 11 12 to the minus tenth per year to 10 to the minus ninth per year, that would require an NRC approval which was 13 obviously an absurd situation. 14

As a result, the DCD omitted the numbers, but those numbers and the fault trees and event trees are still available in the SSAR.

MEMBER ARMIJO: Okay. Okay.

MR. STILLWELL: Thanks, Steve. So continuing, unless there are more questions. The PRA has updated while maintaining the original format to reflect site conditions and selected departures.

23 What I mean by original format, if you 24 look at Reg Guide 1.206, it establishes a format for

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PRAs for Design Certification and Combined License applications. Chapter 19 of the AWBR doesn't meet that format requirement. It was done back in the mid-1980s, 1990s -- certification, and we have 20-something chapters. The Reg Guide 1.206, I think, has six or seven chapters and the information played out a little bit differently.

Because of the certification rule and correct me again if I'm wrong, we have to stay within the format of the DCD so we kept the content and format of Chapter 19 consistent with the DCD content and format and so it's broken up a little bit, or a lot differently to what you see from an applicant from another plant.

What we do provide is a roadmap and Chapter 19.1S to Chapter 19 ABWR versus Chapter 19 Reg Guide 1.206, so if you can you can trace it and see where specific information that you are interested in seeing is located.

The updated PRA is bounded by the results of the original PRA. What does that mean? In Reg Guide 1.206C.III.1.19, for a DC, an approved design, if we can show changes and site-specific information included in the PRA is not a significant change, then

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we basically don't have to make significant changes to 1 2 Chapter 19. We don't have to go in and document a lot 3 of sequence information and stuff, as long as we can show that what we've done to change the plant design 4 5 with departures or what we've done incorporating sitespecific information, that's not significant -- and by 6 7 significant I mean 10 percent core damage frequency 8 change -- the Chapter 19, Reg Guide 1.206.C.III.1.19 9 says we just basically make a statement to that 10 effect, no significant changes. 11 MEMBER CORRADINI: And then, just for 12 clarification, so you have done the analysis, but the analysis is not part of the DCD nor the application.

13 analysis is not part of the DCD nor the application. 14 It is auditable by staff but not --other than your 15 conclusion, that you just repeated, other than that, 16 it's an audit.

MR. STILLWELL: It's an audit. And in fact the audit was performed last September and it's been looked at two or three times since.

20 MEMBER CORRADINI: Right. I saw that. Okay. 21 MR. STILLWELL: So that's a little bit of a 22 history. Next slide, please.

23 MEMBER BONACA: Is the CDF the only 24 criterion to judge --

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MR. STILLWELL: If CDF were significant, 1 2 then we would have to look at other aspects of the 3 PRA. As long as CDF was not significant, we made an argument to convince everyone that we don't have to 4 5 look at Level 2 because there's not a significant change in the Level 1 input. 6 MEMBER BONACA: Even if you had a different 7 8 profile now, that is, the profile is different? 9 MR. STILLWELL: If the risk profile were 10 significantly different, and by significant, if Ι could stay within 10 percent total but I had a 11 12 specific set of initiating events because of site characteristics that changed significantly, that would 13 be, I would say, we would be in a grey area and we 14 15 would have to defend it more. We would probably have 16 to spend more time looking at that specific set of 17 sequences. 18 I will say, fortunately, I believe we 19 didn't get there. 20 MEMBER BONACA: So you have look at more than one parameter alone to make a decision or a 21 22 determination? 23 MR. STILLWELL: Yes, sir. 24 MEMBER BONACA: Okay. **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

MEMBER STETKAR: Bill, you use the word 1 don't understand 2 significant а lot and I the 3 definition of that word so I -- I don't have a dictionary here. What does that word actually mean in 4 5 real technical terms when you say it hasn't --MR. STILLWELL: Ten percent change in core 6 7 damage frequency in Reg Guide 1.206 and it's an 8 increase or a decrease, by the way, which is a kind of 9 a funny situation. 10 MEMBER STETKAR: And because at least I have not had access to the SSAR, I don't particularly 11 12 know what sort of numbers you are dealing with. Do so I have a feel for a you have those numbers 13 14 Ten percent, are talking about 10 benchmark? we percent around a value of one or 10 percent around a 15 value of 10 to the minus  $40^{th}$  or --? 16 17 MR. STILLWELL: I'll talk to you about it. 18 MEMBER STETKAR: Okay. 19 MR. STILLWELL: The base case core damage 20 frequency for the ABWR Level 1 was, I believe, and I'm 21 going to have more digits than I need, 1.76 times 10 22 to the minus seventh per year. 23 MEMBER STETKAR: 1.76 minus seven, okay. 24 MR. STILLWELL: But don't quote me on that **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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20 because it's kind of, pretty close to that. 1 2 MEMBER STETKAR: It's kind of a couple 3 minus seven. MR. STILLWELL: Well, the 1.7 is 4 5 significant, times 10 to the minus seven. Okay? Let me get through this and then I will tell you where we are 6 7 now. 8 MEMBER CORRADINI: And that is the internal 9 events you just quoted. 10 MR. STILLWELL: It's internal events only. Because of the state of the art PRA back then, nobody 11 12 was summing sequences and specifically in this one they said they didn't sum sequences. 13 14 STETKAR: events full MEMBER Internal 15 power? MR. STILLWELL: Internal events full power. 16 17 MEMBER STETKAR: Thank you. 18 MEMBER CORRADINI: Just to close to the 19 loop with one of the staff that clarified something, 20 this though is in the public document if one went back 21 to it, the SSAR? 22 MR. STILLWELL: I am going to say I hope so, but we have had difficulty finding it because it's 23 24 so old. There may be microfiche pages. It's not **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

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something I can go to and find on ADAMS. I can find the DCD but I can't find the SSAR. We can find transmittal letters but we can't find the SSAR, although it was documented obviously.

5 MEMBER BLEY: Bill, I would like to kind of 6 parrot back what I think I've heard and it's a little 7 different than what I thought I heard from some staff 8 before I came. So originally, with the certification, 9 GE had a PRA and they had a summary of it in the DCD 10 which had no numbers.

11 South Texas has, from the information 12 available and the safety analysis, built your own 13 Level -- and that was a Level 2. You have booked your 14 own Level 1, 100 percent PRA for the design.

MR. STILLWELL: Yes, sir.

MEMBER BLEY: And that is what we'll hear some about. Now you're also, separate from this, you are doing a much more thorough, plant-specific PRA, all modes.

20 MR. STILLWELL: All modes, all initiating 21 events, internal and external initiating events. That 22 was actually, very briefly, that's a two-phase 23 project. We're about half-way through the first phase 24 with at-power, low-power model, external events,

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selected external events are being folded into that: 1 2 model, hurricane, floods, tornadoes. 3 That PRA will be peer-reviewed about this 4 time next year. So we'll take it through the ASME 5 peer-review process, given its current state and given the fact that we don't have any operating experience 6 7 and we won't have any operators at this time. 8 The second phase, during construction, 9 will be the fire and external events, or fire and 10 seismic because we can't really complete those until we have something that we can touch and look at. 11 12 That one is expected to be complete 13 probably nine months or so before one year before fuel 14 load. MEMBER BLEY: So will that one include, 15 16 that one will be an integrated Human Reliability 17 Analysis that includes your own procedures and --? 18 MR. STILLWELL: Yes, sir. That one will be, 19 Human Reliability Analysis will actually be the 20 performed with the current model, to the best we can. 21 But everything in that model will be updated to 22 current codes and standards and all of it will be integrated into what we will call the STP 3 and 4 10 23 24 CFR 50.71(h) PRA that satisfies --

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MEMBER BLEY: That's about a year before.

MR. STILLWELL: We have to make that PRA current to codes and standards that exist that the NRC has endorsed in Reg Guide 1.200 at one year prior to fuel load.

So to do that we intend to basically have 6 7 integrated all of the PRA into one common model as 8 much as we can, updated it because we have to update 9 it for things like, we've got operators now, we've got 10 procedures now and we've got а little better understanding of what's going on, and any changes in 11 12 codes and standards so that we can perform peer review and be complete about one year prior to fuel load. 13

One year prior to fuel load, we basically say are there any changes in Reg Guide 1.200 or in the codes and standards and we will do a delta or an update. But hopefully, the way the standards are coming out, there won't be.

MEMBER BLEY: Okay. As you go through the COLA PRA, the one you guys have done, point out places where it's not as complete as you'd like it to be or if there's anything that's not, the non-plant-specific parts if you can do it as go, but not up front.

MR. STILLWELL: Can I ask you to remind me

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periodically? I think I can talk about it but if you 1 remind me I know I'll get it back to you. 2 3 MR. HEAD: But to your point, what you described and what Bill has been trying to describe 4 5 was sounding to me to be the same. MEMBER BLEY: I think so. That's why I 6 7 wanted to ask --8 MR. HEAD: The interesting moment that we 9 have imposed on us is the next page where in essence 10 we have transitioned to Toshiba and so that has, you know, made our work a little different and that's what 11 12 we'll do describing here. MEMBER BLEY: But the PRA that is there 13 now, you guys did, it's not -- Toshiba didn't do that, 14 or did they do their own? 15 MR. STILLWELL: The PRA that is described 16 17 in the DCD? 18 MEMBER BLEY: No, in the DCD. MR. STILLWELL: The PRA we are using to 19 20 evaluate departures. The PRA we are using to evaluate departures is what we did starting from the SSAR 21 22 benchmarking is another step -effort 23 MEMBER STETKAR: It is the to 24 replicate --**NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

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1	MR. STILLWELL: Replicate is a good word.
2	MEMBER STETKAR: SSAR, PRA to the best
3	ability.
4	MR. HEAD: So that we could do the
5	evaluations we needed to do.
6	MEMBER BLEY: Okay, somewhere along the
7	line I thought I heard that Toshiba did that.
8	MR. STILLWELL: No, Toshiba has not done
9	MEMBER BLEY: You guys did that.
10	MR. STILLWELL: We did that, and it's not
11	Toshiba is here, it's that GE is not.
12	MEMBER BLEY: I understand that. Okay go
13	ahead.
14	MR. STILLWELL: So, the key from all of the
15	discussion is we don't have access to the
16	certification PRA, the original codes and the models
17	and everything. So what we have done
18	MEMBER ARMIJO: And the staff doesn't
19	either, right? Does the staff have access to that?
20	MR. STILLWELL: I don't know if I can
21	answer that question or if I know the answer to that
22	question.
23	MR. FULLER: Hi, this is Ed Fuller from the
24	PRA Branch in NRO. We have somewhere a non-electronic
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version of it. As far as, I didn't use it in my review 1 for the Level 2 severe-accident piece. I'm not sure if 2 3 the people who did the Level 1 review used it, but we did rely on the SSAR. 4 5 MR. HEAD: For our purposes, obviously, for doing evaluations, we would need our own to do --6 7 MEMBER ARMIJO: Sure I understand that, I'm 8 just trying to see what the staff compared your work 9 with, if they had access to it or not. 10 CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: Please proceed. 11 MR. STILLWELL: So, as we described, we 12 took the SSAR PRA description, basically rebuilt the system fault trees, system event trees. This is the 13 data that was used in the original quantification, 14 evaluated that model and fixed any discrepancies that 15 we found and we found several, probably documentation 16 17 things or things that we were doing wrong, changes in 18 code version because CAFTA was basically the DOS 19 version and now it's much more user-friendly and easier to transfer information between. 20 21 You see the reconstituted Level 1 PRA 22 includes transfer partial sequences that where eliminated, that's primarily due to the change 23 in 24 CAFTA code. And in the original PRA, the Containment

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Overpressure Protection System, COPS, was actually credited in Level 2 to provide core cooling so we could prevent sequences from going to core damage if COPS actuated successfully.

And it made it difficult to understand 5 Level 1 and Level 2 so this model, 6 what was we 7 basically put COPS with Level 1 where it was 8 appropriate so that core damage, when you could get it 9 is actually damage out, core rather than an 10 artificially inflated core damage that COPS is going to recover in Level 2. 11

12 MEMBER STETKAR: Bill, I -- tell me when we 13 are running short on time. The --

MR. STILLWELL: We knew this was going to
take a while.

MEMBER STETKAR: It's going to be brutal. 16 17 Just get over it. You just mentioned that sort of 18 relocation of COPS and obviously I don't know anything 19 about the models because I haven't seen any models but the words that I read were that some number of core-20 21 damage recovery functions, COPS being one of them, had 22 been implemented through post-processing of, I don't know what you call them, cut-sets or sequences, post-23 24 processing of results, cut-sets. Is that true, is that

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1	the way that's actually been?			
2	MR. STILLWELL: That's the way it was done			
3	originally.			
4	MEMBER STETKAR: That's the way it was done			
5	originally. Have you actually wired those systems into			
6	the Level 1 models as fault trees now?			
7	MR. STILLWELL: I'll ask one of my friends			
8	to answer that question, if I could.			
9	MR. SUMMITT: My name is Rick Summitt. We			
10	help support STP on the development. Initially, we did			
11	it post-processing and in the final reconstituted			
12	model, it is in the model that we have the actual			
13	pieces in there so we can quantify to get the actual			
14	cut-sets, but it's a simplistic model that basically			
15	relates back to what was done by GE.			
16	So there were basically only two aspects			
17	that we had to look at.			
18	MEMBER STETKAR: When you say simplistic			
19	model, I don't particularly care about definitions of			
20	basic events. Do you at least have fundamental support			
21	system, like electric power and cooling water, I have			
22	no idea even what these systems are.			
23	MR. SUMMITT: Yes that is correct.			
24	MEMBER STETKAR: You at least have that			
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1	wired to go.
2	MR. SUMMITT: Yes.
3	MEMBER STETKAR: Okay good.
4	MR. SUMMITT: COPS is one of them and COPS
5	is a fairly, you know independent system by design.
6	MEMBER STETKAR: Okay.
7	MEMBER BONACA: I have one more question.
8	Is the methodology that you used, the analytical
9	tools, are they consistent with what you would have in
10	the mid-90s?
11	MR. STILLWELL: Yes.
12	MEMBER BONACA: Like cutting off sequences?
13	MR. STILLWELL: The tools are basically
14	updated CAFTA has been upgraded by EPRI, it's an
15	EPRI tool. GE used MAAP 3.0b and modified it for the
16	ABWR design and they called that model MAAP ABWR.
17	We actually developed a MAAP 4 model using
18	the best information we could get on fuel design, just
19	in the event we needed to evaluate a departure that
20	started to look like it was going to affect sequences
21	or timing on our Level 2 analysis.
22	But the codes and standards are basically
23	what we had then but they've been upgraded over the
24	years so we've used the latest versions.
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MEMBER BONACA: You don't expect that the 2 different methods made a difference much in the results?

MR. STILLWELL: Actually for some of the benchmarking, and correct me if I'm wrong, for the MAAP analysis, some of the results changed but not significantly and it was due to code changes in MAAP.

8 For the CAFTA, I am not sure that we could 9 say that there are any significant changes. We have 10 found things that they didn't see and we saw and they probably saw things that we didn't because CAFTA DOS 11 12 was a lot more difficult to work with than CAFTA Windows. 13

14 Windows makes it a lot easier to link systems and everything. You don't have a lot of funny 15 intermediate steps to transfer information through a 16 17 set of linked fault trees.

So I think the codes and standards have 18 19 helped us ,probably, an awful lot in recreating the model. 20

21 damage frequency results Okay. Core 22 compared favorably with that published in the DCD, actually what was published in the SSAR, we were 23 24 within one or two percent of the total, I believe, and

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1 on a sequence by sequence, or initiating event by 2 initiating event, some cases we were right on and in 3 some cases we were a couple of percent off or 4 fractions of a percent off.

So we feel that the exercise established that this model is consistent and coherent with the base model or the model that was described in the SSAR.

9 MEMBER CORRADINI: Well, stop right there. 10 Just to get back to -- Mario had a question and you 11 answered about if the profile changed significantly, 12 you would be in a grey area and you might have to 13 address it, so did any of the accident-sequence 14 ordering significantly change?

MR. STILLWELL: The ordering probably changed a little bit once you got down into it a little bit. But for the dominant sequences and the set of equipment that was important, it basically looked the same.

MEMBER CORRADINI: Okay.

21 MR. STILLWELL: Now, you could go to an 22 individual sequence and say, hey, this one jumped up 23 three or four; why? We could always find things like 24 that.

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MEMBER CORRADINI: But in terms of, I 1 understand it, contribution to 2 Ι quess, as the 3 cumulative CDF, the dominant sequence has remained --MR. STILLWELL: The dominant sequence for 4 5 the base model. Okay so we established that the base model PRA was about 1.76 times 10 to the minus seven. 6 7 Our model PRA, I think we got 1.77 but something like 8 that, so it's really close. 9 Okay, now follow me through this one 10 because it's really complicated and he still doesn't understand. 11 12 MEMBER ARMIJO: He is not alone. MR. STILLWELL: I think in the later stages 13 of developing the DCD, probably, or translating the 14 SSAR to the DCD, the NRC identified a significant, I 15 16 don't want to say error or oversight, in the modeling 17 of common-cause in the ABWR PRA. 18 If you have access to the Standard Safety 19 Analysis Report, in Chapter 19D.8, you see the results 20 of a sensitivity evaluation GE performed to talk about this oversight. 21 It turns out that they did not correctly 22 model or did not model correctly common-cause failure 23 24 of reactor service water, reactive building cooling **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

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water, high-pressure core flooder and RHR systems. Those aren't important.

(Laughter.)

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But when they did the sensitivity analysis and then they incorporated those common-cause failures in those mechanical systems, the core damage frequency that they calculated from the sensitivity runs was 30 percent higher than the core damage frequency that was reported in the Standard Safety Analysis Report. About 30 percent.

And they had a note that says the next time we change this model, we have got to incorporate this because, obviously the NRC knew about it. They are the ones that said, hey, you've got to fix this.

Okay so we have a note in 19D.8 of the SSAR that says update the PRA the next time we use this model to incorporate the fix for the commoncause.

19 So we had a PRA that is consistent with 20 the SSAR and we have an error that we have to fix that 21 identified during certification. Everybody was 22 accepted it and said it's not going to affect the conclusions but we had to get this error incorporated 23 24 into the model that we use for a base.

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So that bullet that says we incorporated 1 2 common-cause failure of those systems that were 3 identified in SSAR Appendix 19D.8 so we have a base model that has a core damage frequency of about 1.77 4 5 and I have a modified base model that incorporates a common-cause error or fixes a common-cause. 6 7 That PRA, if we go to the next, real fast 8 9 MEMBER STETKAR: Okay, I'll let you finish. 10 MR. STILLWELL: Go ahead. We'll call that the STP ABWR model. So that is the new base model that 11 12 incorporates a fix or correction to common-cause. 13 MEMBER STETKAR: In the S -- whatever you just called it, that thing. 14 15 MR. STILLWELL: Yes, sir. 16 MEMBER STETKAR: That now has common-cause 17 modeled correctly, what is the scope you -- recognize 18 I've never seen the SSAR PRA so I have no idea what in there and what was not in there and 19 Т was understand that the staff identified the fact that 20 21 failures should be evaluated common-cause for 22 nominally important equipment and it now has been input for nominally important equipment, does the STP 23 24 ABWR model include common-cause failures, а full

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common-cause failure analysis of all pumps, active valves and, let's start out with circuit breakers, or is it still a partial selected common-cause failure analysis?

MR. STILLWELL: The answer I guess, and bear with me, this PRA was started in the late 1980s and went through the early 90s so it's state of the art for the about 8 IPEEE vintage PRAs which was basically those components that are important are going to have pretty decent common-cause.

It does not have what I would call to get 11 12 to Dennis' point, a state of the art treatment of common-cause. What I would say in a PRA that we would 13 bring into the staff to support a risk-informed 14 15 application under the current rules.

16 MEMBER STETKAR: So it still has a partial 17 treatment --

18 MR. STILLWELL: Remove it back to -- it's a 19 partial treatment. It's a little bit better than what, 20 bringing in historical context, what we did in Zion and Indian Point but not quite as good as what we did 21 22 for Seabrook.

MEMBER STETKAR: Okay. Thanks.

MR. STILLWELL: Did that kind of answer the

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question?

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2	MEMBER STETKAR: Sort of, I am just trying
3	to get a sense of whether how much stuff has been
4	selectively added as a response to a specific staff
5	question recognizing also when that question arose in
6	the history of things, compared to what we would do
7	today on a clean slate in terms of the scope of
8	equipment-failure modes.

9 MR. STILLWELL: The PRA we are building to 10 satisfy current codes and standards will have all 11 active failure modes, all active equipment, breakers 12 included.

The PRA, the ABWR PRA would have the important equipment, the diesel generators, I was kind of surprised to see high-pressure core flooder in there but it made it in there.

MEMBER STETKAR: But not necessarily allpumps.

MR. STILLWELL: Not necessarily all, notnecessarily all ventilation systems.

21 MEMBER STETKAR: Yes, or valves, probably. 22 MR. STILLWELL: Valves they actually didn't 23 do a bad job on, I think they actually got the valves 24 pretty well but what got them was the pumps.

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1	MEMBER STETKAR: That helps.
2	MEMBER ARMIJO: So just one last thing.
3	MR. STILLWELL: Yes, sir.
4	MEMBER ARMIJO: You took corrected
5	deficiencies that were in the certification PRA,
6	right? You are syaing you did that and created the STP
7	Level 1 PRA.
8	MR. STILLWELL: Yes.
9	MEMBER ARMIJO: But then you but also
10	say that the STP PRA or the updated PRA is bounded by
11	the results of the original?
12	MR. STILLWELL: PRA.
13	MEMBER ARMIJO: Which had deficiencies.
14	MR. STILLWELL: And
15	MEMBER ARMIJO: So they had compensating
16	things? So I just don't understand; if the original
17	one had problems, why do you feel you need to be
18	bounded by the results of the original one?
19	MR. STILLWELL: Because they actually
20	performed sensitivity analysis in Chapter 19D.8 to
21	calculate the new core damage frequency. So that's why
22	I think we can say it's bounded. They actually did a
23	quantification of it.
24	MEMBER ARMIJO: Okay.
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MR. STILLWELL: They just didn't carry it 1 2 throughout the whole Chapter 19. Okay so they found an 3 error, they fixed the error, they showed how bad it 4 was. 5 MEMBER ARMIJO: And they have a number. MR. STILLWELL: And they have a number and 6 7 then they made a determination that there was no 8 reason to go back and update every place in the SSAR 9 where core damage frequency was talked about because 10 they didn't change any of its conclusions. MEMBER ARMIJO: Right and so you built your 11 12 thing and you found out your number was consistent or bounded by their number. 13 MR. STILLWELL: Our number was -- base-to-14 15 base or modified-to-modified we are bounded by the 16 original results, that the departures to be included 17 did not significantly affect any of the results. 18 Back to the original, next slide, previous 19 slide. Okay so the STP updated model accounts for the 20 departures and site-specific information that may 21 impact PRA results and now we go to the next slide. So when you look at this slide, what's 22 important is that STP APWR model is the base model 23 24 with common-cause corrected, as described in the **NEAL R. GROSS** 

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Standard Safety Analysis Report. The STP 3 and 4 1 departure model is the model that we used to validate 2 departures and has departures incorporated in it. So 3 that's, if you want to think of it as a site model or 4 5 something like that --MEMBER STETKAR: That is the model of 6 7 record for the COL application. MR. STILLWELL: It is the model we use for 8 9 the COL application. We have some issues with model of 10 record because model of record is the DCD PRA or something like that. 11 MR. HEAD: It is the one we are using to 12 evaluate departures. 13 MEMBER STETKAR: I forgot I'm not a lawyer. 14 15 MR. STILLWELL: Don't feel bad. 16 MEMBER BONACA: It is amazing that you came that close. 17 18 MR. STILLWELL: If you go to individual 19 sequences or initiating event frequencies, and the 20 reason I rounded it off is because it's really not any 21 significant change and I didn't want to spend a lot of 22 time talking about 2.62 versus 2.64. I'm sorry, at 10 to the minus 10, I don't 23 24 really care. **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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1	MEMBER BLEY: You pointed out
2	MEMBER ARMIJO: Station Blackout for half
3	an hour to two hours is the biggest one I can see.
4	MEMBER BLEY: You pointed out the things
5	that are common-cause. As far as the basic system
6	models that have matched up pretty well, are they
7	reasonably state-of-the-art kind of models?
8	MR. STILLWELL: Now, yes.
9	MEMBER BLEY: Okay.
10	MR. STILLWELL: It sounds like we are
11	criticizing what they did. They did a very good job
12	building a PRA, given codes and standards that existed
13	and the state of the art and in fact they went beyond
14	what most people were doing in the IPE and IPEEE.
15	So at the time that was a very good model.
16	It wasn't
17	MEMBER STETKAR: I am going to ask him
18	about a few of the departures and the statements that
19	are in Chapter 19 that might ferret out some of that
20	information so yes, I know he's got slides on
21	departures. Eventually we will get there.
22	MR. STILLWELL: The other column that is on
23	this table is, one of our COL action items was to
24	compare the Loss Of Offsite Power frequency and
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recovery to -- because it was generic, to what our current, what we have currently.

We are an ERCOT liability, reliability, Electric Reliability Council of Texas, right? Those of you that work with ERCOT or work in the industry realize ERCOT, we are basically an island, we don't sell power across state lines. We also have a fairly reliable grid, we think.

9 Using ERCOT data from NUREG, I forget exactly the 10 number, the latest loss of offsite frequency after the last Great Northeast Blackout, you 11 12 will see that with ERCOT data and Loss Of Offsite Power frequency and recoveries for the various causes, 13 we actually should see a significant decrease, or 14 15 significant, we see a change in core damage frequency 16 of about 20-plus percent.

So what they used originally was at leastconservative.

MEMBER STETKAR: Well you still retain, all you did is change ERCOT. You just changed grid data, you kept the switchyard and the plant-centered and the weather-related. You did; I checked the numbers.

MR. STILLWELL: Yes, we did.

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MEMBER BLEY: And for the others, looking,

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1	if you look at the LOOP, Loss Of Offsite Power
2	scenarios, that's where you'll see the different
3	MR. STILLWELL: Yes, everything else stayed
4	the same. The only thing we changed was associated
5	with grid stuff.
6	MEMBER BLEY: Oh it would be Station
7	Blackout.
8	MR. STILLWELL: Station Blackout. Okay
9	moving on, Chapter 19 content. I said Chapter 19
10	remains consistent with the format presented in the
11	Design Control Document. We added two new sections.
12	19.4S has to do with maintenance and it describes how
13	we are going to maintain the PRA that we have got to
14	have going forward that provides specific information
15	requested by Reg Guide 1.206.
16	We also added 19.1S, which as I said is
17	the roadmap between requirements of Reg Guide 1.206
18	for Chapter 19 and what the ABWR DCD has.
19	Chapter 19 includes departure information,
20	site-specific supplemental information, information on
21	COL license information items and information on COL
22	applicant safety issues, which are generic safety
23	issues, unresolved safety issues and things like that.
24	The next four or five slides are basically
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a summary of a lot of bookkeeping. Chapter 19.1, 1 2 purpose and summary. There were two departures; they 3 were editorial, primarily. They were editorial. Chapter 19.1S, as I mentioned, it's a map 4 5 from 1.206 to the DCD PRA, 19.2 is supplemental information. The important thing in 19.2 from a review 6 7 standpoint is that's where we present our screening 8 information for all the departures that we looked at. 9 if look at table 19.2 - 1,So you we 10 summarized all of the departures we looked at and described, if it had an effect, was it even talked 11 12 about in Chapter 19, if it had an effect, what we did about it and we summarized where the effect is talked 13 14 about in Chapter 19. 15 19.3 is internal-events analysis, it was 16 originally the summary. There's eight departures that basically affect words but they are departures for 17 18 things like grid grid, electric or not power 19 distribution changing from 6.9 to 4.16. But it's 20 primarily just text descriptions. 21 19.4 is external events and low-power 22 shutodwn. It's a summary section and there's an editorial departure. 23

Did you have anything specific you wanted

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1	to talk about?
2	MEMBER STETKAR: Keep going until you get
3	to 17.
4	MR. STILLWELL: Or can I go through these
5	fairly fast? 19.4S, plant-specific PRA, that satisfies
6	10 CFR 50.71(h).
7	19.5: source term sensitivity studies.
8	That describes sensitivity studies performed and
9	documented in 19E.3, I believe.
10	19.6 is measurement against goals. We have
11	an admin departure in 19.7 PRA it's a design tool,
12	four departures, primarily editorial.
13	19.8, important features identified by the
14	ABWR PRA, we have three departures, basically words.
15	19.9, COL License information items, 30
16	COL License information items, six departures to
17	account for departures in other sections of the Final
18	Safety Analysis Report.
19	19.4.10, assumptions and insights, systems
20	outside ABWR design control. One departure for the
21	Reactor Service Water Pump House.
22	19.11, human action overview, four
23	departures and we picked up a significant human action
24	in 19.11 and we talk about it in more in 19R for
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1	external flood and it's verify that the flood doors
2	are closed.
3	The description in the COL says it's
4	closed for the flood doors but in response to
5	discussions with the NRC, we have now very the doors
6	are closed, the doors are not closed.
7	MEMBER SIEBER: The shutting of the doors.
8	MR. STILLWELL: Sorry?
9	MEMBER SIEBER: Is that one? The shutting
10	of the doors.
11	MR. STILLWELL: What we have done is
12	modified the request for additional information in
13	response to the doors will be closed and embarked on a
14	more detailed flood analysis to support our position
15	that the doors can be opened.
16	But right now the COLA has been modified
17	in the RAI response to say the doors are closed.
18	MEMBER SIEBER: Okay.
19	19.11, human action overview, we just
20	talked about.
21	19.12, input to the Design Reliability
22	Assurance Program, that was actually IBR, incorporate
23	by reference, so we made no changes to that.
24	MEMBER STETKAR: Bill, on that, I will
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interrupt you hear rather than waiting. On the 1 2 Reliability Assurance Program, we haven't seen Chapter 3 17 yet. MR. STILLWELL: Yes, you have. In March. 4 5 MEMBER STETKAR: Okay, well, we've seen Chapter 17, then. One of us has completely forgotten 6 7 it. 8 At what level, the question I had, which I 9 should know but I didn't actually go back and look for 10 it, is, at what level of detail is your Reliability Assurance Program specified. Is it by system, by train 11 12 within a system, by individual component, by specific failure mode for individual component? 13 MR. STILLWELL: The answer is yes. 14 15 MEMBER STETKAR: Okay. 16 STILLWELL: Basically it depends on MR. 17 what the system is. It's some cases it's at system 18 level. 19 MEMBER STETKAR: But it is down to the 20 level of detail of individual -- for some equipment. 21 MR. STILLWELL: For some equipment it 22 actually goes down to failure mode. And in fact one of the open items that we are going to talk about today 23 24 talks about a question that you raised when we did **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS

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present DRAP on how do you get the information before 1 2 construction. 3 We had a very good discussion about it. MEMBER STETKAR: I'm sure we did. 4 19.13, 5 MR. STILLWELL: some of your insights came from the PRA, two departures in the 6 7 external flood. 8 19A is a response to the CPML rule, 10 CFR 9 50.34. One departure having to do with hydrogen 10 recombiner elimination and that was an editorial 11 departure. 12 19B, resolution of unresolved safety issues and generic safety issues, I had two departures 13 14 that were primarily editorial, that were editorial. If 15 I say primarily editorial, I really mean editorial. is design conditions for reducing 16 19C sabotage and that was incorporate by reference and it 17 18 was not originally part of the DCD. They had to refer 19 to the Standard Safety Analysis Report, which in turn said this is proprietary, security-related information 20 21 it was a separate report, just and historical 22 background. 19D, and this is where everybody gets 23 24 confused. That's where all the documentation to the **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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PRA is, but it's not part of the DCD. You have to 1 2 refer to the SSAR if you want to see fault trees and 3 event trees and operator actions and data and all sorts of good stuff. It's all in 19D. 4 5 MEMBER STETKAR: But has the SSAR been updated to document your -- whatever you called it, 6 7 ABWR fault trees and event trees which --8 MR. STILLWELL: No, SSAR is a GE document. 9 MEMBER STETKAR: Okay. 10 MR. STILLWELL: What we have done is document what we did and then the changes we made to 11 12 evaluate departure. So we have model documentation that evaluated --13 STETKAR: 14 MEMBER But that model 15 documentation is only available for staff audit in 16 your offices, is that right? 17 STILLWELL: It's actually down MR. the 18 road. 19 MEMBER STETKAR: But it's not in any --20 MR. STILLWELL: No it's not --MEMBER STETKAR: Published --21 22 MR. STILLWELL: It's not. 23 MEMBER STETKAR: Document that we have. 24 MR. STILLWELL: It's not been formally NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

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1	transmitted. What we've done is make it available for
2	staff audit.
3	MEMBER STETKAR: Okay.
4	MR. STILLWELL: It's three blocks or four
5	blocks that way, whichever way it is.
6	MEMBER BLEY: Here in Washington?
7	MR. STILLWELL: In Washington. In
8	Westinghouse's office.
9	CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: So would a Subsequent
10	COLA be able to reference your modified base model?
11	MR. STILLWELL: I don't know how to answer
12	that question. I guess I would ask Steve Frantz to
13	answer it. That goes outside of anything I'm familiar
14	with.
15	MR. FRANTZ: There are statements in the
16	FSAR which are standard statements that a Subsequent
17	COLA could reference and presumably under the one-
18	time, one-review, one-result role the staff has, it
19	would not go back and look at that information again
20	unless there was a different departure or unless there
21	were different site-specific information.
22	And then that applicant would need to come
23	up with its own evaluation or that departure or that
24	site-specific information.
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1	CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: So they have to start
2	sort of plowing that ocean one more time.
3	MR. FRANTZ: They may have to depending.
4	There's a lot of ways to look at the evaluation, do
5	you evaluate departures or do you evaluate site-
6	specific information, it may be able to do a
7	qualitative analysis, they maybe have to do some kind
8	of quantitative analysis. They would not necessarily
9	have to go back and regenerate a PRA. There are other
10	ways of looking at departures.
11	MR. HEAD: There is obviously business
12	decisions and licensing decisions associated with all
13	of that so, you know
14	CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: I am just trying to
15	see how consistent what you've done is with the, sort
16	of, the original intent of the process, with you being
17	as the lead COLA application and then a Subsequent
18	COLA coming back.
19	MR. HEAD: That's part of the business and
20	underlying strategy that I think we're consistent
21	absolutely with that. I mean, we evaluated our
22	departures and, if someone wants to follow on with,
23	you know, our you know, the Toshiba approach then
24	we are set up clearly right now to do that, so.

