



Illinois Emergency Management Agency
Division of Nuclear Safety

Rod R. Blagojevich, Governor
Andrew Velasquez III, Director
Joseph G. Klinger, Assistant Director

January 5, 2009

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Region III
Quad Cities Nuclear Station
22710 206th Avenue North
Cordova, IL 61242

Attention: Mr. James McGhee

SUBJECT: IEMA – Bureau of Nuclear Facility Safety, Inspection Report
Quarterly Inspection Period: October 1 to December 31, 2008

Dear: Mr. McGhee,


On December 31, 2008 the Illinois Emergency Management Agency-Bureau of Nuclear Facility Safety Resident Inspector completed the quarterly inspection activities at the Quad Cities Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2. Per the terms and conditions of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the NRC and IEMA-BNFS, the enclosed inspection report documents our agency's inspection issues and concerns that were previously discussed with you and members of your resident inspection staff.

The IEMA-BNFS inspection activities were conducted as they relate to nuclear safety and to compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of the plant license. The inspector(s) reviewed selected licensee procedures and records, observed licensee activities, and interviewed licensee personnel.

Specifically, the inspection activities for this period focused on those inspection modules that were proposed to your NRC inspection staff as identified in the Fourth Quarter IEMA Inspection Plan and are disseminated within the text of the attached IEMA-BNFS Inspection Report.

Based on the results of this inspection, the inspectors identified the following IEMA-BNFS Open / Follow-up Items and are discussed within their respective report reference ():

1. The inspector will review the licensee action to correct deficiencies with the identified Emergency Lighting Battery Packs (ELBPs) (R05.3)



4-72



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Any issues, open items and/or concerns that are discovered during the course the inspection period are normally entered into the IEMA – Bureau of Nuclear Facility Safety Plant Issues Matrix, and by this letter, are considered as disseminated to your NRC staff for disposition in accordance with NRC policies and procedures. In full cooperation with the and at the request of the NRC, IEMA-BNFS will continue to follow and assist the NRC Resident Inspection Staff with resolution and closure of all such issues, open items and/or concerns.


In full cooperation with and at the request of the NRC, IEMA-BNFS will continue to follow and assist the NRC Resident Inspection Staff with resolution and closure of all such issues and concerns.

If you have any questions, please contact me at your earliest convenience.

Sincerely yours,

Richard J. Zuffa
IEMA-BNFS/RI Unit Supervisor
Resident Inspection Staff

Docket Nos. 50-254; 50-265
License Nos. DPR-29; DPR-30
Enclosure(s): Inspection Report: 08QC-4QIR
cc w/o encl: A.C. Settles, Chief Division of RICC
C.H. Mathews, IEMA-BNFS-RI



**IEMA INSPECTION REPORT SUMMARY
08QC-4QIR**

STATION: Quad Cities	UNIT 1 – DOCKET NO: 50-254 UNIT 2 – DOCKET NO: 50-265
IEMA INSPECTORS:	Charlie Mathews Jeff Roman
INSPECTION PERIOD:	October 1 through December 31, 2008
NRC REPORT NUMBER:	2008-005
INSPECTION HOURS:	90
SUBMITTED TO NRC ON:	January 5, 2009
INSPECTION SUBJECT:	Safety Inspection of the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station
VIOLATIONS:	None
OPEN ITEMS:	
	1. The inspector will review the licensee action to correct deficiencies with the identified Emergency Lighting Battery Packs (ELBPs) (R05.3)
UNRESOLVED ITEMS:	None
ITEMS CLOSED:	None

Report Details

Plant Status

Unit 1

Unit 1 operated the entire inspection period at near full rated electrical load of 912 MWe, with the following exceptions. Small power reductions were performed as required to facilitate planned control rod maintenance activities and condenser flow reversals.

On October 31st, the unit was reduced in power to less than 300 MWe to add oil to the 1A Reactor Recirculation Pump lower motor bearing and repair leaks in the main condenser.

On November 7th, the unit was reduced in power to less than 800 MWe to inspect and repair the 1B Reactor Feedwater pump.

Unit 2

Unit 2 operated the entire inspection period at near full rated electrical load of 912 MWe until December 13, with the following exceptions. Small power reductions were performed as required to facilitate planned control rod maintenance activities and condenser flow reversals.

On October 1st, the unit was reduced in power to less than 300 MWe due to loss of the 2B reactor recirculation pump. The pump was restarted and power was restored on October 2.

