

Enclosure 4
Farley Nuclear Power Plant Presentation
Meeting Summary of the 6/8/2010 Meeting with
NRC/SNC/FPL/SCE&G
Dated June 17, 2010

Farley Nuclear Plant NRC Screening Criteria Response

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FNP Fire Protection

□ Agenda

- Introduction
 - Screening Criteria
 - Initiatives
 - Conclusion
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FNP Fire Protection

□ Introduction

- FNP - Two 900 MWe 3 loop Westinghouse PWR Units
- Committed to 10CFR 50 App R.
- The FNP fire protection program provides defense-in-depth protection:

Design Features
Personnel Training

Fire Fighting Equipment
Operating Procedures

NRC Screening Criteria

Criteria	Applies to FNP	Reason/Info
Large Number of Operator Actions	Yes*	FNP is estimated to have significantly less than BFN but more than the other SNC plants.
Single Fire can effect more than one Unit.	No*	Fire areas/equipment relied upon for App R safe shutdown are not common. Shared DG's can be impacted. DG redundancy ensures SSD.
Use of Thermoplastic Cables	Not Significant*	Some thermoplastic used for low voltage applications such as cameras or telecommunications. Less than 8 % of cables installed.
Problems documenting cable routing	No	No significant issues with documenting cable routing.
Analysis Credits Self Induced Station Blackouts	No	SISBO not credited
Complicated Manual Operator Actions	Yes *	Based on NRC criteria. Current manual actions are felt to be reasonable. Operators are trained and drilled on actions. Compensatory actions in place.
Mitigation of a fire requires the use of systems from multiple units (electrical or mechanical cross-unit ties).	Not Significant	No electrical cross connections credited. Limited use of cross connected air systems. N2 backup to PORV's is credited and is not a cross connected system.
Use of Symptom based Procedures.	Yes*	Although decision required, event recognition is not required.

FNP Fire Protection Initiatives

□ Initiatives

- Elimination of Kaowool fire wrap by cable reroute to ensure proper cable separation was complete in 2006
 - FNP is transitioning to NFPA 805
 - Fire PRA Model under development
 - Safe Shutdown Analysis Revalidation
 - OMA Feasibility Study & Compensatory Actions
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FNP Fire Protection Summary

- OMA along with procedures is the main reason for yes screen criteria
 - Conservative LOSP assumption has added OMAs
 - Application of NFPA 805 will significantly reduce OMAs
 - Thermoplastic cables used in lower voltage applications and low %
 - No reliance on cable wrap material proper separation exists for cables.
 - FNP believes that 3 of the 8 screening criteria are material.
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