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Florida Power & Light Company, 700 Universe Boulevard, P.O. Box 14000, Juno Beach, FL 33408-0420

TOTAL # of pages
Including this cover = (3)

5/25/10

3/26/2010
75FR 14643

(1)

TO: Michael T. Lesar
FAX # 301-492-3446

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2010 MAY 25 PM 5:33

RULES AND DIRECTIVES
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Chief, Rulemaking and Directives
Branch (RDB)

FROM: ALISON BROWN

FLORIDA POWER + LIGHT CO.
(Phone:) 561-694-3673 (FAX:) 561-694-6274

SUBJECT: Request for Comments -
RE: BTP 7-19

NOTE: Hardcopy Original is being mailed
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SONSI Review Complete
Template = ADM-013
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FRIDS = ADM-03
Add = S. Burrows (sabr)



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MAY 25 2010

L-2010-101

Michael T. Lesar,
Chief, Rulemaking and Directives Branch (RDB)
Division of Administration Services
Office of Administration
Mail Stop: TWB-05-B01M
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Subject: NRC Docket ID 2010-0138 - Request for Public Comments,
Branch Technical Position (BTP) 7-19: Guidance for Evaluation of Diversity and
Defense-in-Depth in Digital Computer-Based Instrumentation and Control Systems

In a March 26, 2010, Federal Register Notice (75FR14643), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requested public comments on proposed NUREG-0800, "Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants," Branch Technical Position (BTP) 7-19, "Guidance for Evaluation of Diversity and Defense-in-Depth in Digital Computer-based Instrumentation and Control Systems."

Florida Power and Light Company, the licensee for the St. Lucie Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, and the Turkey Point Nuclear Plant, Units 3 and 4 (hereafter referred to as FPL) and its FPL Group affiliates, NextEra Energy Seabrook, LLC (NextEra Energy Seabrook) the licensee for Seabrook Station; NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC (NextEra Energy Duane Arnold), the licensee for Duane Arnold Energy Center (DAEC); and NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC (NextEra Energy Point Beach), the licensee for Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 (hereafter referred to collectively as NextEra Energy) hereby submit the following comments on the above listed document contained in NRC Docket ID 2010-0138. The response is provided as an attachment to this letter. FPL and NextEra Energy also endorse the comments transmitted by the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI).

Please contact me at (561) 691-2798 if there are questions concerning these comments.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Larry Nicholson', is written over a white background.

Larry Nicholson
Director of Licensing

Attachment

Florida Power & Light Company and NextEra Energy

Comments on Branch Technical Position (BTP) 7-19: Guidance for Evaluation of Diversity and Defense-in-Depth in Digital Computer-Based Instrumentation and Control Systems

ID	Section, Page, and Line #	Comment
1	Section 1.5, Page BTP 7-19-7	Point 3 does <u>not</u> state there be a diverse backup means for the automated safety-related RPS. Point 3 is in regard to functions, not the entire system and allows for not necessarily the same functions to achieve adequate protection. The linking of Point 3 for CCF and IEEE 603 requirements for manual actuation in this paragraph implies if not specifies that a diverse system be available doing all of the RPS actuation functions, and this should not be a requirement. It is possible that manual actuation at the division level be an input to a digital protection system, and in the event of a CCF in the protection system the manual actuation of components in circuits not subject to the CCF can be shown to achieve adequate protection. The manual actuation of a division that is input to a digital protection system bypasses field sensor and I/O failures, logic associated with coincidence of conditions to actuate, and allows the operator to take action in response to visual indications. A CCF that would disable both the automatic function and the manual division level actuation could be dealt with using manual actions at the component level, or at a level that would actuate multiple functions but a subset of the RPS functions.
2	Section 3.1 (4) , Page BTP 7-19-11	This section attempts to and should not link CCF to control and protection system interaction (specifically ESFAS is targeted). Control and protection system interaction is a protection system design requirement based in single failure criteria. CCF is not a single failure. If shared sensors for protection and control cannot cause an event and disable the required protection function assuming a single failure, then there is no difference to a postulated CCF.
3	Section 3.1 (8) a)	Division level actuation by independent and diverse means may not be required if in the event of a CCF, adequate protection can be provided by functions not affected by the CCF or manual actions at the component level.