On December 5th, the unit was taken off line to allow testing of the new 345 KV Switchyard gas circuit breaker 10-11.

On December 7th, the unit was taken off line to repair leaks to extraction bellows for the 2D1 and 2A1 feedwater heaters.

1. REACTOR SAFETY

Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity

1R04 Equipment Alignment (IEMA Keystone: Reactor Safety) (71111.04)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector performed equipment configuration alignment and general area inspections in the following plant areas:

- Main Control Room and Back Panel Areas
- Unit 1&2 Reactor Feed Water Pump Rooms
- Unit 1&2 4 KV Buses (safety and non-safety)
- Unit 1&2 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Rooms
- Unit 1&2 Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) Pump Vaults
- Unit 1&2 Reactor Building Corner Pump Rooms

- Shutdown Makeup pump (SSMP) Room
- Unit 1&2 and Unit ½ Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Rooms
- Refuel Floor

b. Observations and Findings

During walk down inspections of plant equipment areas, the inspector verified equipment configuration and observed for any material condition deficiencies that could prevent proper equipment operation. Equipment areas were inspected for system leakage, personnel safety hazards, potential interference with system components and controls, fire hazards, water intrusion, and the integrity of system structural supports. The inspector monitored equipment areas for abnormal vibration, odors, sounds, or other conditions that could impact proper equipment operation and plant safety.

On November 25th, the inspector while touring the power block, identified a 4 foot by 6 inch puddle of oil under the Unit 1 generator exciter, on mezzanine level 615' Turbine Building. The inspector also found oil soaked oil absorbent rags on Unit 2 under the Unit 2 Generator Exciter. The inspector discussed these potential fire hazards with the Operations Department Work Execution Control (WEC) Senior Reactor Operator (SRO). The WEC SRO talked to the Fire Marshall and they determined that the quantity was not sufficient to impact the combustible fire loading of the area. The WEC SRO did direct operations personnel to clean up the oil and replace the soaked rags.

On December 8th, the inspector observed the actions of the Main Control Room crew as they secured Reactor Building Ventilation, per QCOP 5750-02, rev 19; Reactor Building Ventilation System, and Turbine Building Ventilation, per QCOP 5750-01, rev 17; Turbine Building Ventilation System, in response to a loss of the auxiliary heating boiler. Securing the above systems required the start of the Standby Gas Treatment system per QCOP 7500-01, rev 19; Standby Gas Treatment System (SBGTS), Standby Operation and Startup. Loss of the auxiliary boiler, with freezing temperatures outside, raised the possibility of freezing the cooling coils on the Reactor Building ventilation intake.

c. Conclusions

There were no significant issues identified during this inspection activity.

1R05.1 Fire Protection (IEMA Keystone: Reactor Safety) (71111.05)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector evaluated the licensee's fire protection program for operational status, and material condition and verified the adequacy of:

- Controls for combustibles and ignition sources within the plant
- Fire detection and suppression capability
- Material condition of passive fire protection features

b. Observations and Findings

The inspector made several tours of the Quad Cities power block over the quarter and while on tour, verified compliance with the licensee's fire protection program per procedures OP-AA-201-004 rev 8, Fire Prevention for Hot Work, and OP-AA-201-009 rev 7, Control of Transient Combustible Material. Due to licensee identified issues in the past with equipment or scaffolds that blocked access to fire protection equipment, the inspector paid particular attention to that potential; however no additional deficiencies were identified.

c. Conclusions

There were no significant issues identified during this inspection activity.

1R05.2 Fire Protection (IEMA Keystone: Reactor Safety) (71111.05)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector investigated the deluge of the # 2 and #3 turbine bearings on November 17, while the licensee was performing surveillance QCOS 4100-30 rev 22B, Quarterly Essential Fire System Suppression Alarm Test Part 1. Reference IR 845855.

b. Observations and Findings

The inspector researched past IRs and other plant Fire Protection documentation to determine if timely corrective action had been performed. The inspector searched the IR database and determined that turbine bearings had been previously deluged three times in since 2004 while performing QCOS 4100-30. These incidents were documented in IRs, 846089, 845855, 45713, 463968, and 275908.

Additionally, the inspector searched plant documentation to determine if the Fire Protection System was required to have a quality assurance program that would mandate a corrective action program as outlined in 10CFR50 Appendix B. The inspector researched Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), Chapter 3 and Section 9.5.1. UFSAR section 9.5.1 stated that the Fire Protection Program is outlined in plant procedures.

