



**UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**

REGION III
2443 WARRENVILLE ROAD, SUITE 210
LISLE, IL 60532-4352

June 3, 2010

Mr. Barry Allen
Site Vice President
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station
5501 North State Route 2, Mail Stop A-DB-3080
Oak Harbor, OH 43449-9760

**SUBJECT: DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION
NRC TRIENNIAL FIRE PROTECTION BASELINE INSPECTION
REPORT 05000346/2010006(DRS)**

Dear Mr. Allen:

On May 14, 2010, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a triennial fire protection inspection at your Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on May 14, 2010, with you and other members of your staff.

As a result of your intent to adopt the National Fire Protection Association Standard (NFPA) 805, "Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants, 2001 Edition," as defined by Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 50, Section 48(c), the inspection was conducted in accordance with Inspection Procedure (IP) 71111.05TTP, "Fire Protection - NFPA 805 Transition Period (Triennial)," issued December 24, 2009, and effective January 1, 2010. The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, no findings were identified.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records System (PARS) component of NRC's Agencywide.

B. Allen

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Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Robert C. Daley, Chief
Engineering Branch 3
Division of Reactor Safety

Docket No.: 50-346
License No.: NPF-3

Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000346/2010006(DRS)
w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Docket No: 50-346

License No: NPF-3

Report No: 05000346/2010006(DRS)

Licensee: FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company

Facility: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station

Location: Oak Harbor, OH

Dates: April 14 through May 14, 2010

Inspectors: G. Hausman, Senior Reactor Inspector, Lead
M. Bielby, Senior Operating License Examiner
B. Jose, Senior Reactor Inspector
D. Passehl, Senior Reactor Analyst
D. Szwarc, Reactor Inspector

Approved by: R. C. Daley, Chief
Engineering Branch 3
Division of Reactor Safety

Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000346/2010006(DRS); 04/14/2010 – 05/14/2010; Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station; Routine Triennial Fire Protection Baseline Inspection.

This report covers an announced triennial fire protection baseline inspection. The inspection was conducted by Region III inspectors. Based on the results of this inspection, no NRC-identified findings were discovered that involved violations of NRC requirements. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, "Significance Determination Process" (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006.

A. NRC-Identified and Self-Revealed Findings

No violations of significance were identified.

B. Licensee-Identified Violations

No violations of significance were identified.

REPORT DETAILS

1. REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events and Mitigating Systems

1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05TTP)

The purpose of the fire protection triennial baseline inspection was to conduct a design-based, plant specific, risk-informed, onsite inspection of the licensee's fire protection program's defense-in-depth elements used to mitigate the consequences of a fire. The fire protection program shall extend the concept of defense-in-depth to fire protection in plant areas important to safety by:

- preventing fires from starting;
- rapidly detecting, controlling and extinguishing fires that do occur;
- providing protection for structures, systems, and components important to safety so that a fire that is not promptly extinguished by fire suppression activities will not prevent the safe shutdown of the reactor plant; and
- taking reasonable actions to mitigate postulated events that could potentially cause loss of large areas of power reactor facilities due to explosions or fires.

The inspectors' evaluation focused on the design, operational status, and material condition of the reactor plant's fire protection program, post-fire safe shutdown systems and B.5.b mitigating strategies. The objectives of the inspection were to assess whether the licensee had implemented a fire protection program that: (1) provided adequate controls for combustibles and ignition sources inside the plant; (2) provided adequate fire detection and suppression capability; (3) maintained passive fire protection features in good material condition; (4) established adequate compensatory measures for out-of-service, degraded or inoperable fire protection equipment, systems or features; (5) ensured that procedures, equipment, fire barriers and systems exist so that the post-fire capability to safely shut down the plant was ensured; (6) included feasible and reliable operator manual actions when appropriate to achieve safe shutdown; and (7) identified fire protection issues at an appropriate threshold and ensured these issues were entered into the licensee's problem identification and resolution program.

In addition, the inspectors' review and assessment focused on the licensee's post-fire safe shutdown systems for selected risk-significant fire areas. Inspector emphasis was placed on determining that the post-fire safe shutdown capability and the fire protection features were maintained free of fire damage to ensure that at least one post-fire safe shutdown success path was available. The inspectors' review and assessment also focused on the licensee's B.5.b related license conditions and the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54 (hh)(2). Inspector emphasis was to ensure that the licensee could maintain or restore core cooling, containment, and spent fuel pool cooling capabilities utilizing the B.5.b mitigating strategies following a loss of large areas of power reactor facilities due to explosions or fires. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

The fire areas and/or fire zones and B.5.b mitigating strategies selected for review during this inspection are listed below and in Section 1R05.11. The fire areas and/or fire zones and B.5.b mitigating strategies selected constitute 5 inspection samples and 1 inspection sample, respectively, as defined in IP 71111.05TTP.