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1	CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: Okay. Please proceed.
2	MR. STILLWELL: Then we get down to 19E
3	which were primarily Level 2 and consequence analysis
4	evaluations, an awful lot of sensitivity evaluations
5	with the MAAP ABWR code.
6	19F, next page, in 19FA, were containment
7	ultimate strengths. Those were incorporated by
8	reference
9	19G was not used therefore it was
10	incorporated by reference.
11	19H and 19I describe the seismic capacity
12	analysis and the seismic margins analysis to support
13	screening of seismic the screening that was
14	performed to support the seismic margins assessment.
15	19J was not used. 19K is PRA-based
16	reliability and maintenance. That's basically
17	describing the inputs and how the original DRAP tables
18	or Table 19K.4 were developed.
19	The DRAP tables in 19K were a combination
20	of Level 1 quantification, Level 2 quantification,
21	low-power shutdown insights, not really
22	quantification, fire screening insights, flood
23	screening insights, seismic screening insights.
24	So it's not entirely quantitative, it's
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quantitative and qualitative, which is what it probably should be for a Reliability Assurance Programs. We have maintained that consistent so we've got, we actually added components to the Reliability Assurance Program, the external flood doors, for instance, in another site-specific supplement.

7 But we have also maintained the Table and that's what we are evaluating right now. In reference 8 9 to your question, we have got the expert panel for 10 Design Reliability Assurance meeting, well, three or four times a year. We've had three now and we are 11 12 actually starting the process of evaluating, at a high level, systems and going down to components in an 13 expert panel. 14

And when we get to the open-item closure, we will talk about that a little bit more.

17 19L is ABWR shutdown-risk evaluation and
18 it goes along with 19Q, QA, QB, QC.

19 19M is fire protection where we document20 the results of the fire screening assessment.

19N is the analysis of common-cause
failure of essential communications. That has one
departure, the departure -- Tier 1 departure for I&C.
One thing you will see in here, we

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originally thought that was going to be a very big deal in the PRA, but because of the way it was analyzed in the original PRA and the fact that we really don't have a design because we are designing the system as we speak, there was no change to what was included in the PRA or what was modeled in the PRA.

So if you think of it as a black box in the original PRA we still have the same black box, we just changed some of the names. It had a little bit more detail than a black box. It wasn't a single number. But it's not -- it didn't change as a result of the I&C departure.

14 19P is evaluation of potential 15 modifications and that's got a pretty good discussion 16 of the steps that GE performed during certification to 17 add, to modify the design based on PRA insights, if 18 you are interested.

19 19Q, QA, QB, QC, describe the low-power 20 shutdown analysis and 19R is the probabilistic 21 flooding assessment. There we have five departures: 22 the external flood assessment, the Reactor Service Water Pump House flood assessment and the reevaluation 23 24 the control room flood assessment and that's of

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probably where most of the actual PRA work was done 1 2 during the flood assessment: the two buildings and the 3 external flood. Questions so far? 4 5 You said you had a question on a specific chapter? 6 7 MEMBER STETKAR: No, keep going. 8 MR. HEAD: That was 17, I think. 9 MR. STILLWELL: Okay. Departures, with the 10 exception of technical specification editorial departures, all of the departures for STP 3 and 4 were 11 12 evaluated within the context of the PRA. So the screening and evaluation process was consistent with 13 14 that described in Reg Guide 1.206 C.III.1.19 and it basically describes the five or six step process that 15 16 says you identify the departure, you map the departure 17 to a specific element, you see if it actually changes 18 something, is it just description, and if it actually 19 changes something then you have to evaluate it using 20 the PRA. 21 basically the So that's process we 22 followed. We had 13 Tier 1 departures, one Tier 2\* departure involving codes and standards, a Tier 2 23

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departure on technical specifications, pardon me, nine

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1	Tier 2 technical specification departures and one Tier
2	2 analysis method.
3	The reason I have mentioned those is all
4	of those require prior NRC approval.
5	MEMBER BLEY: The Tier 2 ones, too?
6	MR. STILLWELL: The Tier 2 codes and
7	Tier 2 codes and standards, Tier 2 technical
8	specifications.
9	MEMBER BLEY: Yes, Tier 2* but Tier 2 does
10	not I believe.
11	MR. HEAD: If you do the analysis and it
12	needs NRC approval it it needs
13	MR. STILLWELL: Technical specifications
14	analysis methods require NRC approval.
15	MEMBER BLEY: Okay.
16	MR. STILLWELL: The rest of the Tier 2, we
17	had 127 other Tier 2 departures and we have a site-
18	specific information change. By that I mean GE in the
19	original DCD described a conceptual ultimate heat sink
20	that was a pond some distance away from the plant.
21	We actually have a basin with cooling
22	towers so the design is significantly different.
23	That's among other things site-specific information
24	that had to be included.
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Eleven of the departures and the information change did not pass the initial screen. The initial screen in our case was it's not even mentioned I can throw it away. It's mentioned but it's only words, okay I can probably throw those away, I talk about the words but those screen very quickly; it is mentioned but it has no significant effect.

Well, those, mentioned but no significant 8 9 effect we basically kept for I have got to do 10 something with it, let's look at them. So that's the 11 11. As a result of the departures there is no 12 significant change to the PRA results presented in the DCD. 13

14 So we basically say we are consistent with 15 what was described in the DCD, including the site-16 specific information so there are no significant 17 changes therefore we feel that what is described in 18 Chapter 19 we are pretty safe in saying there is, we 19 don't have to go back and change a lot of stuff about 20 sequences and what's significant and things like that 21 that Reg Guide 1.206 allows us that flexibility.

Next slide. How am I doing for time?
 Departures requiring further review.
 Departure Tier 1 2.4-1, residual heat removal and

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spent fuel pool cooling. What that did, the original design residual heat removal provided backup cooling for spent fuel in two trains. The departure adds a third train capability for RHR. It gives us additional flexibility in shutdown scheduling maintenance with RHRs spent fuel pool cooling. Has no effect, just additional redundancy.

Standard departure Tier 1 2.4-3, RCIC according to what used to be the WIR design, now it's the TWL design, table and water lubricated design.

It turns out it has a minor effect because we got rid of things like lubrication system, oil lubrication systems, barometric condensers, the things associated with steam seals. But based on data we got, we were able to collect from operating plants that have actually installed the turbine and auxiliary feedwater.

We don't have enough data to warrant changing failure rates but it tends to support, we expect to see a decrease in start reliability and a decrease in unavailability associated with maintenance.

> MEMBER BLEY: Decrease in reliability? MR. STILLWELL: Decrease in unreliability.

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1	MEMBER BLEY: Unreliability.
2	MR. STILLWELL: Increase in reliability,
3	decrease in unavailability. Than, you for catching
4	that.
5	MEMBER STETKAR: Bill.
6	MR. STILLWELL: Yes sir.
7	MEMBER STETKAR: Now we are going to slow
8	down and you tell me when to stop.
9	MR. STILLWELL: Please go ahead.
10	MEMBER STETKAR: In addition to just
11	swapping out the RCIC turbine and you know taking out
12	some of those support systems, the design change also
13	made a change to the steam admission system.
14	MR. STILLWELL: Yes sir.
15	MEMBER STETKAR: It used to have a small
16	steam admission bypass valve that had to open and then
17	the main steam admission valve opened. Did the
18	original PRA model those valves in series, that valve
19	number one had to open and then valve number two had
20	to open, or were they parallel steam supplies such
21	that the current single valve opening would be a much
22	higher unreliability for start.
23	Because now a one out of one valve needs
24	to open rather than a one out of two. I saw no mention
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of that for example in the discussion of this. All of 1 the mention was on how much better the turbine is and 2 3 you have removed support systems. MR. STILLWELL: We have removed support 4 5 equipment, yes. MEMBER STETKAR: What about the 6 steam 7 admission system? MR. STILLWELL: We did not change the steam 8 9 admission modeling. 10 MEMBER STETKAR: Oh. Okay so you did not check the difference on that part of the design 11 12 change. 13 MR. STILLWELL: No. MEMBER STETKAR: Okay. You are going to 14 15 hear a lot of this. Keep going. 16 MR. STILLWELL: Okay. We are prepared to 17 talk about steam admission. 18 MEMBER STETKAR: I am sure you are. 19 MR. STILLWELL: Later today kind. Safety-20 related I&C architecture. We talked about its text 21 changes associated with going from multiplexes to 22 whatever we had. Departure Tier 1 5.0-1 site parameters, it 23 24 gave us the site design basis external flood from a **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

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reservoir breach.

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2	Departure 5.4-1 reactor water clean-up. It
3	actually increased the heat removal capacity of the
4	system. Instead of 250 percent pumps and heat exchange
5	we now have 200 percent faster systems. It makes a
6	slight difference in shutdown cooling scenarios but
7	not enough to quantify and it was actually credited in
8	some of the at power core damage sequences but not
9	early. So it has an insignificant effect. We actually
10	didn't include it in the model.
11	6C1
12	MEMBER STETKAR: I'm sorry Bill, I am
13	talking out of the side of my mouth here. You said
14	reactor water cleanup was sort of modeled or not?
15	MR. STILLWELL: It's modeled in low power
16	shutdown but it has no significant effect. Basically
17	it increases
18	MEMBER BLEY: Don't you take credit for it
19	for makeup for full power?
20	MR. STILLWELL: They talk about it for
21	makeup and it may have actually been modeled but it
22	didn't ever make it to the list of significant
23	sequences and because it is not good enough in the
24	short term.
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1	MEMBER STETKAR: Let me, is there a fault
2	tree in the Level 1 PRA model today for the reactor
3	water cleanup system?
4	MR. STILLWELL: I am not sure if there's a
5	fault tree. I believe there's an operator action.
6	Because the operator
7	MEMBER STETKAR: The pumps are perfect?
8	MR. STILLWELL: No, the operator has to
9	basically line things up and bypass heat exchanges. So
10	you take credit for decay heat removal. You have got
11	to bypass the resins or everything. We could check on
12	that but
13	MEMBER STETKAR: The increase in capacity
14	of the pumps is such that they could have one pump,
15	one out of two pumps running instead of whatever so
16	that would change the number of running pumps and
17	change the model but
18	MR. STILLWELL: And it's not significant.
19	MEMBER BLEY: So if it is only an operator
20	action I am assuming that the quantification of
21	operator action is high enough that you
22	MR. STILLWELL: Oh they use screening of
23	values and in general it's 0.1 in real close to that.
24	It's similar to what we've done with condensate that
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operator action is actually a little model but it doesn't significantly affect anything because operator action dominates it and in this case, because of the timing and what we have to do I am pretty sure it's dominated by operator action. Low power shutdown, it just didn't make a difference because it was a backup to a backup to a backup. But we will check.

8 Containment debris protection of ECCS 9 strainers, they are actually model strainers but 10 there's no effect based on what we are talking about 11 because we are not crediting strainers' operation in 12 extreme core damage sequences.

13Plant medium voltage electrical system14design.

15 MEMBER BLEY: Say that last one again, what 16 does that mean?

MR. STILLWELL: It means --

18 MEMBER BLEY: Are you not counting the 19 chance the strainers could plug?

20 MR. STILLWELL: No, they don't, we don't 21 look --22 MEMBER BLEY: You don't use them?

23 MR. STILLWELL: We don't use them at that 24 point. The strainers, if we have extreme core damage

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the strainers are useless. The only way I can get there is if I don't have core cooling systems. So at that point, that's not even in the model.

MEMBER BLEY: Okay.

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MR. STILLWELL: Plant medium voltage electrical system design. Going from 6.9kV to 13.8 and 4160. Coming down to primarily being code exchanges although we did have some minor PRA modeling effects because we had additional breakers from the combustion time regenerated to the Class 1E systems.

9.2-5, reactor service water system. That was conceptually it's the same system as described in the DCD, in truth this system is now in a pump house that is below the ultimate heat sink. Because of the change of the location in the pump house we also changed the design of reactor service water system.

The pump house is a lot closer to the control room than the conceptual design described in the DCD so inside the DCD they had limits of length of piping and it related to control building flooding in the basement for the reactor building cooling white heat exchanges.

Our system is a lot closer but we are also gravity head rather than siphon. So that we had to

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redo the control building flood analysis and get rid 1 2 of things like vacuum breakers and RSW system. 3 9.5-7, Fire protection, the system 4 described in the DCD is for a single unit site. We 5 have a shared fire protection system for two units and that's probably been one of the more interesting 6 7 issues we have had with the NRC staff in evaluating the shared fire protection system in the context of 8 9 Chapter 19. 10 Departure 19.3-1 is actually the departure we identified to incorporate the error the common-11 12 cause described in 19DA. So it's not really a change to the design but it's a way we had of getting it into 13 14 the COLA to say we had to do something with it. 15 And departure 19R-1 is an actual RSW pump house redesign but we had to go in and evaluate RSW 16 17 pump house internal flooding. 18 And for your information the RSW pump 19 house, pumps are about elevation 10, the ultimate heat 20 sink, basin height is about 85, and control building 21 basement is about -30, -35, so we have got a pretty 22 good head going from the ultimate heat sink down through the pump house. 23 24 The house is three pump separate

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divisions, each division is essentially watertight top to bottom.

3 MEMBER STETKAR: Bill, before you flip the 4 slide I need to get a few of the bugs that have been 5 bothering me. The first thing that I did when I started to look at Chapter 19, you had this really 6 7 well documented table 19.2-2 that systematically goes 8 through each departure from the standard design and 9 identifies what the departure is and summarizes the 10 potential effect on the PRA.

So I started to think about if I was going to have a PRA for a BWR and not having ever seen this PRA, which of these departures might affect something in the models that I would have. Then I went through that exercise and I was bothered by several of the conclusions.

17 You summarized the things that you looked 18 at. I'm a little bothered by the things that have been 19 just dismissed. The first one, I'll mention a couple, 20 but the first one is you've added a fourth division, a fourth division of instrument power and reorganized 21 22 things to be supplied from that fourth division of power and the conclusion for that change to the plant 23 24 that there is "no quantifiable effect on the is

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1	model."
2	What does that mean? Does it mean that it
3	was never modeled at all?
4	MR. STILLWELL: The power supply we are
5	talking about is actually for distributed instrument
6	control. It's not instrument power. They always had
7	four channels of instrument power.
8	MEMBER STETKAR: Okay.
9	MR. STILLWELL: It was an instrument it
10	wasn't quite the same thing. It's non-safety.
11	MR. HEACOCK: Let me clarify this. I'm
12	Evans Heacock, with South Texas. What we added was a
13	non-safety, non-UPS backed instrument power system for
14	maintenance purpose so that if we did need to take out
15	some of our UPS systems we would not drop our
16	instrumentation on our fourth division so it's a, it's
17	diesel-backed but it's not UPS-backed.
18	The UPS-backed channel four always existed
19	and still exists. What we did was make it consistent
20	with divisions 1, 2, 3 and we just added a fourth.
21	Divisions 1, 2 and 3 already had this power. We just
22	added one more.
23	MEMBER STETKAR: So it's not, I guess I
24	must have misinterpreted then.
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table wasn't MR. STILLWELL: The real 1 2 clear. We responded and we had an RAI response where 3 we went in and cleaned up the words because it wasn't real clear in the table. So I'm glad you're asking 4 5 about this. MEMBER STETKAR: Let me ask about a couple 6 7 of others then that might be a little easier. Turbine building closed cooling water, is it modeled in the 8 9 PRA? 10 MR. STILLWELL: It's modeled, it's discussed in Chapter 19 and analyzed as part of the 11 12 turbine building flood. Is it modeled in the PRA? MEMBER STETKAR: Is it modeled as a support 13 system for the feedwater and condensate systems? 14 MR. STILLWELL: Off the top of my head I 15 don't think so. They didn't go into that level of 16 17 detail. 18 MEMBER STETKAR: They didn't model а 19 cooling water system? How important is feedwater and 20 condensate? 21 STILLWELL: The system function is MR. 22 important to their support systems. They didn't credit turbine development -- if the initiating event was 23 24 support system driven, they didn't credit condensate **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS

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1	and feedwater.
2	MEMBER STETKAR: No, no, no, no.
3	MR. STILLWELL: That's basically how they
4	handled it.
5	MEMBER STETKAR: Don't dance around too
6	much. How important is feedwater and condensate for
7	mitigation of LOCAs and transients?
8	MR. STILLWELL: They are risk significant,
9	the functions are risk significant.
10	MEMBER STETKAR: If turbine building closed
11	cooling water failed would those systems fail?
12	MR. STILLWELL: They would fail.
13	MEMBER STETKAR: Okay. S
14	MR. STILLWELL: And it's a support system
15	initiated
16	MEMBER STETKAR: Is turbine building closed
17	cooling water modeled in the do you have a fault
18	tree model for turbine building closed cooling water
19	and turbine building service water in the PRA?
20	MR. STILLWELL: I don't know. What they did
21	was handle it by initiating event. So they
22	MEMBER STETKAR: That's okay. I can
23	understand the initiating event part of it. I am
24	worried about the other 99 percent of the events that
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1	don't, aren't caused by that initiating event. It's
2	why you model electric power you know, and all of the
3	other support systems in a PRA.
4	MR. STILLWELL: Let me see if I can
5	rephrase your question. You are asking if we have
6	modeled turbine building
7	MEMBER STETKAR: Do you have a fault tree
8	for?
9	MR. STILLWELL: No.
10	MEMBER STETKAR: Okay.
11	MR. STILLWELL: Basically, what I said was
12	if the initiating was loss of support for turbine
13	building auxiliaries, they didn't credit feed and
14	condensate.
15	MEMBER STETKAR: I understand what you did.
16	I'm just trying to find out how come what I'm
17	trying to do, Bill, is try to find out how complete,
18	not knowing anything about the SS the original,
19	years-ago models, trying to infer how complete those
20	models were and whether or not your conclusions
21	there are several conclusions that you draw that says
22	not important, no effect on the PRA, not modeled, not
23	quantifiable.
24	All of those types of terms lead me to
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believe that the thing that has changed from the certified design to the current design has not been evaluated either because it was never in the PRA, so the delta is zero because something that is not there can't have a change, even though it might be worse, it could be worse today.

MR. STILLWELL: If I model it in detail. Yes.

9 MEMBER STETKAR: Or is it, did you actually 10 look at it and conclude that there was really no 11 difference, you know, which means it is in the PRA and 12 really the design change is an insignificant design 13 change.

Because we are looking at deltas and you 14 15 talk about 10 percent differences on a couple of times 10 to the minus seven number, it's pretty easy to get 16 17 one of those, especially if something hasn't been 18 modeled and you now look at the current design and say 19 well, what is the real risk contribution from the 20 thing that was never modeled before, which was you know, infinitely optimistic. 21

22 MR. STILLWELL: I agree, but it was the 23 state of the art -- the only thing I can go back to is 24 it was state of the art in the `90s, we didn't go into

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1	that level of detail for turbine auxiliaries.
2	Currently we do, I will give you
3	MEMBER STETKAR: We who?
4	MR. STILLWELL: We, industry in general. In
5	IPEEEs. We didn't have an awful lot of detail for
6	balance of plant support systems.
7	MEMBER BLEY: Oh but some people did.
8	MR. STILLWELL: Some people did but
9	industry in general did not.
10	MEMBER BLEY: That's probably true.
11	MR. STILLWELL: So that's why I say
12	feedwater and condensate was almost a black box. It
13	did have a rudimentary model for feedwater and
14	condensate but it was
15	MEMBER STETKAR: That is what I was going
16	to ask. You have added condensate booster pumps. Is
17	there a fault tree now for the feedwater and
18	condensate system?
19	MR. STILLWELL: We have included a
20	feedwater and condensate fault tree but it was or-ed
21	with an operator action so condensate booster pumps we
22	looked at it in terms of, gee we had condensate pumps
23	adding condensate booster pumps when I need one out of
24	four or-ed with an operator action point one has no
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significant effect.

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2 MEMBER STETKAR: Or-ed with an operator 3 action of point one for what, the system is normally 4 running so for transience and --

MR. STILLWELL: Restoring condensate.

MR. STILLWELL: I need one out of four.

6 MEMBER STETKAR: For restoring condensate 7 but for events when it's normally running, adding the 8 condensate booster pumps makes it less reliable. How 9 much I don't know. I mean, you know, it's 10 percent, 10 I don't know if it's 10 percent, two percent --

12 MEMBER STETKAR: Okay I have said enough. I 13 just wanted to get a few things --

MR. STILLWELL: Okay.

15 MEMBER STETKAR: I have about 15 pages of 16 these but we don't have time to go through item by 17 item --

MEMBER BLEY: I guess, though there are things that we would model carefully today and I am still at this, you know, we are in an uncomfortable spot and we are in that with all of the design certs and COLs where we don't have a PRA of the kind we are normally used to seeing.

MEMBER STETKAR: That is true, but on the

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other hand there's very little, there's nothing that we can do today about the PRA that was approved for the certified design. There's nothing that we can do about that. That is beyond our control.

It could be whatever it was. However at the current moment there have been changes made to that design that should be evaluated within the context of a PRA and there have been conclusions made about the relative risk effects from those changes to the design.

And in my opinion at least is if the old PRA had a known deficiency in it that didn't model that thing and didn't give me the capability to even evaluate that change in the design, that seems to be an issue that we could at least think about in this stage in the game.

I don't know. Perhaps a lawyer would
differ with that opinion, but --

19MEMBER BLEY: I mean it's pretty generic20and most of the others we have seen, it's a pass-21through when you come here and it's an awkward spot.

But I agree with you that there's certainly, we're not getting a real evaluation of the effect of the changes against a PRA that could measure

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MEMBER STETKAR: In the places where the PRA can measure them I think we are getting that effect of the change but where the PRA can't, you are left, that discomfort about --

MEMBER BLEY: And it's a discomfort and I don't know if it would be, let me ask you, are you arguing that it would be reasonable to require the PRAs to be improved enough to evaluate the changes? If you do that, then why not make the PRA a whole lot better?

12 MEMBER STETKAR: Well I think that's a stretch but having a bit more confidence that the work 13 14 that's been done, remember, our sort of independent 15 input process here, that the work that has been done by the staff and their audits of this process, and the 16 17 work that has been done by the applicant to actually reasonable 18 through that process, provides run 19 assurance that the things that they have discounted as 20 having, you know, no effect or something that couldn't 21 be quantified but by implication is insignificant, 22 indeed that there is reasonable justification for 23 that.

24

I mean that's sort of the concern, how

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I'm not advocating, you know, doing a full 1 you, upgrade to the PRA but kind of questioning about how 2 3 do we have assurance that that process and the staff's 4 admitted audit of that process indeed has been okay. 5 MEMBER BLEY: Let go back to the me qualitative way you justified --6 7 MEMBER RAY: Before you do that can I ask 8 you another question? John, are you certified that the 9 things that were included in the PRA as certified and 10 which now are changed are being adequately --MEMBER STETKAR: Yes. 11 12 MEMBER RAY: Evaluated. MEMBER STETKAR: Yes. 13 MEMBER RAY: You said you were but I am 14 15 just asking the question again. 16 MEMBER STETKAR: Yes I am. Yes. For the 17 record, yes. Because reading, not having seen any 18 numbers and not having seen any models but at least 19 reading, and you know, it seemed to make sense, the 20 conclusions that they drew and indeed they identified 21 things like the external flood that you know, were 22 something very site-specific. the other hand, there are several 23 On other, the vast majority of the departures have been 24 **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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basically screened out on bases that it's not clear to me whether they are simplistic qualitative bases or whether there was actual you know, some type of analysis performed to conclude that something was insignificant.

MEMBER BLEY: But if we had seen an RAI on one of these issues and a thorough, qualitative argument came back explaining why it wouldn't, that would be different from what we have now.

10 MEMBER STETKAR: That's right. That's why 11 in my notes several of the things that I originally 12 came up with said "resolved" because indeed, I saw a 13 few RAIs that did that.

But I didn't see an awful lot of --

15 MEMBER BLEY: So this is as much a, you know, a criticism when the staff gets up here. I juts 16 17 wanted to sort of get feedback from you. Because I had 18 difficulty understanding when it says no quantifiable 19 effect or not modeled. I was trying to understand what 20 context you are dealing with to evaluate those 21 lot changes. There were а of those that are 22 characterized that way.

23 MR. STILLWELL: One of the later RAI 24 responses I believe was in January, we went through

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1	and modified Table 19.2-1 completely and also included
2	a white paper that described the screening process.
3	So that RAI response, we took, I hope we
4	took, particular pains to make sure that if I said
5	that it screened this is what the words mean. So if
6	I say it's not in the PRA, it's not describing Chapter
7	19 any place.
8	If I said it is an editorial only, this is
9	what those mean and we kind of parse them out to what
10	at least, in terms of numbers, which ones went with
11	what text.
12	So it's a little bit cleaner if you look
13	at the comments at the end, when I say no quantifiable
14	effect, this is what it meant. Or if I said
15	MEMBER STETKAR: Yes, I had a sense that
16	there was some sort of code words in there
17	MR. STILLWELL: So the white paper
18	describes this in a lot more detail and like I say, I
19	think it was an RAI response from early January. We
20	can get the letter number to you.
21	MEMBER BLEY: I think that would be
22	helpful. That would help me.
23	MEMBER STETKAR: That would help.
24	MEMBER BLEY: Because I didn't see it in
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the SER but then staff summarizes your responses so 1 2 that might be the kind of thing that --3 MR. STILLWELL: We will get you the letter 4 number. 5 MR. HEAD: After the break we will provide that. 6 MEMBER STETKAR: Or the staff can give it 7 8 to us. 9 MR. STILLWELL: We have got it. I've got it 10 on the computer. 11 CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: Let's proceed. We are 12 quite a bit behind schedule but that's okay. MR. STILLWELL: We got through all of the 13 departures, the information change on the ultimate 14 15 heat sink. It's not a significant change in that it didn't affect core damage frequency by 10 percent. 16 17 change obviously, it's Ιt was а an increase, before we had a pond, now we have cooling 18 19 tower fans. 20 The fans were included in the design reliability assurance program. 21 22 The ultimate heat sink design, again, we've got a cooling tower for each unit. There's three 23 24 normally operating trains or divisions, there's two NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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1	fans in each division, one fan is normally operating
2	support plan operation.
3	In addition the ultimate heat sink has a
4	30-day water supply with no makeup for post-LOCA
5	conditions.
6	MEMBER STETKAR: And just for the record
7	Bill, in the PRA now the ultimate heat sink is modeled
8	explicitly, it has the fans and pumps?
9	MR. STILLWELL: Yes, yes. The Reactor
10	Service Water pump house, before it was a standard
11	lakeside pump house, it went over the dyke wall, there
12	was a problem with siphoning and they had a limit on
13	the number of meters return and supply to this control
14	building flood height.
15	Now the Reactor Building Service Water
16	pump house is adjacent to the ultimate heat sink. It's
17	actually below-grade or the basement is at 10 feet.
18	Three normally operating trains or
19	divisions, two pumps per train and again one pump per
20	train is normally operating to support plant
21	operations so key in this one is Reactor Service
22	Water, ultimate heat sink and reactor building cooling
23	water are three operating divisions. They operate
24	continuously, which is somewhat different than

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normally operating BWRs where those safety systems are 1 2 on standby. 3 Other insights, and now we get into the 4 next thing that people want to talk about. Main

5 cooling reservoir breach. It goes into design basis flood height. If anybody has ever gotten Google Earth and looked at South Texas you can see this really 8 impressive stock tank. It's a feature you can see from space.

10 Core damage frequency for the design basis flood is on the same order of magnitude as internal 11 12 events core damage frequency, so it is by 10 to the minus seven. And we are working through that. 13

Per the ASME standard, we feel that this 14 15 flood would screen. ASME standard, it gives me three criteria for screening external events except for fire 16 17 and seismic.

18 The first one is if you satisfy the 19 standard review plan NUREG-0800, so that the plan is 20 designed and meets the requirements of the standard review plan as described in NUREG-0800, you can screen 21 22 that external event.