The inspector next reviewed NO-AA-10, rev 81; Quality Assurance Topical Report, which stated that the quality requirements of the Fire Protection System were defined as augmented quality. Augmented Quality was defined in Appendix A of the document as meeting the requirements as defined in the Exelon response to NRC Branch Technical Position (BTP) 9.5-1. Those systems not covered by BTP 9.5-1 would be in accordance with the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) guidelines.

Document QDC FPR Volume 1 section 5, rev 12, Guidelines of Appendix A to APCS 9.5-1, provides a section by section response to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) BTP 9.5-1. From this document, the inspector learned that only the safety-related portions of the Fire Protection System were required to meet the requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix B. Therefore, timely action to prevent reoccurring deluge of the turbine bearings was not a requirement. The licensee revised the surveillance procedure to isolate the deluge valve prior to performance of this surveillance to prevent future deluging the turbine bearings.

c. Conclusions

There were no significant issues identified during this inspection activity.

1R05.3 Fire Protection (IEMA Keystone: Reactor Safety)(71111.05)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector performed an inspection of emergency lights in portions of the Reactor and Turbine Buildings.

b. Observations and Findings

On November 3rd, the inspector performed a walkdown of the emergency lights in portions of the Turbine and Reactor Buildings. The inspector noted that several of the emergency light battery packs (ELBP) appeared to be missing the seismic battery tray assembly as identified in section 4.4.2

(Figure 1) of Exelon procedure MA-AA-723-350, Emergency Lighting Battery Pack Quarterly Inspection, Temporary/Interim Change (TIC) 2199. The seismic battery tray assembly appeared to be missing because the battery was sitting visibly lower in the battery "box" than expected. A total of 41 ELBPs were noted as missing the seismic battery tray assembly. Of these 41 ELBPs, 2 were also missing a seismic hook bolt (J-bolt). An additional ELBP appeared to be missing the pressure bar on the seismic battery tray.

The inspector reported these observations of the ELBPs to the Shift Manager on November 3rd. After questioning from the inspector, the licensee initiated IR 844775 on November 13th, to determine if the condition of the ELBPs was acceptable. The IR stated Quad Cities does not require a design for a seismic event simultaneous with an Appendix R event. The inspector accepted that statement but has concerns with the ELBPs being displaced and affecting other equipment in the area during a seismic event. The licensee committed to the inspector to address the concern with the ELBPs not being assembled with the seismic tray assembly and missing J hooks. The inspector will review the licensee's action to correct the deficiencies with the identified ELBPs. This pending review is an inspector Open Item. (08QC-4QIR-006)

c. Conclusions

House Keeping and material condition of the areas inspected was adequate. The areas were free of fire hazards. Fire detection and suppression equipment was present in all areas inspected and was in an operable condition.

The licensee's action to correct the deficiencies with the identified ELBPs is an open item.

No other significant issues were identified in this inspection area.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessment & Emergent Work Evaluation (IEMA Keystone: Reactor Safety) (71111.13)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector monitored the licensee's on-line risk assessment on a continued basis.

b. Observations and Findings

The inspector monitored the on duty shift activities concerning risk assessment practices during scheduled plant maintenance and emergent work activities. The on-shift supervisors updated the on-line risk assessments to appropriate levels when plant conditions warranted and it was their practice to consult the Station Risk Coordinator in the event they encountered an equipment configuration not previously evaluated.

On November 24th, following the distribution of the new “Key Quad Cities 1 and 2 PRA Results” summary sheet, the inspector questioned the Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) engineer why the Reactor Protection System (RPS) had been removed from the summary and the PRA model. The PRA engineer stated that the new “Key Quad Cities 1 and 2 PRA Results” summary sheet was revised to be consistent with all Exelon sites and that RPS was removed from the summary sheet and not the PRA model. The inspector was also informed by the PRA Engineer that due to feedback from others on-site, that he planned to add RPS back onto the summary sheet.

On December 1st, with the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System (RCIC) out of service for a maintenance outage, the inspector walked down the standby lineups for the following protected pathway equipment:

- High Pressure Core Injection (HPCI) using QCOP 2300-01, rev 50; HPCI Preparation for Standby Operation,
- Safe Shutdown Makeup Pump (SSMP) using QCOP 2900-01, rev 27; Safe Shutdown Makeup Pump System Preparation for Standby Operation.

c. Conclusions

There were no significant issues identified during this inspection activity.