Fire Area	Room Number(s)	Description
A.09	115CC 314CC	Cable Chase (High Fire Loading >200,000 BTU / sq ft) Cable Chase (High Fire Loading >200,000 BTU / sq ft)
EE.01	500 501 515	Radwaste and Fuel Handling Area Radwaste Exhaust Fan Room Purge Exhaust Equipment Room
R.01	324 324DC	Auxiliary Shutdown Panel and SW C Duct Chase
S.01	325	High Voltage Switchgear Room A
U.01	310 312 313	Passage Spent Fuel Pump Room Hatch Area

.1 Protection of Safe Shutdown Capabilities

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the functional requirements identified by the licensee as necessary for achieving and maintaining hot shutdown conditions to ensure that at least one post-fire safe shutdown success path was available in the event of fire in each of the selected fire areas and for alternative shutdown in the case of control room evacuation. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the fire hazards analysis, safe shutdown analysis, and supporting drawings and documentation to verify that safe shutdown capabilities were properly protected. The updated final safety analysis report and the licensee's engineering and/or licensing justifications (e.g., NRC guidance documents, license amendments, Technical Specifications, safety evaluation reports, exemptions, and deviations) were also reviewed to determine the licensing basis.

The inspectors reviewed the licensee procedures and programs for the control of ignition sources and transient combustibles to assess their effectiveness in preventing fires and in controlling combustible loading within limits established in the fire hazards analysis. The inspectors performed plant walkdowns to verify that protective features were being properly maintained and administrative controls were being implemented.

The inspectors examined the operators' ability to perform the necessary manual actions for achieving safe shutdown by reviewing post-fire shutdown procedures, the accessibility of safe shutdown equipment, the available time for performing the manual actions and whether manual actions had been verified and validated by plant walkdowns. In addition, the inspectors evaluated manual actions not supported by an

NRC approved exemption or deviation using the guidance provided in Attachment 2 of IP 71111.05TTP.

The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's design control procedures to ensure that the process included appropriate reviews and controls to assess plant changes for any potential adverse impact on the fire protection program and/or post-fire safe shutdown analysis and procedures.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Passive Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

For the selected fire areas, the inspectors evaluated the adequacy of fire area barriers, penetration seals, fire doors, electrical raceway fire barriers, and fire rated electrical cables. The inspectors observed the material condition and configuration of the installed barriers, seals, doors, and cables. The inspectors reviewed approved construction details. In addition, the inspectors reviewed license documentation, such as NRC safety evaluation reports, and deviations from NRC regulations and NFPA standards to verify that fire protection features met license commitments.

The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the selected fire areas to observe material condition and the adequacy of design of fire area boundaries (including walls, fire doors, and fire dampers) to ensure they were appropriate for the fire hazards in the area.

The inspectors reviewed the installation, repair, and qualification records for a sample of penetration seals to ensure the fill material was of the appropriate fire rating and that the installation met the engineering design.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.3 Active Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

For the selected fire areas, the inspectors evaluated the adequacy of fire suppression and detection systems. The inspectors observed the material condition and configuration of the installed fire detection and suppression systems. The inspectors reviewed design documents and supporting calculations. In addition, the inspectors reviewed license basis documentation, such as, NRC safety evaluation reports, deviations from NRC regulations, and NFPA standards to verify that fire suppression and detection systems met license commitments.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.4 Protection from Damage from Fire Suppression Activities

a. Inspection Scope

For the selected fire areas, the inspectors verified that redundant trains of systems required for hot shutdown would not be subject to damage from fire suppression activities or from the rupture or inadvertent operation of fire suppression systems including the effects of flooding. The inspectors conducted walkdowns of each of the selected fire areas to assess conditions such as the adequacy and condition of floor drains, equipment elevations, and spray protection.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.5 Alternative Shutdown Capability

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's systems required to achieve alternative safe shutdown to determine if the licensee had properly identified the components and systems necessary to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions. The inspectors also focused on the adequacy of the systems to perform reactor pressure control, reactivity control, reactor coolant makeup, decay heat removal, process monitoring, and support system functions.