That lets you screen things like aircraft 23 24 crashes turbine missiles from external events or

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The second criterion has to do with core 3 damage frequency if you can show -- pardon me, initiating event frequency -- if you can show 5 initiating event frequency is less than 10 to the minus five, they assume that conditional core damage probability is at least 0.1 or less so that external event could screen. 8

9 And the third would be a total core damage 10 frequency of 10 to the minus six. Now that's ASME standard. Reg Guide 1.200 I think it's Revision 2, it 11 12 was issued March of 2009 and modified slightly in July of 2009, because it has a slightly different eternal 13 14 events screening criteria for new plants and it's 15 words to the effect it has got to be commensurate --16 basically it's commensurate with the, new plants have 17 a lower core damage frequency and having a 10 to the 18 minus six screening criteria with a 10 to the minus 19 seven core damage frequency doesn't make a lot of 20 sense.

21 So Reg Guide 1.200, the new words say, is 22 it's got to be commensurate or something like that with core damage frequency. It didn't really say a new 23 24 criterion, it just says you've got to be aware of what

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your core damage frequency for internal events is and make sure that what you're screening is consistent with that criteria.

So ASME standard Reg Guide 1.200 is 4 5 slightly apart but I'm sure that's going to be resolved soon. So per the ASME standard we screen 6 7 because we satisfy the SRP criteria which is also 8 consistent with Reg Guide 1.200 and the core damage 9 frequency is low. It's on the same order of magnitude 10 as the internal events core damage frequency.

Insights, the external flood doors are in the reliability assurance program. Obviously we want those doors to be capable of performing their function. And we have a main control room action to verify the doors are closed.

And as I mentioned we had a discussion and a path forward for this open item just to close those external flood doors while we pursue a detailed riskbased or probabilistic-based flood analysis for the reservoir breach. I have been advocating for 20 years.

21 MR. HEAD: This reservoir breach is a 22 design basis --

23 MR. STILLWELL: This is the design basis24 reservoir breach. Questions?

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1	CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: Please continue.
2	MR. STILLWELL: Other insights, we are
3	close to the Gulf of Mexico, we are about 12 miles
4	away. Safety-related structures in South Texas are
5	designed for tornadoes and high wind. I can't imagine
6	why.
7	MEMBER BLEY: Let me take you back to the
8	design basis from the last slide. What's the basis for
9	the frequency of the breach of the
10	MR. STILLWELL: What's the basis?
11	MEMBER BLEY: Yes. Seismic is very low
12	there right?
13	MR. STILLWELL: Actually, for unit 1 and 2
14	licensing, they analyze that reservoir for seismic
15	failure and a safe shutdown earthquake. It's 0.1 for
16	unit 1 and 2 and it's 0.15 for 3 and 4.
17	MEMBER BLEY: Why is it that high?
18	MR. STILLWELL: It's designed
19	MEMBER BLEY: I thought it was lower. Okay.
20	MR. STILLWELL: I think it's 0.15, correct?
21	Russ? The SSE? Actually it's a spectrum so they
22	actually analyzed the reservoir embankment for
23	response during a safe shutdown earthquake and my
24	analysis showed that the reservoir embankment would

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84 remain intact. It wouldn't structurally fail during a 1 2 seismic event. 3 MEMBER BLEY: So what is the basis for your --? 4 STILLWELL: The 3 and 4 basis is a 5 MR. postulated piping failure through the reservoir either 6 7 through the walls or through the, underneath the 8 embankment wall. 9 people who MEMBER STETKAR: For don't 10 understand dam failure modes, explain what piping means because they are thinking pipes. 11 MR. STILLWELL: It could be. Piping, and we 12 have professor -- I'm a layman so I'm not a dam 13 engineer. Piping describes a process where, because of 14 15 differential pressure between where the reservoir is 16 and where the water is coming out, you actually create 17 a leakage path. 18 And as it goes through and starts washing 19 away, you are actually creating like a pipe. And you 20 wash away more material in the reservoir and it is carried out and the pipe gets bigger and eventually 21 22 the reservoir embankment collapses. 23 Layman's terms. 24 MEMBER BLEY: And 10 to the minus sixth. **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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Actually, MR. STILLWELL: we 1 were 2 fortunate. We found a Corps of Engineers manual that 3 discusses failure modes for embankment dams and they 4 break it down by embankment failure, over-top failure 5 and other failure modes and they have a pretty good discussion of failure rates in the international 6 7 community from large dams and how you can screen 8 particular failure modes for age and for dam 9 construction, you know, what kind of dirt do you use, 10 what kind of source of protection do you use, how long it's been around. 11 12 Using that process, support is something that we had done for units 1 and 2 back in IPE days, 13 14 where we had a similar failure rate but we didn't have as much breakdown of the data. 15 16 Ι think it turns out we weren't, we 17 actually did a pretty good job back then in terms of 18 screening. 19 MEMBER BLEY: Can they just begin to fail 20 or is it usually associated with storms or flooding or 21 \_ \_ 22 Accidentally MR. STILLWELL: you are 23 getting very close to what I am not comfortable 24 talking about. The piping failure mode for dams that **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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have been in construction, what I've read, are once 1 they have been in operation for a while, you should, 2 3 if you've got a good inspection program, see piping start to develop and you fix it. 4 5 So, being this is not what I do, and speaking as a layman, the evidence is that things like 6 7 piping or other failure modes that are basically of 8 that sort, you should be able to see them in well 9 established dams. 10 And this is not really a dam dam, this is a water control structure. We don't have varying water 11 12 heights. If we vary 10 feet in a year that's a bad 13 year, an unusual year. We basically maintain a constant level as 14 close as we can with periodic makeup from the Colorado 15 River. We don't change 100 feet in a day. We couldn't 16 17 change 100 feet if we wanted to. 18 Whereas water control dams or collect 19 control dams, you see constantly changing water levels 20 as rains come and you draw down and you use them for hydroelectric. 21 22 ours is basically more like an in-So ground stock tank if you will. 23 24 MEMBER STETKAR: Do you have, can you find **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

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1	just the reference to that Corps report?
2	MR. STILLWELL: Again, I've got a letter
3	and I can give it to you.
4	MEMBER STETKAR: That would be good.
5	MR. STILLWELL: It actually came out in
6	2006. I was really happy to find it. It's a set of
7	reports on how do you do screening assessments for dam
8	failures so they use it to determine allocation of
9	resources.
10	MEMBER BLEY: That will help me. I would
11	like to see it.
12	MR. STILLWELL: Hurricanes. Again, safety
13	related structures are designed for tornado and high
14	wind. The non-safety related combustion turbine
15	generator and the switch yard are actually designed
16	for 134 miles an hour in South Texas.
17	Core damage frequency from hurricane is in
18	order of magnitude less than the internal events core
19	damage frequency using an conservative screening
20	assessment.
21	Basically, we looked at likelihood of
22	failure of three diesel generators in the CTG at each
23	unit and said what's the core damage frequency?
24	And we actually credited the AC
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independent water addition function of the portable 1 diesel driven fire pump in core damage frequency, it's 2 3 pretty low. MR. HEAD: During a hurricane one of the 4 5 diesels would already have been running so that would be a different failure mode for that. 6 7 MEMBER BLEY: And loading? 8 MR. STILLWELL: Yes, and we start one 9 diesel, well unit 1 and 2, we start one diesel 10 generator two hours before the winds get to the shutdown speed and load it on the safety bus and it's 11 12 basically divorced from the grid. Unit 3 and 4 are similar designs so we are 13 going to do the same thing. 14 15 MEMBER SIEBER: So that would be in your tech-specs? 16 MR. STILLWELL: It would be in the Abnormal 17 18 Operating Procedures but not a tech spec. So it's a 19 site procedure. 20 MR. HEAD: It might cause us to enter a tech-spec action statement doing that, but that's what 21 22 we do. MR. STILLWELL: That's what we do. 23 24 MR. HEAD: Getting ready for the hurricane. **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

MR. STILLWELL: That's consistent with the 1 2 NEI guidance for what do you do for storms and the 3 INPO guidance for storm stuff. So per the ASME standard, again, hurricane 4 5 screens because it meets the SRP criteria and the screening core damage frequency is very low. So that 6 7 is why you won't see a very big distinction. MEMBER BLEY: Are hurricanes not a threat 8 9 to your dyke dams? 10 MR. STILLWELL: No. They looked at storm surge from hurricanes from various locations and one 11 12 of the reasons the dam is so high relative to the height of the water is to handle storm surge from 13 14 hurricanes. 15 So if you look at the dyke, operating level is 47, we have four units we'll be at 49 and we 16 17 have 66 feet or thereabouts is the crest of the dam 18 and that's primarily to handle storm surge, or the 19 winds associated with the hurricane, not the storm 20 surge. 21 MR. HEAD: But the actual storm surge is still an open issue with NRC staff right now, that we 22 are still working through. 23 24 MEMBER BLEY: Oh okay. That's right. NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

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1	MR. STILLWELL: Questions on hurricanes?
2	CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: Would this be a good
3	time to take a break?
4	MR. STILLWELL: Yes sir it would.
5	CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: So why don't we take a
6	break until ten after, ten till.
7	(Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went off the
8	record at 2:34 p.m. and resumed
9	at 2:48 p.m.)
10	MR. STILLWELL: Okay now we are talking
11	about COL license information items unless somebody
12	has a question about what we have talked about to
13	date. Not hearing any on the floor.
14	COL license information items are talked
15	about in three places, two places in the application,
16	it's actually 19.9 and 19A.
17	19B actually talks about unresolved safety
18	issues, generic safety issues, TMI action items and
19	things. Most of the COL information items in 19.9 have
20	to do with ensuring the assumptions made during one
21	facet of PRA analysis or another are actually
22	incorporated into the design of the procedures moving
23	forward.
24	For instance 19.1, a procedure for an
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unisolated clean-up water line break, that was actually the result of a spirited discussion during ACRS hearings for licensing of the ABWR design, where they had a concern about unisolated clean-up water line breaks.

6 So what we've done is converted into a COL 7 license information item and we have converted that to 8 a commitment with a description of how we are going to 9 ensure that the commitment actually gets realized, 10 which in our case is develop a procedure and modify 11 the final safety analysis report when the procedures 12 are available for review.

13 So you will see that in several places 14 here where we talked about procedure development in 15 accordance with 13.5 and FSAR update in accordance 16 with 10 CFR 71.

And I guess I will move through these fairly rapidly and just go page by page and give everyone a couple of seconds or so to see if anybody wants to talk about them rather than read them.

CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: No, I think you ought to just read them as quickly as you would like but I think that would be better.

MR. STILLWELL: Okay, so 19.1, post-

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accident recovery procedure for unisolated clean-up water line break. 19.2 is confirmation of clean-up water operation beyond the design basis.

19.3 is event specific procedures for severe 4 5 external flooding. 19.4 is confirmation of seismic capacities beyond the plant design basis. We are in 6 7 the process of developing high-confidence, lowprobability failure for new plant-specific equipment 8 9 and buildings. That's expected to be completed by the 10 end of September this year, at which time we will modify a response traditional information request to 11 12 provide the updated HCLPF values for buildings like the ultimate heat sink, the reactor service water pump 13 house, the reactor service water piping tunnels et 14 15 cetera.

In addition we have to perform a validation 16 17 or verification of HCLPF prior to fuel load. That's go 18 back and evaluate or look at the site-specific, as-19 designed, as-built structure systems and components 20 and make sure that the HCLPF that we would determine for this significant equipment is similar to 21 or 22 bounded by the HCLPFs that GE assumed for the original design. 23

That has to be done prior to fuel load, it

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1	can't be done until we have something we can actually
2	evaluate.
3	We have to look at the potential for
4	seismic-induced soil failure as 1.67 times the site-
5	specific safe shutdown earthquake and we will modify
6	the FSAR in accordance with 10 CFR 50.71(e).
7	In addition we have to do a seismic walkdown
8	prior to fuel load where we actually put hands on
9	equipment and verify some of the assumption. All this
10	is contained in commitment 19.9-4.
11	Plant walkdowns, we have a procedure
12	development, we have to have a procedure on how we
13	conduct plant walkdowns for seismic and fire. Those
14	will be developed in accordance with the procedure
15	descriptions in 13.5 of the COLA.
16	Confirmation of loss of AC power event, we
17	talked about that. It was a requirement that we
18	validate that the loss of offsite power frequencies
19	and recoveries that we actually see at our site are
20	consistent with what GE assumed in the original DCD.
21	And as we have shown with the ERCOT data, we
22	are actually a little bit better than what they
23	assumed.
24	19.7, procedures and training for use of AC-
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Action to avoid common-cause failures in the essential communications function and other commoncause failures, that's actually procedure development and how do we perform maintenance events testing in the digital I&C systems and that will be included in procedure development described in 13.5.

Action to mitigate station blackout events, that actually has to do with procedure developments and calculations and we will update the FSAR when the calculations are available but it's things like the eight-hour RCIC capability for station blackout, control room ventilation, our control room have an ability for eight hours

17 given station blackout conditions, battery loading for 18 eight hours given station blackout conditions, for all 19 of those a commitment that it will be provided in an 20 FSAR update.

Actions to reduce the risk of internal flooding, procedure development and training in accordance with 13.5 or 13.2 of the FSAR.

Actions to avoid loss of decay heat removal

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and minimize shutdown risk, it's included in the 1 procedure development in 13.5 and it implements the 2 3 requirements guidelines described in not INPO, INSAC document 9108 or whatever it was for shutdown, what do 4 we do for shutdown risk assessment. 5 Procedures for operation of RCIC outside the 6 7 control room, again that will be included in procedure 8 development and training in 13.5 or 13.2. 9 The central core cooling systems, test and 10 surveillance intervals, it's included in procedure developments in 13.5. 11 19.14, accident management, procedure 12 development in 13.5 and training in 13.2. and that's 13 as far as we go. 14 15 Manual operation of motor-operated valves, 16 we'll have procedures in place in accordance with 13.5 17 to manually operate motor-operated valves in locations 18 where necessary. 19 High pressure core flooder discharge valve, 20 that's a procedure development that has to do with ensuring the valve is opened after maintenance because 21 22 it's a manual valve in site containment. Capability of containment isolation valves, 23 24 that's a verification of containment isolation valves **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS

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96 can survive severe accident pressures as opposed to design bases pressures. And that will be done in the FSAR update in accordance with 50.71(e). Procedures to ensure sample lines and drywell purge lines remain closed during operation. Again that's procedure development in accordance with 13.5. Procedures to align the combustion turbine generator to supply power to the condensate pumps. Procedure development in 13.5. do you have a question? Okay. Actions to ensure the reliability of the supporting service water reactor building cooling water systems. That has to do with testing. It's in procedure development 13.5. Housing of the AC-independent water addition equipment, and that will be, what is that, that's an analysis show that the AC-independent to water addition pump house will survive seismic events and basically remain functional for other site external events. And we will do, we will indicate that one in

22 the FSAR update.

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23 .19c, procedures to assure SRV operability24 during station blackout, it's a procedure development.

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1	.19d, procedures for ensuring integrity of
2	freeze seals, it's a shutdown issue and it's going to
3	be covered in 13.5.
4	Procedures for controlling combustibles
5	during shutdown, procedure development 13.5 it's again
6	a shutdown risk issue.
7	Outage planning and control, procedures in
8	development 13.5 and it's an outage risk issue.
9	Reactor service water system definition, it
10	was a requirement that we basically describe or
11	analyze the design that we have and that's included in
12	the application. So the system that we have, the
13	reactor service system, is actually included in the
14	PRA that we are using to evaluate the other
15	CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: Unless the members have
16	questions about the specific items on these slides
17	through slide 31, then we should just go to slide 32.
18	MR. STILLWELL: Thank you sir, I appreciate
19	that. Okay, 19.29, seismic capacity. Again we are
20	going to we are on slide 32 providing high-
21	confidence, low-probability-of-failure for new plant-
22	specific equipment, that's expected to be completed by
23	September of this year and we'll provide an update to
24	an RAI response to put it on the docket.

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Comparison for as-built HCLPFs to as-assumed HCLPFs will be done prior to fuel load. Soil-structure interaction analysis at 1.67 and at walkdown prior to fuel load are all included in commitment 19.9-4.

19.30 is the PRA update and that's included in our application where we incorporated the specific departures that affected the PRA and site-specific information.

9 Additional commitments, 19.4S, added four 10 additional commitments for the plant-specific PRA to 11 satisfy the requirement of 10 CFR 50.71(h), three 12 procedures to control model development, configuration 13 control, who is qualified to do the model.

Those three would be issued prior to COLA issuance and to satisfy the requirements of 57 we will modify the FSAR requirements of 50.71(e) to notify staff on the availability of those procedures.

And again, the ASME peer review required for the ASME standards in Reg Guide 1.200 will be complete at least one year prior to fuel load to meet the requirements of 50.71(h).

ITAAC Chapter 19, there are no ITAACs specifically directed at 19, Chapter 19. However there are ITAAC associated with several of the design

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3 result of the severe accident analyses described i4 Chapter 19.

For instance, the basaltic concrete, it's one of the design requirements that we have basaltic concrete rather than the more limestone-based concrete for hydrogen control post-accident.

9 Vacuum breaker position switches, which is,
10 that is the controlled, bypass leakage, basically, it
11 bypasses the suppression function of the containment.

An addition would be the corium shield for the containment sumps where we actually have a corium shield above the containment sumps to make sure that we don't inadvertently or as a result of a super reaction burn through the sumps and have a direct path outside.

In addition, there are ITAAC associated with risk-significant structures, systems, and components in the Design Reliability Assurance Program in Chapter 17. Next slide. Questions. Comments.

22 MEMBER STETKAR: Bill, the Design Reliability 23 Assurance Program list, I went back, I remembered why 24 I didn't remember anything, because there wasn't

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1	anything there.
2	When does that list actually, when is it
3	actually generated? I know you said you have the panel
4	has been meeting, when will the final list be
5	generated and where will it appear?
6	MR. STILLWELL: Okay what we've got right now
7	is PRA input to that list, so the PRA input is
8	basically
9	MEMBER STETKAR: You have your risk ranked
10	set of whatever
11	MR. STILLWELL: I have my risk-ranked
12	systems, systems structures and components.
13	What has to be done is basically go through
14	the expert panel process. They bring their insights,
15	engineering insights, design insights so we can come
16	up with a combined list of what are we going to do
17	about it. That's the process that we are in right now.
18	MEMBER STETKAR: And that list will
19	eventually appear where?
20	MR. STILLWELL: The list will eventually
21	appear in Chapter 17 and let me back up
22	MEMBER STETKAR: The section 17 simply says
23	that it incorporates by reference the DCD section 17
24	which only has a simplistic example of the standby

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liquid control.

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MR. STILLWELL: But you have to go back to 19K, which is really the list of risk-significant components. 19K4 is in fact the integrated list of those sets of SSCs that made it into DRAP.

What we have done now is, I have provided 7 the PRA input to the tables in 19K and we have modified 19K4 for the PRA insights. 8 What we are actually doing in the expert panel is systematically 10 going through all of the systems and at a system level, high level, screening quickly. 11

12 This one is or is not risk-significant and here's why, document that, go on to this, the next 13 14 one. This one, we haven't --

15 MEMBER STETKAR: But eventually, I guess to cut to the chase, eventually for the COL, at the COL 16 17 stage, will section, I'm going to take a stab at it, 18 17, contain an actual tabulation of SSCs that are 19 included in the reliability assurance program?

20 MR. STILLWELL: Prior to COLA issuance, in 21 the third quarter of 2011, the set of DRAP SSCs and 22 the program that is in place to control future activities, will be complete and the FSAR will be 23 updated in accordance with 10 CFR 50.71(e) so by the 24

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102 end of the third quarter of next year that --1 MEMBER STETKAR: And it will actually appear 2 3 in Chapter 19K. MR. STILLWELL: It will appear in 19K 4 5 eventually. What we will probably do to get it in place and before the staff is to supplement an RAI, 6 7 that here is the table, it's been through the process. 8 MEMBER STETKAR: Okay. 9 MR. STILLWELL: But it kind of depends on 10 what's the update schedule, whether or not we an make 11 it in the update about that time or have to wait for 12 the next --13 MEMBER STETKAR: Well I mean, you know, if it's in an RAI it will become a confirmatory item for 14 Rev x but -- there will eventually be a table. 15 16 MR. STILLWELL: Yes. 17 MR. HEAD: Again what we put up was this was one of the action items. 18 19 CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: We will probably get to 20 it later on after this --21 MEMBER STETKAR: Sorry. 22 CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: No. No problem. MR. CHAPPELL: We have the letter references 23 24 for the two documents, one an RAI and one a Corps NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

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1	report. We will provide that to the staff. Actually
2	both of them are RAI responses.
3	MEMBER STETKAR: Okay just give them to
4	Maitri.
5	CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: Thank you very much.
6	MEMBER CORRADINI: I had a question just to
7	make sure that I am clear. So we focused on the Level
8	1 part, the Level 2 part you essentially refer back to
9	what was already docketed.
10	MR. STILLWELL: Yes sir.
11	MEMBER CORRADINI: And you, I noticed there
12	were some staff questions on Level 2.
13	MR. STILLWELL: There were staff questions if
14	we had identified a departure that touched on Level 2,
15	we would have reconstituted the Level 2 model also. We
16	actually have pieces of a Level 2 model. We have a
17	containment response analysis, using the best
18	information that we got out of the SSAR. We have a
19	MAAP model, a MAAP4 model of the ABWR, using the best
20	information we could get out of the safety analysis
21	report.
22	So we were prepared to take the next step
23	and actually build the Level 2 if we had identified a
24	departure that would have forced us to do an
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1	evaluation for a change. Fortunately we didn't have
2	any departures that we thought affected the Level 2
3	analysis. So we didn't have to take the next step to
4	build the Level 2 model.
5	CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: Are there any other
6	questions for Mr. Stillwell? Hearing none, we will
7	move now to the staff's presentation on Chapter 19.
8	MS. BANERJEE: Let's have Todd Hillsmeier
9	unmuted, please.
10	A.J.?
11	CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: Do you want to confirm
12	that Mr. Hillsmeier can communicate with us?
13	MS. BANERJEE: Can Mr. Hillsmeier hear us and
14	talk to us to confirm that he is unmuted?
15	Hello?
16	CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: He is not on the line.
17	MR. FULLER: I saw an email from him earlier
18	today that he was going to sign on at about 3:15 our
19	time.
20	CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: Well, that's okay. Then
21	unfortunately we cannot wait for him, so.
22	MS. BANERJEE: Can somebody call and as a
23	backup while we start.
24	CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: Yes please proceed. Who
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1	is making the staff's presentation?
2	MR. FOSTER: Good afternoon. My name is Rocky
3	Foster, I am the Chapter 19 project manager for the
4	South Texas project combined license application
5	review.
6	I would like to thank the subcommittee for
7	allowing us to make this presentation on the SER with
8	open items.
9	Here is our list for our project team. Dr.
10	George Wunder is our lead. Project manager beside me
11	is Dr. John Lai, Ms. Marie Pohida, Dr. Ed Fuller and
12	Todd Hillsmeier will be calling in on the telephone
13	shortly.
14	Also from our seismic people is David James.
15	MEMBER BLEY: Oh, somebody joined us.
16	MS. BANERJEE: Hello, is that Todd
17	Hillsmeier?
18	MR. HILLSMEIER:. Yes it is, this is Todd
19	Hillsmeier from NRC.
20	MR. FOSTER: And Todd is available for
21	technical questions on the DRAP program. The overview
22	of the presentation outline is basically our combined
23	license application open items, a description of the
24	open items, the review of approaches that staff took

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looking at the application and then open items of interest and the Appendix K PRA base reliability and maintenance program.

Overall, for Chapter 19, we had 17 open items and we have resolved quite a few of them. I do have a correction of the slide. We do have eight items right now that are unresolved and we are working with South Texas to complete the resolution, the path 8 toward resolution on these.

10 The next five slides I have are basically summary descriptions of the open items that we had. 11 12 The ones that are in bold are the ones that are still open items. 13

14 BLEY: them MEMBER Did any of appear 15 troublesome for you?

16 MR. FOSTER: For me? For me, no. For the 17 technical staff, there are some areas that we do have 18 \_ \_

19 MEMBER BLEY: If you'd highlight those, we'd 20 appreciate it.

MR. FOSTER: -- concern. What we'll do Dennis 21 22 is as we go through the open items of interest, they'll express their levels of concern with them. 23 24 MEMBER BLEY: Okay.

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MR. FOSTER: I do have two corrections to these slides. One is, for open item 19-6 we have confirmed that as a confirmatory item now. It's a closed waiting for the Rev 4 to come in. And on slide number eight, open item 19-14, this is the RAI number that appears in the SER, the supplemental RAI that we issue was 19-33.

And we do have that corrected on the significant items slides later on in the presentation, and then with that I will turn it over to John Lai to talk about our review approach.

12 MR. LAI: I am John Lai, I just recently 13 moved to ACRS. So in case you wonder why I'm not here. 14 MEMBER CORRADINI: You looked familiar.

15 MEMBER BLEY: But we will consider that you 16 are not here.

(Laughter.)

18 MR. LAI: Today I represent NRO to talk 19 about the review approach. I thought that I want 20 to, maybe I can address some of the questions the 21 members have to the STP applicants.

For the feedwater condensate systems, actually they do not have the fault tree model in there. Basically which is use the human-error

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approach, it's a point estimate.

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If you are familiar with the IPEEE days, that is the top EQ, that's what the original DCD and also the STP model has, just the point estimate does not have the fault tree model in there.

And then you also have the question on the reactor building.

9 MEMBER STETKAR: John, when you say 10 there was some discussion and I didn't bring up 11 the numbers, there's some number in there. 12 There's just basically a basic event to replicate 13 the hard work.

14 MR. LAI: Yes just one point yes, just
15 one point.

16 MEMBER STETKAR: No support systems, no17 power supplies, no cooling water, no nothing.

18 MR. LAI: Correct. And you also want to 19 know if the reactor building circ water system, 20 that serves the water system are in there, 21 actually they are in there. So I checked the 22 model. They are there.

And as far as the screening process goes, they are going to send members a paper or

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an RAI response. We have that. So in there they 1 actually changed the unquantifiable statements to 2 3 some statement that is more readable like RAI in fact is more, so you will be able to see that. 4 5 So just let me talk now quickly about our review approach. We actually concentrated on 6 7 the departures. Anything departures has impact on PRA we will evaluate that. 8 9 So as a matter of fact I think that we 10 have an issue RAI is almost all the departures they have in Chapter 19. The reason we do audit 11 12 it is because STP does not really provide any quantitative results. 13 But the reasoning is their delta CDF of 14 15 the plant site-specific PRA model to the STP with regards to the model is less than 10 percent, 16 17 which is based on our ISG-3 guidance there. 18 So if they meet that requirement they 19 do not have to provide us quantitative results. 20 So the staff have to really have to go in there to do audits, to find out what their model looks 21 22 like. MEMBER BLEY: John, how did you address 23 24 the thing Mr. Stetkar was asking about when he NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS

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said if you have a change and you go to evaluate 1 2 the change in risk, but you didn't have that 3 component in your PRA, and you know that the change is insignificant, have you questioned 4 5 that? MR. LAI: Yes, that actually, they 6 7 address in that RAI response. 8 MEMBER BLEY: And that pretty much met 9 your expectations. 10 MR. LAI: Yes, pretty much so. BLEY: We'll look forward to 11 MEMBER 12 seeing it. MR. LAI: And they actually provide our 13 PRA model documents, the hard copies, 14 in Westinghouse Twinbrook office, which is about one 15 16 stop north here. 17 So we, this is there very often, you 18 know since April of 2009 I think we have been there at least four or five times. 19 20 And we actually had a face to face 21 audit with STP staff and contractors that was 22 happened on September 22 or 23 2009. We sat down with them, we look their models, look their 23 24 electronic model, we trace the results and we

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1 generate the RAIs after that.

2	MEMBER STETKAR: John, for that audit
3	where you used the, where you had the actual
4	models available, what was the basic scope of
5	that audit? Did you look at one or two initiating
6	events and try to follow those through?
7	I am trying to understand you know,
8	what you did.
9	MR. LAI: Yes, we described it pretty
10	much in detail in the audit report. We looked
11	through a few sequences, we go through there, the
12	event tree sequences, we look at each branch
13	point and follow the fault tree approach.
14	MEMBER STETKAR: Okay yes, thanks.
15	MR. FOSTER: We provided the ADAMS
16	accession number for the audit report with the
17	SER
18	MEMBER STETKAR: I have the audit
19	report, thanks.
20	MR. LAI: So that is basically what our
21	approach is. I am going to turn to Marie to talk
22	about more interesting open item issues.
23	MS. POHIDA: Now the first thing I would
24	like to draw your attention to is slide 11. What
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1	I would like to discuss is our review approach
2	for where, for topics where there was not a PRA
3	performed. For example for fires, the five
4	methodology was used, for fires that shut down, a
5	qualitative approach was used, for floods that
6	shut down a qualitative approach was used, for
7	seismic, a PRA margins approach was used. And for
8	shutdown there was only a quantitative
9	reliability study of the decay heat removal
10	function, okay?
11	For these topics we referenced the
12	regulations on 10 CFR 52.79 and this is for
13	applicants that are referencing a design
14	certification.
15	And what they are supposed to use is
16	the PRA information for design certification, and
17	it's supposed to be updated to account for site-
18	specific design features and any design changes
19	or departures.
20	So based on a lot of discussion with
21	OGC, our PRA review was limited to site-specific
22	features that are not bounded by the ABWR site
23	characteristics. And what I mean by that is in
24	Chapter 2 of the DCD, of the ABWR DCD, the site

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characteristics for the certification are listed and they include such things as design basis wind speed, or maximum flooding elevation.

So site-specific features that are not bounded by those site characteristics, we looked at. The second feature is site-specific features where there is PRA information to update and that's important, where there's PRA information to update.

For example for hurricane risk, there were full power and shutdown loss of offsite power of event trees, so for hurricane risk there was PRA information to update.

Third we looked at design departures where there is PRA information to update. For example for the fire water design departure that I will be speaking to next, the fire water system was quantified in the full power and shut down event tree so we could evaluate that departure.

I would like to move to slide 12 please and I would like to discuss open item 19-9 and it is the fire water system design departure.

When the ABWR design was certified, itwas certified with one diesel-driven fire water

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pump per unit and STP requested a design departure where they had one diesel-driven fire water pump per site and the impact of this design departure when the hurricane CDF and LRF was not evaluated. Okay?

In a response to staff RAIs we found 6 7 that they used the PRA standard when they used the screening criterion for external events other 8 9 than fire and seismic. And if you look in the 10 standard there's three criteria that you can choose for screening of these types of external 11 12 events and they used criterion (a).

basically if 13 And it meets the NRC 14 standard review plan, you can screen the external event. And for hurricane risk, STP stated that 15 the site for hurricane risk, the site was within 16 17 the parameters specified in the DCD for high 18 winds and tornadoes and therefore they didn't 19 need to evaluate hurricanes.

20 Also as а result of staff RAIS, 21 hurricane risk struck was or removed from 22 revision 3 of Chapter 19 of the FSAR.

23 So what we did is we did our own 24 screening estimate and what I did is I've used

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hurricane return frequencies from NOAA for the Gulf Coast and I also evaluated coastal weatherrelated LOOP frequencies during shutdown, because, you know, during a hurricane the plant is going to go to shutdown from NUREG-6890.