1R19 Post Maintenance Testing (IEMA Keystone: Reactor Safety) (71111.19)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector verified that post-maintenance test procedures and test activities are adequate to verify system operability, and functional capability.

b. Observations and Findings

On December 17th, the inspector reviewed the completed post maintenance test procedure (QCOS 1600-01 rev 16; Torus-to-Drywell Vacuum Breaker Exercise) to verify that Torus-to-Drywell Vacuum Breaker 2-1601-32A position indication functioned properly following maintenance. In addition to valve 2-1601-32A, the remaining Torus-to-Drywell Vacuum Breakers were also tested. No deficiencies were noted.

c. Conclusions

There were no significant issues identified during this inspection activity.

1R22 Surveillance Testing (IEMA Keystone: Reactor Safety) (71111.22)

b. Inspection Scope

The inspector verified that surveillance testing of risk-significant systems, and components demonstrated that the equipment was capable of performing its intended safety function.

b. Observations and Findings

On December 8th, the inspector reviewed completed surveillance procedure QCOS 1300-6, rev 26; RCIC System Power Operated Valve Test, to verify operability of the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System (RCIC). While reviewing this surveillance, the inspector found that the Outboard Steam Supply Isolation Valve, MO 2-1301-17, failed its stroke time. The valve re-stroked and timed and on the second try, met the acceptance criteria. The valve was stroke timed per procedure ER-AA-321, TIC 2209; Administrative Requirements for Inservice Testing.

The inspector suspecting that this was a case of preconditioning contacted the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (IEMA) American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code Compliance Inspector for his insight on the test. The inspector and the IEMA ASME Code Compliance inspector reviewed the completed surveillance, IR 850732, the Inservice Test (IST) evaluation of the completed test of valve MO 2-1301-17, and ASME 1998 OMB Code Subsection ISTC (Inservice Testing of Valves in Light-Water Reactor Nuclear Power Plants).

From this research it was determined that the valve stroke time exceeded the acceptance criteria of section ISTC-5122 (greater than 15% stroke time). Failure to meet this acceptance criterion required that the valve be immediately retested or declared inoperable. In this case the valve stroke timed within the acceptance criteria the second time.

Key to this investigation was that the valve stroke time did not exceed the utility established "limiting value" as provided in the ASME Omb Code. For all Exelon sites this limiting value is 25% of the acceptable valve stroke value. In this case, the limiting stroke time was 15.3 seconds and the first valve stroke time was 15.3 seconds. Per the ASME Omb Code, the valve was operable at all times. Investigation by the licensee into why the valve was slow the first stroke time and acceptable the second yielded no conclusion. This valve was instrumented to monitor the next time the valve is stroke timed.

The result of this surveillance test was considered satisfactory by the inspector.

On December 10th the inspector reviewed the following completed operability surveillances. The surveillances reviewed were:

- QCOS 1100-7 rev 30, SBLC Pump Flow Rate Test
- QCOS 6600-42 rev 30, Unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generator Load Test
- QCOS 1600-04 rev 24, Weekly Containment Oxygen Concentration
- QCOS 0500-12 rev 14, RPS Test Switch Weekly Functional Test

The results of these surveillance tests were considered satisfactory by the inspector.

On December 17th, the inspector reviewed the following completed shutdown operability surveillance.

- QCOS 1600-28 rev 12, Pressure Suppression System Check Valve Vacuum Breaker Test

The result of this surveillance test was considered satisfactory by the inspector.

c. Conclusions

There were no significant issues identified during this inspection activity.

2. RADIATION SAFETY

2OS OCCUPATIONAL RADIATION SAFETY

2OS1 Access Control to Radiological Significant Areas (IEMA Keystone Occupational Radiation Safety) (IP 71121.01 & MC 2515D)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector conducted walk downs of radiologically controlled areas to verify the adequacy of radiological area boundaries, postings, radiological housekeeping and contamination controls.

b. Findings and Observations

During plant walk downs in November and December, the inspector observed access controls and ingress/egress practices through Contamination Area access points. Personnel entering the Contamination Area on the Refuel Floor were dressed in the appropriate level of Personnel Anti-Contamination Clothing (PCs) for the area, and personnel exiting the Refuel Floor Contamination Area, removed PCs correctly using sound contamination control techniques.

Radiological controls, including postings and roped off areas, were appropriate and contamination controls were satisfactorily implemented.

c. Conclusions

There were no apparent degraded conditions associated with this inspection activity.