The team conducted selected area walkdowns to determine if operators could reasonably be expected to perform the alternate safe shutdown procedure actions and that equipment labeling was consistent with the alternate safe shutdown procedure. The review also looked at operator training as well as consistency between the operations shutdown procedures and any associated administrative controls.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.6 Circuit Analyses

a. Inspection Scope

In accordance with IP 71111.05TTP, "Fire Protection - NFPA 805 Transition Period (Triennial)," issued December 24, 2009, and effective January 1, 2010, this segment of the IP was suspended for facilities in NFPA 805 transition.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.7 Communications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed, on a sample basis, the adequacy of the communication system to support plant personnel in the performance of alternative safe shutdown functions and fire brigade duties. The inspectors verified that plant telephones, page systems, sound powered phones, and radios were available for use and maintained in working order.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.8 Emergency Lighting

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a plant walkdown of selected areas in which a sample of operator actions would be performed in the performance of alternative safe shutdown functions. As part of the walkdowns, the inspectors focused on the existence of sufficient emergency lighting for access and egress to areas and for performing necessary equipment operations. The locations and positioning of the emergency lights were observed during the walkdown and during review of manual actions implemented for the selected fire areas.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.9 Cold Shutdown Repairs

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's procedures to determine whether repairs were required to achieve cold shutdown and to verify that dedicated repair procedures, equipment, and material to accomplish those repairs were available onsite. The inspectors also evaluated whether cold shutdown could be achieved within the required time using the licensee's procedures and repair methods. The inspectors also verified that equipment necessary to perform cold shutdown repairs was available onsite and properly staged.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.10 Compensatory Measures

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted a review to verify that compensatory measures were in place for out-of-service, degraded or inoperable fire protection and post-fire safe shutdown

equipment, systems, or features (e.g., detection and suppression systems, and equipment, passive fire barriers, pumps, valves or electrical devices providing safe shutdown functions or capabilities). The inspectors also conducted a review of the adequacy of short term compensatory measures to compensate for a degraded function or feature until appropriate corrective actions could be taken.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.11 B.5.b Inspection Activities

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee’s preparedness to handle large fires or explosions by reviewing one or more mitigating strategies as identified below. This review ensured that the licensee continued to meet the requirements of their B.5.b related license conditions and 10 CFR 50.54(hh)(2) by determining that:

- Procedures were being maintained and adequate.
- Equipment was properly staged, maintained, and tested.
- Station personnel were knowledgeable and could implement the procedures.
- Additionally, inspectors reviewed the storage, maintenance, and testing of B.5.b related equipment.

The inspectors reviewed the licensee’s B.5.b related license conditions and evaluated selected mitigating strategies to ensure they remain feasible in light of operator training, maintenance/testing of necessary equipment and any plant modifications. In addition, the inspectors reviewed previous inspection reports for commitments made by the licensee to correct deficiencies identified during performance of TI 2515/171 or subsequent performances of these inspections.

The B.5.b mitigating strategies selected for review during this inspection are listed below. The off-site and on-site communications, notifications/ERO activation, initial operational response actions, and damage assessment activities identified in Table A.3-1 are evaluated each time due to the mitigation strategies’ scenario selected.

NEI 06-12, Revision 2, Section	Licensee Strategy (Table)	Selected for Review
3.2.2	Off-Site and On-Site Communications (Table A.3-1)	Evaluated
3.2.3	Notifications/ERO Activation (Table A.3-1)	Evaluated
3.2.4	Initial Operational Response Actions (Table A.3-1)	Evaluated
3.2.5	Initial Damage Assessment (Table A.3-1)	Evaluated

NEI 06-12, Revision 2, Section	Licensee Strategy (Table)	Selected for Review
2.3.1	SFP External Makeup (Table A.2-2)	Selected
3.3.4	Manually Depressurize SGs and Use Portable Pump (Table A.4-4)	Selected

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution (71152)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective action program procedures and samples of corrective action documents to verify that the licensee was identifying issues related to the fire protection program at an appropriate threshold and entering them in the corrective action program. The inspectors reviewed selected samples of condition reports, design packages, and fire protection system non-conformance documents.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA6 Management Meetings

.1 Exit Meeting Summary

On May 14, 2010, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. B. Allen and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The inspectors confirmed that none of the potential report input discussed was considered proprietary.

ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee

B. Allen, Site Vice-President, Davis-Besse
B. Boles, Director, Site Operations
F. Bracken, Davis-Besse Plant Operator, Site Operations
K. Byrd, Manager, Design Engineering
G. Chung, Staff Nuclear Engineer, Nuclear Electrical System Engineering
J. Dominy, Director, Site Maintenance
C. Gilig, Nuclear Shift Manager, Operations Support Staff
D. Hartnett, Nuclear Shift Manager, Nuclear Operations Training
B. Hennessy, Manager, Regulatory Compliance
B. Hovland, Manager, Site Training
D. Imlay, Manager, Site Operations
V. Kaminskas, Director, Site Engineering
M. Murtha, Staff Nuclear Engineer, Nuclear Electrical/Instrumentation and Control Engineering
M. Parker, Manager, Site Protection
V. Patton, Fire Marshal, Site Operations
C. Price, Director, Site Performance Improvement
J. Ross, Nuclear Engineer, Nuclear Electrical/Instrumentation and Control Engineering
A. Stallard, Superintendent, Nuclear Operations
D. Staudt, Senior Consultant, Operations Support Staff
J. Sturdavant, Senior Nuclear Specialist, Regulatory Compliance
E. Szymanski, Davis-Besse Plant Operator, Site Operations
C. Tipton, Senior Nuclear Specialist, Nuclear Operations Training
J. Vetter, Manager, Emergency Response, Site Performance Improvement
G. Wolf, Supervisor, Regulatory Compliance

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

R. Daley, Chief, Division of Reactor Safety, Engineering Branch 3
J. Rutkowski, Senior Resident Inspector
A. Wilson, Resident Inspector

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED

Opened, Closed, and Discussed

None

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

The following is a list of documents reviewed during the inspection. Inclusion on this list does not imply that the NRC inspectors reviewed the documents in their entirety, but rather, that selected sections or portions of the documents were evaluated as part of the overall inspection effort. Inclusion of a document on this list does not imply NRC acceptance of the document or any part of it, unless this is stated in the body of the inspection report.

CALCULATIONS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
C-FP-013.10-008	NFPA 805 Transition Fire PRA Task 6 – Fire-Ignition Frequencies	0
C-EE-013.06-001	Cable Ampacity Derating Due to an Appendix R Fire Barrier	4
FEM-005	Hydraulic Calculations for Room 310/313	3
FEM-012	Hydraulic Calculations for Room 501	3

CONDITION REPORTS (CRs) ISSUED DURING INSPECTION

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
10-75261	DZNPS – Small Fire in Containment – Alloy 600 RCP 1-2 Discharge Interference	April 12, 2010
10-75338	Load Bank Not Seismically Restrained In # 2 Low Voltage Switchgear Room	April 13, 2010
10-75353	Unsecured Cart In A High Voltage Switchgear Room	April 13, 2010
10-75382	NRC Triennial Fire Inspection: DB-OP-02519 Related Task Removed From Task Matrix	April 14, 2010
10-76045	Preventive Maintenance Activity for Main Steam Line Manual Valves NRC TRI-FP	April 28, 2010
10-76172	Multiple Spurious Operations Scenarios Review	April 30, 2010
10-76663	DB-OP-03007 Implementation of FHAR 8.1.2	May 10, 2010
10-76733	NRC FP Triennial Inspection: Testing Not Performed on PRZR Heater Switches	May 12, 2010

CONDITION REPORTS (CRs) REVIEWED DURING INSPECTION

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
06-02759	FP328 Cannot Be Closed	July 8, 2006
07-20261	Vital Area / Appendix 'R' Fire Door Not Latched	May 9, 2007
07-26559	Door 323 Will Not Latch	September 13, 2007
08-32635	Tech Spec Fire Door 328 Will Not Close Properly	January 5, 2008
08-45262	Deficiencies With DB-FP-04004	August 25, 2008
09-56017	Door 320A Not Closing From 1/2 Open and 1/4 Open Positions	March 25, 2009

CONDITION REPORTS (CRs) REVIEWED DURING INSPECTION

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
09-63516	Fire Protection Valve Deficiencies	August 21, 2009
09-68970	Cell Phone Battery Expanded From Being Continuously Charged	December 12, 2009
10-74105	Fire Prot Self-Assessment DB-10-001 Deficiency with Operator Time-Line Eval	March 24, 2010