And what I found using my screening estimate, because as you recall, hurricane risk was struck from the FSAR, that based on the information that I had, that hurricane risk exceeded the large release frequency goals.

So we had a discussion on this topic at 11 12 the public meeting with South Texas on April 27 and they agreed to evaluate this design departure 13 14 quantitatively, in more detail, and what they are 15 going to do is document the compensatory measures in the FSAR that would be taken prior to the 16 arrival of a hurricane, which are going to be 17 18 outlined in the hurricane procedures that are 19 going to be developed, and they also gave us more 20 detail at the public meeting such as they are 21 going to keep a containment de-inerted and other 22 risk reduction features that they are going to 23 implement.

MEMBER STETKAR: Marie.

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116 MEMBER BLEY: You mean inerted. 1 2 MS. POHIDA: Yes, you mean containment 3 inerted, thank you. MEMBER STETKAR: Back up that, I'm just 4 5 trying to think through that logic process. MS. POHIDA: It is a lot. 6 7 MEMBER STETKAR: It is, and I'm trying 8 to phrase a question that is somewhat coherent. 9 Run me through that logic process again in 10 abbreviated form, because if a hurricane hits the site, you will lose offsite power. 11 12 MS. POHIDA: Yes. 13 MEMBER STETKAR: Now, to me --MEMBER BLEY: But how did you get large 14 15 release? Go ahead John. MEMBER STETKAR: If, if, if, well how 16 17 did you get the large release --18 MEMBER BLEY: That's what I want to hear. 19 20 MEMBER STETKAR: Did you get the large release because the plant was at power --21 MS. POHIDA: Oh no. 22 23 MEMBER STETKAR: Or because the plant 24 was shut down? **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

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1	MS. POHIDA: No, it's because the plant
2	is shut down, okay?
3	MEMBER STETKAR: Okay.
4	MS. POHIDA: So what I did, is I went to
5	the NOAA website
6	MEMBER STETKAR: No, no, I understand
7	how you got the frequency of hurricanes I'm
8	trying to
9	MS. POHIDA: Okay, so what we did is
10	basically analyze two scenarios and I'm going to
11	pull up my their screening calculations. Okay.
12	Basically what I did was I found the frequency of
13	a Cat 3, 4 and 5 hurricane and I combined that
14	with an approximated common-cause failure of all
15	six emergency diesel generators and that meant
16	that one unit is going to have the diesel-driven
17	fire water pump and one unit would be without the
18	diesel-driven fire water pump.
19	That, the plant without the diesel-
20	driven fire water pump was presumed to go to core
21	damage. Now you have to remember they are at
22	shutdown. The tech specs do not require
23	MEMBER STETKAR: Well no, no, wait a
24	minute, okay go on.
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110 MS. POHIDA: Okay. The tech specs as 1 2 written for the containment do not require the 3 containment to be inerted below mode one. So for this screening estimate, okay 4 because I had --5 STETKAR: That MEMBER is 6 а pretty artificial screening estimate if I have been 7 8 operating at power and I decide to shut down 9 because I know a hurricane is coming I probably 10 wouldn't immediately de-inert my containment, for 11 example. 12 MS. POHIDA: Ι agree but what, it wasn't, but all the hurricane risk information 13 was removed from revision 3 of the FSAR. 14 MEMBER STETKAR: No, I, it's a separate 15 16 issue I am trying to understand how you got to 17 the very high largely early release. And that's, 18 the de-inerted containment --19 MEMBER BLEY: It's a pretty coarse 20 screen. 21 MEMBER STETKAR: It's a pretty coarse 22 screen. 23 MS. POHIDA: It is. It's a very coarse 24 screen. And then what I did was I ran through **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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another scenario where you have a Cat 3, 4, 5 1 hurricane, and all three units, all three of a 2 3 given unit's diesels fail and injection from the 4 diesel-driven fire water pump fails. 5 MEMBER STETKAR: So you took credit, there you took credit, let the fire pump fail. 6 7 MS. POHIDA: Yes, that is correct. 8 MEMBER CORRADINI: So we are debating, I 9 am trying to understand, is it the fact that it's 10 de-inerted and the containment is open that gives you the large release or is it the fact that 11 12 something physically is expected to happen because it's de-inerted or just something between 13 14 those two? 15 MS. POHIDA: I did a core screening 16 evaluation because there information was no 17 provided in the FSAR so because, SO what I 18 assumed, that CDF was going to be equal to LRF 19 unless I was given further information on what 20 they planned to do with our containment, you know, prior to the arrival of a hurricane. 21 22 Yes it was a coarse screening estimate. 23 MEMBER CORRADINI: Okay. 24 MEMBER BLEY: And they are now -- tell **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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us again what they are doing in response. 1 2 MS. POHIDA: What they are going to 3 based on that public meeting that we had on April 27, what they are going to do is they are going 4 5 to do a quantitative evaluation of the fire water pump design departure. 6 7 And what they are going to document in the FSAR is the type of compensatory measures to 8 9 limit the risk of a hurricane and that will be 10 included, that will be documented in the FSAR. For example, you know, starting one of 11 the emergency diesel generators prior to 12 the arrival of a hurricane, you know, keeping the 13 inerted, you know 14 containment and other 15 compensatory measures. 16 MEMBER BLEY: So they are not providing 17 a hurricane PRA, they are just --18 MEMBER STETKAR: But they are not 19 actually going to quantify -- yes. They are not 20 going to quantify the hurricane risk with a realistic estimate for the 21 frequency of hurricanes that would strike the site. 22 MS. POHIDA: They are going to quantify 23 24 the impact of the design departure on hurricane **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS

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<pre>1 risk, the CDF and the LRF. 2 MEMBER BLEY: Which means they have 3 have the hurricane PRA before and after 4 departure. 5 MS. POHIDA: Which basically comes of 6 to, as I understand what we received, basic 7 the impact of having a hurricane and exter 8 loss of the offsite power. 9 MEMBER BLEY: Okay, and that is con 10 later. 11 MS. POHIDA: That has been, I 12 actually received that but I didn't have time 13 review that prior to this meeting.</pre>	
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11 MS. POHIDA: That has been, I 12 actually received that but I didn't have time	ming
12 actually received that but I didn't have time	
	have
13 review that prior to this meeting.	e to
14 MEMBER STETKAR: Is that I am sti	ll a
15 bit confused because the words that you	said
16 could mean a qualitative evaluation	of
17 compensatory measures without actu	ally
18 quantifying a delta risk. Does the submittal	that
19 you have, that you haven't looked at yet	
20 MS. POHIDA: I am sorry, I hav	en't
21 looked at it yet.	
22 MEMBER STETKAR: You haven't even op	ened
23 it up yet?	
24 MS. POHIDA: Yes, not real no.	
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MEMBER STETKAR: Okay. Does it have a 1 2 quantitative measure of delta risk or is it 3 simply qualitative discussion of а the compensatory measures that would enable you to 4 5 ride out a hurricane? MR. FOSTER: We have the author here so 6 7 8 MR. STILLWELL: If you don't mind, Bill 9 Stillwell from South Texas. What we have provided 10 was the quantitative screening assessment where we assumed a hurricane frequency of Category 3, 4 11 12 and 5 and we built a simple event tree model of unit 3 and unit 4 with only diesel generators and 13 14 combustion turbine generators and said okay, we have a hurricane. 15 We assumed offsite power was gone but 16 17 that wouldn't necessarily be the case but in the 18 screening assessment we assumed it was gone and 19 then we just looked at diesel generators and 20 combustion turbine generators. 21 We actually ran two sensitivity cases, 22 one with the CTG and one without the CTG and showed a change in core damage frequency. 23 24 Did you look at all, Marie was talking **NEAL R. GROSS** 

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1	about the shared fire water pump, you didn't even	
2	look at the fire water pump?	
3	MR. STILLWELL: Hold on.	
4	MEMBER STETKAR: Okay.	
5	MR. STILLWELL: What we did for the	
6	diesel generators was this is the configuration	
7	we are going to be in. One engine has already	
8	been started and running so we get rid of common-	
9	cause start failures, common-cause run for the	
10	first hour failures, breaker close start common-	
11	cause, all of that stuff.	
12	And so we have, two diesels have to	
13	start and one diesel is already started and	
14	running loaded.	
15	MEMBER STETKAR: Why did you get rid of	
16	the common-cause run failures Why did you get	
17	rid of the common-cause run for the first hour?	
18	MR. STILLWELL: Because this one started	
19	running two hours before the hurricane shows up	
20	on site. The other two wouldn't start until I	
21	actually lost offsite power.	
22	MEMBER STETKAR: So you could still have	
23	common-cause run failures of those in the first	
24	hour?	
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1	MR. STILLWELL: Not if it's running.
2	It's running.
3	MEMBER STETKAR: Of the other two, in
4	the first hour.
5	MR. STILLWELL: Yes, those, the two that
6	are in the same mode have all the common-cause.
7	The one that is already running and loaded, we
8	added a bunch of common-cause steps and we have
9	no maintenance.
10	MEMBER STETKAR: On that one.
11	MR. STILLWELL: The model does not
12	include recovery of diesel generators or offsite
13	power for 24 hours. It's basically just a
14	snapshot to say what happens if. Once we
15	determine core damage frequency, and it's a real
16	simple sequence model, it's only I think six or
17	eight sequences, you know, CTG works or not,
18	diesel generator works or not. If the CTG doesn't
19	work, so it's not very many sequences.
20	For the core damage sequences, I
21	multiplied each core damage sequence, or the sum
22	of the core damage sequences for either unit 3 or
23	unit 4 by the likelihood of failure of the AC-
24	independent water addition function because

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that's the departure that we are talking about 1 and that is the one that was credited in low 2 3 power shutdown. So I have a sequence frequency sum --4 STETKAR: You did that for a 5 MEMBER single unit. 6 7 MR. STILLWELL: I did it for both units. MEMBER STETKAR: Simultaneously? 8 9 MR. STILLWELL: No, in the model Ι 10 actually looked at the likelihood of failure of both units through the hurricane, but for that 11 12 sequence, where both units have failed, I didn't include any recovery from AC-independent water 13 14 addition, it's about a 10 to the minus ten 15 sequence. 16 MEMBER STETKAR: Okay. 17 MR. STILLWELL: But for the sequences 18 where it's individuals, I said if you had three 19 fails, unit 4 is working, AC is going to go to 3 20 or vice versa. And we included the AC-independent 21 water addition for a unit core damage but not for 22 the combined unit core damage and it, at that point, without credit for AC-independent 23 core damage frequency is on the order of 10 to the 24

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1	minus six as a screening assessment, with credit
2	for AC-independent water addition it goes down to
3	about 10 to the minus eight.
4	MEMBER STETKAR: Good diesel.
5	MR. FOSTER: So staff will review this
6	RAI response and then see if it mutes the
7	resolution of the open item.
8	MS. POHIDA: Are there any further
9	questions?
10	CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: Please continue.
11	MS. POHIDA: Okay, thank you. I would
12	like to move on to slide 13. And this is open
13	item 19-12. And this is external flooding due to
14	breach of the main cooling reservoir.
15	You know as Bill stated, the main
16	cooling reservoir is a 12.4 mile earthen-filled
17	embankment dam and a postulated design basis
18	breach results in flooding at the site of
19	approximately five feet.
20	Following a postulated breach, the
21	security personnel is supposed to notify the
22	operators, okay? And the operators are to ensure
23	that three normally open doors are shut.
24	And these doors are the watertight
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control room access door and two watertight doors 2 in the reactor building access corridor, and if one of these three doors is left open, core damage is assumed.

It could be that if one of the three doors is left open, the control room is flooded, a loss of all DC power, since these rooms are below grade.

For this event, in the responses to our 9 10 RAIS, STP also used criterion (a) from the PRA 11 standard so as a reason as to not to do a 12 detailed evaluation SO they did a screening 13 assessment.

14 breach frequency was And STP's two 15 orders of magnitude more optimistic than 16 published dam failure data. Initially their dam 17 failure frequency was 1E-6 and this dam frequency 18 excluded certain failure mechanisms as took credit for 19 25 impossible. Ιt years of 20 successful operating experience that was already 21 included in the data and this 1E-6 dam breach 22 frequency also was limited to a certain, 1,000foot section of the northern embankment of the 23 24 dam, which is 16,000 linear feet.

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When I went through and looked for 1 2 published dam failure data and using published 3 dam failure data combined with, of 1E-4, times a human error probability for the operator closing 5 one of three doors in 30 minutes, that gives you a core damage frequency that exceeds the Large 6 7 Release Frequency goals.

8 Now, regarding where we got published 9 dam failure data, I am looking right now at a 10 slide from the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation and it's respective on failure rates. 11

12 And this slide that I am reading from actually was covered in a training course for dam 13 14 risk and they listed six sources of dam failure data and the dates of this data range from 1981 15 16 1998 and the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation to 17 concludes that very roughly, dams fail about at a 18 rate of one per 10,000 per year, depending on the 19 age and failure mode.

And what they believe is that this 20 failure rate can really be used as an anchor to 21 22 dams that show really no tendency toward being more adverse or more favorable. 23

MEMBER CORRADINI: So this is actual

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1	data from a range of earthen dams?	
2	MS. POHIDA: It's actually published dam	
3	failure data from a range of sources, yes.	
4	MEMBER CORRADINI: But	
5	MEMBER BLEY: Well, they were telling us	
6	they used the Corps of Engineering data on the	
7	same kind of earthen dam they have, is, how does	
8	that relate to this, is this all kinds of dams in	
9	all kinds of applications, all kinds of use?	
10	MEMBER STETKAR: I thought the Corps is	
11	responsible for dams and Bureau of Reclamation	
12	isn't, are they?	
13	MS. POHIDA: Okay, this is based on,	
14	what I did is, once we, I went to the audit in	
15	September of 2009 and I found this screening	
16	analysis on dam failures.	
17	I went to FEMA. FEMA gave a course on	
18	dam risk and dam safety and the U.S. Bureau of	
19	Reclamation has people that specialize in risk	
20	assessment for dams.	
21	MEMBER RAY: Yes, that's right.	
22	MS. POHIDA: Now, regarding your other	
23	question about the sources of data, I think you	
24	were asking about failure modes, or	
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MEMBER BLEY: Well, no, I was, the way you began this it sounded like you used real published data and they didn't. They told us they used data from the Corps of Engineers report that was from similar kinds of dams. So my first question was did you look at that and I wonder why it's not appropriate.

My second question was from the data you took, from Bureau of Reclamation, is that for similar dams or for just all sorts of dams?

11 MS. POHIDA: Let me, I probably should 12 go back and go through a little bit of the 13 background of the RAI responses that we have had 14 back and forth between the staff and South Texas.

When South Texas initially provided the screening evaluation for MCR breach, what they used was their source of data was the Baecher paper and the Baecher paper provides a generic failure frequency of 1E-4, okay?

And what South Texas did is they took, they used the Baecher paper as their generic frequencies and took a number of reductions from this frequency to obtain their MCR breach frequency of 1E-6.

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And I can give you a detailed list but 1 include excluding 2 of these reductions some 3 failure modes certain impossible, taking as credit for 25 years of successful operation for 4 5 this dam that is already included in the Baecher 6 paper --MEMBER ARMIJO: So there may be double-7 8 counting, is that what you are getting at? 9 MS. POHIDA: The staff believes it was 10 double-counting, yes. And also taking a reduction because only a certain 1,000-foot linear section 11 12 of the northern embankment was evaluated and the linear footage of that northern embankment was 13 14 16,000 feet. So when you take a 1E-4 frequency, and 15 combine it with these reductions combined with 16 17 the 1,000 divided by 16,000 you know 500 linear 18 feet, you arrive at a breach frequency of 1E-6 19 and we had concerns with that. rephrase 20 MEMBER BLEY: Let me mγ question. Maybe there's a time sequencing issue 21 22 here. 23 MS. POHIDA: Okay. 24 MEMBER BLEY: They told us about the **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS

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Corps of Engineers data. 1 2 MS. POHIDA: Yes. 3 MEMBER BLEY: Is this something they did 4 later? 5 MS. POHIDA: That was something they, that is something we discussed at the April 27 6 7 meeting. 8 MEMBER BLEY: So you began with a rough 9 estimate from them. You did an estimate of your 10 own. 11 MS. POHIDA: Yes. 12 MEMBER BLEY: And they have done something more. 13 14 MS. POHIDA: That is correct. 15 MEMBER BLEY: So we have these out of 16 sequence events. 17 MS. POHIDA: That is correct. 18 MR. FOSTER: And to kind of cut to the chase here, we had a public meeting on the 27<sup>th</sup> 19 20 and this was one of the major topics we talked 21 about in South Texas. 22 MEMBER BLEY: Okay. FOSTER: And out of the meeting, 23 MR. 24 basically we, the differences of the information NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

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that was provided, the justifications for some of the information that was provided during the frequency calculations, South Texas had told us that they would provide us justifications for those and some of the information that they had at the time was the best information that they had.

8 They had gotten new information and 9 would provide that in a response to us. What they 10 decided to do at the public meeting was for now to provide us a supplemental response to shut the 11 12 doors and they would go through their evaluation process, possibly using a dam failure expert to 13 14 subsidize their information to provide that to us so that we could then position ourselves 15 to 16 respond to their new position on the doors, okay?

17 we have gone through a path of So 18 resolution to get it to this point where the 19 doors shut, that the are we know some of information is kind of an imbalance between the 20 applicant and us, the regulators. 21

And we have got to that point now where the doors are shut and they will, they have the option to supplement that information later on,

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1	probably this summer, and we will start looking
2	at that.
3	MEMBER BLEY: Just another question on
4	that and I didn't ask them because they said they
5	are going to close the doors now, but are these
6	doors, is it possible to close these doors after
7	the breach or is that a real stretch? I don't
8	know what the doors look like, I haven't seen
9	MR. FOSTER: They are original and I
10	hate, and interrupt me any time Marie that I
11	speak on this.
12	MS. POHIDA: No I'm listening here.
13	MR. FOSTER: I mean their position was
14	they wanted to have the doors and all be open and
15	they would post the security guard with a clear
16	view of the MCR itself and it would breach, they
17	would notify operations to shut the door.
18	They felt they had a 30-minute window
19	for doing that. The staff questioned that amount
20	of time, okay, and so it became apparent during
21	the April 27 meeting that the best approach right
22	now was to shut the doors and they would look at
23	what options they could provide to us for the
24	staff to review to accept them being open.

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1	MEMBER BLEY: Okay that helps. Without a
2	sequence of steps I was having real trouble
3	understanding what was
4	MS. POHIDA: Yes.
5	MR. FOSTER: This meeting was very eye-
6	opening to all of us on the information.
7	MEMBER RAY: I realize we are in Chapter
8	19 and we are talking about PRA but is there a
9	deterministic consideration here in terms of
10	flooding risk?
11	MS. POHIDA: Yes there is. The
12	hydrologists in DSIR are working on this issue
13	and we are working with them to resolve this
14	issue. We are actually working with DSIR to get a
15	dam risk consultant to evaluate
16	MEMBER RAY: Okay I mean it's kind of
17	like building a plant below sea level or
18	something. The issue is what, aside from debates
19	about dam failure rates and so on, is what is the
20	design requirement that you impose on the plant
21	as a result of its location relative to this
22	muddy water?
23	MR. HEAD: And we have that in the
24	Chapter 2 discussion we will discuss the design
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basis flood level that we considered with a 479-1 2 foot breach of the MCR. We will present more 3 detail on this on Chapter 2. MR. FOSTER: So we are working with the 4 5 Chapter 2 people on this. MEMBER RAY: Yes, Ι mean, because 6 7 regardless of how this debate over whose paper 8 counts, it seems like something that ought to be 9 looked at deterministically as well. 10 MS. POHIDA: And we agree and also when you think of this in the context of defense in 11 12 depth and if you read the defense in depth that are documented in quidelines 13 Req Guide 14 on coming back to the 1.174, we keep same 15 statement is that you wanted to minimize а 16 reliance, over-reliance, programmatic on on 17 activities to compensate for weaknesses in plant 18 design and our concern is that if you had a 19 breach, the only thing that was left was you 20 know, operator actions. 21 something And so that was that 22 concerned the staff. So you know, following the public meeting, STP committed to keep 23 these 24 normally open doors closed and we are still

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1 working on the issue

1	working on the issue.
2	MEMBER ARMIJO: What about the existing,
3	the current, the plants that are already there.
4	Do they have doors that are already shut or?
5	MR. FOSTER: They are but the control
6	room is above ground level.
7	MEMBER ARMIJO: The control room is
8	MR. FOSTER: So you know, we voiced all
9	our concerns on the different information that
10	came in. South Texas agreed that it now would go
11	ahead and shut the doors. They reevaluated and
12	more than likely they will resubmit, trying to
13	address all these different areas of concern that
14	we have and then the staff will evaluate and see
15	if we can seek resolution on things.
16	MS. POHIDA: All right that concludes my
17	discussion. Does anybody have any additional
18	questions?
19	Thank you.
20	MR. FOSTER: Let's move on to Dr.
21	Fuller.
22	MR. FULLER: Thank you. I'll be
23	discussing the next three slides. So on slide 15
24	we are discussing open item 19-5, which is COL
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license information item, 19.14 on accident management.

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3 We reviewed the information that they 4 have in section 19.9.14 of their FSAR which would 5 refer back in turn to the SAR and determined that the application didn't address all of the items 6 7 required to establish, in our mind at least, a 8 sufficient technical basis for developing 9 accident management procedures for units 3 and 4.

We believe that consistent with what we 10 have been discussing for quite some time now with 11 12 GΕ on the ESBWR that accident management strategies need to be developed to address the 13 14 consequences of flooding the lower drywell after vessel breach. 15

The current severe accident guideline 16 17 with the BWR owners' group has for the ABWR 18 discusses flooding, if you will, the upper 19 drywell for certain scenarios but not the lower 20 drywell.

On the other hand, there is a design feature drywell flooder that would indeed if it worked properly in the ABWR do this in the event of severe accident. That the after vessel breach

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debris would come the the core into lower 1 2 drywell, which would be dry and this lower 3 drywell would heat up and once the temperature 4 reached 500 degrees Fahrenheit or 533 kelvin, 5 fusable plugs would melt and water would pour through this drywell flooder valves, plural, 6 7 basically from the suppression pool but through the downcomer regions in between. 8 9 And the idea is to quench the debris to 10 prevent core debris-concrete interaction and basically if heat removal is working properly 11 12 stabilize the melt and working in conjunction with the Containment Overpressure System, they 13 14 would avert containment failure. 15 Okay? That's the idea. 16 CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: And there is no 17 mechanism for water to get into the lower drywell 18 before the melt gets there? 19 FULLER: No. I suppose there are MR. 20 certain LOCAs where you could do it, but 21 basically no. 22 CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: Okay. 23 MEMBER CORRADINI: Ed, can I, I don't 24 remember this. So there's a skirt that keeps **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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water from coming down similar to the ESBWR in 1 2 terms of just a geometrical thing? I don't 3 remember --MR. FULLER: You can't get water from 4 5 the upper drywell to the lower drywell. MEMBER CORRADINI: Is there some sort of 6 7 skirt that essentially catches everything? FULLER: Yes. Okay. 8 MR. We are also 9 concerned about the possibility of premature 10 opening of the fusible -- and we, so, we as part of a confirmatory assessment project that I will 11 12 be discussing in a few minutes, we noticed that in certain relatively low-likelihood scenarios, 13 14 that our MELCOR calculations were indicating that it was possible that you could get lower drywell 15 temperatures above 500 Fahrenheit before vessel 16 17 breach. 18 MEMBER BLEY: And that is the 19 temperature that will melt the fusible links? 20 MR. FULLER: Yes. MEMBER RAY: It is supposed to --21 22 MR. FULLER: So we basically feel that we are talking about very low-probability events 23 24 below Large Release here, way Frequency

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criterion. But when you are dealing with accident 1 management, we don't think about frequencies. We 2 3 think about what you could do in this particular plant given that you have something like this 4 5 happen. And know, all these other 6 so you 7 accident management procedures are also 8 addressing very low-frequency events. 9 MEMBER STETKAR: And the total estimated 10 core damage frequency is 2.7 times 10 to the minus seven which in itself is a minuscule value 11 12 so --MR. FULLER: This is not a PRA issue, 13 this is a severe accident management issue. So we 14 15 have a path to resolution that we worked out as a 16 result of RAI questions and responses and 17 reiterated again in the public meeting in April. 18 MEMBER CORRADINI: What is that? Oh you're getting there. You're on your way. 19 20 MR. FULLER: I am almost there. I am 21 just weaving a story. South Texas is agreeing to 22 follow the industry guidance NEI in 91-04 revision 1 on closure accident, severe accident 23 24 issues and in particular the accident management,

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of accident management reduction strategies 2 turning into procedures.

committing And so they are to incorporate severe accident strategies into their overall accident management program.

Changes in the EPGs, Emergency 6 7 Procedures Guidelines, which are prior to core damage, and severe accident guidelines, which by 8 9 the way GE combines into one overall strategy, so 10 changes in those, such as the containment flooding strategy, would be included as inputs to 11 12 the plant specific technical guidelines, which would be developed in this case by South Texas by 13 14 the time they load fuel. You can't do those yet they 15 but can develop those procedures and 16 training programs around them at a later date.

17 We find this approach acceptable with 18 the caveat that we want to be sure that the 19 technical basis for ABWR accident severe 20 management is established based on current 21 understanding of severe accident progression and 22 the ABWR.

Reading between the lines of what I 23 24 just said, the current accident management

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strategies were developed based on the work General Electric did back in the mid-90s and earlier even, based on using the earlier version of the MAAP code that Bill was discussing during his presentation a little while ago.

One of the issues there is that the earlier versions of MAAP assumed that once you got core debris into the lower vessel head, you immediately assumed the vessel was going to fail.

10 In reality, the current state of the 11 art models of MAAP, MELCOR, et cetera, say you 12 have several hours. That changes the name of the 13 game in accident management space quite a bit.

MEMBER CORRADINI: So I guess I want to understand, I didn't mean to interrupt you if you still have more to say but I am trying to interpret what you said and the stuff on the board.

So are you saying that the path to resolution is that the STP folks are going to come up with a series of guidelines on what should be done to minimize the chance that this would occur? Or --

MR. FULLER: No, at this point we want

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make sure that they understand what their 1 to technical basis is and I'm not sure they do yet 2 3 but they do have the tools to determine it. MEMBER CORRADINI: So you are not 4 5 telling them, so the path to resolution is they are going to go think about it. 6 7 MR. FULLER: They are committing, they to 8 basically committing incorporate the are 9 severe accident strategies. This is an open item, 10 Mike. MEMBER CORRADINI: Okay, okay, fine. 11 12 MR. FULLER: Okay? 13 MEMBER ARMIJO: These are procedural changes. 14 15 MEMBER CORRADINI: That is what I guess 16 I am trying to --17 MR. FULLER: No no, yes, they would be 18 procedural changes but they need to be based on 19 the best understanding of how severe accidents 20 would progress and how they could be mitigated at 21 the time, up to date understanding, not 15-year-22 old understanding. MEMBER RAY: But this fusible thing, is 23 24 it part of an existing certified design? **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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FULLER: It is, they took MR. 1 а 2 departure on it, which gave me a reason to raise 3 this whole question. It is, they did change their logic on it some, on when they are going to use 4 5 it and what the --STETKAR: Well, they actually MEMBER 6 7 changed the design of the valves themselves, didn't they? 8 9 MEMBER RAY: Yes. I mean, this opens at 10 a precise temperature. MR. FULLER: More or less precise, yes, 11 12 you know. 13 MEMBER CORRADINI: So can I just use an analogy, I'm sure that the STP people will be 14 upset with this but what is it different than 15 something I have in the room here which is at 16 17 prescribed temperature plus minus some or uncertainty this thing will start pouring water 18 19 into the room? 20 Am I missing something? Or is that just 21 basically it? 22 MEMBER BLEY: Lower temperature. MEMBER CORRADINI: Yes, thank you. But 23 24 is that it? **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

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1	MR. STILLWELL: This is Bill Stillwell
2	from South Texas. What was described in the DCD
3	was temperature actuated fusible plug valve that
4	actuated at 533 degrees kelvin I believe.
5	MR. FULLER: Right.
6	MR. STILLWELL: During certification
7	they evaluated a range of temperatures above that
8	and looked at what happened, what would be the
9	consequence of the lowest drywell flooder
10	actuated at higher and higher temperatures.
11	But they didn't really evaluate what
12	happened if it opened at a lower temperature. So
13	what they did in the DCD was say the valve cannot
14	open below 533 degrees.
15	What our original departure said, did
16	for us was to change the valve design to
17	something we think we can build and also gave us
18	the tolerance on that, 533 plus or minus 10. And
19	when the NRC brought it up to us, we said gee
20	whiz you are right, there is a lower limit that
21	we should not have gone below.
22	So we have modified the departure to
23	take away the temperature band and went back to
24	what was described in the DCD and kept the design
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1	with something we feel we can build.
2	MEMBER SIEBER: But there is an implicit
3	assumption that melt-through of the vessel
4	MR. STILLWELL: Prior to the lower
5	drywell flooders actuating.
6	MEMBER SIEBER: To me there is a lot of
7	uncertainty there too, probably more than the
8	fusible link operation. And to have that
9	operation first is not a good thing. You've got
10	the potential for steam explosions and different
11	challenges to containment.
12	MR. FOSTER: This is Rocky Foster. Bill
13	you have responded to this supplemental RAI,
14	right, or this RAI?
15	MR. STILLWELL: It came in at the same
16	time we sent the supplemental response.
17	MR. FOSTER: The staff is evaluating it
18	to see if
19	MEMBER ARMIJO: So is the temperature
20	where these plugs melt, is it the right
21	temperature, should it be higher if in fact the
22	vessel doesn't breach as quickly as you thought?
23	MR. FULLER: Well I think the way you
24	have to look at it is, you have to look at the
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temperature responses to these accidents while the debris is still in the vessel and if you are getting relatively close, I don't know close is too close, then you have to wonder whether or not they are going to open prematurely.

As I said, in one of the scenarios we looked at in our confirmatory assessment, which happened to be initiated by a main steamline break inside containment, we saw with a MELCOR calculation, you were getting right up there, right up in that range before the vessel was calculated to be breached.

And as you would imagine there is a ton of uncertainty in the models of the various phenomena of what's going on in the vessel with molten core material in it.

17 MEMBER ARMIJO: So you don't want it to 18 open too early, you don't want it to open too 19 late so that you have got a big problem.

20 MEMBER CORRADINI: So I guess I have a 21 question.

22 MR. FULLER: Well, if you have a steam 23 explosion it doesn't mean it's the end of the 24 world so just think of that too.