2PS Public Radiation Safety

2PS1 Environmental Monitoring Program and Radioactive Material Control Program (IEMA Keystone: Public Radiation Safety 2515A, 71122.01)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed the results from the last set of 54 Tritium well samples.

b. Observations and Findings

On November 18th, the inspector received the latest well sample results from the 54 Tritium sample wells. The samples were taken in early November.

The groundwater sampling program is intended to monitor the existing plume of tritium (from previous sub-surface piping leaks that were identified and repaired) as it traverses the owner controlled area and to provide early warning of new radioactive leakage. The samples are now taken monthly, down from the previous weekly sampling frequency when a known sub-surface pipe leak existed. The minimum detectable level of Tritium is 200 PicoCuries per liter (pCi/L).

The previously known Tritium leak on the Residual Heat Removal pump suction line from the Contaminated Condensate Storage Tank was repaired in August and the excavation area backfilled in November.

From the latest well sample data, the inspector believes that Tritium activity has begun to decrease overall, with the plume moving to the southwest as expected.

c. Conclusions

The inspector will continue to follow sample results.

There were no issues of significance identified during this inspection activity.

2PS3 Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP) and Radioactive Material Control Program: (IEMA Keystone: Public Radiation Safety) (71122.03)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector performed a verification of the Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP) analyses with respect to its impact of radioactive effluent releases to the environment. The inspection was performed to validate the integrity of the radioactive gaseous and liquid effluent release program and to ensure that the licensee's surveys and controls are adequate to prevent the inadvertent release of uncontrolled radioactive contaminants into the public domain.

b. Observations and Findings

On November 18th, the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (IEPA) visited the Quad Cities Station for their quarterly joint inspection with IEMA. The following is an update of activities since the previous IEPA visit of September 23, 2008.

- The Unit 1 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) underground suction line from the Clean Condensate Storage Tank (CCST) has been repaired and placed back into service.
- Tritium levels in the groundwater around the leak repair area have fallen off somewhat and appear to have leveled off.
- No changes were noted in this quarter's monitoring well samples. The only change noted was an increase in tritium levels in the three monitoring wells near the Waste Water Treatment Facility. This appears to confirm the theory that the tritium plume is moving in that direction (to the Southwest).

A review of the licensee's IRs for the quarter regarding facility tritium activity and REMP sampling issues contained nothing noteworthy.

c. Conclusions

There were no significant issues identified during this inspection activity.

4 ALL Cornerstones

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems: (IEMA Keystone: ALL) (71152)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector reviewed corrective action documents to determine the licensee's compliance with NRC regulations regarding corrective action programs. The inspector verified that the licensee was identifying operator workarounds at an appropriate threshold and entering them into the corrective action program.

b. Observations and Findings

The inspector reviewed the majority of the Issue Reports (IRs) initiated during the fourth inspection quarter to assess whether the licensee was properly identifying issues. There were no noteworthy IRs identified that are not discussed elsewhere in this report.

The inspector reviewed the following reports:

- From IR 836178; Root Cause Investigation into Explosion in the Floor Drain Surge Tank Vestibule Building from the buildup of methane gas
- From IR 847945; Operability Evaluation of all three Diesel Generator Cooling Water pumps (DGCWP) due to failure of the Unit 2 DGCWP Impeller Wear Ring.

The inspector reviewed each of the above documents in detail, discussed the documents with applicable site personnel, and reviewed the applicable governing documents, i.e. Technical Specifications, UFSAR, and 10CFR. No issues were found.

c. Conclusions

There were no significant issues identified during this inspection activity.

40A3 Follow-up of Events (IEMA Keystone: All Keystones)(71153)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector responded to the station following an explosion onsite and declaration of an Unusual Event.

b. Observations and Findings

On October 27th at approximately 0300 hours, an explosion occurred onsite in the floor drain surge tank building. The building is inside the protected area and outside the vital area to the south and west of the Turbine Building. The licensee declared an Unusual Event per Emergency Action Level (EAL) HU6 for an explosion within the protected area boundary resulting in visible damage to a permanent structure or equipment.

The inspector was dispatched to the site on behalf of IEMA to act as the Technical Support Liaison for IEMA's Radiological Emergency Assessment Center (REAC). The licensee managed the event response from the Outage Control Center (OCC). The Shift Manager acted as Emergency Director. When the inspector first arrived at the OCC, the licensee response appeared to be unorganized. There were no documented priorities listed in the OCC and the overall direction of the event response appeared poor. The IEMA and NRC inspectors made numerous inquiries about the event and the management of the response. By late morning the licensee had improved their response tactics. Priorities were clearly

established with specific teams working on each one. The OCC staff had clear direction on what needed to be accomplished and how to achieve it.