DRAWINGS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
A-221F	Fire Protection General Floor Plan EL. 545' - 0"	9
A-222F	Fire Protection General Floor Plan EL. 565' - 0"	15
A-223F	Fire Protection General Floor Plan EL. 585' - 0"	21
A-224F	Fire Protection General Floor Plan EL. 585' - 0"	23
A-225F	Fire Protection General Floor Plan EL. 623' - 0"	17
A-226F	Fire Protection General Floor Plan EL. 643' - 0"	13
A-227F	Fire Protection General Roof Plan	4
A-228F	Fire Protection Sections A-A & B-B	2
A-229F	Fire Protection Sections C-C & D-D	5
A-230F	Fire Protection Intake Structure	9
A-231F	Fire Protection Water Treatment Bldg & Diesel Oil Storage Tank & Pump House	3
A-2236	Barrier Penetration Drawing Barrier 325-E Auxiliary Bldg.	1
C-213, Sheet 3	Auxiliary Building Floor Plan EI 585'-0	45
E-892, Sheet 5	Raceway Fire Alarm System Auxiliary Building Plan EL. 585'	8
E-892, Sheet 2	Raceway Fire Alarm System Auxiliary Building Plan EL. 623'	7
M-530-431-8, Sheet 1 of 2	SASS Wiring Loop 1 S.G. 1 Outlet Press	T8
J-102, Sheet 6A	Loop Diagram Steam Generator 1 Start-Up Level (LT-SP9B3)	1
J-102, Sheet 6B	Loop Diagram Steam Generator 1 Start-Up Level (LT-SP9B3)	4
J-102, Sheet 7A	Loop Diagram Steam Generator 2 Start-Up Level (LT-SP9A3)	1
J-102, Sheet 7B	Loop Diagram Steam Generator 2 Start-Up Level (LT-SP9A3)	4
J-102, Sheet 24A	Loop Diagram Pressurizer Level LT-RC14-1, LT-RC14-2 & LT-RC14-3	1
J-102, Sheet 24B	Loop Diagram Pressurizer Level LT-RC14-1, LT-RC14-2 & LT-RC14-3	1

DRAWINGS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
J-102, Sheet 56	Loop Diagram Neutron Flux Monitoring System NF-5874 (Channel 1)	2
J-102, Sheet 57	Loop Diagram Neutron Flux Monitoring System NF-5875 (Channel 2)	3
J-107, Sheet 12	Loop Diagram RC Loop 1 Extended Range Pressure (PT-6365B)	1
J-107, Sheet 14	Loop Diagram RC Loop 1 Extended Range Pressure (PT-6365B)	2

MODIFICATION

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
06-0006-00	Modification to CMU Walls 3167, 3177, and 3187	6

PROCEDURES

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
DBBP-OPS-1013	Control of Time Critical Actions	1
DBBP-TRAN-0034	Davis-Besse Operator Fundamentals Memory List	2
DB-FP-00003	Pre-Fire Plan Guidelines	5
DB-FP-04004	12 Month Valve Cycle	10
DB-FP-04004	12 Month Valve Cycle	10
DB-OP-02501	Abnormal Procedure Serious Station Fire	15
DB-OP-02519	Abnormal Procedure Serious Control Room Fire	16
DB-OP-02600	Abnormal Procedure Operational Contingency Response Action Plan (OUO)	8
NEP 90-08197	Appendix R Radio Communications, Revision 2	July 13, 1990
NOP-OP-1012	Material Readiness and Housekeeping Inspection Program	2
PFP-AB-310	Protected Area Pre-Fire Plan: Passage/Mix Tanks and Hatch Area	4
PFP-AB-312	Protected Area Pre-Fire Plan: Spent Fuel Pool Pump Room	4
PFP-AB-314	Protected Area Pre-Fire Plan: No. 4 Mechanical Penetration Room	7
PFP-AB-324	Protected Area Pre-Fire Plan: Auxiliary Shutdown Panel and Transfer Switch Room	4
PFP-AB-325	Protected Area Pre-Fire Plan: High Voltage Switchgear Room A	4
PFP-AB-500	Protected Area Pre-Fire Plan: Radwaste and Fuel Handling Areas Air Supply Equipment Area	3
PFP-AB-501	Protected Area Pre-Fire Plan: Radwaste Exhaust	3