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1	CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: Mike.
2	MEMBER CORRADINI: So, it is for the
3	moment, the answer I guess I got back from the
4	STP folks is more procedural at this point.
5	MR. STILLWELL: Yes, the response to
6	this particular RAI's procedure.
7	MEMBER CORRADINI: Speak into the
8	microphone.
9	MR. STILLWELL: I'm sorry, I'm sorry.
10	Yes, the response for this RAI is procedural and
11	following the owners' group guidelines and
12	accident management
13	MEMBER CORRADINI: But just to follow
14	the thing, I happen to have been at an ACRS
15	meeting back 20 years ago when this was talked
16	about. And there were calculations put into the
17	record by, for the DCD, for exactly this, for FCI
18	calculations.
19	I mean, they were presented by GE and
20	actually strength calculations were done for the
21	lower drywell so is that something that is known
22	to you folks?
23	MR. STILLWELL: Yes.
24	MEMBER CORRADINI: Fine, just wanted to
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1	make sure.
2	MR. FULLER: Okay, any more questions?
3	MEMBER BLEY: Yes, I have one question.
4	Building a valve that you can build, are there
5	failure modes that could allow this to open
6	without temperature melting the fusible link?
7	I would like somebody to think hard
8	about that for some time.
9	MEMBER CORRADINI: These damn things
10	leak all the time.
11	CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: Mr. Fuller, please
12	continue.
13	MR. FULLER: Thank you very much. Let's
14	go to slide 16. And while I am talking about
15	this, think back to what Marie was talking about
16	regarding the shutdown risk consideration because
17	these are tightly coupled.
18	One of the departures that they took
19	was to eliminate hydrogen recombiner because they
20	don't, you know the existing plants don't really
21	need them anymore. And because we wanted to get
22	some more information about shutdown risk, we
23	decided to create an RAI around this.
24	And basically we believe that during
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normal operation this departure, adopting this departure doesn't have any impact on the risk of severe accidents initiated during normal operation or on accident management strategies you know, from normal, accidents from normal operation.

7 There are however concerns about 8 startup and shutdown operations the when 9 containment would not be inerted. Now you've 10 heard а little while ago that they are essentially committing to keep that containment 11 12 inerted in the event that a hurricane comes along. 13

14 Okay we had an RAI question, 19-3 it was, that asked the applicant to explain whether 15 16 or not the leading, this system, including the 17 recombiners, would affect considerations of 18 hydrogen combustion when the containment may not 19 be inerted and I wasn't really thinking about 20 hydrogen recombiners being able to control such 21 an event.

What I was after was if the containment was not inerted, and you had all that hydrogen in it from a severe accident, what would their

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likelihood be, their estimate be of the likelihood of failing a containment from a hydrogen burn or overpressure or what.

So we also requested in that RAI question a discussion of the impacts on the Large Release Frequency and conditional containment failure probabilities from low power and shutdown scenarios for units 3 and 4.

9 And that is because we realized that a 10 core damage event would probably be somewhat 11 close to, you know, a large release would have a 12 fairly high probability of happening if you had 13 the core damage event, if you had the containment 14 not inerted.

So while this is going on, Marie issued the RAI that she just talked about, 19.01-31 that's open item 19-9, related to the departure on the fire water system design.

So two things, they sent in a response to the question pertaining to whether or not the recombiners, what impact they would have, and they basically showed that they couldn't really prevent major hydrogen combustion during any severe accidents that could be initiated during

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shutdown and we concur with that.

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And we are also, we have also decided that Marie's RAI question is more encompassing than what my question was regarding the Large Release Frequency and conditional containment failure probability because it was to me, getting more to the point.

And so our path to resolution is basically that they already answered the question on the impact on the hydrogen recombiners and whatever we accept on open item 19.9 and would let it close would be good enough to also close open item 19-8.

Is that, was I clear about that?

MEMBER SHACK: Ed, I don't see that really resolves your issue, I mean, it's going to be inerted when they are coming down from full power but there are certainly going to be times during startup and shutdown this is not going to be inerted.

## MEMBER ARMIJO: That is right.

22 MR. FULLER: Yes, but the likelihood of, 23 the other part of the resolution of Marie's 24 question had to do with this analysis that Bill

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Stillwell talked about in terms of what the frequencies are of this happening and assuming that they get these frequencies down low enough, that it's not close to a 10 to the minus six large release frequency, then we would consider it resolved.

But if the, this is still an open item, but if the answer comes in that a large release frequency is somewhere in the order of 10 to the minus six, then we have got more to talk about.

You look puzzled Said.

MR. FOSTER: Does that make sense?

MEMBER SHACK: No, I'm still, I look at 13 14 them as two different problems. One is to handle 15 the hurricane, the other is something associated 16 with startup and shutdown operations. Now, you 17 maybe make the argument that well, can the 18 likelihood is small enough that you can live with 19 it, but I don't see how the two are connected, I 20 quess --

21 MR. FULLER: Well, to me the shutdown 22 risk is primarily going to be contributed to by 23 external events like this hurricane. The internal 24 events will be quite low, in the order of the

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1	existing at power large release frequencies.	
2	MEMBER STETKAR: That's an assumption.	
3	MR. FULLER: Yes, but you know, they	
4	didn't do a level 2 PRA and they didn't do	
5	MEMBER STETKAR: That's the problem	
6	isn't it.	
7	MR. FULLER: And they didn't do a	
8	shutdown PRA level 1 or level 2 so, and we, you	
9	know, in our conversations with lawyers, we are	
10	not sure we are allowed to push them to do that.	
11	MEMBER STETKAR: Fortunately this	
12	committee isn't governed by lawyers. We can talk	
13	about technical things.	
14	MEMBER SHACK: It is not any different	
15	for an existing BWR, right, it's going to have	
16	the same problem. It's going to be inerted.	
17	MR. FULLER: Exactly, yes.	
18	CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: Please continue.	
19	MR. FOSTER: I think Ed is talking about	
20	if the frequency calculations from what South	
21	Texas provides us for the justification	
22	addresses, Marie's open item provides us a very,	
23	very low probability That then will illuminate	
24	Ed's concern because of the low probability right	

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off the frequency calculations. 1 MEMBER SHACK: If I assume that -- if 2 3 the assumption is that hurricanes is the only 4 precursor to shutdown. 5 MEMBER STETKAR: During shutdown. MR. FULLER: Well, it's not the only but 6 7 8 MEMBER SHACK: You think it is the 9 dominant one. 10 MR. FULLER: It's my guess, yes, it's a 11 guess. Okay. 12 MR. FOSTER: Remember this is severe accident management, a lot of it is probabilities 13 14 and what are the likelihoods. 15 MR. FULLER: Yes this is a PRA question not a severe accident question. Okay let's go to 16 17 slide 17 which is my last one and this is an open 18 item that is not associated with an open RAI and 19 I need to explain why that is the case. 20 It's related to a departure, a change in the drywell lower fusible, lower drywell 21 22 fusible plug valve that we were just discussing a few minutes ago. 23 24 This lower drywell flooder consists of **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

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pipes that run from the vertical pedestal 10 1 2 vents into the lower drywell. Each one has an 3 isolation valve fusible and а plug valve connected to the end of the pipe that extends 4 5 into the lower drywell.

And as I said earlier, they would melt presumably when the surrounding air reached the temperature of 533 degrees kelvin.

9 And if you think about it there are 10 10 of these, even if only half of them work, you are 11 probably going to flood properly, okay, so 12 there's a little more tolerance than just talking 13 about one, quite a bit more.

14 So they would remain open after the water would come in and the, it would flood the 15 16 lower drywell until head you came to а 17 equilibrium between the water in the drywell and 18 the water in the suppression pool.

They also have another way to get water in through the AICW if they need to. But let's just talk about this for now. The recoolability by an overlying water pool has not been yet conclusively demonstrated by ongoing research activities although being somewhat cognizant of

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the core-concrete interaction experiments now going on out at Argonne for the OECD, I believe we are getting closer and closer to such a demonstration.

So we are concerned that this containment liner failure may not be averted for 24 hours after core damage even with water on top of it, the core debris.

9 And because of that concern we decided 10 to carry out a confirmatory assessment using the MELCOR 1.8.6 code and we, to do this particular 11 12 confirmatory assessment we asked a couple of RAIS, RAI 19-1 and RAI 19-28 to get information 13 from them that would enable 14 us to do the 15 confirmatory assessment.

And what we needed was information on 16 17 their MAAP model and we wanted to use that 18 information to do MAAP calculations. So the 19 confirmatory assessment works as follows.

20 My contractor does the MELCOR calculations, I myself do the MAAP calculations, 21 22 what it for says or three we see two representative scenarios that they used in their 23 24 PRA and also to use to put their MAAP model

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And then if anything showed that you couldn't achieve containment integrity for 24 hours or less then we would be concerned. If you couldn't show that then we wouldn't be concerned. If you showed that you could keep it intact for at least 24 hours, then they would meet our requirements.

9 And so we have done the calculations 10 and --

11 MEMBER CORRADINI: You are concerned? 12 MR. FULLER: We are not really concerned. We are still documenting them and the 13 14 path to resolution is that once we successfully complete the calculations, we'll do the checking 15 16 of the calculations and completing the 17 documentation that this item would be a closed 18 item.

19 MEMBER CORRADINI: Okay so you don't see 20 anything in terms of comparing two computer calculations that give you pause at this point? 21 22 MR. FULLER: Well that is the way we do our confirmatory assessments now for the other 23 24 plants, for the design certifications.

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MEMBER CORRADINI: The reason I am asking that is not for this plant actually, I am trying to understand what you did for other potential plants.

MR. FULLER: Well, for the other plants we used the vendor/applicant's MAAP calculations and we set up our MELCOR calculations through the Office of Research to get the MELCOR runs done 8 and then we put --

10 MEMBER CORRADINI: The reason I asked the question though, just precisely though, is my 11 12 memory is, again from a long time ago, is that the ABWR satisfies the EPRI Utility Requirements 13 Document in terms of how many square meters per 14 15 something or other --

MEMBER SHACK: You probably wrote that 16 17 Ed.

18 MR. FULLER: No I didn't actually write 19 that, but for your information we don't pay much 20 attention to that requirement.

21 MEMBER CORRADINI: I am sure you don't 22 but on the other hand what I was trying to get at, was I was just trying to understand what to 23 24 compare it to in terms of other designs. That's

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all. 1 MEMBER SHACK: No, but I mean, in the 2 3 original certification they didn't buy the coolability either. 4 5 MR. FULLER: That is correct. There's a lot of uncertainty that was referred to in the 6 7 SER. MEMBER SHACK: So I mean this is still 8 9 an issue that is not very different from 1990. 10 MR. FULLER: My predecessors certified the design. 11 12 MEMBER SHACK: Well that's why it's basaltic concrete. 13 14 MR. FULLER: You see, we didn't, the models are different now than they were then. We 15 wanted to satisfy ourselves. 16 CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: At this time let's 17 18 proceed with the last two slides in your 19 presentation please. 20 MR. FULLER: And I am done. 21 MR. FOSTER: Thank you Ed, for that very 22 informative discussion. The next two open items we have are the 23 24 seismic margin analysis areas. We have two open NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

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1	items, 19-14. This deals with the standard
2	departure, South Texas, reclassify the right-of-
3	way from seismic category one to a non-seismic.
4	We issued an RAI requesting the STP to
5	augment its response with analysis procedures
6	equivalent to the SRP section 3.7.2.8c and a
7	related ITAAC.
8	Next open item is 19-17, sequence- and
9	plant-level seismic HCLPF capacities. This is a
10	COL license information item. It should include
11	an update of the system model development of DCD
12	incorporate capacity reductions due to site
13	specific effects and site specific SSEs.
14	Commitment 19.9-4, South Texas has
15	committed to go ahead and provide us with the
16	sequence level and plant levels, seismic, HCLPF
17	capacity pursuant to 10 CFR 52.79(a)(46). And
18	that is supposed to come in in September 2010
19	this year.
20	Questions? Next item.
21	MR. LAI: Okay this is actually a review
22	by Todd Hillsmeier and he is not here today so I
23	am just going to present it for him.
24	STP already discussed this. I am just
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going to talk from a staff point of view. The initial identification of a size specific SSCs is incorporated by reference with the list of risksignificant SSCs in Appendix 19K of the satisfied and approved ABWR DCD.

for developing, STP's 6 process 7 maintaining and updating a comprehensive list of 8 risk-significant SSEs is based on the methodology 9 described in STP, FSAR section 17.4S.1.4, which 10 includes that identification of risk-significant SSCs based on PRA risk importance measures, risk 11 12 insights and the key assumptions.

And STP is going to use expert panel to identify additional risk-significant SSCs based on deterministic equips and operating experience, which augment the PRA techniques.

17 September 2011, and prior to STP By 18 entering the detailed design in the construction 19 basis, STP expects to provide a comprehensive 20 list of risk-significant SSCs using the methodology described in section 17.4S.1.4. 21

22 STP commits to completing these 23 activities under commitment 17.41 in section 24 17.4S. The staff plans to conduct audits in the

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third quarter of 2010 as part of the safety 1 2 evaluation for section 17.4S. 3 Questions? MEMBER STETKAR: Yes. 4 5 MR. LAI: Okay have Todd we can Hillsmeier unmute his phone --6 7 MEMBER STETKAR: He has control of his 8 own microphone. 9 MR. HILLSMEIER: Can you hear me? 10 MEMBER STETKAR: We can hear you now Todd. 11 12 MR. HILLSMEIER:. Is the background noise too loud? 13 14 MEMBER STETKAR: You are. You can back 15 off from the microphone though. 16 MR. HILLSMEIER:. Okay. 17 MEMBER STETKAR: That's better. How is 18 the staff, I am staring at table 19K.4 in the 19 certified design DCD, and I see things like 20 individual check valve by number fails to open. 21 So individual components and failure modes are 22 that reliability assurance program listed in 23 table. 24 We have already heard that the PRA is NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

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1	not complete, in fact it doesn't have models for
2	even some systems in it. How can the PRA be used
3	with very specific numerical criteria of Fussell-
4	Vesely importance greater than or equal to 0.005
5	and Risk Achievement Worth of greater than 2.0 to
6	identify the equipment failure modes that are in
7	the reliability assurance program list when a lot
8	of the equipment isn't even in the PRA?
9	How do you have assurance that that
10	list is indeed complete especially to the level
11	of detail of not systems even, but individual
12	components and failure modes?
13	How does the staff develop assurance
14	that that PRA support for the reliability
15	assurance program list is indeed valid?
16	You can now speak.
17	(Laughter.)
18	MR. HILLSMEIER: Are you still there?
19	MEMBER STETKAR: Oh, yes.
20	MR. HILLSMEIER: Okay. Because part of
21	your question is getting chopped off.
22	MEMBER STETKAR: Oh, is it? Okay.
23	MR. HILLSMEIER: But I understand the
24	basis of your question. As John and I stated,
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the initial identification of DRAP SSCs was incorporated by reference in 19K. And my personal opinion also is in alignment with yours, that that 19K in the DCD is not an entirely complete list. It is even based on a model that is 15 years old, and that is just my opinion.

And, first, the reason why we identify the DRAP SSCs is because the non -- during the design and construction phase is because the nonsafety-related DRAP SSCs will be subjected to the QA controls when STP enters the detailed design construction phase.

And it should also be noted that DRAP 13 only adds additional controls and processes to 14 15 the non-safety-related SSCs. It doesn't decrease 16 any existing requirements. And in STP's FSAR, 17 STP provided a revised methodology, and it is 18 this revised methodology that gives me confidence 19 that the list of risk-significant SSCs will be 20 sufficiently complete.

21 So prior to STP entering the detailed 22 design construction phase, STP will have updated 23 the list of DRAP SSCs using the methodology 24 described in their FSAR Section 17.4(s).

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1	And this methodology helps compensate	
2	for the potential limitations of the PRA through	
3	two ways. First, STP's methodology uses a lower	
4	PRA importance threshold criteria. Instead of a	
5	RAW of five that the DCD uses, they will be using	
6	a RAW of two.	
7	MEMBER STETKAR: Just let me stop you	
8	there. If something is not in the PRA, its risk	
9	achievement	
10	MR. HILLSMEIER: Right.	
11	MEMBER STETKAR: worth is precisely	
12	zero.	
13	MR. HILLSMEIER: Right.	
14	MEMBER STETKAR: So you can use the	
15	risk achievement worth of, you know, .2, and it	
16	would never show up. So it's	
17	MR. HILLSMEIER: Right.	
18	MEMBER STETKAR: that is not a	
19	crutch.	
20	MR. HILLSMEIER: No, but it is part of	
21		
22	MEMBER STETKAR: Okay. Go on.	
23	MR. HILLSMEIER: part of the crutch.	
24	It's	
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1	MEMBER STETKAR: It is	
2	MR. HILLSMEIER: The other the	
3	second part of the crutch, which is more	
4	important	
5	MEMBER STETKAR: There you go.	
6	MR. HILLSMEIER: is they will be	
7	using the expert panel to identify additional	
8	DRAP SSCs based on the deterministic technique	
9	that is described in FSAR Section 17.4(s).	
10	MEMBER STETKAR: Okay.	
11	MR. HILLSMEIER: And	
12	MEMBER STETKAR: So you	
13	MR. HILLSMEIER: Section 17.4(s).1.4	
14	describes that detail, this deterministic	
15	technique. And Bill Stillwell could describe	
16	that technique in more detail, if you'd like to	
17	hear more about that.	
18	MEMBER STETKAR: Well	
19	MR. HILLSMEIER: And I should also	
20	mention that through current RAP guidance, which	
21	is SECY 95-132 and SRP 17.4, there is no	
22	requirement to use PRA to identify these RAP	
23	SSCs. The PRA is simply one tool that can be	
24	used, and STP is using that as a tool, but also	
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STP is using the expert panel with this deterministic technique to identify the other RAP SSCs.

4 When STP completes their plant-specific 5 PRA, they will need to update the list of risksignificant SSCs relative to that plant-specific 6 7 PRA also. So based on the revised methodology Section 8 that STP described in 17.4(s) for 9 identifying the DRAP SSCs, PRA is just one tool 10 that is used, and also the deterministic 11 techniques that they provide -- that they describe is another very interesting tool to 12 identifying the RAP SSCs. 13 14 CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: Thank you. 15 MEMBER STETKAR: Okay. Thanks. 16 MR. FOSTER: Okay. Any other questions on Table 19K? 17 18 MEMBER CORRADINI: Mute, please. 19 MR. HILLSMEIER: Any other questions? 20 MEMBER STETKAR: No. 21 MR. HILLSMEIER: No? 22 MEMBER CORRADINI: You can go mute. 23 MR. HILLSMEIER: Okay. 24 MEMBER CORRADINI: Thank you. **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS

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1	MR. HILLSMEIER: Put it on mute?
2	MEMBER CORRADINI: Yes.
3	CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: Thank you.
4	MR. FOSTER: Okay. That completes our
5	presentation on Chapter 19.
6	CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: Are there any
7	other questions for the staff?
8	(No response.)
9	All right. Thank you very much.
10	MR. FOSTER: Appreciate it.
11	CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: Appreciate it. At
12	this time, let's take a 10-minute break, and then
13	we will come back and discuss the followup on the
14	open items from the prior meetings. Okay? So we
15	will reconvene at 20 minutes before 5:00.
16	(Whereupon, the proceedings in the foregoing
17	matter went off the record at 4:27 p.m.
18	and went back on the record at 4:38
19	p.m.)
20	CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: We are back in
21	session.
22	So Maitri has a list of I believe three
23	items from this meeting, and we will just make
24	sure that that's that squares away with
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171 everybody's record. Okay? 1 2 MS. BANERJEE: The first item is for me 3 to get a copy of Chapter 19 SSAR, if the members 4 are interested. 5 Okay. The second one is the white paper that describes what the words in Table 19.2 6 7 means. (Laughter.) 8 9 I don't have any other reference to 10 that white paper. So I'd like to have a better 11 \_ \_ 12 MEMBER BLEY: It was response to an RAI. 13 14 MEMBER STETKAR: Ιt was an RAI 15 response, just so -- and STP will provide that. 16 MR. HEAD: Yes, we are going to provide 17 you that RAI response, correct, today. 18 MR. CHAPPELL: We have a letter 19 reference to that. 20 MEMBER STETKAR: Okay. 21 MR. CHAPPELL: We will confirm that 22 number, and after the session provide it. 23 MEMBER STETKAR: Okay. MS. BANERJEE: And the third one was 24 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

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1	actually this may be one or more reports, one
2	was the Army Corps of Engineers report on dam
3	failure data 2006.
4	MR. CHAPPELL: Right. And we are going
5	to provide you that also.
6	MR. HEAD: That is part of another RAI.
7	MR. STILLWELL: It is identified in
8	another RAI response. We'll give you both of
9	those.
10	MS. BANERJEE: Okay. And then, staff
11	used this U.S. Bureau of Reclamation dam failure
12	data. Is there a report associated with it, if
13	the members are interested? And this Baecher
14	report, Baecher paper, they were
15	MEMBER BLEY: Yes. I think it would be
16	I think we ought to have that. I got the
17	impression they just had a table from it, but
18	that should be from staff.
19	MS. BANERJEE: That should be from the
20	staff, yes.
21	MS. MROWCA: This is Lynn Mrowca. We
22	can give you a copy of that Baecher report.
23	MEMBER BLEY: Okay. Thank you.
24	MS. BANERJEE: Baecher paper and then
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the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation dam failure data. 1 2 CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: Anything else on 3 anybody's list? MR. HEAD: Yes. 4 5 CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: Yes, sir. MR. HEAD: I just want to go over to 6 7 see if they are open items. Early on, we had a discussion on the RCIC steam valve failure --8 MEMBER STETKAR: Model for it. 9 10 MR. HEAD: -- model for it. And that was coupled with an RWCU discussion also, so I 11 wondered, is there is an open item on that one 12 specifically, or --13 MEMBER STETKAR: Let's hold off on that 14 15 for a while, because I think when we finish up the meeting here and go around the table -- are 16 17 we doing that --18 CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: Yes, sir. 19 MEMBER STETKAR: -- now? 20 CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: No, no, not now. 21 MEMBER STETKAR: Okay. When we finish 22 up and go around the table, I'd like to float a couple of ideas, but --23 24 MR. HEAD: Okay. NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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MEMBER STETKAR: -- hold off on that, 1 2 Scott. 3 MR. HEAD: All right. Well, then, the 4 last one I heard was there was a fusible link 5 failure mode question you asked us. I said, "Is there a MEMBER BLEY: 6 7 failure mode of those valves, the ones with the fusible links, that will allow water to pass 8 9 through them without the fusible link melting?" 10 MEMBER RAY: And to ensure they have a seismic fragility, for example. 11 12 MEMBER BLEY: They must have some other 13 failure mode. If not, that's going to be 14 interesting news. 15 MEMBER STETKAR: Yes. We'll follow up 16 on that. 17 CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: Okay. 18 MR. HEAD: That's all I had. 19 CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: how about staff? 20 MR. WUNDER: We don't have anything in addition to that. We agree with what you --21 22 CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: Thank you. Okay. At this time, we will proceed to discuss the 23 action items from prior meetings. 24 **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

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MS. BANERJEE: And I have a -- this is 1 2 Maitri Banerjee. I have a list attached to the 3 agenda that I distributed at the beginning of the meeting. 4 5 CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: So we can just follow up. They were referred to the -- the open 6 7 items by number. 8 MS. BANERJEE: Yes. If you could 9 reference open items by number that we are going 10 into to discuss today that will be helpful. MR. HEAD: We will in fact be showing 11 12 you that this is something of a work in progress for us, okay? So we have a similar list, and we 13 14 obviously need to reconcile that this is being 15 shown, to let you know that we are keeping track 16 of everything that we are under -- you know, that 17 we are getting from these meetings. 18 I don't know, Coley, are these the same 19 numbers that --20 MR. CHAPPELL: These are the same 21 that were provided in the numbers public 22 reference. 23 MR. HEAD: Okay. 24 MR. CHAPPELL: And with the exception NEAL R. GROSS

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of the last few from the May 20th meeting, which 1 2 I added on without -- because there was no 3 reference. MS. BANERJEE: Good. Thank you. 4 5 MR. HEAD: So we are both -- our intent 6 show you the status of this at each is to 7 meeting. 8 CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: Okay. 9 MR. HEAD: Let you know a visual view 10 of the progress. And our intent today is to talk about the following open items. 11 12 MEMBER ARMIJO: The ones that are bold? Well, yes, they are bolded 13 MR. HEAD: on this list, and here is the list of the actual 14 15 ones we are going to talk about today. They are the Part 21, and then a series of electrical 16 17 switchyard issues, a RCIC cycle, a RCIC question 18 that was from one of the previous meetings, and 19 then a DRAP that we got actually up on the screen 20 earlier. 21 CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: Okay. 22 MR. HEAD: Okay? 23 CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: Yes, sir. 24 MR. HEAD: All right. Part 21 is going NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

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1	to be lead by Brad Maurer from Westinghouse.
2	MR. MAURER: Good afternoon. My name
3	is Brad Maurer. I work for Westinghouse. My
4	current position is Manager of ABWR Licensing at
5	Westinghouse. I have been with Westinghouse for
6	over 36 years now, many of those in the licensing
7	area. Prior to that I did piping analysis and
8	support design, turbine missile probability
9	studies, and also electrical equipment seismic
10	qualification.
11	This afternoon I will talk to the
12	action item this is action item Number 4 on
13	the detailed list, Part 21 issues that affect the
14	ABWR design.
15	Back in our March 2nd meeting, the
16	Committee raised a question concerning the Part
17	21 issue relative to the stability issue, and we
18	responded to that in the March 18th meeting
19	specifically. We have taken the action to look
20	at all Part 21 issues to see if there are others
21	that affect the ABWR design, and we have done
22	that.
23	We looked at Part 21 reports going back
24	to 1995, thinking that the ABWR DCD was approved
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in about mid-1997, so we backed off a couple of years thinking anything before that would have been included in the DCD itself. So from -- we looked at '95 to the present.

of 5 result their review, As а we identified 45 Part 21 reports, which we felt 6 7 might be applicable to BWR issues, and we did a 8 detailed review of those 45 reports. And as a 9 result of that, we came up with a number --10 several reports that fell into two different One area was the stability option 3 area, 11 areas. 12 which was the subject of the original question from the Committee, and the second area was the 13 14 calculation of SLMCPR, which is the safety limit for minimum critical power ratio. 15

These two areas were already known and were identified in the STP 3 and 4 COLA as COL items. In the table here, we talk about these two items in a bit more detail. The stability option 3 was identified in four of the Part 21 reports, in some cases plus supplements.

The COLA Part 2 COL commitment, 4.4-3, commits us to provide an updated stability analysis addressing the current -- or the design

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-- fuel design that will be used at STP 3 and 4. 1 2 The second item, the SLMCPR, came up in two 3 different Part 21 report. And also, this item is 4 a commitment in the COL or in the COLA, COM 4.4-5 2, and this also commits us to perform an analysis on the thermal limits, which includes 6 7 the SLMCPR. So both 8 of these areas will be 9 addressed, utilizing our methodology in a fuel 10 design that will be used at STP 3 and 4. MEMBER ARMIJO: Well, when will that be 11 12 done? 13 MR. MAURER: I'm sorry? MEMBER ARMIJO: When will you do that? 14 15 You know, you need the actual fuel design that 16 you are going to put into the plant in order to 17 do these analyses, and so my question is: when 18 are you going to do that to make sure everything 19 is okay? 20 MR. MAURER: Well, those analyses are 21 currently underway right now. We are providing a 22 stability topical report with our methodology to the staff by September. 23 24 MEMBER ARMIJO: Well, we'll want to be **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

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looking at --1 2 CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: For which fuel, 3 though? MEMBER ARMIJO: Yes. But which fuel is 4 5 going to be --CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: We don't want it 6 7 for the GE7 fuel. MR. HEAD: Right. These will be closed 8 9 for the fuel used for the plant, is I think what 10 you're really asking. MEMBER ARMIJO: Yes, the fuel, the 11 12 SVEA96 plus, whatever that design is, that's the one that is -- that we are interested in. 13 14 HEAD: The commitments will be MR. 15 closed when we have actually done those analyses 16 for the fuel that we are going to be loading in 17 the plant is what --18 MR. MAURER: That's right. That is 19 what you're --20 MEMBER ARMIJO: I'm just asking, will the ACRS see this -- these --21 22 MR. HEAD: Yes. And we'll -- in terms of those topicals, I think you have already 23 24 recognized that you have the opportunity to NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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review those as those become available. MEMBER ARMIJO: Yes. And you have provided a list of topical reports to us, and I think we need to do some homework here to make

sure that we get on the agenda to --

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MS. BANERJEE: Yes. If I may say that 6 7 the Committee decided at the April P&P that it is 8 going be a joint subcommittee, Thermal to 9 Hydraulics, ABWR, and probably also Power Uprate, 10 that will look at those, you know, list and 11 select --

12MEMBER ARMIJO:The Fuel Subcommittee13will want to be part of that, you know, so --14MS. BANERJEE:So it's the full --15MEMBER ARMIJO:-- make sure that --16MS. BANERJEE:-- full committee.

MEMBER ARMIJO: It's pretty much a full
 committee, because it's important to everything.

MS. BANERJEE: And Zeyna and I areworking.

MEMBER ARMIJO: Okay.

22 MS. BANERJEE: She I think probably is 23 going to provide you with a list pretty soon.

MEMBER ARMIJO: Okay.

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102 CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: Now, the 1 2 assumption in this response that any Part 21s3 prior to 1995 would have been captured during the 4 original DCD review --5 MR. MAURER: That was our assumption, 6 yes. 7 CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: Now, how good is that assumption? Is there something inherent in 8 9 the process that gives you that assurance? 10 MR. MAURER: No, there isn't. Our assumption was simply based on the fact that in 11 12 1995, or prior to 1995, the DCD was under active review with the staff, and that any issues that 13 14 GE would have brought up at that time related -that affected the ABWR would have been included 15 16 in the ABWR design and the DCDs. 17 MR. HEAD: I think there is something 18 inherent in the process. 19 CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: There is? 20 MR. HEAD: Within the Part 21 process 21 itself --22 CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: Right. MR. HEAD: -- and the expectation that 23 24 the vendors, the expectation that the vendors **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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have to making the report, the expectations that 1 2 the applicant or licensees have to react to that 3 information. And I think there is also that -that is a topic that is inspected by the NRC as 4 5 to the validity -- you know, the robustness of the Part 21 process, either at vendors or 6 at 7 licensees via their corrective action program. 8 MR. WUNDER: This is George. 9 CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: You know, a Part 10 21 that may be applicable to the ABWR may not have been generated by either the vendor or the 11 12 applicant. They could have been generated by somebody else. 13 MR. WUNDER: This is George. 14 15 CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: They may be relevant to the ABWR. 16 This is George Wunder for 17 MR. WUNDER: 18 the staff. This is an excellent question, and I 19 think that it will probably be part of it. Ι 20 think it is probably appropriate to address it in the staff's presentation on this issue, which we 21 will be doing not today but we hope at the next 22 meeting, at the beginning of it. 23 24 CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: Okay. NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

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1	MR. HEAD: Okay?	
2	CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: Thank you.	
3	MR. MAURER: What we have presented,	
4	though, is the results of our research.	
5	CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: Right. I think,	
6	still, the open issue is whether the 1995 date,	
7	cutoff date that you have selected, is really	
8	appropriate, or maybe something may have fallen	
9	through the cracks in the process.	
10	MR. MAURER: Understand.	
11	CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: Thanks.	
12	MR. HEAD: Okay. The second topic will	
13	be and, as a matter of fact, there are a	
14	number of electrical topics. It will be led by	
15	Evans Heacock.	
16	MR. HEACOCK: Good afternoon. My name	
17	is Evans Heacock. I'm design engineering lead	
18	for South Texas Project. I presented the Chapter	
19	8 information to the ACRS, and just wanted to go	
20	back over the open questions that were presented	
21	from last time.	
22	Starting off with the first one, would	
23	be the question was confirmed that the east	
24	offsite transmission lines, the Velasco, which	
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are on the screen, the two on the right-hand side 1 2 circled, number 8 and number 9, and whether they 3 are capable of supplying power to all four units 4 if we lose what was known as the north 5 northwestern corridor, which -- of all the other lines, 2 through 7 there at the top. 6 We went back and --7 I'm just having Coley to 8 MR. HEAD: 9 maybe mark them with the pointer, if he can. 10 There you go. MR. HEACOCK: Over there on the right-11 12 hand side. 13 CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: What are those 14 two? 15 MEMBER CORRADINI: Make your hand wave 16 again. 17 (Laughter.) 18 MEMBER SHACK: North is at the top 19 always. 20 MR. HEACOCK: Yes. The question was I 21 the transmission lines going out all quess 22 bundled. We ended up, anyways, going back to our transmission service provider for South Texas 23 24 Project's Units 3 and 4 and asked them to run NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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some studies for us.