The licensee determined the explosion was caused by a buildup of methane gas. The licensee determined the methane gas was produced by a bacterial breakdown of the resins in the floor drain surge tank producing methane. The methane should have been removed by the ventilation system in the building but the floor drain surge tank building exhaust fan was unknowingly inoperable. The licensee determined through sampling that following the explosion, the levels of methane in the building were no longer at explosive levels. With the assistance of personnel from the State Fire Marshal's Office, the ignition source was determined to be a light in the vestibule area of the building.

Later in the day on October 27th, the licensee determined that the criteria to exit the Unusual Event had been met. The NRC staff however, disagreed with the licensee. The NRC had a concern that the methane levels could again rise due to additional production of more methane. The NRC wanted definitive assurance that another explosion would not occur. The licensee implemented a plan for purging the air space in the surge tank with nitrogen and at the same time venting the space to the outside atmosphere. Once this was begun, the NRC allowed the Unusual Event to be terminated. The Unusual Event was terminated by the licensee at 1530 on October 28.

The licensee continued restoring normal ventilation to the building. During the process it was also found that the Hydramotor (hydraulic motor on the exhaust ventilation damper) on the ventilation ductwork along with the ventilation fan did not function properly. The licensee repaired the components and returned the ventilation to a normal configuration.

c. Conclusions

An explosion occurred onsite leading to an Unusual Event declaration. The licensee's initial response was lacking but soon improved to an acceptable level.

INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED

The following procedures were used to perform inspections during the report period. Documented findings are contained in the body of the report.

<u>Inspection Procedure Number</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Section</u>
IP 71111-04	Equipment Alignment	R04
IP 71111-05	Fire Protection	R05
IP 71111-13	Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation	R13
IP 71111-19	Post Maintenance Testing	R19
IP 71111-22	Surveillance Testing	R22
IP 71121.01	Access Control to Radiologically Significant Areas	0S1
IP 71122.01	Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment and Monitoring	PS1
IP 71122-03	Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP) and Radioactive Material Control Program	PS3
IP 71152	Identification and Resolution of Problems	OA2
IP 71153	Follow-up of Events & NOEDs	OA3

INSPECTION PROCEDURES NOT PERFORMED

Due to being offsite for medical reasons, follow-up on the licensee Unusual Event, and other inspector priorities, the following inspection modules were not completed this inspection period, they will be rescheduled for next quarter:

IP 71121.02	ALARA Planning and Controls	0S2
IP 71121.03	Radiation Monitoring Instrument	0S3

LIST OF ACRONYMS AND INITIALISMS USED IN REPORT

10CFR	Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations
ASME	American Society of Mechanical Engineers
ASME	1998 OMB Code Subsection ISTCASME Operations & Maintenance 1998 Addenda "b" subsection, Inservice Testing of Valves in Light-Water Reactor Nuclear Power Plants
BTP	Branch Technical Position
CCST	Clean Condensate Storage Tank
DGCWP	Diesel Generator Cooling Water pumps
EAL HU6	Emergency Action Level, HU6 – Unusual Event classified under "Hazards or other conditions affecting plant safety"
EDG	Emergency Diesel Generator
EHC	Electro-Hydraulic Control System
ELBP	Emergency Light Battery Packs
FP	Fire Protection
HPCI	High Pressure Coolant Injection
IEMA	Illinois Emergency Management Agency
IEPA	Illinois Environmental Protection Agency
IR	Incident Report
IST	Inservice Testing
KV	kilo-volts
NFPA	National Fire Protection Association
NRC	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
QCOS	Quad Cities Operating Surveillance
OCC	Outage Control Center
PRA	Probabilistic Risk Assessment
RCIC	Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System
REAC	Radiological Emergency Assessment Center
REMP	Radiological Effluent Monitoring Program
RHR	Residual Heat Removal System
RHRSW	Residual Heat Removal Service Water
RPS	Reactor Protection System
SBGTS	Standby Gas Treatment System
SRO	Senior Reactor Operator
SSMP	Safe Shutdown Makeup pump
TIC	Temporary/Interim Change
TS	Technical Specifications
U1, U2	Unit 1, Unit 2
UFSAR	Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
WEC	Work Execution Control