PROCEDURES

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
PFP-AB-515	Equipment and Main Station Exhaust Fan Room Protected Area Pre-Fire Plan: Purge Exhaust Equipment Room	3
PFP-YD-STRAT	Protected Area Pre-Fire Plan Protected Area Yard Strategy (OUO)	3

REFERENCES

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
05000346 / 2008007(DRS)	Davis-Besse Nuclear Power TI 2515/171 Verification of Site Specific Implementation of B.5.b Phase 2 and 3 Mitigating Strategies Inspection Report	June 18, 2008
FHAR	Davis-Besse Fire Hazards Analysis Report	22
IP 71111.05TTP	Fire Protection – NFPA 805 Transition Period (Triennial)	December 24, 2009
N/A	Fire Protection Surveillances Frequency Engineering Evaluation	November 1995
N/A	NFPA Code Review Compliance Report for NFPA 72 1990	March 20, 1998
N/A	Davis-Besse Unit 1 Time-Line Study for Appendix R Operator Actions	3
NORM-ER-3610	Valve – Manual Operated	3
NRC Letter	Notification to Perform B.5.B Phase 2 and 3 Mitigating Strategies Inspection at Davis - Besse	April 23, 2008
NRC Letter	Notification to Perform A Triennial Fire Protection Baseline Inspection While In Transition To 10 CFR Part 50.48(C) Is In Progress Inspection Report 05000346/2010006(DRS)	January 15, 2010
USAR	Davis-Besse Updated Safety Analysis Report	26

VENDOR DOCUMENTS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
M-255Q-00139-02	Dow Corning Instructions Manual for 3-6548 Silicone RTV Foam	January 1, 1980
M-324AQ-00330	Foxboro Instruction for Current-to-Voltage Converter Models 2AI-I2V, 2AI-I2V-XGB, 2AI-I2V-CGB, 2AI-I2V-FGB, 2AI-I2V-BGA, 2AI-I2V-PGA & 2AI-I2V-YGA Dated 11/1/1978 and Addendum Current to Voltage Converter Dated 11/1/1991	6
M-380Q-00021-06	Gamma-Metrics Instruction Manual for Neutron Flux Monitor with Rack Mount Signal Processor	3

VENDOR DOCUMENTS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
M-536-00118	Bailey Controls Product Instruction for Buffer Module – PT. No. 6624610P	June 1, 1980

WORK ORDERS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Description or Title</u>	<u>Date or Revision</u>
200234914	Supervisory and Functional Test for Node 2	October 28, 2008
200234915	Supervisory and Functional Test for Node 3	February 28, 2008
200234918	Supervisory and Functional Test for Node 6	May 29, 2008
200234921	Supervisory and Functional Test for Node 9	October 16, 2008
200241973	Diesel Fire Pump Flow Test	May 3, 2009
200249318	Supervisory and Functional Test for Node 3	February 3, 2009
200262717	Supervisory and Functional Test for Node 6	May 21, 2009
200282680	Supervisory and Functional Test for Node 9	August 20, 2009
200284925	Supervisory and Functional Test for Node 2	October 27, 2009
200291436	Electric Fire Pump Flow Test	November 17, 2009
200297780	Emergency Lighting System Test	February 22, 2010
200368175	Post Maintenance Visual Inspection of Penetration Seals	April 30, 2009
200407444	Post Maintenance Visual Inspection of Penetration Seals	February 28, 2010
200415880	Essential Heater Bank Control Test	May 13, 2010

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

ADAMS	Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
CMU	Concrete Masonry Unit
CR	Condition Report
DRS	Division of Reactor Safety
ERO	Emergency Response Organization
FHAR	Fire Hazards Analysis Report
FP	Fire Protection
IMC	Inspection Manual Chapter
IP	Inspection Procedure
IR	Inspection Report
NEI	Nuclear Energy Institute
NFPA	National Fire Protection Association
NPF	Nuclear Power Facility
NRC	U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NUREG	NRC Technical Report Designation
OUO	Official Use Only – Security-Related Information
PARS	Publicly Available Records
PRA	Probabilistic Risk Assessment
PRZR	Pressurizer
SDP	Significance Determination Process
SG	Steam Generator
SFP	Spent Fuel Pool
TI	Temporary Instruction
USAR	Updated Safety Analysis Report

B. Allen

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Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/
Robert C. Daley, Chief
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