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2	What we had them do is look at the
3	normal load for Units 1 and 2, which is about 16
4	megawatts, and then Units 3 and 4 are about 100
5	megawatts each from load. They put that into
6	their analysis and came out and showed that, yes,
7	the transmission lines were capable of supplying
8	adequate load with just those two lines, when
9	basically the 8 was the Velasco 27 to Units 3 and
10	4, and number 9 line coming in, Velasco 18.
11	MEMBER STETKAR: Good.
12	MR. HEACOCK: Okay?
13	MEMBER STETKAR: Thanks.
14	MR. HEACOCK: The other question you
15	had, is there one or two closing coils in our
16	switchyard breakers? There are only one closing
17	coil that can be in our switchyard breakers,
18	which is consistent with industry. We even asked
19	the vendors if there were if they have ever
20	seen anybody ask for two, and nobody has ever
21	asked for two closing coils ever.
22	So this I guess the followup on this
23	is, because you have two DC sources out there
24	in order to reclose those breakers to restore
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electric offsite power, you know, you have dual 1 2 trip coils that are powered from each of the 3 separate DC sources, so you are pretty well assured that the breakers are going to open. 4 5 MEMBER STETKAR: Yes. MR. HEACOCK: On the other hand, if you 6 lose a DC source, the allocation of breakers out 7 8 in that switchyard, between the DC power 9 supplies, is a little bit important to have 10 assurance that you can get offsite power back in, and you can reclose those breakers. 11 12 MEMBER STETKAR: Right. 13 MR. HEACOCK: It is a little logic problem that you need to think about. 14 Well, and 15 MEMBER STETKAR: let me finish with the rest of your logic. Part of --16 17 when you are clearing a breaker with the two 18 coils, it is important for us to make sure that 19 we trip a line during a fault, so it does not 20 spread, so the reason for that. 21 However --22 MR. HEACOCK: However --23 MEMBER STETKAR: -- the other part is 24 is that you do lose -- if you lose part of your NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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grid, or in this case if we lost our switchyard, 1 2 does not mean that all our breakers are going to 3 They will actually stay closed and wait -open. awaiting restoration of offsite sources in, and 4 5 That is presuming a lot MR. HEACOCK: 6 7 about the type of fault that you had. 8 MEMBER STETKAR: Well, we're getting 9 into a grid, which is going to -- which is going 10 to be, whatever caused it, it could be local or 11 it could be remote -- you're correct. Typically, 12 you do not clear your whole switchyard, though, on a situation for a fault. 13 If your backup breakers are caching, it is usually going to 14 15 strip one past, and your breakers even in your 16 switchyard are going to stay closed. 17 MR. HEACOCK: Just -- I'm not going to try to run through all of the possible ways that 18 19 you can get faults that may or may not open --20 MEMBER STETKAR: Well, yes. HEACOCK: -- combination 21 MR. of 22 breakers in the switchyard. It is just a caution that when you think about supplying power to the 23 24 closing coils on those breakers --**NEAL R. GROSS** 

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1	MEMBER STETKAR: No, I understand that.	
2	MR. HEACOCK: make sure that you	
3	have a little bit of diversity.	
4	MEMBER STETKAR: Yes, not necessarily	
5	all off the same battery	
6	MR. HEACOCK: Not off the same battery.	
7	MEMBER STETKAR: That's right. I	
8	understand.	
9	MR. HEACOCK: Or	
10	MEMBER STETKAR: They also have manual	
11	methods to go out and close, too. You can also	
12	go out there mainly to close breakers. You do it	
13	electrically and then manually.	
14	MR. HEACOCK: Can you really do that	
15	manually?	
16	MEMBER STETKAR: Oh, yes, it's a push-	
17	button. It's a push-button on the breaker.	
18	MR. HEACOCK: If it's a push-button on	
19	the breaker, you are energizing that coil.	
20	MEMBER STETKAR: Not always. Some of	
21	those are manual. Some are manual, some aren't.	
22	MR. HEACOCK: A lot of people say they	
23	can close breakers manually mechanically, and	
24	then they find out that they can't close the	
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breakers manually mechanically. They can open 1 2 them manually mechanically, they can close them 3 with the local button that energizes the closed 4 coil, but --5 MEMBER STETKAR: Yes. MR. HEACOCK: -- a lot of times people 6 7 don't like to have human beings out there --8 MEMBER STETKAR: No, it's not -- it's 9 not --10 MR. HEACOCK: -- methodically closing 11 these. 12 (Laughter.) It could kill that. 13 MEMBER STETKAR: That's not preferred, 14 15 Ι agree. And we will take that into 16 consideration for which things -- the use of 17 diversity in --18 MR. HEACOCK: That's --MEMBER STETKAR: We can look at that 19 20 and use diversity. 21 HEAD: Chairman, MR. Mr. Ι was 22 wondering, just as we maybe -- referring back to the previous one, could we acknowledge -- have we 23 24 addressed the ACRS's concern with --**NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

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MEMBER STETKAR: Yes. 1 2 MR. HEAD: -- this second one? 3 MEMBER STETKAR: Yes. 4 MR. HEAD: On this one, you have --5 MEMBER STETKAR: This one, at least you have -- I know the answer. The concern -- the 6 7 concern derives from what we were just 8 discussing. 9 Right. MR. HEAD: 10 MEMBER STETKAR: The concern is that the design describes in some detail the redundant 11 12 DC power supplies and makes- the fact that you have dual tripping coils, so you are sure that 13 14 you can clear a fault, and all that kind of But for the station blackout restoration 15 thing. 16 of offsite power function that you also have to 17 address, the question is: does the design 18 provide adequate redundancy for that function, 19 which means, can you have assurance that given a 20 failure of a DC power supply you still have a 21 path that you can reclose those breakers. 22 MR. HEACOCK: Yes. Under 23 MEMBER STETKAR: the worst 24 conditions where you just strip the entire NEAL R. GROSS

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switchyard through some fault, or combinations of 1 2 faults, form related --3 MR. HEACOCK: Some adversity --MEMBER STETKAR: -- do that a lot. 4 5 MR. HEAD: And so that is my question, is we can agree to go back and consider that. 6 Is 7 that sufficient to close this, or how would we --I mean --8 9 CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: You are asking 10 about a process whether we close this action item and create another one or --11 MR. HEAD: Well, that would be --12 CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: -- just this would 13 be simply a clarification of the action item, and 14 15 the fact that this response may not have addressed the concern? 16 17 MEMBER STETKAR: Well, the response -the response provides information. 18 19 MR. HEAD: Right. 20 MEMBER STETKAR: I mean, if they came back and said, "Yea, verily, each breaker has two 21 22 redundant closing coils," there would be no followup because, you know, you'd power one from 23 each one, and that's the problem. I knew this 24

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1	one would
2	MR. HEACOCK: Yes, I figured you
3	probably would be, too.
4	CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: Rather than
5	proliferating the action items, I would rather we
6	keep this open and just address the concerns.
7	MEMBER STETKAR: Yes. I mean, the real
8	issue here is the ability to restore and
9	restore at least one offsite power supply.
10	MR. HEACOCK: Yes. And then, I guess I
11	would from the standpoint of what we're saying
12	close being able to close it even with the
13	future, I don't know how I would keep it open and
14	address your concerns, unless we I'm not sure
15	how I would end up closing it.
16	CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: We can open a new
17	one, if that makes it easier for you.
18	MR. HEACOCK: No, no.
19	MR. HEAD: What you're asking us to do,
20	it seems like somewhat we've got to go through
21	a design evolutionary process to address that,
22	and
23	MEMBER CORRADINI: I guess I just I
24	wanted to ask I want to ask John, is this
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1	something that you'd fall on your sword over, or
2	is this a little item?
3	MEMBER STETKAR: It's it could be
4	potentially important, if indeed for loss if
5	loss of offsite power events are important
6	contributors to core damage, and, a) they are;
7	therefore, the ability to recover offsite power,
8	which is explicitly modeled in the PRA, could be
9	important.
10	Now, if for some reason the design of
11	the switchyard is not conducive to the to your
12	ability to restore power to the plant, that
13	numerically could have an effect.
14	MEMBER CORRADINI: Okay.
15	MEMBER STETKAR: So it is I'm not
16	going to fall on my sword over it, in that sense,
17	but it could be a potentially you need to have
18	a failure of DC power. I'm not going to do a
19	risk assessment sitting at a table here, but it
20	is something that probably has not been
21	considered in the risk assessment.
22	MEMBER CORRADINI: Okay.
23	MEMBER STETKAR: And it is something
24	that probably has not been considered in the
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if I can use the term "design of the switchyard" 1 2 where the design of the switchyard includes the 3 allocation of circuit breakers specific \_ \_ circuit breakers between the two available 4 5 sources of DC power to say that, even with the failure of one source of DC power, I still can 6 7 restore an offsite power of supply back into the 8 plant. Right now, there is no assurance that you 9 can do that, because you don't know how those breakers are allocated among the -- between the 10 two different DC power supplies. 11

12 MR. HEACOCK: And I guess -and bringing it up, I don't know of any other plant 13 14 that has gone through something -- what you're 15 asking for. And there really has not been any 16 guidance on our side trying to ask for it. Maybe 17 we can go back and --

18 MEMBER STETKAR: This gets back to an 19 issue between -- our role is to ask technical 20 questions. It is probably devolving now into an 21 issue between you and the staff in terms of, you 22 know, what is the requirement for the --

23 MEMBER CORRADINI: So I guess that's 24 what I --

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And there's not MR. HEACOCK : 1 а 2 requirement. That's part of it: there's no 3 requirement out there. MEMBER STETKAR: But there is 4 а 5 requirement that you'd be able to demonstrate that you can restore a source of offsite power. 6 7 MEMBER SIEBER: Right. 8 MR. HEACOCK: I would say yes. 9 (Laughter.) 10 MEMBER STETKAR: Station blackout. MR. HEACOCK: Station blackout, yes. 11 12 We'll discuss about how --13 CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: So how do you want to leave this, John? 14 15 MEMBER STETKAR: You know, Said, Ι 16 don't know. I mean, you know, it's getting to 17 the point that we -- you know, South Texas raises 18 a valid issue in terms of in licensing space, you 19 know, where is that boundary? And I don't know the answer to that question. I just don't know. 20 21 That's something that the staff needs to answer. 22 CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: For the time being, we will just say we will revisit --23 24 MEMBER STETKAR: Okay. I agree. **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

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1	CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: this at a later
2	date. Otherwise, we are going to
3	MEMBER STETKAR: Yes.
4	MS. BANERJEE: Revisiting at the full
5	committee meeting, and then we decide whether we
6	are going to send a message or not.
7	MR. HEAD: Maybe on the 23rd or 24th,
8	we might have another perspective or additional
9	insights to share.
10	CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: Okay. That would
11	be fine. We'll talk about it.
12	MEMBER STETKAR: I mean, from a
13	design/licensing perspective, I agree with you
14	completely. There is you meet the criteria.
15	On the other hand, it is in a gray area that
16	could be numerically important to restoration of
17	offsite power. So it's in that gray area.
18	MR. HEACOCK: It's a good question.
19	It's a good question.
20	CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: Let's proceed.
21	MR. HEACOCK: Okay.
22	CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: Thank you.
23	MR. HEACOCK: The next item we talked
24	about was, what is the discharge time for the
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batteries in the control system? We went back 1 into our transmission supplier and talked to 2 3 them, and had actually several conversations. We basically ended up with saying their normal -- it 4 5 was actually eight hours. We went ahead and asked them to extend it to 10 hours, so we will 6 7 have a coping -- the battery being able to last 10 hours without a charge. 8 9 MEMBER STETKAR: They will exceed the 10 coping time for --MR. HEACOCK: Yes, exactly. 11 12 MEMBER STETKAR: Okay. That's good. MR. HEACOCK: Yes. 13 (Laughter.) 14 15 That's kind of why I asked --16 MEMBER STETKAR: You kid about these 17 two-hour batteries. The former question would have been a lot more interesting. 18 19 (Laughter.) 20 MR. HEAD: No. We were kind of hoping this one might reflect on the first one. 21 22 MEMBER STETKAR: Well, it does help. It does help, because this says that you need to 23 24 have a failure of one of those battery supplies NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

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1	to get you into the situation where I was
2	concerned about, where you could have a
3	configuration where you might not be able to
4	restore you know, restore a pathway. So this
5	is good, this helps.
6	MR. HEACOCK: The other information is
7	our normal seismic criteria in accordance with
8	IEEE standards. It's a 25 percent aging margin
9	and 10 percent design margin, and typical
10	batteries lead acid batteries are 10 to 15
11	to 20 years.
12	MEMBER STETKAR: So.
13	MS. BANERJEE: So we can close
14	MEMBER STETKAR: And this is closed,
15	yes, absolutely.
16	MS. BANERJEE: Okay. Thank you.
17	MR. HEACOCK: The next question was
18	asked, "Address the qualifications for
19	submergence submerged 345 cables." I'd like
20	to make a little clarification is that our
21	these cables are actually not qualified. They
22	are non-safety-related. They are transmission
23	owned by the transmission company. They do not
24	necessarily qualify them per se.
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These also are not continuously submerged. They will be submerged from time to time based on rainfalls and what not. So the rest of the response being that these cables are lead-sheathed.

lead sheathing does, What that it 6 7 provides an impervious barrier from the 8 insulation, from the groundwater or any kind of a 9 flood situation, from actually getting to the 10 insulation and working its way through and causing a fault. So the lead sheath is the path 11 12 -- is the item to keep it from actually getting wet all the time. 13

14 It's in accordance with our IEEE and 15 NEMA standards. As you can see, we list several 16 standards there, and NEMA's WC 71, also 74, and 17 the definition for -- in the NEMA WC 71 and 74 18 says that a lead or smooth aluminum sheath, with 19 or without out supplementary protection, i.e. a 20 jacket of some sort, shall be used when 21 impervious covering is required.

This is -- these are cables that have been used by the transmission company for some time. As you can see, we have actually talked

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1	with the transmission companies, gotten an idea
2	how well they actually work. They have been in
3	service 40 years, and they say they test like
4	new, so this is this is "the qualification."
5	They are not fully qualified in accordance with a
6	10 CFR
7	MEMBER STETKAR: But at least there is
8	operating experience from
9	MR. HEACOCK: That's correct.
10	MEMBER STETKAR: from your
11	MR. HEACOCK: Right.
12	MEMBER STETKAR: transmission
13	service provider with similar cables.
14	MR. HEACOCK: Right. And they are
15	actually used in industry, like Florida Power and
16	Light uses them down in their nuclear plants.
17	They put lead sheath down, since they are wet all
18	the time, so
19	MEMBER STETKAR: For the rest of the
20	Committee's benefit the Subcommittee's
21	benefit, the reason for concern about this
22	question is that it is related to the first
23	question about the capacity of those the two
24	eastern circuits to supply the unit. And one of

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those eastern circuits indeed goes through one of 1 these cables underground, specifically they are 2 3 Units 3 and 4. I think this is the --MR. HEACOCK: Right. 4 5 MEMBER STETKAR: -- feed, so this is up -- I think we are good on this one. 6 7 MR. HEACOCK: Okay. 8 MEMBER STETKAR: We're good on this 9 one. Thank you. The next 10 MR. HEACOCK: 11 question you had asked, a question about the 12 performance of the switching logic under various electrical transients. In specific, you had 13 asked, what about the loss of a unit auxiliary 14 transformer? 15 16 MEMBER STETKAR: You know, and, Coley, 17 you can go through this. But I will be honest 18 with you, I'm going to have to go back and 19 rescrew my head around a little bit to remember. 20 This one was fairly subtle, if I recall. And I haven't thought about it --21 22 MR. HEACOCK: Okay. MEMBER STETKAR: -- before this, so --23 24 so run through the presentation, and then -- but **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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I suspect we will probably wind up leaving it 1 2 open for me to be able to think about it a little 3 bit. MR. HEACOCK: Okay. That's fine. And 4 5 what it will do is that we went ahead and put out -- graphically, it's a little bit easier to show 6 7 you the normal lineup. What you're seeing now on 8 the screen, it will be the normal lineup for 9 Units 3 and 4. 10 You will see that our -- and we didn't label them, but the very top set of buses -- I'll 11 12 point to them -- these are power generation buses, 13.8, are typically energized on the unit 13 14 auxiliary transformer. The plant investment 15 protection buses, which is the next set down, are 16 normally energized by the unit auxiliary 17 transformers. 18 And then, our -- two of our safety-19 related buses, Division I, Division II, are going 20 to be typically powered by the unit auxiliary 21 transformer. 22 The third division is typically going to be powered, and normally energized through one 23 of the reserve auxiliary transformers that you 24

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see on the dark, heavy path coming down. And that is an intentional feed, so that we don't have them all on one source, and that we have to go with all diesel, so that we have immediate access to an offsite source at any given time, should we have a transient.

7 So as we go forward in looking at a 8 fault, if we had a fault on our unit auxiliary 9 transformer, our generator breaker will open up 10 right at the generator, and we will also have 11 generator breakers in the switchyard open up to 12 isolate the unit auxiliary transformer, whichever 13 one was faulted.

14 The feeds into the PG buses, the plant 15 investment protection buses, and Division I, Division II breakers will open on undervoltage. 16 17 The diesel generators for Divisions I and II will 18 receive an automatic start signal due to loss of 19 voltage on the bus. And Divisions I and II will 20 connect as the diesels come uprate at speed and 21 frequency.

Division III bus will remain energized by the reserve auxiliary transformer alpha. Also, the combustion turbine generator that we

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have will actually -- it will receive an automatic start signal based on loss of the PIP buses, voltage on the PIP buses, and come up to speed. But it actually will not load, since we actually still have a feed from one of the other reserve auxiliary transformers.

And then, we have two pre-selected PIP buses we will load back on to the reserve auxiliary transformer through one of the CTG -bus number 3. And if you go back down to the next figure, you'll show how that -- how that occurs.

We fault one of the unit auxiliary, as we're showing. It deenergizes all of the 13.8 PG buses. It will deenergize the PIP buses, and it will deenergize two of the safety-related buses.

17 After the diesel generators come up, as 18 we talked about a minute ago on Divisions I and 19 II, the bus will reload on the diesel generators. 20 And then, the third division, you will notice that the diesel generator does not start and it 21 22 stays energized by the reserve auxiliary transformer. 23

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And then, also, you will see that two

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"pre-selected" PIP buses will transfer over to 1 2 CTG3 bus and reenergize, and also the combustion 3 turbine generator is now black, which shows that 4 it started but it's not loading, since we still 5 have a source of power. Okay. MEMBER STETKAR: This would 6 7 probably resolve it. I just need to go back 8 through my thought process to make sure that this 9 answers all the questions. 10 MR. HEACOCK: Yes, I think it might If I can help -- you might have been 11 have. asking I think that -- you are worried about the 12 stripping possibly of the third division --13 14 MEMBER STETKAR: Right. 15 MR. HEACOCK: -- I think is what you 16 were asking, sir. 17 MEMBER STETKAR: I think that's right, 18 but I -- as I said --19 MR. HEACOCK: Yes. 20 MEMBER STETKAR: -- I haven't thought about this one, so I'll need to do that. 21 22 MR. HEACOCK: Okay. 23 MEMBER STETKAR: So we'll keep it open, 24 but --**NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

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MR. HEACOCK: Okay. 1 2 MEMBER STETKAR: -- don't worry about 3 it. MR. HEACOCK: Okay. 4 5 MR. HEAD: It's poised to be closed 6 maybe. 7 (Laughter.) 8 MR. HEACOCK: The last question it asks 9 is a RAT -- the reserve auxiliary 4160 us, 10 winding capable of fitting two plant investment protection buses and one safety bus? 11 The answer 12 is yes, it can feed it. 13 But we have -- and we have multiple What we explained here are the multiple 14 ways. 15 different directions we can actually feed that 16 PIP bus, the safety buses and the PIP buses. 17 MEMBER STETKAR: That's fine. As long 18 as it --19 MR. HEACOCK: Yes. 20 MEMBER STETKAR: -- windings enough to carry that load, that's all I was looking for. 21 22 also MR. HEACOCK: We have some procedural guidance that we will have a place to 23 24 say that Operations will have to look to make **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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200 sure we don't overload. 1 2 MEMBER STETKAR: So, in effect, if you 3 can flip back up to the -- if you lost -- go back 4 to 16. You went two, up two. There we go. If 5 you lost, for example, the third safety bus there, the diesel didn't start, you could still 6 7 -- you could still power those two PIP buses and 8 \_ \_ 9 MR. HEACOCK: And the safety bus. 10 MEMBER STETKAR: -- the two PIP buses and the third safety bus --11 12 MR. HEACOCK: Correct. 13 MEMBER STETKAR: -- from that single winding --14 15 MR. HEACOCK: Correct, yes. 16 MEMBER STETKAR: -- without kicking on 17 the CTG. 18 MR. HEACOCK: Right. As you can see, 19 yes, from a RAT, we can come down through the 20 reserve auxiliary. 21 MEMBER STETKAR: Yes. I think that was 22 part of my concern, to figure out what the switching was doing --23 24 MR. HEACOCK: Yes. **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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MEMBER STETKAR: -- and figure out 1 2 whether or not I had to load the CTG to pick up 3 the specific combination. 4 MR. HEACOCK: Yes, I think so, too. 5 MEMBER STETKAR: Yes. MR. HEACOCK: Okay? 6 7 MEMBER STETKAR: Okay. Thank you. 8 This one is certainly closed. 9 MR. HEACOCK: Yes. MEMBER STETKAR: I still want to go 10 back and make sure I thought about the switching 11 12 logic correctly. 13 MR. HEACOCK: Okay. MR. HEAD: All right. For this action 14 15 item, I am going to turn the discussion over to 16 Tom Daley, who was here for one of our previous 17 discussions. 18 MR. DALEY: Good afternoon. I'm Tom 19 Daley, Mechanical Engineering Group supervisor for STP Units 3 and 4. 20 21 During our discussions on the departure associated with the new RCIC turbine, we talked 22 about potential failure mechanisms, most notably 23 24 turbine overspeed. The question was asked, **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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"Well, during your design basis scenario, how 1 2 often would this turbine be exposed to the 3 possibility of this overspeed event?" So we asked Toshiba to take a look at 4 this. 5 And they did -- they did run a quick analysis, and it shows that about four times in 6 7 that eight-hour period would we cycle between the start-signal receipt at a Level 2 and the secure 8 9 signals receipt at Level 8. new pump is a turbine 10 The water 11 lubricated pump. This is typically supplied by 12 Wier. Hey, Tom, just one second. 13 MR. HEAD: That was -- that was one action item, right, was 14 15 the answering of that one? 16 MR. DALEY: That's correct. 17 MR. HEAD: I was just wondering, are 18 there any further questions on --ABDEL-KHALIK: 19 CHATR This is 20 information that is --21 MR. HEAD: Okay. All right. 22 MR. DALEY: And I, once again, want to just quickly mention that for our new Wier-type 23 24 pump, turbine water lubricated pump, I put a --**NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

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again, put a simple schematic for the control system arrangement there.

This control system has a governor which directly senses the pump discharge flow and pump discharge pressure. And it then, in turn, through a direct linkage, all internal to the turbine pump arrangement, adjusts the throttle valve directly to make sure you get the correct and set flow rate for that situation.

10 So your Terry-type turbine uses an electro-hydraulic system with a servo mechanism 11 12 with -- it is driven right off the shaft of the pump. So it starts up and drives the oil, which 13 14 in turn it uses to control itself. So that is 15 why it ends up being sometimes more prone to 16 overspeed events during startup.

However, with this direct mechanical type arrangement on the Wier pump, we agree with the vendor that it ends up with a smoother startup rate, as shown in the curve on the right side of the picture up there.

22 CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: I think this item23 is closed.

MR. DALEY: Okay.

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1	MEMBER STETKAR: Yes. The reason that
2	I actually asked about the it is a two-part
3	thing. The reason I asked about the number of
4	cycles, one is for overspeed and whether it needs
5	to be reset. The other, which I probably learned
6	earlier today, is probably not even modeled,
7	because the PRA is so simplified they would never
8	think about this, is looking at the number of
9	cycles of the RCIC turbine start-stop cycles
10	during a station blackout event.
11	So, but I already know that's not
12	modeled, so
13	MR. DALEY: For sure, that is not
14	modeled.
15	MEMBER STETKAR: For sure, that is not
16	modeled. But, you know, if you had a real PRA,
17	you would it looks like you would model four
18	cycles within a nominal 24-hour period, or at
19	least you have now some information about how
20	many cycles, depending on the offsite power
21	recovery time period, during these station
22	blackout events.
23	So, thanks, we can close this. It's
24	MR. HEAD: I think this is the last
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open item, right?

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MEMBER STETKAR: Yes.

MR. HEAD: Okay.

4 MR. STILLWELL: This is Item 30, when 5 DRAP would be effectively populated. We talked about this a little bit earlier this afternoon. 6 7 We intend to complete a majority of the system 8 reviews, and by "system reviews" I mean a high 9 level, rapid screening very assessment to 10 determine whether the system is used in emergency procedures, can contribute to a plant 11 trip, affects systems that are modeled in the PRA, the 12 questions that you had asked to screen systems 13 14 out of the maintenance rule.

15 Those will be complete -- the majority of those will be complete by the end of this 16 17 All of the system reviews for all of the year. 18 systems in the ABWR will be complete next year, 19 including going down to the component level and 20 failure model level to identify what needs to be 21 those non-safety-related in DRAP to control 22 systems, structures, or components to ensure their continued availability and reliability as 23 the plant goes into operation, and what other 24

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special testing we may need to identify for safety-related systems, structures, or components. And that will be finished by the third quarter of 2011.

5 What we intend to do is when that list 6 is completely populated, we will amend an RAI and 7 submit that to the NRC saying, "Here is the final 8 list, and this is the set of equipment that we 9 intend to monitor, and here is the controls we 10 have in place, and here is what we ask -- we are 11 asking the operational programs to consider."

12 And then, we will amend the FSAR at the 13 first amendment cycle after we have completed the 14 actions.

MS. BANERJEE: Is that going to be
after fuel --

MR. STILLWELL: No. This --

18 MS. BANERJEE: -- after COL is 19 received?

MR. STILLWELL: This is before COL is 20 It's the third quarter of 2011, and it 21 issued. 22 would amend the RAI before responses COL 23 issuance. We are just not sure we can get the 24 FSAR updated in the short period of time between

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1	the third quarter of 2011 and the potential
2	issuance of the
3	MEMBER STETKAR: I mean, in terms of
4	the timing, the importance is that there will be
5	a list submitted to the staff with appropriate
6	supporting, you know, analyses to justify the
7	population on that list before the COL is issued.
8	MR. STILLWELL: Yes.
9	MEMBER STETKAR: Whether or not there
10	is a confirmatory item to get it into the next,
11	you know, version of the FSAR is not as important
12	as whether or not the list is developed, and the
13	staff has an opportunity to review the process.
14	And I use the word "review" rather than "audit,"
15	review the process to populate that list.
16	MR. STILLWELL: As they mentioned in
17	this slide, they intend to perform an audit on
18	the process. Do we have the procedures in place,
19	and are we following our process third quarter
20	this year? And that's what we hope.
21	MEMBER STETKAR: Yes.
22	MR. STILLWELL: And then, periodically,
23	I would assume they will review what we have
24	done, or we can provide, hey, we finished this
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I don't know how that is going to work. 1 part. 2 But then, RAI response would be modified when 3 it's complete. If I could to amplify on something that 4 5 was talked about, the reason we use the expert panel -- and if you're familiar with South Texas 6 7 Units 1 and 2 and the graded quality assurance 8 the expert panel in graded process, we used 9 quality assurance to make up for known 10 deficiencies in PRA. We expect those people to come to the 11 table prepared to talk about the significance of 12 plant systems, structures, and components, that 13 14 the PRA doesn't model, things like control room 15 ventilation or control room filtration, or, in 16 this case, systems that didn't make it to the PRA 17 for whatever reason. 18 We set of deterministic have а 19 questions that we expect the expert panel to 20 answer during the sessions, and they have 21 basically five topics, and it is topics that you 22 would expect in a maintenance rule. Is it used in emergency procedures? Can its failure affect 23 24 systems that we do rely on? Off the top of my

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head, I forget what the other three are. And we 1 2 will --3 PARTICIPANT: Shutdown? MR. STILLWELL: Is it used in shutdown 4 5 analysis or shutdown -- is it used in shutdown space, for either shutdown cooling or to get the 6 7 containment hatch closed? Or something like And we rate that quantitatively based on 8 that. 9 what we think its importance is, and we sum that, 10 and it can go into DRAP entirely based on deterministic criteria. 11 12 So we'll put it in the list, because we think, based on the expertise at the table, that 13 14 the control room filtration system should be 15 important. It should be a risk-significant 16 system, although it is not modeled in anybody's 17 PRA. 18 MEMBER BLEY: Have you set a policy on 19 how you -- what kind of people you have to have 20 when you --21 MR. STILLWELL: Yes, that's described 22 in 17.4(s). 23 MEMBER BLEY: Okay. MR. STILLWELL: So we have all of the 24 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

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engineering groups represented. By "groups" 1 2 mean Toshiba, Fluor, Sargent & Lundy, STP. Ιt 3 has PRA, it also has operations. MEMBER BLEY: It has operations? 4 5 That's what I wanted to get to. STILLWELL: What we don't have MR. 6 7 right now, what we rely on the other members, is maintenance people. So we rely on the other 8 9 engineering organizations to provide maintenance 10 experience, but, yes, we've got all of the major disciplines that you would expect to see at an 11 12 operating plant, and you were going through a maintenance rule, 13 with an awful strong representation from design engineering, because 14 15 that's the stage we're at. MEMBER BONACA: I think we have to 16 17 review that list, however, when it comes out. 18 The end of next year? 19 MR. STILLWELL: It will -- the goal is 20 to finish it by September of next year, and modify an RAI response. 21 22 MEMBER BONACA: Because, I mean, the number of systems or components fall within the 23 24 PRA. If I understand it, it's a very small **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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1	fraction of the ones you rank.
2	MR. STILLWELL: Yes, that's a true
3	statement.
4	MEMBER BONACA: I think about maybe
5	2,000 components, and you are ranking 30- or
6	40,000. And this is for Units 1 and 2. That's
7	
8	MR. STILLWELL: We reviewed 30- or
9	40,000, and I think we wound up ranking in the
10	graded quality assurance about 2- to 3,000.
11	MEMBER BONACA: All I'm saying is that
12	for many of them the PRA doesn't give you any
13	insight, so, therefore, you have to make a
14	judgment
15	MR. STILLWELL: We rely on the expert
16	panel.
17	MEMBER BONACA: and, you know, but I
18	have always been curious about that, because, I
19	mean, we were never allowed to use a system of
20	this nature to discuss among a number of experts.
21	And the rank and the ranking was done with
22	specific classification of the safety systems,
23	and so on and so forth, okay? With certain
24	specific rules.

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So this is pretty subjective, the way 1 2 you are doing it. I'm not saying that it is not 3 a valid way. I think we have to look at it. MR. STILLWELL: Speaking for 1 and 2, 4 5 it's subjective, but it's repeatable, that I can in different people to substitute for bring 6 7 expert panel, and we get remarkably consistent 8 results. And maybe because we bias everybody the 9 right way, but I think we've got --10 (Laughter.) We're asking the right questions. 11 We 12 have guidelines on what the responses mean. So if we say something is extremely important, it 13 14 falls into this set of rules. If we say it's something that is not important, it is obviously 15 down here in this set of rules. 16 17 MEMBER SHACK: After all, did we 18 approve 50.69, which is -- it's a very similar 19 process. 20 MR. STILLWELL: Exactly. 21 Well, you know, MEMBER BONACA: some 22 people approved it with more enthusiasm than 23 others. I think the 24 MEMBER STETKAR: real NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

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challenge -- and it's -- we could discuss this forever, but the real challenge is that the PRA experts must clearly elaborate what is explicitly modeled in the PRA, that and what is not. You know, that there -- that must be stated very, very clearly, especially if that list is going to be populated at the level of detail of individual components and failure modes.

9 That's -- it's really important that 10 those experts who know nothing about PRA, they 11 have this ultimate faith that you have this 12 wonderful model that is 100 percent complete. 13 And if something doesn't show up as numerically 14 important from that model, therefore, I trust 15 that.

MR. HEAD: And after you've ranked 17 100,000 components, you will know a lot about the 18 PRA, and you do know a lot about its weaknesses. 19 You know some of the value you are adding to the 20 process, because --

21 MEMBER STETKAR: But, you know, and 22 especially in a situation like this where the PRA 23 is a bit murky, let's call it, it is really 24 important.

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222 Now, if the ranking was only going to 1 2 be done on a system basis, or a flow path type 3 basis, there is a little bit less concern about 4 that. 5 MEMBER SIEBER: You still need a good PRA. 6 7 MEMBER STETKAR: Well, but given the 8 fact that you don't have a complete model --9 MR. STILLWELL: May I modify that 10 slightly? You need a PRA that you understand its limitations. 11 12 MEMBER STETKAR: Well, but you also need a PRA person to clearly specify what --13 14 What MEMBER BLEY: is and isn't 15 working. MEMBER STETKAR: -- what is and isn't 16 17 handled, that the whole panel has SO that 18 information. The whole panel -- you know, I come 19 back to that turbine building closed cooling 20 water system. The feedwater pump right now, for 21 failure to run, is currently on the list. The 22 condensate pumps are not on the list, and there is not even any -- certainly no mention of the 23 24 that cools both of those pieces of system

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equipment.

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2	If you're not careful, you know, if
3	somebody says, "Well, did you model feedwater in
4	the PRA?" The PRA people says, "Well, yes, we
5	did." "Well, you must have modeled condensate,
6	you must have modeled" you know, "Well, we
7	didn't model the condensate booster pumps,
8	because I know they are new, so I might ask why
9	they're not on the list."
10	MEMBER SIEBER: Not on the new system
11	or the

12 MEMBER STETKAR: But you must have 13 modeled the turbine building closed cooling water 14 system, and the turbine building service water 15 system, because, you know, I know they are 16 required. So I don't need to think about those.

17 So the PRA people need to explicitly 18 say, "Hey, we did not model those things. You 19 need to think about whether we should do that." 20 That's a really --

21MR. HEAD:That's crucial to the22process.

MEMBER STETKAR: That's a -- yes. I mean, that's a heavy burden on the part of the

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PRA people to explicitly state what is not there. 1 2 CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: So at this time 3 this item is closed, but we will have an 4 opportunity to review this? 5 MS. BANERJEE: Yes. We can keep it in the organizational memory, because this whole 6 7 thing is going to come back at Phase 6. Is that 8 \_\_\_ 9 MR. HEAD: Well, yes, I guess I would 10 like to ask that. If on this schedule the SER have -- already have been 11 will issued by 12 September of 2011, and it will be past the last ACRS, so I guess the schedule aspect of it -- not 13 14 to presume I'm not -- where the schedule is 15 actually going to be, but as of right now that 16 would be past the --17 MEMBER ARMIJO: We will never see the 18 DRAP test. 19 MR. HEAD: I was just reacting to the 20 fact that you all wanted to see it again, and I 21 understand that, and maybe there are ways to --22 but in --But as I understood 23 MEMBER STETKAR: it, though, Scott, you said that the DRAP list 24 **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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would eventually be supplied as an amended response to an RAI. It is not clear to me how the staff -- and this is the staff's business, but how the staff could issue a final SER with no open items if they still have an incomplete answer to an RAI.

MS. BANERJEE: License condition is one way of doing that.

9 MR. HEAD: No, I don't believe this is 10 -- I think what we're defining here is the 11 process we are going through and how soon it will 12 be available to us, the station, to go through 13 the process.

14 MEMBER STETKAR: Understood. That's a 15 timing issue, but I'm -- you know, this concept that the SER will be written and we -- we, as the 16 17 ACRS, will have thereby lost any opportunity to 18 go back and revisit this issue, my question is, 19 is, you know, can the staff actually issue an SER 20 without any open items with something like this remaining, you know, an outstanding submittal. 21

22 MR. HEAD: Is this an open item at this 23 point? I believe, having defined this schedule, 24 haven't we resolved the staff's --

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We have admitted the MR. STILLWELL: 1 2 RAI response to provide this information. Is it 3 an open item? It will probably be an open item with confirmatory action. 4 5 MR. CHAPPELL: By the date they -- it's unlikely the staff has completed their review of 6 7 this RAI. CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: Yes, Jack. 8 9 MEMBER SIEBER: The difficulty I think 10 that the staff is going to have is if they use the DCD PRA, modified only to reflect change --11 physical changes in the plant, how will they 12 review the DRAP? 13 MEMBER STETKAR: Well --14 15 MEMBER SIEBER: Because they are -- you 16 know, because it's not going to be modeled or --17 MEMBER STETKAR: Well, but, I mean, it 18 should be -- the justification for what is on the 19 DRAP, and by implication what is not on the DRAP, 20 would come from the expert panel, the documentation of the expert panel, you know, 21 elicitation process, or whatever you call it. 22 if you want 23 MEMBER SIEBER: So to 24 decide whether the expert panel really did its NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS

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job, how are you going to do it without a good 1 2 PRA? 3 MEMBER STETKAR: Well, I mean, that's 4 5 MR. STILLWELL: PRA is one piece of it 6 and --7 MEMBER STETKAR: -- the PRA is one 8 piece of it, but --9 MEMBER SIEBER: Yes. 10 MEMBER STETKAR: -- I think in terms of the review process -- well, you know, we could 11 12 talk about this for a long time, but in terms of the review process the reliability assurance 13 program list is supposed to be available at the 14 15 COL stage. 16 MR. HEAD: Good question. I don't know 17 if I have a good answer to that. 18 MEMBER STETKAR: Okay. 19 MS. BANERJEE: How about if we ask the 20 staff to come back at the next meeting? 21 CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: Right. Is the 22 staff --MEMBER STETKAR: I would hate to be 23 24 caught in a bind, you know, a -- a process bind NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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where something that is supposed to be delivered 1 2 at the COL stage, and reviewed at the COL stage, so that -- you know, and by implication, because 3 4 it's reviewed at the COL stage, we get a chance 5 to look at it, is caught in an area where the SER is written, and there is a confirmatory item on 6 7 something that really hasn't been reviewed. CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: 8 We'll have the 9 staff provide an answer to this timing issue. 10 Okay. thank you. 11 MEMBER BONACA: It seems to me -- just one last note -- the PRA is being used for two 12 purposes. One is to support the certification 13 14 process, okay, and I think that -- I think we can 15 wrap it up earlier. The second portion is to 16 rank, and that is more of an operations support 17 So maybe that is -- and a reasonable step. 18 expectation for us to expect that the whole thing 19 will be completed by a time. I don't know. We 20 need to think about that. 21 MEMBER SIEBER: By the ACRS. 22 CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: But, nevertheless, I think a clarification of the timing would be 23 24 helpful. Okay. Thank you.

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1	Are there any other questions to STP				
2	regarding any of these open items?				
3	(No response.)				
4	Okay. Do you have any questions for us				
5	in terms of				
6	MR. HEAD: No. I was going to				
7	CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: you know, the				
8	status or, you know, whether an item is fully				
9	closed or is still open? Do you have a clear				
10	indication?				
11	MR. HEAD: Item 25 on the closings,				
12	which is still open, and we will look at that				
13	some more for a future item. The last one we				
14	just discussed, it sounds like it's open for NRC				
15	to come back and provide a				
16	MEMBER STETKAR: You know, what I				
17	think, from my perspective, prompted that was				
18	just to make sure that indeed the list would be				
19	available prior to issuance of the COL. We have				
20	determined I'm not sure what we determined				
21	based on that. The answer is, yes, the list will				
22	be available, but it's a bit gray.				
23	MR. HEAD: Where that list plays in the				
24	COL process versus the ITAAC is				
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230 MEMBER STETKAR: I mean, the point --1 2 yes. 3 MR. HEAD: -- we need all of that. MEMBER STETKAR: That's correct. 4 5 CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: And the first item, I guess there is just a need to clarify or 6 7 justify the 1995 cutoff date. 8 MR. HEAD: Okay. So that one is still 9 open for us from that perspective, and the NRC 10 also owes you a discussion on the --11 CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: Right. 12 MR. HEAD: -- process. CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: Correct. 13 MR. HEAD: Okay. 14 15 MS. BANERJEE: So can I go over the 16 status quickly? 17 CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: All right. Okay. 18 MS. BANERJEE: I'm sorry. 19 CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: No problem. No 20 problem. 21 MS. BANERJEE: Part 21, question on 22 Part 21 report, Item Number 4. It is not closed 23 \_ \_ 24 CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: Right. **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

BANERJEE: -- pending staff's MS. 1 2 presentation on Dr. Abdel-Khalik's question on 3 the cutoff date. MR. HEAD: And a presentation from us 4 5 on the cutoff date. CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: Right. 6 7 MS. BANERJEE: Yes. Okay. And then, we go into Item Number 20, the next one that is 8 9 closed, number of RCIC cycles. 10 CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: Yes. MS. BANERJEE: Okay. Number 24, east 11 12 transmission line capability, that is closed. CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: Yes. 13 MS. BANERJEE: Number 25, single 14 closing coil, it is still open pending Dr. 15 16 Stetkar's brainstorming. 17 MEMBER STETKAR: No. It's a different 18 issue, but for the simplicity it is still open. 19 MS. BANERJEE: Oh, I'm sorry. Yes, 20 it's still open. 21 MR. HEAD: It's still open for us to go 22 think about after what we've heard today. MEMBER STETKAR: 26 is closed. 23 MS. BANERJEE: 26 is closed. 24 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

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1	MEMBER STETKAR: 27			
2	MS. BANERJEE: Battery life.			
3	MEMBER STETKAR: 27 is temporarily			
4	still open, but			
5	MS. BANERJEE: Pending your			
6	MEMBER STETKAR: nothing is			
7	nothing is nothing more is needed from you			
8	guys.			
9	MS. BANERJEE: Right. Number 29 is			
10	submerged cable, closed. Number 30, DRAP list,			
11	we the staff will make a presentation at the			
12	next meeting. Number 31, 4.16 kV winding,			
13	closed.			
14	MEMBER STETKAR: Yes.			
15	MS. BANERJEE: That's it.			
16	CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: Okay. Thank you			
17	very much.			
18	MEMBER STETKAR: Thank you.			
19	CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: Okay. At this			
20	time, we would like to see if there are any			
21	members of the public, either in this room or			
22	joining us by phone, who would like to make a			
23	statement or provide a comment. First, is there			
24	anybody here in this room who would like to make			
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1	a statement or provide a comment?	
2	(No response.)	
3	Okay. There is none. How about on the	
4	phone? Is the telephone line connected so that	
5	we can hear them?	
6	MS. BANERJEE: I don't know.	
7	CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: Could you please	
8	check for me?	
9	MS. BANERJEE: Yes, I'm going to check.	
10	But I was wondering if they can hear me. AJ,	
11	can you hear me?	
12	MR. BROWN: Yes, the phone is still	
13	open.	
14	MS. BANERJEE: Okay. Thank you.	
15	CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: Okay. Is there	
16	anyone on the phone who would like to make a	
17	statement or provide a comment?	
18	(No response.)	
19	Hearing none, then I guess we will go	
20	back to the next item on the agenda, which is the	
21	Subcommittee discussions. I would like to just	
22	go around the table and see if members have	
23	additional comments that we need to capture in	
24	the summary of this meeting. Jack?	
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MEMBER SIEBER: Okay. I will be very brief. I don't want to open any open items, but I -- in the review and our meeting today, I come away with the impression that the PRA from the DCD is missing things, and probably does not describe in sufficient depth the equipment and processes to give a real good answer as to what is going on.

9 Because of the way the rule is written, 10 the staff accepts the DCD as approved already, 11 and the applicant is faced with describing, by 12 analysis, any deviations in their design from the 13 design in the rule, which means that that process 14 perpetuates the deficiencies that were originally 15 in the PRA from the DCD.

And when I think through it, to the 16 17 extent that it will cause problems in the 18 ultimate licensing of the plant, with the 19 exception that DRAP, which has a lot of other 20 input to it, that is probably the only place 21 where it would occur, and that's why I am not prepared to make an open item out of it. But, to 22 me, it is troublesome. 23

CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: Okay.

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MEMBER SIEBER: That would be the most significant thing that I have.

CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: Thank you, Jack. Sam?

5 MEMBER ARMIJO: Yes, I am a little confused still 6 about, you know, the linkage 7 between the certified design, the PRA and the 8 certified design, and the current PRA that takes 9 into account departures and deficiencies in the 10 certification PRA and everything else, in that the certification PRA, at least I heard from one 11 12 member of the staff he didn't really use it to compare with what South Texas has done with their 13 14 PRA.

15 And the question I had is: 1) is it Is that certification PRA important 16 important? 17 for the regulatory process to be legitimate? 18 And, if so, does the staff have that 19 certification PRA in their position? And do they 20 need to use it to be sure that the original 21 certified design is properly linked to the design 22 you are going to build? And, to me, it is confusing, and so it's more a question for the 23 24 staff.

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1	I don't know if this all this links
2	up together in a neat way where we can say,
3	"Okay. The South Texas PRA plugs in right here,
4	and we, the staff, have the certification PRA
5	that we can compare to what South Texas has done
6	and convince ourselves that everything is in
7	order." So you can use a certified design there.
8	It's and maybe that's garbled, but that's
9	where I'm at.
10	MEMBER SIEBER: Same thing.
11	CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: Okay. Harold?
12	MEMBER RAY: There already is an open
13	item on the issue that we touched on having to do
14	with the elevation of the reservoir, and so on,
15	relative to the plant and the vulnerabilities
16	that may exist. So there is no need to add to
17	that, I don't believe, although I understand,
18	further, that it will be discussed in Chapter 2
19	as well. And it is in that domain rather than in
20	the area of dam failure probabilities that I
21	would look to be satisfied with the provisions.
22	CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: Okay. Dennis?
23	MEMBER BLEY: Yes. I have asked most
24	of the things I am especially concerned about,

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and I think seeing that -- the RAI response, white papers, seeing the SSAR, and the other things that Maitri had, will help me.

Jack and Sam's comments -- you know, 4 5 we've got a problem in all of these COLs with the I think the interesting process they had 6 PRAs. 7 to go through here reconstituting the PRA has shined a light on that in a way we haven't 8 9 noticed it before, but I think the problem is 10 everywhere. And there is not an easy way around it. You know, they won't really have their PRA 11 12 until a year before operation, and that is the one that really matters. But this has raised 13 14 things for us to think about, but I don't have 15 anything new to add because of that.

CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: Okay. John?

17 MEMBER STETKAR: Yes. I think that we 18 already heard other members' kind have of 19 concerns and a bit of uneasiness. I tend to look 20 at the PRA from the perspective of, given the 21 fact that the certified design PRA was indeed 22 accepted, and that there were -- if we can call it -- the "reconstituted PRA" replicates that 23 24 certified PRA. That, indeed, is the best thing

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that we can have, you know, as far as the PRA for the design certification.

So, and that's something we have to live with. You know, regardless of how comfortable we may feel about that PRA, it is something legally, if nothing else, we have to live with.

That being said, there is a couple of 8 9 things that the PRA process needs to address at 10 this stage of the licensing, and one of those things is the adequacy of the PRA process. 11 And I'll keep using "the process" rather than 12 the word to distinguish between what may or may not 13 14 be in the model.

15 How does that process give us assurance that indeed the changes that have been made to 16 17 the design have been adequately addressed in the 18 sense of their effect on plant risk? So that 19 long list of design departures -- do we feel 20 confident, "we," the ACRS, feel confident that 21 indeed the PRA process has adequately addressed 22 the risk implications of those changes? Because that is, indeed, one of the requirements. 23

And the second part is developing a

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confidence, or at least an understanding, to the 1 2 degree at which the PRA can support the numerical 3 results from the PRA, those important measures can support the population of the reliability 4 5 assurance program list, so that, indeed, we at least have some confidence of what is in the PRA, 6 7 where the PRA numerical importance measures are useful, and what is not in the PRA, where the 8 9 numerical importance measures, you know, are 10 basically unavailable, or that something is only 11 partially modeled such that а numerical 12 importance measurement may be generated, but it 13 might not be a complete -- a fully valid numerical measure, because a particular function 14 has been modeled for some initiating events, and 15 not other initiating events, or vice versa. 16 17 It is a really subtle area. But if 18 you're dealing with .0005 as a black-line cutoff, 19 you need to be worried a bit about those types of 20 things. 21 So, you know, I am uneasy a bit about

21 So, you know, I am uneasy a bit about 22 the PRA process in those terms. And I think we 23 can talk a little bit later, perhaps offline, 24 about, you know, how do we, as the Committee,

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gain some confidence in that process and the tools to support, you know, what we're interested in right now, which is -- which is the COL stage

of the licensing process.

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CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: Okay. Thank you, John. Bill?

7 MEMBER SHACK: Well, I guess I have 8 more confidence in the DRAP process. I mean, I 9 think it really does depend strongly on the 10 expert panel, and I don't expect that at any 11 other -- you know, it will never get away from a 12 strong dependence on it.

And you have to look at the purpose of 13 the DRAP program, which is to identify components 14 before detailed design for additional attention. 15 And I just don't think, between the PRA and the 16 17 expert panel, that they will miss any particularly risk-significant component. 18

You'll get a second shot at this again with a much more valid PRA when we come back to the ORAP program and the maintenance rule, that, you know, things will be looked at again. This is -- this is just the first look, so that you -when you are doing the design, you are getting it

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1	right, but it is not the last word, and it can't
2	be the last word.
3	So I to me, it is such a big
4	improvement in the process that I'm not going to
5	worry if it's not the absolute best list that we
6	will ever possibly have.
7	CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: Okay. Were you
8	done?
9	MEMBER SHACK: I'm done.
10	CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: Mike?
11	MEMBER CORRADINI: I guess I'm not
12	concerned about the pedigree of the Level 1 part
13	of this. I think I understand where it evolved
14	and where we are. On the Level 2 part, I guess I
15	am I am waiting to see the response from the
16	applicant relative to some of the questions that
17	are still open from the staff. But my impression
18	is that they know where they're going, and they
19	should be able to answer them, particularly with
20	diffusible plug questions.
21	CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: Okay. Mario?
22	MEMBER BONACA: Yes, I already
23	expressed my thoughts on the PRA. I agree with
24	Bill in a way, however, that for the purpose of

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242 what we are trying to do at this stage, that is 1 2 going to be probably unacceptable, too. 3 CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: Okay. Well, thank 4 you. 5 At this stage, I'd like to express our thanks and appreciation to the applicant and to 6 7 the staff for a very good meeting. Thanks very much. Thanks 8 MR. HEAD: 9 for letting us continue the meeting past, you 10 know --CHAIR ABDEL-KHALIK: Oh, no problem. 11 12 No problem. 13 The meeting is adjourned. 14 (Whereupon, at 5:49 p.m., the proceedings in the 15 foregoing matter were adjourned.) 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

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## South Texas Project Units 3 & 4 Presentation to ACRS Subcommittee Chapter 19 Probabilistic Risk Assessment



STP 3&4 COLA Presentation to ACRS Subcommittee 6/8/2010



# Agenda

- Introduction
- Summary
- Contents of FSAR Chapter 19
  - Departure Information
  - COL License Information Items
  - □ Site-Specific Supplements
- ITAAC
- Conclusion



#### Attendees

Scott Head

Bill Stillwell

Gene Hughes

**Ricky Summitt** 

Manager, Regulatory Affairs, STP 3&4 PRA Supervisor, STP 3&4 ETRANCO RSC/ETRANCO



### **Chapter 19 Summary**

STP 3 & 4 FSAR Chapter 19:

- The PRA for the ABWR was developed as part of the original Certification effort in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
- The Certification PRA is a Level 2 Internal Events PRA with generic consequence evaluations
  - Fire Hazards Analysis (FIVE), Seismic Margins Assessment, and Shutdown screening analysis included
- The PRA has been updated, while maintaining the original format, to reflect site conditions and selected departures
- The updated PRA is bounded by the results of the original PRA



### **PRA Reconstruction**

- STP does not have access to the Certification PRA
- STP ABWR PRA model reconstructed using ABWR DCD (SSAR) information and findings from our review.
- Reconstituted PRA (Level 1 only) revision includes
  - Partial sequences that transfer to other event trees were eliminated
  - Credit taken for containment overpressure protection system (COPS) and control rod drive systems
- CDF result compared favorably with that published in the DCD (SSAR)
- Incorporated CCF of the RSW, RBCW, HPCF, and RHR systems which were identified in the ABWR SSAR Appendix 19D.8
- The STP updated PRA model accounts for Departures and sitespecific information that may impact the PRA results



#### **Model Results**

Initiator	Description			
		STP-ABWR Model (/yr)	STP 3&4 (DEP) (/yr)	Sensitivity Run With ERCOT LOOP (/yr)
ATWS	ATWS Accident Sequence	2.6E-10	2.6E-10	2.6E-10
BE0	SBO for More than 8 Hours	1.6E-08	1.6E-08	1.6E-08
BE2	SBO for 0.5 to 2 Hrs	7.3E-08	6.7E-08	6.7E-08
BE8	SBO from 2 to 8 Hours	2.8E-08	2.6E-08	2.6E-08
S0	Large Break LOCA	3.7E-09	3.7E-09	3.7E-09
S1	Medium Break LOCA	1.2E-08	1.2E-08	1.2E-08
S2	Small Break LOCA	1.7E-09	1.7E-09	1.7E-09
TE2	LOOP from 0.5 to 2 Hours	8.2E-09	8.3E-09	2.2E-09
TE8	LOOP from 2 to 8 Hours	2.3E-08	2.3E-08	6.0E-09
TEO	LOOP for Over 8 Hours	2.6E-09	2.6E-09	6.7E-10
TIO	Inadvertently Open Relief Valve	1.0E-08	1.0E-08	1.0E-08
TIS	Isolation/Loss of Feedwater	1.1E-08	1.1E-08	1.1E-08
ТМ	Reactor Shutdown Frequency	1.8E-08	1.8E-08	1.8E-08
TT	Turbine Trip	4.7E-09	4.7E-09	4.7E-09
	Total CDF	2.1E-07	2.1E-07	1.8E-07



#### **Chapter 19 Contents**

The format of Chapter 19 remains consistent with the format presented in the ABWR DCD.

- Two new sections
  - 19.4S PRA Maintenance Provides plant specific PRA information requested by RG 1.206
  - 19.1S Roadmap between RG 1.206 and original Chapter 19 format
- Departure information
- Site-specific supplemental information
- COL License Information Items
- COL Applicant Safety Issues (GSIs, USIs, etc.)



### **Chapter 19 Sections**

- 19.1 Purpose and Summary
  - 2 Departures, editorial
- 19.1S Additional Information to Support COLA
  - □ Map from RG 1.206 to DCD PRA Chapter
- 19.2 Introduction
  - Supplemental Information, Departure Screening Summary
- 19.3 Internal Events Analysis
  - B Departures
- 19.4 External Events and LPSD
  - □ 1 Departure, editorial



#### Chapter 19 Sections (cont'd)

19.4S PRA Maintenance

□ Plant Specific PRA for 10CFR50.71(h)

19.5 Source Term Sensitivity Studies

- □ Incorporated by Reference (IBR)
- 19.6 Measurement Against Goals
  - □ Admin Departure (text change)
- 19.7 PRA as a Design Tool
  - 4 Departures, editorial
- 19.8 Important Features Identified by ABWR PRA
  - □ 3 departures, editorial



#### Chapter 19 Sections (cont'd)

19.9 COL License Information

- 30 COL License Information Items
- 6 departures to account for departures in other sections of the FSAR
- 19.10 Assumptions and Insights, Systems Outside ABWR Design Certification
  - □ 1 departure, RSW Pump house
- 19.11 Human Action Overview
  - □ 4 departures, External Flood HEP in Flood Model
- 19.12 Input Into the RAP (IBR)
- 19.13 Summary of Insights Gained from the PRA
  - 2 departures, external flood

STP 3&4 COLA Presentation to ACRS Subcommittee 6/8/2010



# **Chapter 19 Appendices**

19A Response to CP/ML Rule 10 CFR 50.34(f)

- 1 departure, Hydrogen Recombiner elimination, editorial
- 19B Resolution of Unresolved Safety Issues and Generic Safety Issues
  - □ 2 departures, editorial
- 19C Design Conditions Reducing Sabotage Risk (IBR)
  - □ Not part of DCD, refer to SSAR
- 19D Probabilistic Evaluations (IBR)
  - □ Not part of DCD, refer to SSAR



**19E Deterministic Evaluations** 

- □ 3 departures
- □ 19E.1 Introduction
- 19E.2 Deterministic Analysis of Plant Performance
- □ 19E.3 Consequence Analysis

19EA Direct Containment Heating (IBR)

- 19EB Fuel Coolant Interactions (IBR)
- 19EC Debris Coolability and Core Concrete Interaction (IBR)
- 19ED Corium Shield (IBR)
- 19EE Suppression Pool Bypass (IBR)



- 19F Containment Ultimate Strength (IBR)
- 19FA Containment Ultimate Strength (IBR)
- 19G (Not Used) (IBR)
- 19H Seismic Capacity Analysis
  - □ 1 departure, R/W Building Classification
- **19I Seismic Margins Analysis** 
  - 2 departures, Dual Unit, MOV to AOV in one penetration
- 19J (Not Used) (IBR)
- 19K PRA Based Reliability and Maintenance
  - □ 6 departures



19L ABWR Shutdown Risk Evaluation

- □ 7 departures
- 19M Fire Protection PRA
  - □ 6 departures
- 19N Analysis of Common Cause Failure of Essential Communications Functions
  - □ 1 departure, I&C
- 19O (Not Used) (IBR)

19P Evaluation of Potential Modifications to the ABWR Design (IBR)

19Q ABWR Shutdown Risk Assessment

□ 9 departures



19QA Fault Trees (Shutdown) (IBR)

19QB DHR Reliability Study

- □ 1 departure, RWCU design
- 19QC Review of Significant Shutdown Events: Electric Power and Decay Heat Removal
  - □ 1 departure, 1 supplement for data source

19R Probabilistic Flooding Analysis

- □ 5 departures.
- External flood, RSW pump house flood, re-evaluate Control Building flood



#### **Departures**

- All STP 3&4 departures were evaluated for to determine whether the departure has a significant impact on the results of the Certification PRA
- Screening/evaluation process consistent with RG 1.206 C.III.I.19
  - □ Tier 1 Thirteen
  - □ Tier  $2^*$  One, Codes and Standards
  - □ Tier 2, Technical Specifications (TS) Nine
  - □ Tier 2, Analysis Method One
  - □ Tier 2 (not including TS editorial) One-hundred twenty-seven
  - □ Site specific information change (UHS)
- Eleven departures and the information change did not pass initial screening
- No significant change to the PRA results presented in the DCD (SSAR)



#### **Departures Requiring Further Review**

- STD DEP T1 2.4-1, Residual Heat Removal System and Spent Fuel Pool Cooling – No effect
- STD DEP T1 2.4-3, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) Turbine/Pump – *Minor effect*
- STD DEP T1 3.4-1, Safety-Related I&C Architecture *Text changes*
- STP DEP T1 5.0-1, Site Parameters Design Basis External Flood
- STD DEP 5.4-1, Reactor Water Cleanup System *No effect*
- STD DEP 6C-1, Containment Debris Protection of ECCS Strainers
   No effect
- STD DEP 8.3-1, Plant Medium Voltage Electrical System Design Text changes, minor PRA effect



#### **Departures Requiring Further Review**

- STD DEP 9.2-5, Reactor Service Water (RSW) System
    *Control Building Flood*
- STD DEP 9.5-7, Fire Protection House Boiler Area of the Turbine – No effect
- STD DEP 19.3-1, Evaluation of Common Cause Failures
    *Modified Base PRA*
- STP DEP 19R-1, RSW Pump House Re-design
   Pump house flood

#### Information Change

Ultimate Heat Sink Design – Not "Significant Change"

□ Fans in Reliability Assurance Program



# **Site Specific Supplement**

Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) Design

- □ Cooling Tower for each Unit
  - Three normally operating trains, two fans/train
  - 30 day supply of water in UHS Basin

□ Reactor Service Water Pump House

- Three normally operating trains, two pumps/train
- Pump rooms below UHS basin height, separated by flood doors and walls



# **Other Insights**

- Main Cooling Reservoir Breach
  - □ Controls Design Basis Flood (DBF) Height
- Core Damage Frequency (CDF) for DBF same magnitude as internal CDF (screening assessment)
- Per ASME PRA Standard, screens (meets SRP criteria and CDF is low)
- Insights
  - External flood doors in Reliability Assurance Program
  - Main control room action to verify external flood doors closed



#### Other Insights (cont'd)

- Hurricane
  - □ STP is approximately 12 miles from Gulf of Mexico
  - Safety-related structures designed for tornado and high wind (SRP criteria met)
  - Non-safety Combustion Turbine Generators and Switchyard – 134 mph
- Core Damage Frequency (CDF) from hurricane order of magnitude less than internal CDF (conservative screening assessment)
- Per ASME PRA Standard, screens (meets SRP criteria and screening CDF is low)



### **COL License Information Items**

Forty-one COL License Information Items in Section 19.9, and Appendices 19A and 19B:

19.1 Post Accident Recovery Procedure for Unisolated CUW Line Break

Procedure development, Section 13.5, (COM 19.9-1)

19.2 Confirmation of CUW Operation Beyond the Design Basis

- Procedure development, Section 13.5, (COM 19.9-2)
- Evaluation, prior to fuel load (50.71(e)) (COM 19.9-28)
- 19.3 Event Specific Procedures for Severe External Flooding
  - Procedure development, Section 13.5, (COM 19.9-3)



19.4 Confirmation of Seismic Capacities Beyond the Plant Design Bases

- HCLPF new plant specific equipment Sept 2010
- HCLPF comparison, prior to fuel load (50.71(e))
- Potential for seismic induced soil failure at 1.67 times the site-specific SSE, prior to fuel load (50.71(e))
- Walkdown, prior to fuel load (50.71(e))
- (COM 19.9-4)
- 19.5 Plant Walkdowns
  - Procedure development, Section 13.5, (COM 19.9-5)
- 19.6 Confirmation of Loss of AC Power Event
  - Included in application



- 19.7 Procedures and Training for Use of AC-Independent Water Addition System
  - Procedure development, Section 13.5, Training, Section 13.2 (COM 19.9-6)
- 19.8 Action to Avoid Common-Cause Failures in the Essential Communications Function (ECF) and Other Common-Cause Failures
  - Procedure development, Section 13.5 (COM 19.9-7)
- 19.9 Action to Mitigate Station Blackout Events
  - Procedure development, Section 13.5, Calculations (50.71(e)) (COM 19.9-8)



19.10 Actions to Reduce Risk of Internal Flooding

- Procedure development, Section 13.5, Training, Section 13.2 (COM 19.9-9)
- 19.11 Actions to Avoid Loss of Decay Heat Removal and Minimize Shutdown Risk
  - Procedure development, Section 13.5 (COM 19.9-10)
- 19.12 Procedures for Operation of RCIC from Outside the Control Room
  - Procedure development, Section 13.5, Training, Section 13.2 (COM 19.9-11)
- 19.13 ECCS Test and Surveillance Intervals
  - Procedure development, Section 13.5 (COM 19.9-12)



- 19.14 Accident Management
  - Procedure development, Section 13.5; Training, Section 13.2 (COM 19.9-13)
- 19.15 Manual Operation of MOVs
  - Procedure development, Section 13.5 (COM 19.9-14)
- 19.16 High Pressure Core Flooder Discharge Valve
  - Procedure development, Section 13.5 (COM 19.9-15)
- 19.17 Capability of Containment Isolation Valves
  - Prior to fuel load (50.71(e)) (COM 19.9-16)



- 19.18 Procedures to Ensure Sample Lines and Drywell Purge Lines Remain Closed During Operation
  - Procedure development, Section 13.5 (COM 19.9-17)
- 19.19 Procedures for Combustion Turbine Generator to Supply Power to Condensate Pumps
  - Procedure development, Section 13.5 (COM 19.9-18)
- 19.19a Actions to Assure Reliability of the Supporting RCW and Service Water Systems
  - Procedure development, Section 13.5 (COM 19.9-19)
- 19.19b Housing of AICWA Equipment
  - Prior to fuel load (50.71(e)) (COM 19.9-20)



19.19c Procedures to Assure SRV Operability During Station Blackout

Procedure development, Section 13.5 (COM 19.9-21)

19.19d Procedures for Ensuring Integrity of Freeze Seals

Procedure development, Section 13.5 (COM 19.9-22)

19.19e Procedures for Controlling Combustibles During Shutdown

Procedure development, Section 13.5 (COM 19.9-23)

19.19f Outage Planning and Control

Procedure development, Section 13.5 (COM 19.9-24)

19.19g Reactor Service Water Systems Definition

Included in application



- 19.19h Capability of Vacuum Breakers
  - Prior to fuel load (50.71(e)) (COM 19.9-25)
- 19.19i Capability of the Containment Atmosphere Monitoring System
  - Prior to fuel load (50.71(e)) (COM 19.9-26)
- 19.19j Plant Specific Safety-Related Issues and Vendors Operating Guidance
  - Procedure development, Section 13.5 (COM 19.9-27)
- 19.20 Long-Term Training Upgrade
  - Section 18.8.8 Operator Training
- 19.21 Long-Term Program of Upgrading of Procedures
  - Section 13.5.3.1.b



19.22 Purge System Reliability

- Sections 3.9 and 6.6.9.1
- 19.23 Licensing Emergency Support Facility
  - Part 5 of the application
- 19.24 In-Plant Radiation Monitoring
  - Sections 12.5.2, 12.5.3.1, and 12.3.5.2
- 19.25 Feedback of Operating, Design and Construction Experience
  - Sections 13.2.3 and 13.5.3
- 19.26 Organization and Staffing to Oversee Design and Construction
  - Section 13.1



19.27 Develop More Detailed QA Criteria

STP Units 3 & 4 Quality Assurance Program Description

19.28 COL Applicant Safety Issues

- Chapter 1.9S, COM 19B-2 (GSI A-47)
- 19.28a Testing of Isolators
  - Procedure, procedure development in Section 13.5, prior to fuel load (COM 19B-1)



19.29 Seismic Capacity

- HCLPF new plant specific equipment Sept 2010,
- HCLPF comparison, prior to fuel load (50.71(e))
- Potential for seismic induced soil failure at 1.67 times the site-specific SSE, prior to fuel load (50.71(e))
- Walkdown, prior to fuel load (50.71(e))
- (COM 19.9-4)

19.30 PRA Update

Included in application



#### **Additional Commitments**

Section 19.4S added four additional commitments for the plant-specific PRA (10CFR50.71(h))

- Three procedures, prior to COL Issuance (50.71(e))
- □ ASME peer review, prior to fuel load

#### Nuclear Operating Company

# ITAAC

- There are no ITAAC for Chapter 19
  - There are ITAAC associated with several of the design features incorporated into ABWR as a result of the severe accident analyses described in Chapter 19 (e.g., basaltic concrete, vacuum breaker position switches, corium shield for containment sumps)
- There are ITAAC associated with risk-significant Structures, Systems, and Components in the Design Reliability Assurance Program (Chapter 17)



#### **Chapter 19**

#### **Questions and Comments**





# Presentation to the ACRS Subcommittee

**South Texas Project Units 3 and 4 COL Application Review** 

SER/OI Chapter 19 Response To Severe Accident Policy Statement

June 8, 2010



#### **STP COL Chapter 19 Staff Review Team**

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- George Wunder, Lead PM
- Rocky Foster, Chapter PM

#### Technical Staff

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- John Lai, (former) Reliability & Risk Analyst
- Marie Pohida, Senior Reliability & Risk Analyst
- Ed Fuller, Senior Reliability & Risk Engineer
- Todd Hilsmeier, Reliability & Risk Analyst

#### **Structural Engineering Branch**

– David Jeng, Senior Structural Engineer



# **Presentation Outline**

- Overview of STP Combined License Application Open Items
- Description of Open Items
- Review Approach
- Open Items of Interest
- Appendix 19K–PRA Based Reliability and Maintenance



#### **Overview of STP Combined License Application**

Chapter 19 – Response to Severe Accident Policy Statement		
SE Chapter	Subject	Total Open Items / Unresolved Ols
19	Response to Severe Accident Policy Statement	17 / 9
Total Number of RAIs = 63		



- <u>Open Item 19-1</u>, <u>RAI 19.01-13</u>, <u>DEP T1 2.4-2</u>
   Feedwater Line Break Mitigation: Open item is resolved.
- <u>Open Item 19-2, RAI 19.01-22</u>
   PRA Level 1 Results: STP updated Appendix 19K of the FSAR relative to the latest STP PRA model. Open item is resolved.
- <u>Open Item 19-3</u>, <u>RAI 19.01-29</u>, <u>STD DEP 8.3-1</u> Medium Voltage Electrical Design: Open item is resolved.
- <u>Open Item 19-4</u>, RAI 19.01-22, STD DEP 19.3-1 Evaluation of Common Cause Failures: Open item is resolved.



• Open Item 19-5, RAI 19-5

Steam Explosion Potential from Premature Opening of the Drywell Flooder

#### • Open Item 19-6, RAI 19-32

**Capability of Containment Isolation Valves:** Staff issued RAI requesting applicant to describe the method and tracking mechanisms to address COL License Information Item 19.17 (Capability of Containment Isolation Valves). Staff reviewing RAI response.

#### • Open Item 19-7, RAI 19.01-25

**Resolution of COL Information Items:** Staff requested applicant to address all other COL information items in Chapter 19 (e.g., Appendix 19A and 19B). Staff reviewing supplemental RAI response.

Chapter 19 - Response to Severe Accident Policy Statement



#### • Open Item 19-8, RAI 19-3, DEP T1 2.14-1

**Impact of Hydrogen Combustion During Shutdown:** Impact on Level 2 (large release frequency) shutdown due to the shared common fire protection system when containment is de-inerted (hydrogen combustion). This open item is associated with Open Item 19-9.

- Open Item 19-9, RAI 19.01-31, STP DEP 1.1-2
   Shared Common Fire Protection System: Staff has questions on the impact of this departure on hurricane risk.
- <u>Open Item 19-10</u>, <u>RAI 19.01-23</u>
   Fire Risk Evaluation in Turbine Building: Open item is resolved.



• Open Item 19-11, RAI 19-16, STD DEP 7.7-1

Flushing of RPV Water Level Instrumentation Lines in Modes 4 and 5: Open item is resolved.

• <u>Open Item 19-12, RAI 19-30</u>

**MCR Breach Evaluation:** Staff has concerns with the MCR breach frequency calculation.

- Open Item 19-13, RAI 19-1
   MAAP and Fusible Plug: Staff performing confirmatory assessments.
- Open Item 19-14, RAI 19-24 Supplement 1
   Seismic Effect: Staff awaiting applicant's RAI response.



- <u>Open Item 19-15</u>, <u>RAI 19-27 Supplement 1</u> SSCs in UHS/RSW: Open item is resolved.
- <u>Open Item 19-16</u>, <u>RAI 19-22</u>
   Housing of ACIWA Equipment: Open item is resolved.
- Open Item 19-17, RAI 19-31

**Demonstrate the Sequence and Plant-Level Seismic HCLPF Capacity:** Staff issued RAI to applicant requesting clarification of items related to seismic sequence and plant-level HCLPFs. Staff awaiting response to this RAI.



### **Review Approach**

- Reviewed design departures for impact on the PRA and risk insights
- STP did not provide any quantitative results (because the ∆CDF of the plant specific PRA model to the STP Revised MOR is less than 10%)
  - Held many telecons with the applicant on clarification of the model documents and RAIs
  - Frequently audited the PRA model documents (hard copies) provided by STP in the Westinghouse Twinbrook office
  - Held audit with STP staff and contractors (including review of electronic model on applicant's PC) on September 22-23, 2009 (RAIs developed on accident sequences, success criteria, data analysis, system modeling, etc.)



### Review Approach: Fires, Floods, Seismic and S/D

§ 52.79 – For applicants referencing a DC

- "In addition, the plant specific PRA information must use the PRA information for the design certification and must be updated to account for site-specific design information and any design changes or departures"
- PRA review limited to:
  - site specific features not bounded by ABWR site characteristics OR
  - site specific design features where there is PRA information to update OR
  - design departures where there is PRA information to update.



#### <u>Open Item 19-9 RAI 19.01-31</u> <u>STP DEP 1.1-2</u> Fire Water System Design Departure

- ABWR design- one diesel driven fire water pump per unit.
- STP DEP 1.1-2-one diesel driven fire water pump per site.
- Impact of departure on the hurricane CDF/LRF not evaluated.
  - ASME/ANS RA-Sa-2009, Subsection 6-2.3, criteria for screening external events other than fire and seismic.
  - Criteria (a) if it meets the criteria in the NRC's 1975 Standard Review Plan (SRP) or a later revision.
- Hurricane risk struck from revision 3 of Chapter 19 FSAR.
- Staff's estimate of hurricane LRF exceeds goals
  - Using hurricane return frequencies from NOAA OR
  - Coastal weather related LOOP frequencies during shutdown from NUREG 6890
- Following Public Meeting on April 27
  - STP to evaluate design departure.
  - STP to document compensatory measures in FSAR.

Chapter 19 - Response to Severe Accident Policy Statement



### Open Item 19-12 RAI 19-30

### External Flooding – MCR Breach

- Following breach
  - Security Personnel notify operators
  - Operator close three normally open doors:
    - watertight control room access door
    - two watertight doors in the Reactor Building Access Corridor
- Core damage assumed if one of three doors is left open.
- Control Building Flooded



### Open Item 19-12 RAI 19-30 (cont.)

### External Flooding – MCR Breach

- STP's breach frequency two orders of magnitude more optimistic than published dam failure data.
- Using published dam failure data \* HEP for operators closing one of three doors in 30 minutes exceeds LRF goals.
- Defense in depth philosophy consistent with RG 1.174 not maintained.
  - "Over-reliance on programmatic activities to compensate for weakness in plant design"
- Following public meeting on April 27
  - STP committed to close the normally open water tight doors
  - STP to consider other options.



### Open Item 19-5 RAI 19-5

### COL License Information Item 19.14 Accident Management

- Information in Section 19.9.14 is insufficient to establish the technical basis for developing AM procedures.
  - Must address consequences of flooding the lower drywell (LDW).
  - Confirmatory assessment indicates that LDW temperatures may exceed 533 °K before vessel breach.
  - The staff believes that the AM strategies may have to consider the consequences of premature LDW flooding, including steam explosions.
- Path to resolution
  - STP intends to follow NEI 91-04 Revision 1.
  - Changes in the EPGs and SAGs (such as the containment flood strategy) will be included as inputs to the plant-specific technical guidelines.
- This approach is acceptable, provided that the technical basis for ABWR severe accident management is based on current understanding of severe accident progression in the ABWR.



### Open Item 19-8 RAI 19-3 STD DEP T1 2.14-1 Hydrogen Recombiner Requirements Elimination

- The staff had concerns about startup and shutdown operations, when the containment would not be inerted.
  - Hydrogen combustion during severe accidents
  - Impacts on LRF and CCFP from low-power and shutdown scenarios.
- Subsequently, the staff issued RAI 19.01-31 (Open Item 19-9), related to the shared fire water system.
  - The staff also requested a description of the dominant sequences contributing to the shutdown and full power hurricane CDF and LRF estimates.
- Path to resolution
  - STP agreed that hydrogen combustion could not be prevented by during any severe accidents initiated during startup and shutdown operations.
  - Open Item 19-8, will be resolved when Open Item 19-9 is resolved.



### Open Item 19-13 RAI 19-1 Lower Drywell Fusible Plug Valve

- The LDW fusible plugs will melt at a temperature of 533 °K (500 °F), after molten core debris enters the lower drywell
  - Valves would remain open to allow water to flow through each flooder pipe into the LDW and cover the core debris.
- Debris coolability by an overlying water pool has not yet been conclusively demonstrated
  - The staff was concerned that the containment liner failure may not be averted for 24 hours after core damage, and decided to carry out a confirmatory assessment using the MELCOR 1.8.6 computer code.
- Path to resolution
  - There is no open RAI associated with this issue.
  - Open item will be closed following successful completion and documentation of confirmatory assessment.



### Open Items 19-14 and 19-17

### **Seismic Margins Analysis**

#### Open Item 19-14 - Seismic Effect

STD <u>DEP T1 2.15-1</u> reclassified Radwaste Building from Seismic Category I to Non-Seismic. STP stated RW/B to be designed for no II/I interaction under a safe-shutdown earthquake (SSE) or tornado. The staff issued RAI 19-33 requesting STP to augment its response with analysis procedures equivalent to SRP Subsection 3.7.2.II.8 C and related ITAAC.

# Open Item 19-17 - Sequence and Plant-Level Seismic HCLPF Capacity

STP COL license information item should include an update of the system model developed in the DCD to incorporate capacity reductions due to site-specific effects and site-specific SSC. STP should determine whether site-specific soil failures control the seismic HCLPF capacities of SSCs associated with the seismic accident sequences. STP should provide the sequence-level and plant-level seismic HCLPF capacity pursuant to 10 CFR 52.79(a)(46) and 10 CFR 52.79(d)(1).



#### Appendix 19K–PRA Based Reliability and Maintenance

#### Risk-Significant (RS) SSCs Within the Scope of the Reliability Assurance Program (RAP)

- The initial identification of site-specific RS SSCs (i.e., RS SSCs) in preparation of the COL application incorporates by reference (with the appropriate departures and sitespecific supplements) the list of RS SSCs in Appendix 19K of the certified and approved ABWR DCD
- STP committed to provide by September 2011 a comprehensive list of RS SSCs using the methodology described in STP FSAR Section 17.4S.1.4 (Commitment 17.4-1):
  - PRA (FV  $\ge$  0.005, RAW  $\ge$  2.0, consideration of risk insights and key assumptions)
  - Use of deterministic techniques and operating experience under the cognizance of a full expert panel to augment PRA techniques in the risk ranking of SSCs
- Staff plans to conduct an audit in third quarter of 2010 to confirm that the comprehensive list of RS SSCs is being developed in accordance with established RAP procedures (Confirmatory Item 17.04-8 of SER)
- Staff plans to conduct an inspection to verify that STP has met Commitment 17.4-1 and that the comprehensive list of RS SSCs is acceptable (expected to be performed in late 2011)



## **Overview of STP COL Chapter 19**

### **Discussion/Committee Questions**

Chapter 19 - Response to Severe Accident Policy Statement



### **Backup Slides**

Chapter 19 - Response to Severe Accident Policy Statement



### **STP COL Chapter 19**

#### Regulatory Guidance

- The Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) dated July 21, 1993 on SECY-93-087 provides direction about the treatment of external events in PRAs to support DC and COL applications.
  - The Commission approved the use of PRA insights to support a margins-type assessment of seismic events.
  - The Commission approved the use of simplified probabilistic methods, such as but not limited to the Electric Power Research Institute's Fire-Induced Vulnerability Evaluation (EPRI's FIVE) methodology, to evaluate fire risk.
  - The Commission approved the staff's position that advanced LWR vendors should perform bounding analyses of site-specific external events likely to be a challenge to the plant (such as river flooding, storm surge, tsunami, volcanism, high winds, and hurricanes). If the site is enveloped, the COL applicant need not perform further PRA evaluations for these external events. The COL applicant should perform site-specific PRA evaluations to address any site-specific hazards for which a bounding analysis was not performed or which are not enveloped by the bounding analyses to ensure that no vulnerabilities due to siting exist.



### **STP COL Chapter 19**

### Regulatory Requirements

- 10 CFR 52.79(a)(38) states that a COL application for a LWR design must contain an FSAR that includes a description and analysis of design features for the prevention and mitigation of severe accidents, for example, challenges to containment integrity caused by core-concrete interaction, steam explosion, highpressure core melt ejection, hydrogen combustion, and containment bypass.
- 10 CFR 52.79(a)(46) states that a COL application must contain an FSAR that includes a description of the plant-specific PRA and its results.
- 10 CFR 52.79(d)(1) states that if a COL application references a DC, then the plant-specific PRA information must use the PRA information for the DC and must be updated to account for site-specific design information and any design changes or departures.
- 10 CFR 50.71(h)(1) states that no later than the scheduled date for initial loading of fuel, each holder of a COL shall develop a level 1 and a level 2 PRA. The PRA must cover those initiating events and modes for which NRC-endorsed consensus standards on PRA exist one year prior to the scheduled date for initial loading of fuel

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### STP COL Chapter 19

- Regulatory Guidance
  - Standard Review Plan (SRP), Section 19.0, "PRA and Severe Accident Evaluation for New Reactors", Rev. 2, 2007
  - RG 1.206, "Combined License Applications for Nuclear Power Plants" (LWR Edition), Section C, Part 1, Section C.I.19 and Part III, Section C.III.19
  - Interim Staff Guidance, ISG-3, provides clarification on RG 1.206
    - RG 1.206, Section C.III.1 addresses the COL applications that reference a DC. If there are any design changes or departures from the certified design, the staff expects COL applicants to submit the PRA numerical changes when the cumulative risk impact of the changes resulting from the COL departure is more than a 10% change.
    - Reviewers must determine that the quality of the PRA is sufficient to justify the specific results and risk insights that are used to support the DC or COL application. As discussed in RGs 1.174 and 1.200, the quality of a PRA is measured in terms of its appropriateness with respect to scope, level of detail, and technical adequacy.



#### Open Item 19-1 RAI 19.01-13 STP DEP T1 2.4-2 Feedwater Line Break Mitigation

- No automatic isolation of condensate system for feedwater line break event inside the containment was assumed in the original ABWR PRA model. This may create unacceptable response in the containment, therefore STP proposed to isolate of the condensate system for the feedwater line break event. The RAI asked the applicant to explain why this departure was not modeled in the STP plant specific PRA.
- It turned out that containment response is acceptable using the GOTHIC code for this event, therefore, no isolation of the condensate system is needed. STP still plans to maintain this mitigation function.
- This issue is resolved.



### **STP Plant Specific PRA Model**

#### • Open item 19-3 RAI 19.01-29 STD DEP 8.3-1

#### Medium Voltage Electrical Design

Medium Voltage Electrical System (MVES) changed from one 6.9KV to two systems, 13.8KV and 4.16KV.

- Additional breakers were added to the fault trees from the 13.8KV CTG to the 4.16KV class 1E buses and PIP buses.
- No reported difference in failure data between distribution voltage designs, therefore the data in the original ABWR DCD(SSAR) was chosen to represent the updated MVES design.
- Quantification of the fault trees in the STP plant specific PRA model showed insignificant changes compared to the STP base MOR.
- STP will provide a list of new basic events and staff anticipates no further questions.



### **STP Plant Specific PRA Model**

- STP has developed the screening criteria to only include those departures or design changes which are not screened out in the plant specific PRA model based on the description in RG 1.206 Section C.III.19. The screening process is controlled by the STP procedure, U7-P-RA02-001, "Screening Process for Plant Changes".
- The staff reviewed the screen criteria and issued RAIs asking the applicant to address those screened-out departures which staff questioned.
- The staff issued RAIs on almost all the departures cited in Chapter 19.



### **STP Plant Specific PRA Model**

#### • <u>Open item 19-10 RAI 19.01-23</u>

#### Fire Risk Evaluation in Turbine Building


New components and new locations of the equipment in the turbine building do not affect the ABWR DCD conclusion using the FIVE methodology.

- No new equipment affects the safe-shutdown for the ABWR design.
- CTG in the STP turbine building was screened from the analysis using the FIVE methodology because fire in this area do not directly lead to plant trip and do not affect offsite power distribution to the plant.

This issue is resolved.



### South Texas Project Units 3 & 4 Presentation to ACRS Subcommittee ACRS Action Items





### Agenda

- Working Action Items List
- Action Items Discussion



### **Attendees**

Scott Head

**Brad Maurer** 

Evans Heacock Tom Daley Coley Chappell Bill Stillwell

Manager, Regulatory Affairs, STP 3&4 Manager, ABWR Licensing Westinghouse **Design Engineering Lead Mechanical Systems Supervisor** Licensing STP 3&4 PRA Supervisor, STP 3&4



#### **Working Action Items List**

No.	Action Item	Owner/s – Status	
1	Fuel-related topical reports and fuel change (amendment to COL)	ACRS	
2	Address DG qualification to $60^{\circ}$ C, occupancy issues and HVAC changes	– Resolved DG EQ on 3/18; remainder to discuss in Ch 9	
3	Part 21 reports issued on stability analysis	– Resolved 3/18	
4	Part 21 issues that affect the ABWR design	esign STP / NRO	
5	Deletion of MSIV closure and scram on high radiation – Resolved 3/2		
6	FW line break mitigation, accident is not described in Chapter 15       STP / NRO – discuss in Ch et al.		
7	Address FPGA in more detail	– Discussed on 5/20	
8	Address GSI-191 flow blockage (not just for fuel)	STP / NRO – discuss in Ch 6	
9	Address underground piping carrying radioactive liquids –		
10	New GALE code – Resolved 3/18		
11	Disparity between presentations related to x/q values bounded by DCD	– Resolved 3/2	
12	How specific DAC acceptance criteria are amenable to staff inspection	ACRS	
13	How adding wetwell pressure indication on SPDS gives higher assurance of control room capability post accident	NRO	
14	EDG qualification to increased ambient temperature	– Resolved 3/18	
15	SER conclusion on operator ability to switch from digital MCR to analog RSS	NRO	
16	Staff review of HFE	ACRS / NRO	



#### Working Action Items List (cont'd)

No.	Action Item	Owner/s – Status	
17	Staff needs to formalize handling of DAC	ACRS / NRO (See #12)	
18	SER open item 1-3 on aging management	ACRS / NRO	
19	Comparison of occupational doses – Resolved 3/18		
20	RCIC cycles during an 8 hour SBO event       STP		
21	Rx vessel EOL fluence value and error band       - Resolved 3/18		
22	Consistent use of a set of units (either English or Metric) in plant documents STP		
23	RCS leakage Tech Spec limits and instrument sensitivity       STP		
24	East transmission lines capacity	STP	
25	Single or double closing coils on switchyard breakers	STP	
26	Switchyard control system backup battery discharge time	STP	
27	Switching logic under various electrical transients	STP	
28	SBO rule, operator actions, and CTG startup time within 10 minutes	NRO	
29	Qualification of submerged 345 KV cables	STP	
30	D-RAP list and staff review	STP / NRO	
31	RAT 4.16 kV winding capability	STP	
32	Identification of ESF (and RPS) overlap testing, end-to-end testing	STP	
33	Steam velocity numbers for STP 3 & 4 STP – discuss in Ch 3		



#### Working Action Items List (cont'd)

No.	Action Item	Owner/s – Status
34	Apparent discrepancy between STD DEP 7.2-2 text and Figure 7.2-8	STP
35	Cyber Security ITAAC	NRO
36	Staff to provide FIV reports for ACRS review	NRO



#### **Action Items for Discussion**

- Part 21 issues that affect ABWR design
- East transmission line capacity
- Switchyard breakers closing coils
- Switchyard control system backup battery discharge time
- Qualification of submerged 345 KV cables
- Switching logic under various electrical transients
- RAT 4.16 kV winding capability to feed PIP and safety buses
- RCIC cycles during an 8 hour SBO event
- D-RAP list and staff review



Part 21 issues that affect the ABWR design.

**Response:** STP reviewed Part 21 reports from 1995 to the present

- Identified a total of 45 reports filed with NRC (some were supplemental to the initial filing) related to BWR issues
- Performed a review to determine potential applicability to STP 3&4

Part 21 issues applicable to STP 3 & 4 are the application of Stability Option III and the calculation of SLMCPR.

These are currently known and addressed in the STP 3&4 COLA.



#### Action Item (cont'd)

Part 21 issues to be addressed for STP 3&4:


Topic / Feature	Applicable Part 21 reports	How addressed for STP 3&4
Stability Option III	2001-23, 2002-27, 2002-31, 2003-25	COLA Part 2 Section 4.4 provides a commitment (COM 4.4-3) to provide an updated Stability Option III analysis. Supporting documentation for this COM clearly notes the Part 21 issues.
SLMCPR	1996-47, 2004-20	COLA Part 2 Section 4.4 provides a commitment (COM 4.4-2) to provide an analysis to determine the thermal limits, which includes SLMCPR. The analysis methodology addresses the full range of flows at 100% power.



Confirm that the east offsite transmission lines (Velasco) are capable of supplying power to all four units' safety loads when other lines are lost.

**<u>Response</u>**: The east offsite transmission lines (Velasco) can provide power to all four units.

The load analysis was performed with all four units offline and the entire standby switchyard load (60 MW each for STP 1&2, 100 MW each for STP 3&4) being supplied by the respective circuit of the Velasco line.





State if there are single or double closing coils on switchyard breakers.

**<u>Response</u>**: The switchyard breakers have single closing coils.



Provide switchyard control system backup battery discharge time.

**<u>Response</u>**: Regarding the capability of the switchyard controls to operate on the battery backup, the batteries are

- Sized to operate the switchyard DC loads for 10 hours
- Sized with a 25% aging margin and a 10% design margin
- Have an expected life of 15 to 20 years

The batteries are designed to supply 10 hours of load at the 15 year point, although the 10% design margin will allow them to last longer.



Address qualification of submerged 345 KV cables.

**Response:** Lead sheath cable is designed for use in a wet environment.

Several industry standards and organizations acknowledge that cables with continuous metallic sheaths are impervious to water (IEEE 141, NEMA WC 71, NEMA WC 74, NFPA 70 (National Electric Code)).

For example, NEMA WC 71, 5.3.1 and NEMA WC 74 7.3.1 say:

"A lead or smooth aluminum sheath, with or without outer supplementary protection, shall be used when an impervious covering is required."

From discussion with a transmission service provider, underground lead sheath cable which has been in service for 40 years produced test results similar to a new cable.



Performance of switching logic under various electrical transients.


**Response**: For the loss of a UAT:

- Generator breaker and switchyard breakers for the generator <u>OPEN</u>.
- Source breakers from UATs to all PG buses, all PIP buses, and the Division I and II Class 1E buses <u>OPEN</u>.
- DGs for Divisions 1 and II <u>START</u> on bus undervoltage and Divisions I and II <u>CONNECT</u> to their respective DGs.
- Division III Class 1E bus <u>remains energized</u> on RAT A.
- CTG starts on loss of power (undervoltage) to two PIP buses, CTG3 bus <u>remains energized</u> through RAT B.
- Two pre-selected PIP buses are powered upon transfer to bus CTG3.



#### Action Item (cont'd)


Switching logic for the loss of a UAT electrical transient:





#### Action Item (cont'd)

Switching logic for the loss of a UAT electrical transient:





RAT 4.16 kV winding capability to feed two PIP buses and one safety bus.


**<u>Response</u>**: Two PIP buses and one safety bus (1E) can be supplied from the 4.16 kV winding for RAT B directly connected to bus CTG3, as well as from the RAT A or B 13.8 kV winding via CTG1 to CTG3.



Number of times RCIC is expected to cycle on and off during an 8 hour SBO event.

**<u>Response</u>**: Analysis performed shows that RCIC system is expected to cycle on and off (automatically, between Level 2 and Level 8) approximately four times during an 8 hour SBO event.

Reactor water level under SBO (8 hours):



RCIC pump is a Turbine Water Lubricated (TWL) Pump (STD DEP T1 2.4-3).




#### Action Item (cont'd)

The TWL governor directly senses pump flow and adjusts the throttle valve through a direct linkage.

TWL pump achieves a rapid (3-10 seconds), controlled startup with no over-speed.

Typical start transient :





Address when D-RAP list will be effectively populated.

**Response:** From RAI 17.4-9 Response, Revision 2, dated 5/19/2010:

The PRA input to D-RAP is included in FSAR Tables 19K-1, 19K-2 and 19K-4.

Appropriate SSCs will be evaluated by the D-RAP Expert Panel using the process described in FSAR Section 17.4S.1.4 as detailed design progresses. Current schedule is to complete a majority of the system reviews by the end of 2010 and to complete all of the system reviews, provide a list of the set of D-RAP SSCs, and have the program elements in place to control future activities, by 3<sup>rd</sup> quarter of 2011. The FSAR will be updated (10CFR50.71(e)) to provide the Expert Panel Failure Modes and RAP activities recommendations for this set of risk-significant equipment. (Refer to COM 17.4-1.)



### **ACRS Action Items**

#### **Questions and Comments**

